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Freshmen Teachers and College Major Choice: Evidence from a Random Assignment in Chile

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Preliminary and incomplete. Comments are welcome.

Abstract

We exploit the exogenous characteristic of random freshmen course assignment in a large Chilean university to identify the causal effect of teachers and their qualitative characteristics over students' major choice. Using administrative records, we establish what makes students from the "Commercial Engineering" career chose between an "Economics" major or a "Business" major. We find that first-economic-course teachers may account for 15-22% of the probability of choosing Economics as a major. We also identify which characteristics of these teachers make students more prone to choosing this particular major. These results are robust to the inclusion of different covariates and specifications. Placebo-type falsification tests are performed, confirming our findings.

Keywords: Freshmen, Teachers, College Major, Random Assignment.
JEL Codes: A23, C93, I23, J24.

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1 Introduction

1.1 About Major Choice

In recent years, several studies have focused on the subject of college major choice. Indeed, major choice is a well studied subject in many dimensions because of its relevance in the configuration of our society's tertiary-educated citizens. This issue has been in the spotlight over the past decades, as it is a common phenomena around the world to see, for instance, low female enrollment rates in Engineering and Economics majors (Bettinger and Long, 2005), higher enrollment rates in high-return majors for upper-class students (Macmillan, Tyler, and Vignoles, 2015), among other stylized facts.

The latter examples depict some well-addressed relations between college major choice and student characteristics. Nevertheless, other important determinants of college major choice lie on the other side of the classroom: teacher characteristics.

There are a lot of insights from other social sciences such as psychology or sociology that confirm the importance of teachers on students' major choice decisions (Chambliss and Takacs, 2014). That is, an important future-determining choice that one might consider as completely endogenous may still be highly conditioned by external factors such as role-model shocks induced by instructors (Canes and Rosen, 1995; Rask and Bailey, 2002; Zafar, 2013) or informational shocks that affect the future prospect of a major for each student (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman, 2015).

Notwithstanding, there is an important challenge for economists to quantify these external effects, as usually students choose their teachers according to unobserved characteristics and therefore endogenously determine these "external" shocks that affect their major choice. To address this issue, we exploit the exogenous characteristic of random freshmen course assignment in a large Chilean university to identify the causal effect of teachers and their qualitative characteristics over students' major choice.

In order to fully understand our methodology, some briefing on the underlying institutional setting is provided in the next subsection.

1.2 Institutional Setting

The Chilean higher education system possesses some particular features that converts it into an interesting case to study college major choices. First of all, the main mechanism to access tertiary education is through a nationally standardized set of tests called *Prueba de Selección Universitaria* (PSU). Once students obtain their test scores, they may choose among universities subscribed to this general system¹ by ranking their programs in a nationally-centralized admission system. After this, each university fills each program's capacity with the higher-scoring students that opted for them. Students get enrolled only in the topmost program in which they got accepted. For a thorougher description of the Chilean higher education admission system, see Bordon and Fu (2015).

The important part for this study is what comes next. In the School of Economics and Business of one of the largest universities, when students get enrolled as freshmen, they get their initial courses assigned randomly, i.e. they can't choose their teachers until they start their second semester. This ensures that first-semester teachers are completely exogenous for these freshmen, and so are the eventual shocks they might receive from them.

This School offers three programs: i) Commercial Engineering, ii) Engineering in Information and Management Control and iii) Accounting-Auditing. An important fact is that the former program mandates students in their second year to choose between two radically opposite majors: Economics or Business. It's because of this characteristic that we'll pose our attention on students enrolled in the Commercial Engineering program.

As a last part of this short institutional setting briefing, we'll also exploit a mandatory survey that students must fill each semester. In this survey there is a module oriented to teacher characteristics, in which students rate each professor they had in that corresponding semester. For more details on the questionnaire, see Table 4 in Appendix A.

The rest of the document is structured as follows: section 2 shortly reviews some of the existing literature, section 3 presents a simple model which, combined with the data presented in section 4, allows different specifications from section 5 to obtain the results from section section 6. Finally, section 7 provides a simple robustness check and section 8 concludes.

¹There are some universities that don't qualify into this system.

2 Literature Review

There is a broad (and somewhat controversial) literature in educational economics concerning college major choices. For instance, Montmarquette, Cunnings, and Mahseredjian (2002) use mixed multinomial logit and probit models to identify the effect of expected earnings on the probability that a student will choose a specific major among four choices of concentrations, while Arcidiacono (2004) and Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012) develop structural models to explain college major choices based on the expected future stream of income that each one yields.

On the reduced-form side, Sacerdote (2001) and Sohn (2016) exploit different natural experiments to identify their effects on educational outcomes, among them, college major choice. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) explicitly focus on college major choice by implementing a randomized controlled trial with an informational treatment.

There's also a lot of interest in determining to what extent teachers influence students in different dimensions. Influence can be through many mechanisms, like gender-matching (Paredes, 2014), race-matching (Dee, 2004) or simply because of the teacher's quality (Carrell and West, 2010).

Notwithstanding, research focusing on the causal effects of teachers (and their characteristics) on college major choices is scarce². This is mainly³ due to the fact that usually teachers are endogenously chosen at college and therefore this yields the typical absence of an appropriate counterfactual to identify the effect (Holland, 1986).

Thus, there are a few randomized controlled trials, but no one has explored deeply into individual characteristics of teachers and how they affect college major choices. A contribution of this document is the use of a rich and extensive data set that, through a random assignment, allows for a causal identification (Rubin, 1974) of the effect of particular teacher characteristics on college major choices.

²For a superb review of the existing literature, see Grove and Wu (2011).

³Other important reason may be the lack of direct policy implications. We'll get back to this shortly.

3 The Model

In spite of basing our results on a random assignment, an underlying theoretical model is explicitly presented in order to account for the eventual assumptions being made when computing treatment effects (Keane, 2010).

Consider that student i may choose between majoring in Business or in Economics. Denote the observed outcome Y_i as 1 if she chooses Economics and 0 if not. Suppose that there is a tacit net utility of choosing Economics over Business for student i and denote it as U_i . Thus, we have that

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{iff } U_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{iff } U_i \leq 0 \end{cases}, \quad (1)$$

i.e. student i is fully rational and will choose a major if and only if it yields a higher net utility than the other.

Now we impose some structure on U_i , letting it be

$$U_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i, \quad (2)$$

where T_{ij} is 1 if student i was assigned to teacher j in set J and 0 if not, \mathbf{X} is a set of observed characteristics and ε_i is an unobserved error component. In this case, β_j may be interpreted as the effect of a non-specific shock received by a student from teacher j , just as we commented before.

Suppose now that $\varepsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma_t^2)$, where t indexes years/cohorts. Then, substituting (2) in (1) we get

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{iff } \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{iff } \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i \leq 0 \end{cases}.$$

But $\beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i > 0 \iff \varepsilon_i > -(\beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B})$ and the odds of this event are equal to

$$\mathbb{P}(Y_i = 1 | \{T_{ij}\}_{j \in J}, \mathbf{X}) = \Phi \left[\left(\beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} \right) / \sigma_t \right],$$

where Φ is a cumulative standardized Gaussian distribution.

Therefore, we finally obtain a reduced-form probit model described by

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i.$$

4 Data

We use administrative data from a large Chilean university, particularly from its School of Economics and Business. We possess information from ten cohorts spanning from 2005 to 2014 on a biannual basis (whole available database).

The data is restricted only to freshmen enrolled in Commercial Engineering on their first semester whose teachers were randomly assigned. Their major choice is retrieved from the same administrative records.

For identification purposes, we'll be interested in the Introduction to Economics (ECON101) course. In this way, T_{ij} will be 1 if student i was assigned to teacher j in the ECON101 course, so J is restricted to the set of (thirteen) teachers that dictate ECON101 in the sample.

Additionally, we only consider teachers that have been at least 2 years with the course. This ensures a minimum amount of student observations per teacher and eliminates potential noise generated by “first-and-last-time” teachers (with no experience, where the course was not of their preference, etc.). Figure 1 shows the average probability of majoring in economics over all the considered ECON101 professors.

Finally, we count with several control variables such as the grade (scaled continuously from 1 to 7) of each student on the ECON101 course, the entrance score constructed as a weighted average their PSU scores, their preference ranking for the program, their school GPA, the week days on which the ECON101 course is dictated (1 if lectures are held Monday and Thursday and 2 if they're held Tuesday and Friday), a failure status dummy and a “Block” variable that indicates the time schedule in which lectures are held⁴.

Summary statistics for all of these variables are presented in Table 1. Note how about 40% of the students choose Economics as their major⁵, so we have enough variation in majors to identify effects. It's also important to note that this School has relatively high entrance scores, as the country's mean score in each test is standardized to 500 points with a standard

⁴It's equal to 1 if lectures are from 8:00 am to 9:30 am, 2 if they are from 9:40 am to 11:10 am, 3 from 11:20 am to 12:50 pm, 4 from 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm, 5 from 3:10 pm to 4:40 pm and 6 from 4:50 pm to 6:20 pm.

⁵We have only 1561 observations because some students of the last cohorts haven't chosen their major yet, mainly because they've failed courses and delayed their career.

deviation of 110 points, i.e. the School's mean is two standard deviations over the national average. School GPA's mean is over 90% of the full score and failure rates are relatively low for the ECON101 course (about 12%). Bivariate histograms are shown for the former two variables in Figure 2 for students majoring in Economics and in Figure 3 for Administration majors while individual densities are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 for each major.

A potential threat is given because the data set is very unbalanced, as some teachers have more than 13% of observations while others barely pass 3%. Years are more balanced, but we still have problems with year 2012 (administrative issues that will be solved soon in the next edition of this document...). Other caveat is the fact that β_j might not be identifying the effect of teacher j , but might include confounding effects such as teacher j 's TAs or the classroom assigned. In this sense, the effect may be interpreted as an all-inclusive effect, not only as the single impact of the teacher.

Having all of this clear, we may explain our main identification strategy.

Figure 1: Percentage of Students Majoring in Economics by Professor





Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Econ. Major	1561	.4144779	(.4927895)	0	1
ECON101 Grade	1829	4.793166	(.9228158)	1.2	7
Entrance Score	1827	723.9126	(23.40134)	679.1	830.2
Preference	1340	1.485821	(.6619559)	1	4
School GPA	1827	6.414926	(.2583345)	5.1	7
Week Days	1829	1.300164	(.4584545)	1	2
Failed ECON101	1829	.1246583	(.3304214)	0	1
Prof. 2	1829	.0437397	(.2045714)	0	1
Prof. 3	1829	.0732641	(.2606407)	0	1
Prof. 4	1829	.1388737	(.3459093)	0	1
Prof. 5	1829	.1098961	(.3128458)	0	1
Prof. 6	1829	.0464735	(.2105658)	0	1
Prof. 7	1829	.1394204	(.3464795)	0	1
Prof. 8	1829	.0656096	(.2476662)	0	1
Prof. 9	1829	.0415528	(.1996194)	0	1
Prof. 10	1829	.1306725	(.337134)	0	1
Prof. 11	1829	.1170038	(.3215128)	0	1
Prof. 12	1829	.0322581	(.176733)	0	1
Prof. 13	1829	.0311646	(.1738098)	0	1
Block. 2	1829	.2121378	(.4089337)	0	1
Block. 3	1829	.1618371	(.368402)	0	1
Block. 4	1829	.0896665	(.2857815)	0	1
Block. 5	1829	.0426463	(.2021135)	0	1
Block. 6	1829	.049754	(.2174957)	0	1
Year 2006	1829	.0978677	(.2972169)	0	1
Year 2007	1829	.0967742	(.2957309)	0	1
Year 2008	1829	.1109896	(.3142052)	0	1
Year 2009	1829	.0995079	(.2994246)	0	1
Year 2010	1829	.1328595	(.3395156)	0	1
Year 2011	1829	.0978677	(.2972169)	0	1
Year 2012	1829	.0448332	(.2069943)	0	1
Year 2013	1829	.1109896	(.3142052)	0	1
Year 2014	1829	.1388737	(.3459093)	0	1

Figure 2: ECON101 Grade and Entrance Score for Economics Majors



5 Identification Strategy

Course assignment is random, conditional on program. As our sample consists uniquely of students of the Commercial Engineering career, assignment is completely random for them.

We estimate the following pooled⁶ Probit model:


$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} \beta_j T_{ij} + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i, \quad (3)$$

where Y_{ij} is 1 if student i chooses economics as her major and 0 otherwise; T_{ij} is 1 if she is assigned to professor j in set J and 0 otherwise; \mathbf{X} is a set of student and course covariates and ε_i is a well-behaved unobserved component.

In this case, the β_j coefficients in (3) will account for the mean effect of teacher j (and all the other eventual confounding effects we discussed before) on the odds of choosing Economics as a major.

⁶Exploiting the panel characteristic of our data set won't allow us to have enough power due to the reduced amount of observations per cohort that we possess.

Figure 3: ECON101 Grade and Entrance Score for Administration Majors




Additional to this main specification, a second (and surely more interesting) set of estimations are held. The idea is to recover the characteristics of teachers that make students more prone to choosing an Economics major. In order to do this, we make use of administrative data containing all the student responses to the Teacher Evaluation Survey (TES) that proxy twelve different characteristics of different professors. Thus, one may estimate the effect of each of these characteristics with the reduced-form probit model described by

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j \in J} T_{ij} \cdot \left(\sum_{k \in K} \beta_k Q_{ijk} \right) + \mathbf{X}\mathbf{B} + \varepsilon_i, \quad (4)$$

where Q_{ijk} denotes the score (ranging from 1 to 7) for teacher j in characteristic $k \in K$ and where teacher-specific fixed components are included.

To account for the endogeneity of Q_{ijk} , it is replaced by Q_{tjk} , i.e. the average score of characteristic k for professor j in cohort t (not provided by student i , but by her classmates). Therefore, this aggregate measure of each characteristic is an exogenous covariate that may impact student i 's major.

Figure 4: ECON101 Grades of Economics and Administration Majors



–*Coming soon:* Relative effect of characteristics... A variation of model (4) will be estimated using Economics-Business teacher pairs as T_j and the score difference of each characteristic as Q_{tjk} to account for relative, not absolute, effects of them. The hypothesis tested behind this is that major choice may not necessarily be highly conditioned because of a teacher’s particular characteristic, but because of the comparison of it against another teacher. This may shed some light on how important are relative prospects (opposed to absolute prospects) when students choose majors. Additionally, model (3) will also be estimated only with Business teachers.–

6 Results

The results for the estimation of (3) with different controls are presented in Table 2. As one can easily see, significant coefficients are relatively stable under different specifications. Thus, there are four teachers that actually influence relevantly in students’ major choice, evidencing that this decision may actually be exogenously conditioned. Moreover, there are some teachers that can even increment in over 20% the probability of choosing an Economics major, i.e. they can neutralize the effect of failing ECON101!

Table 2: Probit Estimates (Marginal Effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Econ. Major	Econ. Major	Econ. Major	Econ. Major
Prof. 2 (d)	0.0912 (0.0897)	0.0252 (0.0815)	0.0188 (0.0751)	0.0191 (0.0749)
Prof. 3 (d)	0.0742 (0.120)	0.0634 (0.154)	0.0581 (0.149)	0.0583 (0.148)
Prof. 4 (d)	0.0328 (0.0860)	0.0565 (0.105)	0.0836 (0.0999)	0.0841 (0.1000)
Prof. 5 (d)	0.0186 (0.0813)	0.0351 (0.101)	0.0619 (0.0959)	0.0623 (0.0955)
Prof. 6 (d)	0.152 (0.136)	0.129 (0.148)	0.132 (0.140)	0.132 (0.140)
Prof. 7 (d)	0.0629 (0.0925)	0.0519 (0.101)	0.0853 (0.0931)	0.0856 (0.0926)
Prof. 8 (d)	0.136 (0.0874)	0.123 (0.112)	0.124 (0.107)	0.123 (0.105)
Prof. 9 (d)	0.220** (0.0994)	0.214** (0.107)	0.214** (0.101)	0.215** (0.101)
Prof. 10 (d)	0.160* (0.0887)	0.153* (0.0931)	0.154* (0.0879)	0.154* (0.0884)
Prof. 11 (d)	0.142** (0.0716)	0.161* (0.0875)	0.168** (0.0819)	0.168** (0.0824)
Prof. 12 (d)	0.105 (0.0863)	0.132 (0.113)	0.120 (0.109)	0.120 (0.108)
Prof. 13 (d)	0.223* (0.123)	0.228* (0.126)	0.215 (0.131)	0.215 (0.131)
Failed ECON101			-0.236*** (0.0433)	-0.236*** (0.0439)
School GPA				0.00258 (0.0374)
Block Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1561	1561	1561	1559

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Effect of Teacher Characteristics on Major


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Econ. Major	Econ. Major	Econ. Major	Econ. Major
Shows Confidence	-0.0366 (0.128)	-0.0189 (0.127)	-0.00832 (0.125)	-0.00224 (0.127)
Prepares Classes	0.0202 (0.0736)	0.00787 (0.0829)	0.0353 (0.0845)	0.0228 (0.0876)
Exposes Clearly	-0.0327 (0.140)	-0.0355 (0.158)	-0.0468 (0.160)	-0.0479 (0.160)
Solves Doubts	-0.0963 (0.185)	-0.0802 (0.195)	-0.0926 (0.194)	-0.0925 (0.194)
Promotes Discussion	-0.122 (0.112)	-0.110 (0.107)	-0.0867 (0.106)	-0.0890 (0.107)
Allows Sharing Ideas	0.305** (0.146)	0.264* (0.136)	0.276** (0.133)	0.276** (0.136)
Stimulates Interest	0.199*** (0.0769)	0.213** (0.0972)	0.210** (0.0966)	0.211** (0.0966)
Evaluates Fairly	0.142*** (0.0551)	0.149** (0.0704)	0.125** (0.0593)	0.132** (0.0593)
Shows-up Punctually	-0.0434 (0.0629)	-0.0312 (0.0685)	-0.0315 (0.0695)	-0.0256 (0.0694)
Meets Deadlines	0.00697 (0.0333)	-0.00686 (0.0446)	-0.0103 (0.0483)	-0.0123 (0.0476)
Treats Respectfully	-0.280*** (0.104)	-0.293*** (0.113)	-0.307*** (0.107)	-0.308*** (0.105)
Is Available	-0.00122 (0.0635)	0.00390 (0.0711)	-0.00170 (0.0713)	-0.00310 (0.0717)
Failed ECON101 (d)			-0.235*** (0.0373)	-0.235*** (0.0376)
School GPA				-0.00538 (0.0430)
Block Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1540	1540	1540	1539

Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses

(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 5: Entrance Scores of Economics and Administration Majors




When digging into what characteristics make students more prone to choosing the Economics major, there are four *winners*. The first and most important characteristic is related to the extent up till which teachers allow questions and expressing ideas (Characteristic 6 from Appendix A). Indeed one might expect economists as “social scientists” to be more oriented towards expressing their opinion about any social matter.

A second characteristic is precisely how stimulating is the teacher when advancing through the syllabus. This surely proxies how much interest for economics will be rooted in each student. A third, but less relevant characteristic indicates the perception of fairness in evaluations. I’d say that students that feel they were evaluated unfairly are mostly the ones with worst grades. Thus, this may seriously correlate with ECON101 grades and therefore major choice.

As a final characteristic we have how respectful is a teacher with her students. In this case, the effect is negative, i.e. if teachers are respectful, students are less prone to choosing Economics. One might think that respectfulness and closeness with students may be negatively correlated, and thus, “disrespectful” ECON101 teachers may actually just be more friendly to students, making them have a better prospect of Economics as a major.

Figure 6: Prob. of Majoring in Economics by ECON101 Situation



7 Robustness Check

Over the 2005-2012 period, the other two careers at this School, the “Engineering in Information and Management Control” program and “Accounting-Auditing” program were considered as a single one for freshmen. Once they’d finished the common core of both programs, they could choose on which one to major. Nevertheless, this common core also includes both, the Introduction to Economics course and the Management and Business course and a random assignment is performed, just as in the Commercial Engineering case.

Notwithstanding, this major choice shouldn’t have much relation with, say, the Introduction to Economics course, as the majors they choose have practically no direct relation with the subject. Therefore, as a robustness check, the original specifications are tested over a sample containing only students that are not enrolled in the Commercial Engineering program. The sample is restricted to the cohorts that entered college before 2013, as in this year there was a major curricular reform that modified the enrollment system, separating Engineering in Information and Management Control and Accounting-Auditing as two different programs.

–The results of this falsification test will be presented in the next edition of this document... Future versions of this paper will also consider other (much more unexplored) effects: the impact of teachers and their characteristics on (first job) labor market outcomes.–

8 Concluding Remarks

Contrary to what one may think, important decisions such as choosing a college major are not completely endogenously taken. Indeed, there is a significant and economically important effect of freshmen teachers over college major choice. The conditioning estimated effect of teachers on the chances their students opt for the Economics major spans from about 15% to almost 22%. This is robust to different specifications.

There are also certain characteristics that exogenously bend students towards choosing Economics as a major. These make intuitive sense and may be also very relevant when making this decision.

As in most “experimental designs” such as this one, there is a clear lack of external validity. Indeed, there is no way to ensure such results may be replicated in other context, not even with the same program and in the same country⁷. Thus, results must be handled with care and policy implications must not blindly follow them, but use them as a case study with high internal validity.

Finally, as a future research agenda we’d like to propose other dimensions in which teachers may causally impact students and their future career development. These kind of random assignments are a great opportunity to explore and answer important questions on how higher-education students are formed and how does this formation impact the configuration of our future tertiary-educated society.

⁷As we commented earlier, this is a very selective university with a very particular context.

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A Questionnaire of TES

Table 4: Teacher Evaluation Survey

Q	Characteristic (in Spanish)
01.	Demuestra seguridad y dominio sobre las materias
02.	Prepara las clases
03.	Es claro para exponer las materias
04.	Resuelve dudas y problemas de los alumnos
05.	Incentiva la discusión y participación
06.	Permite hacer preguntas y expresar ideas
07.	Estimula el interés por las materias
08.	Hace evaluaciones justas y razonables
09.	Asiste puntualmente a clases
10.	Cumple plazos y normas establecidas
11.	Trata a sus alumnos con respeto
12.	Está disponible para sus alumnos