

Gender wage inequality in inclusive and exclusive industrial relations systems: a comparison of Argentina and Chile

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Drawing on an empirical and comparative mixed methods analysis of Argentina and Chile, this article investigates arguments about the role of ‘inclusive’ versus ‘exclusive’ industrial relations systems in promoting gender wage equity and enabling attractive wage returns to women investing in higher education. Our findings confirm the importance of Argentina’s inclusive industrial relations system in narrowing gender pay differences to a greater extent than Chile. Nevertheless, Chile’s industrial relations institutions are not wholly exclusive; its high-level statutory minimum wage has played a strongly distributive role in the 2000s and compressed wages in the lower half of the wage distribution. Also notable is the finding from quantile regression that highly educated women in high-paid jobs enjoy a larger wage premium in the class-equal Argentina than in Chile despite a far wider wage gap between low/high-educated workers in Chile overall.

Key words: Gender pay equity; Industrial relations; Latin America; College education
JEL Classification: J31

1. Introduction

Despite considerable progress in the promotion of equal opportunities for women, sex discrimination in pay and employment still disadvantages women’s labour market prospects, and this in turn hinders a country’s economic development and social progress more generally. Given far-reaching shifts in the character of women’s labour supply (especially increased years of education and greater employment continuity), analyses of persistent gender pay inequality have for some years looked beyond human capital accounts (e.g. [Humphries, 1995](#); [Karamessini and Ioakimoglou, 2007](#)). Two lines of analysis have proven particularly valuable for our understanding of trends and country patterns of gender pay gaps both because they widen the analysis to include ostensibly non-gender-specific causal factors and because they shift attention to the character of labour market demand.

The first is that gender wage inequality is tightly inter-connected with both the shape of the overall wage distribution and with women’s and men’s representation at different points of the distribution ([Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1997](#)). Comparative studies reveal patterns of ‘complex inequality’ arising from gender stratification by class

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position (as well as race), such that the effects of an unequal wage structure by level of education depends also on women's representation at different education levels, the wage penalty associated with a low education level and the wage penalty of being a woman, all three of which may vary (Bernhardt *et al.*, 1995; Mandel and Shalev, 2009A). The second line of analysis is that industrial relations institutions affect gender wage inequality independently of gender differences in education. Research suggests more 'inclusive' industrial relations systems (higher union density, higher collective bargaining coverage and universal low-wage protection) act to narrow the gender pay gap (e.g. Whitehouse, 1992; Kidd and Shannon, 1996; Blau and Kahn, 2003). However, certain combinations of institutions may generate ambiguous effects: what are the gender pay equity effects, for example, of a 'hybrid' system described by a high statutory minimum wage and weak collective bargaining coverage? Moreover, there are inter-connections between these two lines of analysis. Low-educated women are expected to enjoy an advantage in countries with a more equal wage structure, which in turn is associated with inclusive industrial relations institutions, whilst highly educated women may benefit more in exclusive systems by accessing higher wage returns to education (Mandel and Shalev, 2009B).

Building on these two lines of analysis, this article interrogates the complex inter-linkages between gender wage inequality, wage structure (especially related to the reward to education) and industrial relations institutions. The labour market and equal pay policy contexts of Argentina and Chile provide a valuable testing ground for several reasons. Chile has a wider gender pay gap and a higher level of wage inequality than Argentina. Nevertheless, during 2000–2009 both countries witnessed a fall in wage inequality and a rise in women's employment participation at all points of the wage structure. Also, education levels increased amongst men and especially women, yet unlike the experience of the USA or the UK, Argentina and Chile register falling wage returns to education for men and women. With regards to industrial relations, Argentina and Chile are distinctive and can broadly be classified as near to the opposite poles of the inclusive–exclusive continuum, albeit with interesting hybrid features. Finally, the legacy of equal pay policies is quite distinctive: Argentina implemented legislation in line with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards to combat unequal pay between men and women in 1973, whilst comparable legislation was only introduced in Chile in 2009 (thanks to the so-called Bachelet effect; see Franceschet, 2010; Stevenson, 2012).

The article begins by reviewing economic and sociological analyses of the gender wage gap to set out the influence of earnings differences at various levels of the wage distribution and by educational level. It then distinguishes different features of a country's wage-setting institutions and reviews the empirical evidence for their multi-layered effects on gender wage inequality. Section 3 describes the research method and data, specifically the use of national household surveys for quantile regression analysis and data on wage-setting institutions for Argentina and Chile. The findings, presented in the following three sections, confirm that the character of wage-setting institutions has shaped the trends and inter-country patterns of gender wage inequality. However, the patterns of rewards to education only partially align with the anticipated results using the inclusive–exclusive criteria. The evidence suggests that exclusive industrial relations institutions may on the one hand increase opportunities for higher wage returns, but on the other hand close them down through a greater risk of sex discrimination against highly educated women.

2. Explaining gender wage inequality

2.1 Wage structures, education and the gender wage gap

Women in many countries have increased their employment participation and levels of education, but their relative wage gains have tended to be offset by rising wage inequality. Men have benefitted more than women because of women's over-representation in the lower tail of the wage distribution. In the USA, growing wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s is estimated to have lessened the actual narrowing of the average gender pay gap by around one quarter (Blau and Kahn, 1997). However, this reflected a stark polarisation in men's earnings from the beginning of the 1970s, with increases at the top and falls at the bottom. These trends had different impacts on women's relative pay at varying points of the distribution, indicating that the causes underlying changes across the full distribution of women's earnings need interrogation.

Bernhardt *et al.*'s (1995) original analysis found that rising inequality in male earnings in the USA in fact contributed to the lowest pay segment for women moving towards the middle of the overall wage distribution. Wage inequality amongst women also increased resulting in higher female representation amongst the upper wage deciles of the overall wage distribution. This rising inequality amongst women, however, did not have the expected detrimental effect on women's relative position at the bottom of the overall wage distribution due to the even greater polarisation trend in men's earnings (Bernhardt *et al.*, 1995, pp 319–21). At the same time, women and men may both experience a dampening effect on wages arising from factors associated with what McCall (2000) calls a 'deinstitutionalised labour market'—joblessness, casualisation and immigration. These factors are likely to affect women more than men because women are over-represented in the lower tail of the wage distribution (McCall, 2000, p 251).

Increased education, now higher amongst women than amongst men in many countries, has played a major role in narrowing the average gender wage gap. Recognition of this change in female labour supply has also led to more research on variations in wage trends amongst groups of women, instead of treating women and men as two separate homogeneous groups. For many commentators, expanding the pool of women workers who can expect to benefit from a higher education wage premium is an obvious remedy which should narrow the gender pay gap. As employers demand more skilled labour, skill premiums have increased and long-standing patterns of sex discrimination in many occupations and industries have diminished (Berg and Kalleberg, 2001). For the USA, McCall (2000) finds that women enjoy around the same college wage premium as men (around 1.64), and in fact it is higher once part-time workers and younger workers (aged 18–24) are excluded.

However, these changing gender patterns of higher education and wage premiums have also contributed to new patterns of inequality both amongst and between male and female workers. At the same time, according to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the gender pay gap is usually greater for high-educated women than for low-educated women, as the former face more sex segregation within better paid jobs in the private sector; although in more class-equal societies, variation in the gender pay gap by level of education is likely to be less (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Evertsson *et al.*, 2009;). Gender bias in returns to education may be high for a variety of reasons: employers may discriminate against women where large investments in training and skill development are required; managers may subject women with dependent

children to impossible working-time demands (e.g. long and/or unpredictable hours); and women may face restricted promotion possibilities at middle and upper rungs of the corporate job ladder (Hoobler *et al.*, 2010).

2.2 *Industrial relations institutions and the gender pay gap*

Industrial relations institutions influence labour market outcomes. Those outcomes of relevance to this article are the wage structure, changes in returns to education and gender pay equity. Specific industrial relations institutions of interest include trade union membership, coverage of collective bargaining, the degree of centralisation and co-ordination, the role of the state in extending wage agreements, equal pay legislation and the character of minimum wages. We know that wage compression tends to be greater in countries where union density and collective bargaining coverage are high, and bargaining is co-ordinated and/or centralised (Blau and Kahn, 1999, 2002; Marshall, 1999; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002). Similarly, there is evidence of a direct relationship between high bargaining coverage rates and a smaller gender pay gap, both in Europe (Ruberly and Fagan, 1994; EC, 2008) and Argentina (Trajtemberg, 2008). Overall, wage-setting approaches that are more consensus-led, transparent, centralised and co-ordinated tend to establish the conditions which can underpin improved gender wage equity in the labour market.

Industrial relation institutions can make a significant contribution to gender pay equity, especially where men and women are equally represented across sectors and can share similar pay outcomes. In situations where women are more concentrated in women-dominated sectors, such as care or retail, there is a risk that segmented patterns of collective bargaining may result in women receiving lower wage rates than those negotiated in male-dominated sectors (Grimshaw, 2010). Therefore, inclusive industrial relations institutions (providing wide coverage of collective pay agreements in combination with a relatively high-level, statutory national minimum wage) can correct for the otherwise uneven bargaining strengths of workers in low-wage, sex-segregated jobs and contribute positively to gender pay equity (Blau and Kahn, 1992; Ruberly *et al.*, 2005; Hayter and Weinberg, 2011). Much of the institutional effect occurs by compressing wages in the middle and raising the wage floor. As such, the presence of a statutory national minimum wage and its value relative to the median wage (the so-called Kaitz index) is potentially significant, especially when combined with a strong trade union movement and centralised wage-setting system. Indeed, these institutions tend to be complementary: ‘if statutory minimum wages exist, the presence of unions and centralised wage bargaining tends to increase the ratio of minimum wages to average wages’ (EC, 2008, p 79). There tends to be a strong and positive relationship between high minimum wages (high Kaitz index) and gender pay equity. Furthermore, countries that combine a high national minimum wage and high collective bargaining coverage tend to have relatively narrow gender pay gaps.

Several studies confirm these general claims for the case of Latin America. In their study of 19 Latin American countries, Kristensen and Cunningham (2006) find that rises in statutory minimum wages during 1997–2001 produced an equalising effect by raising wages at the bottom of the distribution; the positive effect is confirmed for the 2002–7 period in a subsequent study by Cornia (2010). In Argentina, Rojo and Tumini (2009) show that the gender pay gap significantly diminished during 2004–7 in those occupations or sectors where median earnings were close to the level of the

national minimum wage, such as education, health, hospitality and retail. The positive minimum wage effect corresponds with women's over-representation amongst minimum wage earners (also in Chile) (Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006).

3. Research design: data, methods and questions

In light of the preceding literature review, this article explores the inter-relationships between wage structures, industrial relations institutions and patterns of gender wage inequality in Argentina and Chile. As a result, we designed the following research questions and propositions.

Research Question 1: What impact do the industrial relations institutions of Argentina and Chile have on gender pay equity?

Proposition 1: Inclusive (exclusive) industrial relations systems are associated with relatively compressed (dispersed) wage structures and narrow (wide) gender pay gaps.

Research Question 2: What is the relative position of highly educated women in the wage structure, and how do particular industrial relations institutions explain the variation between countries?

Proposition 2: High-educated women situated in the upper half of the wage structure are better off relative to men in an exclusive-type model than in an inclusive model.

Two types of data underpin the research design. The first are earnings data derived from each country's national household survey—Permanent Household Survey (EPH) for Argentina and National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN) for Chile. The two surveys are, as far as possible, harmonised between countries to improve comparability. For both countries we examine four years of cross-sectional data, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. Choice of time period is always difficult. For the Argentinian data, changes in the household survey in 2003 limit comparability with preceding years.¹ Also, the selection of 2000 as our starting point, although useful from the point of view of capturing a relatively similar starting point in both countries (both had suffered a decline in GDP during 1999 but then relative stability during 2000), was soon followed by very different economic fortunes, with the debt crisis in Argentina taking it to a level of GDP per capita below Chile, from which it has not recovered despite steady growth in both countries since then. This considerable shock to the Argentine economy needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the data trends.

Both survey samples include salaried employees on a full- and part-time basis and limit the age range to 25–60 years old. Excluded from the sample are individuals classified as informal sector workers (defined as not registered as making pension contributions) on the basis that the industrial relations system analysed herein is applicable

¹ Significant changes to the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) in Argentina were introduced in 2003, when data started to be collected more continuously following a panel sampling method. This means that data for 2000 are not fully comparable with the years 2003 onwards. However, for the purpose of analysing wage patterns prior to the 2001 crisis, it is important to make reference to the data for 2000. Given that the information used for this study considers raw data from variables such as income of main occupation, demographic data and type of education amongst others, it was not affected by changes in variables related to the categorisation of employment status. The most significant changes that may reduce the degree of comparability over time relate to the sample. In particular, the periodicity that the sample is taken (from two to four times per year), the length of the observation window and the size of the sample. Other publications also report trend data that straddle 2003 (see, for example, Beccaria *et al.*, 2005; Groisman 2013).

mainly to formal sector employees. It is worth noting that this does generate a potential difficulty in making the inter-country comparison because the share of workers in the informal sector is estimated to be significantly larger in Argentina than in Chile (53% and 36%, OECD, 2009), albeit with many difficulties of generating reliable estimates. As such, it is possible that the observable bottom decile wage in Argentina's formal sector is higher up the wage distribution than it would otherwise be with a smaller share of the workforce in the informal sector. A degree of caution in interpreting and comparing the results is therefore warranted. Also excluded from the sample are individuals who are categorised as self-employed, working in the armed forces or unpaid workers in a family business and those who are not salaried.

Observations with missing data on any of the variables of interest were excluded from the regression analysis. The total number of observations per year and country are reported in Table 1. The data cover a set of demographic, human capital and work-related characteristic variables. The variables used to run the regression analysis are categorised as follows:

- Dependent variable: hourly wages of main occupation
- Independent variables:
 - Human capital: age, education (university, technical, secondary, and no or incomplete secondary)
 - Family factors: responsibility for children under 10 years old and marital status
 - Job characteristics: firm size, occupation, industry, private or public organisation, working time, permanent or temporary work

To construct a sample that was more representative of the general population, two main decisions were made to exclude outliers: to limit the number of hours worked per week to between 10 and 80; and to exclude earnings with values lower than the 1st percentile and greater than the 99th percentile.

The second type of data involves a classification of the institutional characteristics of each country's industrial relations system. Following the framework suggested in previous studies (especially Marshall, 1999), our analysis draws on a part quantitative, part qualitative characterisation of key institutional features: trade union density; employer membership of collective associations; level, coverage and degree of collective

Table 1. *Number of observations per year and by country*

Year	Argentina			Chile		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
2000	10,454	7,483	17,937	20,146	9,610	29,756
2003	5,230	3,962	9,192	21,098	11,001	32,099
2006	15,944	11,697	27,641	24,486	13,004	37,490
2009	19,100	14,589	33,689	21,194	12,328	33,522

Source: Sample number from Household Permanent Survey (EPH) for Argentina and National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN) for Chile.

Notes: Observations represent individual cases from the sample; an expansion factor or weight is applied to each observation in the descriptive statistics to represent the overall population.

bargaining; presence of tripartite bodies in wage-setting; form of state intervention; and character of minimum wage system. The data derive from a mix of primary sources (21 semi-structured interviews with labour market specialists, trade union officials and government policy makers) and secondary sources, including relevant academic studies and reports and data issued by the two governments.

The chosen methods of data analysis are also mixed. Drawing on the two household surveys, we present descriptive statistical portraits to present the key features of wage structures and gender gaps over time and at different points of the wage distribution. The aim is to compare not only wages across the wage structure and between countries but also the main differences by educational level. Then we apply a quantile regression method to analyse differences across the wage distribution. The analysis is based on an estimation of several wage equations for women and men in Argentina and Chile, which relate the logarithm of the wage per hour of a worker i (w_i) with a set of exogenous covariates (x_i). Since we are interested in both the effect of these covariates on the mean value of the wages and the whole distribution of wages, we use the quantile regression method (Buchinsky, 1998; Koenker and Hallock, 2001). This method allows us to identify the effect of the specific employment factors and personal characteristics that have most influence at different levels of the wage distribution; that is, the impact of x on the θ th quantile of the distribution. The Appendix provides details of the quantile regression technique and the procedures adopted to reduce the risk of selection bias.

With respect to the dependent variable (wages), the natural logarithm was applied to hourly pay to transform the distribution from a right-skewed to a normal curve. Hourly wages have been corrected for each country's inflation measure² and standardised using USD exchange rates in November 2009. An advantage of applying the natural logarithm of wages is that the exponentiated regression coefficient ($100*(e^b - 1)$) can be understood as the percentage change in hourly wages for every unit change in the independent variable (Prince-Cooke, 2011, 2012).³ Furthermore, the original coefficients, significance levels and standard errors for 2009 are displayed in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for Argentina and Chile, respectively, as well as in Appendix Tables A3 and A4 for 2000.

4. The industrial relations context: inclusive and exclusive wage-setting institutions

Table 2 summarises the key institutional features of each country's industrial relations model. Overall, the characterisation points to a relatively inclusive model for Argentina and an exclusive type for Chile, as characterised in Section 1. Moreover, building on Hassel's (2006) categorisation of government responses to labour market challenges, Argentina fits the 'institutional or corporatist' category, whereby the

² Since there is controversy over the official inflation figures for Argentina, we use an alternative consumer price index of nine provinces (IPC-9) elaborated by the research centre CIFRA.

³ The variance in percentage is in a given percentile only, meaning that the same variation effect in the 25th and 75th percentile will indicate a higher hourly wage variation at the 75th percentile, as the hourly wage rate at that percentile is higher than at the 25th percentile. For instance, the dummy variable of university education for women at the 25th and 75th percentiles in Table 3 has values of 0.44 and 0.63, respectively. Applying the exponential rule to transform the natural log we have $100*(e^{0.39} - 1)$ and $100*(e^{0.46} - 1)$, meaning a 55% and 88% premium in hourly wages for high-skilled women relative to low-educated ones, at the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively.

Table 2. *Wage-setting institutions in Argentina and Chile, 2010–2011*

	Argentina: relatively inclusive	Chile: relatively exclusive
Unionisation rate	Medium levels of unionisation reflected in 37% of union density in 2008.	Low levels of unionisation, mainly in large firms. Reached 11.9% of union density in 2011.
Employer membership of collective bodies*	11 employer chambers or confederations participate directly or indirectly in national minimum wage negotiations. These and many others participate in sector-wide or occupational-wide collective bargaining.	Employers' associations do not participate as a body in collective bargaining.
Right to strike	Permissive: State defines the legality of strikes.	Restrictive: substitution of strikers is explicitly allowed. The strike process is highly regulated.
Collective bargaining coverage*	High coverage of collective agreements (85% in 2008).	Low collective bargaining coverage (9.8% in 2011).
Bargaining level	Hybrid. Presence of firm-level bargaining, but predominance of industry-wide collective bargaining (higher worker coverage than firm-level unions).	Decentralised: most unions at the firm-level. National unions have low influence in collective bargaining.
Co-ordination*	Co-ordinated bargaining by peak organisations at the industry-wide level, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules.	Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations.
Tripartite bodies	Established body that operates to bargain minimum wage increases on an annual basis.	Ephemeral influence. Acts non-regularly as a consultative body only for minimum wage setting.
State wage interventions*	The government exerts strong influence on minimum wage negotiations and also moderates sector agreements in case of union-employer disagreements.	Medium. The executive proposes to congress annually minimum wage increase and the congress decides independently. No intervention on industry disputes.
Minimum wage*	Works as a wage distributive tool, although sector agreements include their own wage floors. High involvement of a tripartite body to define regular increases. High Kaitz index.	Main wage distributive tool. Low participation and incidence from unions and employers' associations. Very high Kaitz index.

Source: Institutional categories adapted from Marshall (1999), except those indicated by an asterisk, which were elaborated by the authors.

government embraces a centralised system of trade union organisation as governance partners, in exchange for industrial relations peace and wage moderation. Chile, by contrast, fits the ‘market response or pluralist’ category, since its government makes only limited efforts at supporting trade unions, the labour market is highly deregulated and trade unions are fragmented and excluded from substantive political influence over economic policy.

Argentina and Chile exhibit contrasting realities in union membership. Argentina is perhaps one of the few countries in the world that has witnessed a return of unions to a scheme of traditional corporatist power (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). The new deeper involvement of social partners in the national political arena has meant a revival of its past tradition of what Katz *et al.* (2004) call ‘corporatist policy-making coordination’ resulting from the government’s active promotion of social dialogue since 2003 and expansion of collective bargaining (Sénen González, 2011). Data for 2008 suggest union density in Argentina was 37% (EIL Survey). By contrast, union density in Chile has remained low in recent years, at just 12% in 2010 (National Employment Survey). Following the restitution of the Chilean democratic government in 1990, new labour reforms were implemented to fully guarantee workers’ union rights and collective bargaining rights at the sectoral level. However, the Labour Code (the body of legislation that underpins worker rights) has retained a strongly pro-capital form of flexibility that has contributed to the low level of unionisation. With respect to the right to strike, the two countries differ significantly. Whilst the Argentinean system is more permissive, in Chile the right is undermined both by the ability of employers to substitute workers on strike and by highly regulated and restricted strike procedures.

In relation to collective bargaining, Argentina displays a relatively inclusive model with a hybrid articulated structure of industry and firm-level collective bargaining that enjoys high coverage, whereas Chile is characterised by a decentralised, fragmented bargaining structure at the firm-level and low coverage (Table 2). In Argentina, three layers of legally binding regulations shape the employment relationship. In order of decreasing importance these are the workers’ statute and other general laws that determine the framework for collective bargaining and labour relations, the centralised collective bargaining process at the industry or occupational level and provisions for firm-level agreements, which must build on the other binding regulations (Mondino and Montoya, 2004). Indeed, new legislation in 2004 granted supremacy to bargaining agreements at the higher level over the lower one (Palomino and Trajtenberg, 2007). Therefore, Argentina is characterised by a multi-level system of collective bargaining, strongly influenced by wage bargaining at the industry or occupational level.

Proof of the importance of Argentina’s trade union movement and the strength of its wage-setting system is the significant increase in number of collective agreements negotiated since 2004 (Figure 1). Moreover, Argentina has witnessed an increasing collective bargaining coverage rate—up to 85% in 2010. The number of workers covered by collective agreements in the private sector increased from 3 to 5 million between 2003 and 2010 (Berasueta *et al.*, 2010). Despite the fact that firm-level bargaining represents approximately three quarters of all the agreements signed in 2010, collective bargaining at the industry/occupation level covers 9 out of 10 workers whose pay is covered by collective agreement, which reflects a relatively centralised, industry-level system (MTEySS, 2010).




Fig. 1. *The number of collective bargaining agreements and covenants at the firm and sector/occupation level in Argentina, 1991–2010*

Source: Undersecretary of Technical Programming and Labour Studies (MTEySS).

Notes: A covenant is a binding clause that modifies only one or a few aspects of a full collective agreement, usually related to wage floors or wage increases.

In Chile, low union density of 14% combines with very low coverage of collective agreements of just 10% in 2011 (Dirección-Trabajo, 2012), down from a peak of 14% in 1992 (Salinero, 2006). Collective bargaining takes place at the firm level as a bipartite arrangement, between union(s) and the employer(s), who have a high degree of autonomy to settle their disputes. The twin processes of collective bargaining and conflict resolution are regulated in detail in the Labour Code, although the bargaining parties are granted considerable autonomy in the negotiation process.⁴ The labour law favours union pluralism, which means that several unions can co-exist in an establishment and negotiate separate agreements with the employer. New labour reforms in 1991 introduced multi-employer bargaining and legislated for the formation of national trade union groups (Federation, Confederation or Union Central). Thus, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) became the main union for worker representation. Nevertheless, firm-level bargaining continues to be the main form of negotiation for several reasons: multi-employer bargaining is held back by the reluctance of employers to join employer associations (Salinero, 2006) and the Labour Code continues to protect firm-level bargaining as the main form of collective bargaining, as well as imposing significant restrictions on the right to strike.

As might be anticipated, the degree to which wage-setting institutions are co-ordinated, formally or informally, also differs between the two countries. Alongside its more centralised wage-setting system, Argentina enjoys a strongly coordinated set of institutions, which, with some similarity with descriptions of France (Gautié, 2010),

⁴ There is also the possibility of an unregulated bargaining process, which can be conducted if there is a mutual agreement between the parties involved. Nevertheless, the negotiating group and its represented workers do not have the right to strike.

involves articulation by the state, which sponsors social pacts and tripartite agreements and has the capacity to intervene in case of disagreements between employers and labour. Indeed, the increasing centralisation and co-ordination of collective bargaining in Argentina diverges from international trends (Palomino and Trajtenberg, 2007). Key referent agreements include those negotiated by the tripartite body that sets the minimum wage increases on an annual basis (Marshall, 2000),⁵ as long as the wage increase rate exceeds the inflation rate. A further key agreement is that negotiated by the truck drivers' union, largely because of their recognised national bargaining strength and because its leader was at the time the same person who led the official nation-wide Argentinian union (Central General de Trabajadores, CGT). In Chile, by contrast, there is very limited formal inter-connectedness between different collective bargaining units, and the lack of participation of employers' associations in the wage-setting process contributes to undermine the general influence of collective bargaining institutions over wage developments. Despite the fact that the Chilean collective bargaining system is framed in a highly legalistic process, the state cannot be considered interventionist, as it enables full autonomy of both employers and workers. State intervention is restricted to policy level, through tripartite national consultation, involving setting legislation for trade union organisation, shaping the collective bargaining process (including conciliation) and developing social security reforms (Edwards and Lustig, 1997). A tripartite consultation agreement was reached in 1990 between the government, the peak union confederation (CUT) and the employers' Confederation of Production and Commerce, which acknowledged the significance of social dialogue. This agreement, which brought together discussions from different institutional bodies, was instrumental in shaping developments of labour policy, including adjustments of the national minimum wage.

Indeed, both countries have a statutory national minimum wage, and it is perhaps surprising to find that it is set at a relatively high level in both countries and increased significantly during the 2000s (Figure 2). However, the institutional processes and roles of social actors differ. In Argentina, there is a tripartite body to monitor and fix the statutory minimum wage, involving representatives from government, the two main trade unions (CGT and CTA) and nine national employers' associations. Since 2004, this body has bargained annual increases in the minimum wage and implemented especially large rises in 2004 and 2005, which were higher than average industrial wage growth (Marshall, 2010). As a result, average monthly wage rates (floors) of unskilled industrial workers was 1.4 times the minimum wage in 2003, yet had converged by late 2005. Since 2006, statutory minimum wage increases ranged between 16% and 20% (2006–8) and reached 25% in 2011.

In Chile, despite its new tripartite agreement (already described), it is the government that commands most influence in setting the minimum wage with the tripartite body only given consultation rights. Moreover, the influence of the tripartite body has been questionable and irregular—in only just over half (55%) of the occasions between 1991 and 2010 has consultation taken place (Fundación Sol, 2011), much like the situation in Hungary where tripartite arrangements are often set aside in favour of unilateral government authority (Köllő, 2010). Nevertheless, in a context of very low union membership and low collective bargaining coverage, the statutory minimum wage exerts a significant impact on the wage distribution. Its Kaitz index is higher than

⁵ Personal communication with the author confirming this pattern until 2013.




Fig. 2. The Kaitz index relative to median earnings in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

Note: The sample corresponds to the salaried workforce (see Section 3).

in Argentina and, in fact, is one of the highest in the OECD; out of 28 countries Chile scores second place with a Kaitz index value of 0.67 after Turkey (0.71) and above France (0.60).⁶ The remarkable recovery of the minimum wage dates back to 1988, when regular real annual increases began. A 1992 agreement indexed the minimum wage to a formula consisting of inflation and productivity and during 1995–2000 an equity index⁷ was added to this formula (Fundación Sol, 2011).

5. Findings I: gender wage inequality across the wage distribution

This section draws on an original analysis of the national household survey data available for each country. We begin by assessing the overall shape of the wage structure and the gender pay gap in each country and explore the association with industrial relations institutions (Research Question 1). We then assess the relative position of highly educated women in the wage structures of each country whilst again referring to industrial relations institutions as possible explanatory factors (Research Question 2).

5.1 Wage structure and the gender pay gap

Figure 3 shows the respective patterns and trends in wage inequality in Argentina and Chile drawing on an original analysis of male and female earnings estimated from the respective household survey data. The figure plots three general indicators to display an overall wage inequality indicator ($p90/p10$ ratio), a measure of lower tail inequality ($p50/p10$ ratio) and a measure of upper tail wage inequality ($p90/p50$ ratio).

⁶ OECD minimum wage database (www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm#minwage, accessed October 2013). Expressed relative to average earnings instead of median earnings, the position of Chile falls down the international ranking to joint sixth, which supports our findings (Section 5) of considerable compression in the bottom half of Chile's wage structure and more inequality in the upper tail, since this causes a large gap between median and average earnings.

⁷ The equity formula set real increases (after inflation) of 3.8% per year.




Fig. 3. Wage inequality by decile ratios and gender in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

A first key finding is that Argentina scores lower on measures of the overall level of wage inequality than Chile. This fits with our expectations that more inclusive industrial relations systems tend to be associated with less unequal wage structures. For men, the inter-decile ratios in 2009 were 3.8 in Argentina and 4.5 in Chile, and for women 4.0 and 4.9, respectively. Moreover, Argentina registers a similar value for the bottom and upper tail wage inequality indicators, signifying a relatively equal wage distribution from the median to both upper and lower ends. Chile, by contrast, combines a compressed distribution in the lower half with a significantly wider level of inequality (for men and women) in the upper half of the wage distribution.

Two further findings point to a more nuanced set of results and caution against an overly simplistic mapping of a country's institutional form and its wage structure. First, both countries register a similar trend during 2000–2009 of decreasing wage inequality, especially amongst men. Given the radical shift to a more centralised and consensus-led wage-setting system in Argentina, coupled with the observed increase in collective bargaining agreements and coverage, we expected a far more significant compression of wages in Argentina than in Chile. The explanation relates to a second finding, which is that compared to Argentina, the wage at the bottom decile (p10) in Chile has increased to a higher level and at a faster rate relative to the median wage (p50). This is an unexpected result, as the higher profile and activity of unions in Argentina ought to have raised the relative level of the wage floor more so than in Chile. Nevertheless, we saw already that the Kaitz index is significantly higher in Chile than in Argentina. One way to infer the influence of the minimum wage on the bottom

tail of the wage distribution is to correlate the Kaitz index value with the p50/p10 ratio over the years. The Chilean data suggest there is a positive relation and a high level of correlation of 0.88 between the two ratios.

With respect to the gender effects, although women are usually expected to benefit more than men from the wage compressing effect of a rising minimum wage, here we find that men benefit as much as women (if not more in the case of Argentina) from a decreasing p50/p10 ratio in the context of a rising minimum wage (Figure 3). This is largely because the concentrations of women compared to men amongst the bottom two deciles is not as differentiated as the case in other international studies: in Argentina men's and women's concentrations are 6.9% and 7.1%, respectively, and in Chile 10% and 15%, respectively (2009 data).

The kernel distributions shown in Figure 4 reveal a significant flattening in Argentina's overall wage distribution during 2000–2009 in keeping with our observation of wage compression: the upper tail is more extended and the concentration (density) of workers at the peak (or mode) of the distribution has reduced. A notable feature of the change in Chile's wage distribution during 2000–2009 is the shifting of women's wage distribution to the left of men's, suggestive, as we now show, of a widening gender pay gap.

We expect Argentina's more inclusive industrial relations system and compressed wage structure, compared to Chile, to deliver a smaller average gender pay gap (Proposition 1). Data from 2000 and 2009 confirm our expectations: in 2009, women




Fig. 4. Kernel distributions of hourly wages by gender in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

workers in Argentina earned 106% of men’s earnings at the median wage (which confirms other evidence of a ‘reverse gender wage gap’, *Atal et al., 2009*, p 64), whils in Chile the comparable estimate is 93% (*Figure 5*). It appears, therefore, that higher bargaining coverage and stronger co-ordination and centralisation of Argentina’s wage-setting system is associated with a more favourable gender pay gap than in Chile. Also, in line with the gradual compression of the inter-decile measure of wage inequality in both countries during 2000–2009, we anticipated a reduction in the gender pay gap in both countries. This was not confirmed by our data; the gender pay gap at the median and most other points of the wage distribution for both countries is not as favourable for women in 2009 as it was in 2000.

A further notable result relates to gender pay inequalities at the upper end of the wage distribution. We expected (following *Mandel and Shalev, 2009A*), to find the gender pay ratio amongst workers in the upper half of the wage structure to be higher in Chile with its exclusive industrial relations model than in Argentina. What we find, however, is that women’s relative earnings compared to men at the 75th and 90th percentiles in Argentina out-perform those of similarly situated women in Chile in both years. By contrast, the data do confirm the result that women positioned at the lower end of the wage distribution are better protected in inclusive countries.

5.2 Returns to education and the gender pay gap

Countries with high rewards to education tend to display wider earnings differentials, as evidenced by the overall wage structure and the gender pay gap (*Blau and Kahn, 1995*; section 2). For Argentina and Chile, *Figure 6* compares the wage gaps between men and women workers with a university degree (high educated) and with less than secondary education (low educated) during 2000–2009. Both countries register a declining trend in the return to higher education relative to low-educated workers, which contrasts with evidence for example for the USA (*Baum et al., 2013*). It is likely that the rise in numbers of university graduates in both countries and a slower growth in demand for professional skills provides some explanation for the declining college wage premium. In Argentina, an additional explanatory variable is likely to be (at




Fig. 5. Gender pay ratios at different points of the wage distribution in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

Note: The gender pay ratio is women’s hourly pay in a particular percentile of women’s wage distribution divided by men’s hourly pay in that same percentile of the men’s wage distribution.




Fig. 6. Wage ratios of high-educated workers (university education) and low-educated workers (less than secondary education) by gender in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

Note: The wage ratio is calculated according to the median wage of each group.

least in those sectors where professionals are covered) the rising number of collective agreements, since they have slowed down wage growth at the top and facilitated higher wage growth at the bottom (Lustig *et al.*, 2013). Whilst they share a common trend, the more striking result in Figure 6 is the higher wage premium in Chile, almost twice that of Argentina (3.6 and 2.0 for all workers, respectively). Indeed, Chile registers the highest premium for tertiary education graduates in the OECD (OECD, 2013, p 103, 2011 data). Therefore, building on Blau and Kahn's findings, it is consistent that Chile registers wider earnings differentials than Argentina across the entire 2000–2009 period (Figure 3). It is especially notable that Chile reports wider wage differentials than Argentina in the top half of the earnings distribution (p90/p50).

The major inter-country disparity in the wage premium for higher education can be further interrogated by comparing the respective wage distributions for wage earners with higher education and those with less than secondary education (Figure 7). Two results are notable from the 2009 data. First, there is an observable gender pay gap at all points of the wage distribution for both groups of workers in both countries. Second, and perhaps more striking, the Chilean wage distributions for the two types of educated workers are polarised, that is, there is very little overlap of the wage curves in Chile compared to those of Argentina. This result fits with evidence of the lower wage premium for higher education in Argentina compared to Chile. It also supports our overall thesis that inclusive industrial relations institutions in Argentina act to link and tie together the wage prospects of different groups of workers in the labour market, generating a more overlapping and compressed wage structure by level of education both for men and for women.

Comparing the relative pay of high-educated women with high-educated men during 2000–2009, we observe a steady improvement from 80% to 89% in Chile and a similar overall upwards trend (although very uneven) in Argentina from 82% to 92%. For low-educated women workers, Figure 8 displays a slight rise in relative pay in Chile and in Argentina a small drop, in both cases of around 2 percentage points. The key




Fig. 7. Kernel distributions of log hourly wages by gender and educational level in Argentina and Chile, 2009.

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.




Fig. 8. Gender pay ratios by level of education in Argentina and Chile, 2000–2009

Source: Own calculations from Argentinian and Chilean household surveys, restricted to a defined sample population.

Note: High- and low-educated groups defined as in Figure 6.

result here is that the logic underpinning our second proposition does not hold: higher educated women are not better off relative to men in Chile’s exclusive-type model than in Argentina’s inclusive system. This holds for all four years shown; in 2009, for example, the gender pay ratio for high-educated workers was 92% in Argentina and 89% in Chile. A key factor is likely to be the greater wage inequality in Chile at the upper end of the wage distribution and the potentially greater risk of sex discrimination. Indeed, the data for Chile show that high-educated women have faced greater gender wage penalties than low-educated women for the 2000–2009 period.

6. Findings II: quantile regression results

To assess the changing and differential effects of the independent variables over time, we ran regressions for 2000 and 2009. As described in Section 3, the coefficients, or beta values, of the quantile regressions were exponentiated to understand their variability. The quantile regression results confirm the expected variability of individual,

demographic and job-related characteristics between genders and countries across the wage distribution. Tables 3 and 4 show the 2009 results for Argentina and Chile, respectively.

In both countries, there is a significant wage premium for college education and it tends to increase the further up the wage distribution graduates are located. The size of the premium is larger in Chile than in Argentina for male graduates at all points of the wage distribution, with the highest premium of 105% recorded for male graduates at the 90th percentile. For female graduates the premium is higher in Chile than in Argentina at the median and lower percentile wages but is in fact lower at the 75th and 90th percentiles. Considering gender differences within each country, we find that women's wage premium for higher education out-performs men's consistently across the wage distribution in Argentina, but in Chile men's premium exceeds women's at the median and upper wage points by a considerable margin. Again, this suggests Proposition 2 does not hold.

Comparing 2000 data with results for 2009, we find that the premium to higher education decreased consistently across the whole distribution for Argentinian men and women. By contrast, it increased for Chilean women from the median to the top end of the distribution and decreased for Chilean men at all levels except the 90th percentile. For instance, in Argentina female graduates' premium at the 75th and 90th percentiles fell from 161% and 243%, respectively, to 88% and 92% during 2000–2009. Comparable data for Chile show an improved wage premium from 71% and 66%, respectively, in 2000 to 82% and 88% by 2009.

The second variable that positively influence wages for Argentinian women at the top end of the distribution, after holding a university degree, is working in the mining industry. Working in the mining industry is also a key factor in Chile, where it became the most important and profitable industry during the 2000s. However, although the mining industry awards high premiums for high-educated women, women's employment share in this sector is only around 10% in both countries. The other important sector where women enjoy a considerable premium, especially in Chile, is finance and banking, which is more notable for its even representation of female employment (close to 50% in both countries).

With respect to family factors, an issue that deserves considerably more investigation in future research, we find large variation between countries. First, having a partner in Argentina represents a small wage penalty for women at the 90th percentile but a small wage premium at the lower points (10th and 25th). By contrast, women in Chile enjoy a large and significant wage premium for having a partner across the whole earnings distribution, especially at the top end, and men experience a very large penalty. Second, the presence of dependent children younger than 10 years is associated in Argentina with a premium for both men and women across the entire wage distribution (although not significant for the higher wage earners), whilst in Chile men's wages are penalised and women earn a premium, especially at the top end of the distribution. In Chile, therefore, it would appear (in support of Mandel and Shalev, 2009A; Gupta *et al.*, 2010) that higher paid women are more able than lower paid women to purchase market substitutes for unpaid child care and other domestic work. The ability of high-earning women to purchase paid services is clearly facilitated (in both countries) by the large concentration of cheap labour willing to work as domestic workers compared to developed countries.

In both Argentina and Chile, part-time workers enjoy higher wage premiums compared to full-time workers, which aligns with international evidence that finds

Table 3. Quantile regression results by gender, Argentina, 2009

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Sample no.	19,064	21,402	19,064	21,402	19,064	21,402	19,064	21,402	19,064	21,402
Age	0.01**	0.00**	0.01**	0.00**	0.01**	0.00**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.38**	0.41**	0.37**	0.44**	0.44**	0.49**	0.48**	0.63**	0.47**	0.65**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Technical education	0.20**	0.32**	0.21**	0.32**	0.24**	0.32**	0.26**	0.38**	0.29**	0.38**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Secondary education	0.13**	0.16**	0.10**	0.16**	0.12**	0.16**	0.15**	0.21**	0.15**	0.23**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Partner	-0.05	0.07**	-0.05*	0.04*	-0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.06*	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Children (0–9 years old)	0.03*	0.05*	0.03**	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.02*	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Private sector organisation	-0.07**	-0.15**	-0.08**	-0.18**	-0.08**	-0.17**	-0.08**	-0.19**	-0.08**	-0.20**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Full-time job	-0.28**	-0.31**	-0.33**	-0.31**	-0.33**	-0.28**	-0.33**	-0.28**	-0.33**	-0.29**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Mining industry	0.23	0.42	0.55**	0.39**	0.71**	0.57**	0.73**	0.49**	0.63**	0.47**
	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Financial industry	0.18	0.32	0.30**	0.33**	0.37**	0.29**	0.36**	0.28**	0.28**	0.22**
	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)
R squared	0.10	0.24	0.13	0.25	0.16	0.25	0.17	0.23	0.15	0.20

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of variables denoted by * $p < 0.05$ and ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4. Quantile regression results by gender, Chile, 2009

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Sample no.	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Tertiary education	0.53** (0.03)	0.55** (0.03)	0.61** (0.04)	0.63** (0.03)	0.67** (0.05)	0.62** (0.03)	0.67** (0.04)	0.60** (0.03)	0.72** (0.04)	0.63** (0.04)
Technical education	0.21** (0.02)	0.13** (0.02)	0.26** (0.02)	0.14** (0.02)	0.34** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	0.41** (0.02)	0.24** (0.02)	0.47** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)
Secondary education	0.09** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)	0.09** (0.01)	0.09** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.07** (0.01)	0.14** (0.01)	0.07** (0.01)	0.20** (0.01)	0.11** (0.01)
Partner	-0.69** (0.09)	0.59** (0.15)	-0.53** (0.09)	0.76** (0.11)	-0.48** (0.07)	0.80** (0.08)	-0.43** (0.06)	0.97** (0.08)	-0.62** (0.17)	1.01** (0.09)
Children (0-9 years old)	-0.22** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.15** (0.03)	0.12** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.02)	0.14** (0.01)	-0.12** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	-0.16** (0.05)	0.19** (0.02)
Private sector organisation	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Full-time job	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.02)	-0.34** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.02)	-0.67** (0.05)	-0.35** (0.03)	-0.86** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.05)
Mining industry	0.21** (0.02)	0.23* (0.10)	0.29** (0.02)	0.09 (0.05)	0.41** (0.02)	0.07 (0.06)	0.50** (0.02)	0.21* (0.11)	0.51** (0.03)	0.57** (0.19)
Financial industry	0.22** (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.19* (0.08)	0.12* (0.05)	0.36** (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)	0.41** (0.07)	0.36** (0.06)	0.39** (0.07)	0.47** (0.10)
R squared	0.13	0.19	0.15	0.24	0.27	0.34	0.36	0.44	0.39	0.45

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels denoted by * $p < 0.05$ and ** $p < 0.01$.

part-time wage premiums in countries where the overall share of part-time work is relatively low. This wage advantage is highest at the top end of the distribution in Chile for both men and women, reaching a 37% premium for women part-time workers at the 90th percentile. Meanwhile in Argentina, the premium for female part-time workers is fairly stable at around 25% across the distribution. These patterns for 2009 are confirmed by analysis of 2000 data. The findings for Chile are illuminated by a study of part-time employment by [Rau \(2008\)](#), which shows female part-timers benefit from the requirement for employers to pay a supplement for child care costs (0–2 years old) which is equivalent for full-time and part-time employees.

7. Discussion and conclusion

This article sought to build on ideas from international comparative studies of European countries and the USA and apply them to Argentina and Chile, where the contrasting industrial relations models, increasing bite of the national minimum wage and the rising presence of highly educated women in the workforce make for an interesting comparative analysis. The aim was to test the extent to which we can understand inter-country differences and country trends in patterns of gender pay equity by interrogation of the influences of industrial relations institutions and of wage structures, especially returns to education.

It is clear that the wage-setting processes of Argentina and Chile are embedded in contrasting systems of industrial relations. Argentina's collective bargaining system has a strong historical tradition to promote and protect union activity. This pattern was reinforced in 2003, and has continued since, with the promotion of nation-wide agreements by the state and the granting of further recognition and status to unions. The return of unions to what we might call a scheme of traditional corporatist policy-making co-ordination ([Hassel, 2006](#)) generated a significant increase of collective bargaining activity and coverage, which, as other studies of Argentina also show ([Trajtenberg, 2008](#)), has compressed the wage structure (see, for Europe, [EC, 2008](#)). This institutional trend diverges not only from most countries in the region and world but also from its neighbouring country, Chile, which has experienced a decline in trade union power and coverage of joint regulation of wages. Chile's wage-setting system remains highly decentralised, characterised by trade union pluralism and a fragmented bargaining structure. As anticipated, our comparative analysis found a positive association between the level of collective bargaining coverage and size of gender pay gap. Nevertheless, Chile's overall index of wage inequality also reduced over the period investigated, suggesting that other factors are significant.

In fact, although one might describe Argentina's industrial relations institutions as inclusive and Chile's as exclusive (following [Bosch et al., 2010](#)), our analysis identifies a significant role for the high and rising statutory national minimum wage in each country; Chile's wage-setting institutions are therefore not entirely exclusive in character. However, the effects of Chile's minimum wage on pay equity are mediated through interaction with the industrial relations model, and this shapes the nature of gender pay equity effects. The hybrid case of Chile is in fact similar to evidence for some European countries (e.g. the UK, Hungary), where the combination of a high minimum wage and weak collective bargaining coverage creates a skewed wage distribution characterised by a lower median wage and a high share of women workers paid at or just above the statutory national minimum wage ([Grimshaw, 2013](#)). The contrasting

kernel wage distributions of Figure 7 illustrate the drift in Chile towards a high-wage segment, pulled apart from the lower wage segment for low-educated workers where women's wages, and to a lesser extent men's, are tightly inscribed at or just above the national minimum wage. By contrast, in Argentina, centralised bargaining seems to enable trade unions to build on minimum wage increases by following a solidaristic approach that improves the pay package of those at the bottom. Thus, it may be justifiable to claim that there is too much compression of pay in the bottom half of Chile's wage distribution and this has not been beneficial to advancing gender pay equity.

These institutional effects on gender pay equity interact with complex lines of stratification, particularly regarding women's differentiated level of education, their changing location in the wage distribution and relative returns to education (Bernhardt *et al.*, 1995). In Argentina, the decrease to the university education premium is likely in part to be a consequence of the increasingly inclusive wage setting system during the 2000s, which has upgraded wages for low-educated women workers compared to high-educated women. Indeed, Rojo and Tumini (2008) show that the gender pay gap in Argentina is favourable to low-educated women workers covered by collective agreements; gender pay equity is worse for low-educated workers not covered by such contracts. Thus, our results to some extent confirm the findings of European comparative research (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Evertsson *et al.*, 2009): low-educated women have a comparative advantage in more class-equal societies, such as Argentina, and gender pay equity by level of education is relatively similar. With respect to highly educated women, we expected to find they would enjoy a relative wage advantage in Chile, given its relatively exclusive wage-setting model, compared to Argentina. However, here our results conflict with this proposition. First, for all years investigated, the gender pay gap was wider in Chile than in Argentina for highly educated workers. Second, the quantile regression results suggest men in Chile earn an increasingly higher wage premium than women for tertiary education as they move up the wage distribution from the median to the top decile. By contrast in Argentina, highly educated women enjoy a higher return than do men for tertiary education across the whole distribution. Moreover, women's wage premium for tertiary education at the top of the wage distribution (upper quartile and top decile) is higher in Argentina than in Chile. This result may indicate that the individuality of wage setting, especially in the higher paid jobs of the Chilean labour market, may be discriminatory against women after controlling for demographic and human capital characteristics.

There are nevertheless limitations to the design and scope of our analysis. The first concerns the wage data reported in the article. For both countries, the sample excludes informal sector workers, and therefore our results are likely to under-estimate the spread of the wage distribution. This is complicated by the fact that as we noted, the share of informal sector employment is significantly larger in Argentina than in Chile (according to the household surveys used in this article as well as published OECD data),⁸ which means the share of workers employed in low-wage jobs in Argentina is likely to be under-estimated (raising the bottom decile relative to the median). The second limitation

⁸ OECD (2009) data cite figures of a 53% share of informal sector workers in Argentina and 36% in Chile.

is that we did not extend the comparative analysis of institutional policies to encompass equal pay and anti-discrimination legislation. Both countries have long since ratified the relevant ILO Conventions (C100 Equal Remuneration and C111 Anti-Discrimination) and introduced anti-discrimination legislation in the 1980s. However, whilst Argentina introduced equal pay legislation in 1973 (L15532), Chile only adopted an equal pay law in 2009 (L20348) as a result of the ‘Bachelet effect’ of legislative reforms to promote gender equality (Stevenson, 2012). The number of reforms implemented at the beginning of her period in office (2006–2007) was remarkable; indeed, 2007 was the year with the highest number of gender legislative initiatives during 1990–2009 (UNDP, 2010). Given the strong Chilean presidential system in place, Bachelet also used her leadership for several other initiatives, such as appointing a gender parity Cabinet in 2006 (Fernández and Rubilar, 2011) and actively promoting gender issues at the Cabinet and high-profile committee levels, which raised the sense of urgency of gender initiatives amongst decision makers and political leaders (Thomas, 2010). We know from Whitehouse’s (1992) widely cited study of 13 OECD countries that the gender equity effects of equal pay legislative measures are likely to be contingent: stronger in an environment of centralised wage-setting and high shares of public employment (which would correspond to Argentina), but weaker in decentralised settings (such as Chile) where the focus of equal pay comparisons is the enterprise level so that ‘significant gains may have minimal impact when aggregate statistics are considered’ (Whitehouse, 1992, p 81). Thus, a proposition for future research might be that the new equal pay legislation in Chile has been ineffective in a context of exclusive industrial relations institutions. We welcome further research on these issues in the Latin American context. A third limitation is the scope of country coverage and its relevance for extant literature focussed on high-income countries. Our interpretation of the association between wage-setting systems and gender wage inequality would benefit from further research that includes a wider variety of middle-income countries.

In summary, the evidence highlights the significant influence of the Argentinian wage setting system over a more equal wage distribution and narrower gender pay gap compared to Chile. We might have expected that the reinforced corporatist industrial relations tradition during the 2000s in Argentina might have improved the compression of the wage distribution and gender pay differences far more so than in Chile given Chile’s persistent application of neoliberal and individualistic labour market practices and traditions. However, Chile’s minimum wage policy appears to have exerted a key institutional effect on the compression of wages at the lower end, lifting women’s relative pay, albeit at the apparent expense of a falling median wage and a segmentation of minimum wage jobs in the formal sector. Further research might fully explore the role of governments in supporting a sustained rise in the statutory minimum wage in the absence of what are usually thought of as complementary institutions in collective bargaining.

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Appendix: details of the quantile regression technique

In more detail, the quantile regression technique is based on the assumption that the conditional quantile of the log wages, q_θ , is linear in x ,

$$q_\theta = x\beta(\theta) + \varepsilon$$

The coefficient vector of variables across the wage distribution, β , is estimated as the solution to the following equation:

$$\hat{\beta} = \min_{\beta} \left\{ \sum_{i: y_i \geq x_i \beta(\theta)} \theta |y_i - x_i \beta(\theta)| + \sum_{i: y_i < x_i \beta(\theta)} (1 - \theta) |y_i - x_i \beta(\theta)| \right\}$$

This particular technique is appropriate to answer the research questions (stated below), as it facilitates an analysis of high-wage, highly educated employees. More generally, this method is able to generate evidence of women's changing relative position across the wage structure during 2000–2009 in Argentina and Chile.

Importantly, since the data set does not include observations of wages for women outside the labour force, there is a risk of selection bias in our analysis. To address this well-known problem, we first correct for the probability of being employed and then estimate the wage equation by quantile regression, adding the adjustment factor proposed by Heckman (1979), the Mills ratio. In the first stage, we use the whole sample (all individuals aged 25–60 years old, regardless of labour market status) to estimate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) by running a probit model of labour force participation. The probit model includes demographic, human capital and household income variables, z . The variables that we chose to estimate the probability of employment are age, educational level, whether the person has children younger than 10 years old, having a partner and the amount of income received from other household members.

$$s = 1[z\gamma + e \geq 0]$$

Using the estimated gamma from the probit (robust standard errors are included in the probit estimation), the estimated IMR is given by

$$\hat{\lambda} = \lambda(z\hat{\gamma}) = \phi(z\hat{\gamma}) / \Phi(z\hat{\gamma})$$

where $\phi()$ is the normal density function and $\Phi()$ is the cumulative normal density function. In a second stage, we include IMR in the quantile regression. The estimated equation adjusted by sample selection is given by,

$$q_{\theta} = x\beta(\theta) + \lambda\delta + \varepsilon$$

In addition, bootstrapped standard errors are computed to verify the statistical significance of the variables.

Table A1. *Quantile regression results by gender, Argentina 2009*

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Dummy ed. univ.	0.38** (0.04)	0.41** (0.04)	0.37** (0.03)	0.44** (0.04)	0.44** (0.02)	0.49** (0.03)	0.48** (0.02)	0.63** (0.05)	0.47** (0.04)	0.65** (0.05)
Dummy ed. tech.	0.20** (0.03)	0.32** (0.04)	0.21** (0.03)	0.32** (0.04)	0.24** (0.02)	0.32** (0.03)	0.26** (0.02)	0.38** (0.04)	0.29** (0.04)	0.38** (0.04)
Dummy ed. sec.	0.13** (0.02)	0.16** (0.02)	0.10** (0.01)	0.16** (0.02)	0.12** (0.01)	0.16** (0.02)	0.15** (0.01)	0.21** (0.02)	0.15** (0.02)	0.23** (0.03)
dpartner	-0.05 (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
dchildren_0_9	0.03* (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
d priv.firm	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.15** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.18** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.17** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.19** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.20** (0.02)
d.large firm	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
d.medium firm		-0.10** (0.02)		-0.08** (0.02)		-0.10** (0.01)		-0.10** (0.02)		-0.08** (0.02)
d.small firm	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)
d.living in metrop.reg.	0.11** (0.02)	0.15** (0.02)	0.10** (0.01)	0.14** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)
d. permanent job	0.25** (0.04)	0.41** (0.03)	0.17** (0.03)	0.34** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	0.30** (0.02)	0.18** (0.03)	0.27** (0.02)	0.16** (0.03)	0.23** (0.02)
d. full-time job	-0.28** (0.02)	-0.31** (0.01)	-0.33** (0.02)	-0.31** (0.01)	-0.33** (0.02)	-0.28** (0.01)	-0.33** (0.02)	-0.28** (0.01)	-0.33** (0.03)	-0.29** (0.01)
Occ_Office and legal clerks	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.41** (0.05)	-0.22** (0.06)	-0.38** (0.03)	-0.35** (0.04)	-0.39** (0.02)	-0.28** (0.01)	-0.33** (0.03)	-0.22** (0.03)	-0.30** (0.03)

Table A1. Continued

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Occ_Accounting and finance clerks	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.35** (0.05)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.33** (0.03)	-0.33** (0.04)	-0.38** (0.04)	-0.27** (0.03)	-0.34** (0.04)	-0.24** (0.03)	-0.32** (0.05)
Occ_Retail sales, transport and telecom.	-0.24** (0.05)	-0.53** (0.05)	-0.29** (0.06)	-0.47** (0.03)	-0.44** (0.04)	-0.50** (0.03)	-0.34** (0.02)	-0.44** (0.04)	-0.30** (0.03)	-0.43** (0.04)
Occ_Basic social services workers (e.g.health, educ.)	-0.31** (0.04)	-0.40** (0.04)	-0.35** (0.05)	-0.36** (0.03)	-0.47** (0.04)	-0.39** (0.02)	-0.39** (0.02)	-0.35** (0.03)	-0.35** (0.03)	-0.32** (0.03)
Occ_Various services (e.g.domestic)	-0.30** (0.05)	-0.60** (0.04)	-0.37** (0.06)	-0.58** (0.04)	-0.50** (0.04)	-0.61** (0.03)	-0.46** (0.02)	-0.57** (0.03)	-0.46** (0.02)	-0.58** (0.03)
Occ_Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing	-0.39** (0.14)	-0.95* (0.39)	-0.44** (0.11)	-1.01* (0.50)	-0.55** (0.08)	-0.64 (0.38)	-0.47** (0.08)	-0.68** (0.12)	-0.42** (0.05)	-0.84** (0.10)
Occ_Energy, construction, mining workers	-0.19** (0.05)	-0.26** (0.07)	-0.29** (0.06)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.44** (0.04)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.37** (0.03)	-0.28** (0.07)	-0.31** (0.03)	-0.20* (0.09)
Occ_Manufacturing labourers	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.37** (0.06)	-0.25** (0.06)	-0.39** (0.04)	-0.42** (0.04)	-0.43** (0.03)	-0.33** (0.02)	-0.29** (0.06)	-0.28** (0.04)	-0.24** (0.06)
Ind_Mining and Quarrying	0.23 (0.15)	0.42 (0.25)	0.55** (0.07)	0.39** (0.14)	0.71** (0.06)	0.57** (0.19)	0.73** (0.07)	0.49** (0.13)	0.63** (0.09)	0.47** (0.11)
Ind_Manufacturing	0.00 (0.12)	0.11 (0.18)	0.05 (0.05)	0.11 (0.11)	0.15** (0.04)	0.05 (0.10)	0.07 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.06)
Ind_Electricity, Gas and Water	0.11 (0.12)	0.37* (0.19)	0.21** (0.04)	0.36* (0.17)	0.32** (0.05)	0.29** (0.11)	0.33** (0.05)	0.20* (0.08)	0.32** (0.07)	0.10 (0.12)
Ind_Construction	-0.12 (0.12)	0.31 (0.20)	0.00 (0.05)	0.32** (0.11)	0.14** (0.04)	0.19 (0.13)	0.10 (0.06)	0.22* (0.10)	0.08 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)
Ind_Wholesale & Retail Trade & Rest.&Hotels	-0.06 (0.11)	0.11 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.11 (0.11)	0.05 (0.03)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)
Ind_Transport, Storage and Communication	0.01 (0.11)	0.29 (0.19)	0.11* (0.05)	0.28* (0.12)	0.21** (0.04)	0.25* (0.11)	0.18** (0.06)	0.22* (0.09)	0.16 (0.10)	0.16* (0.07)

Table A1. *Continued*

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Ind_Financial Institutions	0.18 (0.12)	0.32 (0.19)	0.30** (0.06)	0.33** (0.11)	0.37** (0.05)	0.29** (0.11)	0.36** (0.07)	0.28** (0.10)	0.28** (0.08)	0.22** (0.06)
Ind_Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services	-0.03 (0.12)	0.15 (0.18)	0.03 (0.06)	0.16 (0.11)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	0.01 (0.06)
Ind_Community, Social and Personal Services	-0.01 (0.11)	0.20 (0.18)	0.07 (0.05)	0.20 (0.12)	0.16** (0.04)	0.14 (0.10)	0.12 (0.06)	0.07 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	0.04 (0.07)
_constant	0.67** (0.14)	0.43** (0.16)	1.05** (0.11)	0.68** (0.15)	1.31** (0.08)	0.98** (0.10)	1.43** (0.10)	1.19** (0.11)	1.73** (0.14)	1.44** (0.11)
R squared	0.10	0.24	0.13	0.25	0.16	0.25	0.17	0.23	0.15	0.20

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of variables denoted by * meaning $p < 0.05$ and ** meaning $p < 0.01$. (Sample no.: men 19,064, women 21,402 observations). Auxiliary occup. in manufacturing and serv. were omitted from the table.

Table A2. Quantile regression results by gender, Chile 2009

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
N	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328	21,194	12,328
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Dummy ed. univ.	0.53** (0.03)	0.55** (0.03)	0.61** (0.04)	0.63** (0.03)	0.67** (0.05)	0.62** (0.03)	0.67** (0.04)	0.60** (0.03)	0.72** (0.04)	0.63** (0.04)
Dummy ed. tech.	0.21** (0.02)	0.13** (0.02)	0.26** (0.02)	0.14** (0.02)	0.34** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	0.41** (0.02)	0.24** (0.02)	0.47** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)
Dummy ed. sec.	0.09** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)	0.09** (0.01)	0.09** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.07** (0.01)	0.14** (0.01)	0.07** (0.01)	0.20** (0.01)	0.11** (0.01)
dpartner	-0.69** (0.09)	0.59** (0.15)	-0.53** (0.09)	0.76** (0.11)	-0.48** (0.07)	0.80** (0.08)	-0.43** (0.06)	0.97** (0.08)	-0.62** (0.17)	1.01** (0.09)
dchildren_0_9	-0.22** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.15** (0.03)	0.12** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.02)	0.14** (0.01)	-0.12** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	-0.16** (0.05)	0.19** (0.02)
d priv.firm	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
d.large firm	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.09** (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.13** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
d.small firm	-0.10** (0.01)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
d.living in metrop.reg.	0.04** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.11** (0.02)
d. permanent job	0.16** (0.01)	0.14** (0.03)	0.09** (0.01)	0.09** (0.02)	0.07** (0.00)	0.08** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.11** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)
d. full-time job	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.02)	-0.34** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.02)	-0.67** (0.05)	-0.35** (0.03)	-0.86** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.05)
Occ_Professionals	0.13** (0.04)	0.12 (0.06)	0.09* (0.04)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.10)

Table A2. *Continued*

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Occ_Technicians and associate professionals	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.24** (0.04)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.28** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.30** (0.10)
Occ_Clerks	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.25** (0.05)	-0.19* (0.09)	-0.36** (0.05)	-0.38** (0.08)	-0.33** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.06)	-0.31** (0.06)	-0.48** (0.11)
Occ_Service and sales workers	-0.23** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.05)	-0.37** (0.05)	-0.30** (0.09)	-0.57** (0.05)	-0.49** (0.07)	-0.62** (0.04)	-0.65** (0.05)	-0.59** (0.06)	-0.71** (0.10)
Occ_Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	-0.21** (0.04)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.35** (0.05)	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.58** (0.05)	-0.55** (0.08)	-0.65** (0.04)	-0.72** (0.06)	-0.60** (0.06)	-0.74** (0.15)
Occ_Craft and related trades workers	-0.19** (0.04)	-0.31** (0.06)	-0.30** (0.05)	-0.32** (0.09)	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.49** (0.07)	-0.49** (0.04)	-0.68** (0.06)	-0.46** (0.06)	-0.70** (0.11)
Occ_Plant and machine operators	-0.18** (0.04)	-0.33** (0.06)	-0.31** (0.05)	-0.31** (0.09)	-0.46** (0.04)	-0.54** (0.07)	-0.48** (0.04)	-0.67** (0.06)	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.64** (0.13)
Occ_Elementary occupations	-0.27** (0.04)	-0.35** (0.05)	-0.39** (0.05)	-0.38** (0.10)	-0.61** (0.05)	-0.57** (0.08)	-0.72** (0.04)	-0.73** (0.05)	-0.75** (0.06)	-0.81** (0.10)
Ind_Mining and Quarrying	0.21** (0.02)	0.23* (0.10)	0.29** (0.02)	0.09 (0.05)	0.41** (0.02)	0.07 (0.06)	0.50** (0.02)	0.21* (0.11)	0.51** (0.03)	0.57** (0.19)
Ind_Manufacturing	0.06** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Ind_Electricity, Gas and Water	0.05 (0.04)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.14** (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.22** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.28** (0.06)	0.01 (0.14)
Ind_Construction	0.09** (0.02)	0.02 (0.08)	0.06** (0.01)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06** (0.01)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11** (0.02)	0.12** (0.05)	0.17** (0.02)	0.27* (0.12)
Ind_Wholesale & Retail Trade & Rest.&Hotels	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.09** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.09** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Ind_Transport, Storage and Communication	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.09** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.06* (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	0.14** (0.05)

Table A2. Continued

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Ind_Financial Institutions	0.22** (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.19* (0.08)	0.12* (0.05)	0.36** (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)	0.41** (0.07)	0.36** (0.06)	0.39** (0.07)	0.47** (0.10)
Ind_Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services	0.07** (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.07** (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	0.11** (0.01)	0.11** (0.03)	0.13** (0.02)	0.16** (0.03)
Ind_Community, Social and Personal Services	0.01 (0.01)	-0.10** (0.04)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.12** (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.11** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
_constant	1.69** (0.16)	1.09** (0.16)	1.83** (0.19)	1.58** (0.15)	2.33** (0.12)	2.01** (0.08)	2.79** (0.12)	2.60** (0.10)	3.42** (0.28)	2.88** (0.15)
R squared	0.13	0.19	0.15	0.24	0.27	0.34	0.36	0.44	0.39	0.45

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels denoted by * meaning $p < 0.05$ and ** meaning $p < 0.01$.

Table A3. *Quantile regression results by gender, Argentina 2000*

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>N</i>	10,454	7,483	10,454	7,483	10,454	7,483	10,454	7,483	10,454	7,483
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Dummy ed. univ.	0.64** (0.07)	0.65* (0.31)	0.68** (0.04)	0.71* (0.32)	0.76** (0.25)	0.76** (0.25)	0.82** (0.05)	0.96** (0.17)	0.84** (0.20)	1.23** (0.20)
Dummy ed. tech.	0.29** (0.06)	0.47* (0.22)	0.33** (0.03)	0.41 (0.23)	0.38** (0.04)	0.40* (0.19)	0.49** (0.05)	0.57** (0.13)	0.55** (0.05)	0.80** (0.14)
Dummy ed. sec.	0.19** (0.02)	0.25* (0.12)	0.18** (0.02)	0.22 (0.13)	0.23** (0.02)	0.25* (0.10)	0.32** (0.02)	0.35** (0.08)	0.38** (0.02)	0.48** (0.08)
dpartner	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.16** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.17** (0.05)	0.14* (0.06)
dchildren_0_9	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.05)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05** (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
d priv.firm	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.19** (0.02)	-0.15** (0.02)	-0.17** (0.02)	-0.15** (0.02)	-0.16** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.02)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.03)
d.large firm	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07** (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
d.small firm	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
d.living in metrop.reg.	0.15** (0.03)	0.24** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)	0.22** (0.12)**	0.19** (0.01)	0.21** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)	0.16** (0.02)	0.13** (0.02)	0.14** (0.03)
d. permanent job	0.12** (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	0.17** (0.02)	0.12** (0.03)	0.13** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.14** (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
d. full-time job	-0.34** (0.05)	-0.36** (0.02)	-0.29** (0.03)	-0.34** (0.02)	-0.26** (0.02)	-0.29** (0.02)	-0.28** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.02)	-0.26** (0.03)	-0.22** (0.02)
Occ_Office and legal clerks	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.60 (0.45)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.39 (0.38)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.15** (0.03)

Table A3. Continued

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Occ_Professionals	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.58 (0.45)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.36 (0.39)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.25** (0.03)
Occ_Technicians and associate professionals	-0.19** (0.04)	-0.76 (0.47)	-0.24** (0.03)	-0.54 (0.40)	-0.17** (0.04)	-0.27* (0.14)	-0.15** (0.04)	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.08 (0.04)	0.03 (0.06)
Occ_Clerks	-0.25** (0.05)	-0.70 (0.46)	-0.29** (0.04)	-0.48 (0.39)	-0.21** (0.03)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.18** (0.05)	-0.23** (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.02 (0.02)
Occ_Service and sales workers	-0.23** (0.05)	-0.91* (0.44)	-0.30** (0.04)	-0.69 (0.39)	-0.26** (0.04)	-0.44** (0.14)	-0.29** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.07)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.19** (0.03)
Occ_Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	-0.48* (0.19)		-0.52** (0.07)		-0.30* (0.15)		0.00 (0.18)		0.01 (0.13)	
Occ_Craft and related trades workers	-0.15* (0.06)	-0.70 (0.48)	-0.18** (0.05)	-0.30 (0.42)	-0.17** (0.04)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.13** (0.04)	0.00 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.25 (0.14)
Occ_Plant and machine operators and assemblers	-0.16** (0.04)	-0.73 (0.47)	-0.19** (0.04)	-0.54 (0.42)	-0.16** (0.04)	-0.29 (0.17)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.30* (0.12)	-0.18** (0.05)	0.18 (0.12)
Occ_Elementary occupations		-0.31 (0.55)		-0.17 (0.47)		-0.03 (0.21)		-0.28 (0.17)		-0.08 (0.17)
Ind_Mining and Quarrying	0.59** (0.21)	1.93** (0.62)	0.60** (0.14)	1.13* (0.57)	0.62** (0.16)	0.99 (0.53)	0.74** (0.18)	0.52 (0.48)	0.51* (0.23)	0.36 (0.42)
Ind_Manufacturing	0.14 (0.17)	1.02 (0.59)	0.13 (0.13)	0.35 (0.60)	0.06 (0.17)	0.38 (0.56)	0.22 (0.16)	0.08 (0.49)	0.21 (0.23)	0.05 (0.39)
Ind_Electricity, Gas and Water	0.38 (0.19)	1.12 (0.61)	0.39** (0.14)	0.59 (0.62)	0.42* (0.18)	0.61 (0.55)	0.57** (0.17)	0.25 (0.49)	0.37 (0.22)	0.26 (0.37)
Ind_Construction	-0.15 (0.20)	1.19 (0.65)	-0.11 (0.14)	0.44 (0.60)	-0.10 (0.17)	0.48 (0.54)	0.12 (0.16)	0.02 (0.50)	0.00 (0.24)	0.07 (0.43)
Ind_Wholesale & Retail Trade & Rest.&Hotels	0.06 (0.18)	1.03 (0.61)	0.07 (0.13)	0.34 (0.62)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.31 (0.55)	0.13 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.49)	0.05 (0.23)	-0.09 (0.39)

Table A3. Continued

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Ind_Transport, Storage and Communication	0.26 (0.17)	1.13 (0.63)	0.28* (0.13)	0.54 (0.62)	0.20 (0.16)	0.52 (0.57)	0.33* (0.16)	0.17 (0.49)	0.17 (0.23)	0.34 (0.41)
Ind_Financial Institutions	0.50** (0.19)	1.36* (0.61)	0.53** (0.15)	0.69 (0.61)	0.42** (0.16)	0.65 (0.55)	0.50** (0.15)	0.28 (0.48)	0.34 (0.23)	0.26 (0.37)
Ind_Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services	0.05 (0.19)	0.99 (0.58)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.39 (0.60)	-0.06 (0.16)	0.42 (0.55)	0.15 (0.15)	0.01 (0.50)	0.07 (0.22)	0.00 (0.39)
Ind_Community, Social and Personal Services	0.21 (0.18)	1.07 (0.59)	0.20 (0.13)	0.41 (0.60)	0.13 (0.16)	0.44 (0.55)	0.29 (0.16)	0.09 (0.50)	0.12 (0.21)	0.11 (0.39)
_constant	0.05 (0.20)	-0.68 (0.63)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.71)	0.51** (0.17)	-0.08 (0.60)	0.53** (0.17)	0.21 (0.58)	0.76** (0.18)	-0.15 (0.54)
R squared	0.16	0.23	0.19	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.21

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels denoted by * meaning $p < 0.05$ and ** meaning $p < 0.01$.

Table A4. Quantile regression results by gender, Chile 2000

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
N	20,145	9,610	20,145	9,610	20,145	9,610	20,145	9,610	20,145	9,610
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Dummy ed. univ.	0.69** (0.04)	0.66** (0.05)	0.69** (0.03)	0.69** (0.04)	0.72** (0.03)	0.60** (0.04)	0.74** (0.03)	0.54** (0.04)	0.69** (0.03)	0.51** (0.05)
Dummy ed. tech.	0.27** (0.03)	0.25** (0.03)	0.34** (0.02)	0.28** (0.02)	0.41** (0.03)	0.31** (0.02)	0.48** (0.03)	0.34** (0.02)	0.50** (0.03)	0.36** (0.04)
Dummy ed. sec.	0.10** (0.01)	0.09** (0.02)	0.11** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.16** (0.01)	0.13** (0.01)	0.21** (0.01)	0.16** (0.02)	0.24** (0.01)	0.19** (0.03)
dpartner	-0.19 (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.31** (0.10)	0.12 (0.06)
dchildren_0_9	-0.61 (0.32)	-0.08 (0.37)	-0.60 (0.33)	0.11 (0.34)	-0.59** (0.22)	-0.14 (0.27)	-0.50* (0.23)	0.02 (0.20)	-1.05** (0.32)	0.16 (0.19)
d priv.firm	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
d.medium firm	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.10** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.10** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)
d.small firm	-0.12** (0.01)	-0.13** (0.02)	-0.13** (0.01)	-0.10** (0.01)	-0.17** (0.01)	-0.11** (0.01)	-0.21** (0.01)	-0.14** (0.01)	-0.21** (0.02)	-0.18** (0.02)
d.living in metrop.reg.	0.12** (0.01)	0.18** (0.01)	0.14** (0.01)	0.18** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)	0.19** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)	0.20** (0.01)	0.10** (0.01)	0.22** (0.02)
d. permanent job	0.12** (0.02)	0.12** (0.02)	0.11** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)	0.11** (0.01)	0.13** (0.01)	0.12** (0.01)	0.15** (0.02)	0.17** (0.01)	0.18** (0.02)
d.full-time job	-0.18** (0.05)	-0.22** (0.03)	-0.30** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.02)	-0.51** (0.04)	-0.29** (0.02)	-0.66** (0.03)	-0.35** (0.02)	-0.87** (0.05)	-0.44** (0.03)

Table A4. *Continued*

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Occ_Professionals	0.04 (0.13)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.14* (0.06)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.21** (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.14 (0.08)
Occ_Technicians and associate professionals	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.30** (0.06)	-0.20 (0.10)	-0.33** (0.05)	-0.27** (0.05)	-0.33** (0.04)	-0.27** (0.06)	-0.32** (0.06)	-0.30** (0.08)
Occ_Clerks	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.49** (0.07)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.56** (0.06)	-0.42** (0.04)	-0.54** (0.04)	-0.55** (0.06)	-0.61** (0.06)	-0.60** (0.08)
Occ_Service and sales workers	-0.38** (0.12)	-0.40** (0.06)	-0.70** (0.06)	-0.49** (0.10)	-0.79** (0.05)	-0.66** (0.04)	-0.79** (0.04)	-0.82** (0.06)	-0.82** (0.05)	-0.84** (0.09)
Occ_Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	-0.39** (0.12)	-0.41** (0.05)	-0.71** (0.07)	-0.52** (0.11)	-0.86** (0.06)	-0.71** (0.05)	-0.91** (0.04)	-0.93** (0.06)	-0.96** (0.05)	-1.00** (0.10)
Occ_Craft and related trades workers	-0.32* (0.12)	-0.47** (0.06)	-0.62** (0.07)	-0.59** (0.11)	-0.73** (0.06)	-0.77** (0.05)	-0.73** (0.05)	-0.94** (0.07)	-0.75** (0.05)	-1.01** (0.12)
Occ_Plant and machine operators	-0.35** (0.13)	-0.47** (0.08)	-0.64** (0.07)	-0.61** (0.12)	-0.76** (0.06)	-0.78** (0.07)	-0.76** (0.05)	-0.94** (0.07)	-0.81** (0.06)	-1.03** (0.10)
Occ_Elementary occupations	-0.43** (0.12)	-0.50** (0.06)	-0.76** (0.07)	-0.57** (0.10)	-0.93** (0.05)	-0.76** (0.04)	-1.03** (0.04)	-0.94** (0.06)	-1.13** (0.05)	-1.03** (0.09)
Ind_Mining and Quarrying	0.32** (0.03)	0.33** (0.11)	0.39** (0.02)	0.19** (0.06)	0.47** (0.02)	0.33** (0.09)	0.51** (0.02)	0.41** (0.12)	0.52** (0.03)	0.27* (0.11)
Ind_Manufacturing	0.07** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07** (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.08** (0.01)	0.00 (0.04)	0.09** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.05)
Ind_Electricity, Gas and Water	0.12** (0.03)	-0.25 (0.16)	0.10** (0.03)	-0.22* (0.10)	0.19** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.18** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.21** (0.07)	-0.15 (0.13)
Ind_Construction	0.11** (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)	0.09** (0.01)	0.00 (0.05)	0.12** (0.01)	0.06 (0.05)	0.14** (0.01)	0.01 (0.07)	0.17** (0.02)	0.22* (0.11)
Ind_Wholesale & Retail Trade & Rest.&Hotels	0.02 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.10** (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)

Table A4. Continued

	q10		q25		q50		q75		q90	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Ind_Transport, Storage and Communication	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.07** (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08** (0.02)	0.12** (0.04)	0.10** (0.03)	0.20** (0.06)
Ind_Financial Institutions	0.35** (0.06)	0.14** (0.05)	0.33** (0.05)	0.16* (0.06)	0.31** (0.05)	0.28** (0.05)	0.38** (0.06)	0.31** (0.05)	0.43** (0.10)	0.28** (0.08)
Ind_Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.14** (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	0.17** (0.03)	0.15** (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.19** (0.07)
Ind_Community, Social and Personal Services	0.06* (0.02)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.12** (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)
_constant	1.31** (0.45)	0.47 (0.41)	1.78** (0.39)	0.60 (0.39)	2.26** (0.29)	1.15** (0.31)	2.57** (0.34)	1.24** (0.24)	3.77** (0.47)	1.51** (0.26)
R squared	0.15	0.25	0.22	0.31	0.32	0.40	0.39	0.44	0.41	0.41

Notes: Omitted variables for men and women: Occ_Legislators, senior officials and managers, Ind_Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, d. medium firm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels denoted by * meaning $p < 0.05$ and ** meaning $p < 0.01$.