Liquidity Contractions and Prepayment Risk on Collateralized Asset Markets
Documento de trabajo
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This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with default and collateral requirements. In contrast with previous literature, our model allows for liquidity contractions and general prepayment specifications. We show that liquidity substantially affects credit and prepayment risks, and that different borrowers may follow differentiated payment strategies: whereas some pay, others prepay or default. The lack of liquidity increases debtors’ willingness to continue paying, even thought prepayment cost could be higher than the collateral value. This mechanism rationalizes underwater mortgages. We prove existence of equilibrium, and provide a numerical example illustrating the main determinants of optimal payment strategies.
Quote ItemSerie Documentos de Trabajo No. 364, pp. 1 - 22, Septiembre, 2012
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