Consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information ...

Introducing assets backed by physical collateral, we extend the [Cornet, B., De Boisdeffre, L., 2002. Arbitrage and price revelation with asymmetric information and incomplete markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, ...

We develop a two period general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and differential information. Making endogenous the traditional informational restriction on consumption, we allow agents to obtain ...

We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique ...

We address a two-period equilibrium model with securitization of collateral-backed promises. Borrowers may suffer extra-economic default penalties and debts are pooled into collateralized loans obligations (CLO), allowing ...

We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We ...

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with default and collateral requirements. In contrast with previous literature, our model allows for liquidity contractions and general prepayment specifications. ...

This paper extends the roommate problem to include externalities, allowing preferences for a partner to depend on the situation of others. Stability concepts for matchings and partitions of the set of agents are proposed ...

In infinite horizon incomplete market economies, when the seizure of collateral guarantees is the only mechanism enforcing borrowers not to entirely default on their promises, equilibrium exists independently of the ...