Essential Equilibria of Large Games
| Author | dc.contributor.author | Correa, Sofía | |
| Author | dc.contributor.author | Torres Martínez, Juan Pablo | |
| Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2017-05-12T19:23:47Z | |
| Available date | dc.date.available | 2017-05-12T19:23:47Z | |
| Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| Cita de ítem | dc.identifier.citation | Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 362, pp. 1 - 21, Diciembre, 2012 | es_ES |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/143945 | |
| Abstract | dc.description.abstract | We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria. | es_ES |
| Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | es_ES |
| Publisher | dc.publisher | Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios | es_ES |
| Type of license | dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | * |
| Link to License | dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | * |
| Source | dc.source | Serie Documentos de Trabajo | es_ES |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Essential equilibria | es_ES |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Essential sets and components | es_ES |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Large games | es_ES |
| Título | dc.title | Essential Equilibria of Large Games | es_ES |
| Document type | dc.type | Documento de trabajo | |
| Cataloguer | uchile.catalogador | rca | es_ES |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile