UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE

FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA Y HUMANIDADES

DEPARTAMENTO DE LINGÜÍSTICA

A Pragmatic Analysis of Emergency Calls: Cooperativeness and Politeness in the Language of Shooters and Victims during Hate Crime related Mass Shootings

Informe Final de Seminario de Grado para optar al grado de Licenciado/a en Lingüística y Literatura Inglesas

Profesor Guía: Pascuala Infante Arriagada

Yael Cancino Saavedra

Mingxia Chiang Arriagada

Belén Espinoza Chacano

Darling García Vidal

Sebastián Garrido Ramírez

Camila Miranda Lara

Stephanie Silva Loyola

Francisca Urbina Droguett

DICIEMBRE, 2021

SANTIAGO, CHILE

Dedicated to mass shootings victims

Acknowledgments

Gracias a mis papás por apoyarme incondicionalmente, y prevenir que me volviera loca en los momentos de estrés. Por animarme y escucharme horas y horas hablar cosas que no entendían, por incentivarme a superarme día a día, hacerme reír cuando ya estaba chatisima de la vida y por hacer todo lo que pudieron para traerme hasta aquí. Agradecer a mi familia que, aunque no tenían idea lo que estaba estudiando siempre me apoyaron y dijeron palabras de ánimo, a mis abuelos por recibirme en su casa 2 años y, sobre todo, por ser una red cálida de apoyo incondicional.

Gracias infinitas a mis amigas de infancia: Natalie, Feña, Pily, Meru, Ode, Gabi y Javi por entender mis tiempos, por subirme el ánimo y el ego, por confiar en mí y en mis capacidades incluso cuando yo no lo hacía. Mi amigo Marcelo, gracias por sacarme a tomar aire, por el apoyo y las risas. A mis amigas de la u, Savka, Darling y Poly, gracias infinitas por ser un apoyo enorme, son lo mejor que me paso en la u, las quiero demasiado, gracias por todo.

Doy gracias a la profe Pascuala Infante, por siempre estar para nosotres, por ser un rayito de sol y por darnos la seguridad que necesitábamos para confiar que no estábamos tan perdides como pensamos. Gracias a todos los profes que hicieron estos cuatro años un agrado y por ser ejemplos de persona y docentes, en especial a la profe Carmen Nabalón, Natalia Tranchino y Georgios Ioannou. Gracias a este grupo precioso de tesis, no los conocía, pero de verdad no pude haber caído en un mejor grupo. Gracias por todo el apoyo y el apañe, el cariño y la buena onda para que todo saliera adelante, son lo mejor cabres.

Por último, no menos importante, estoy agradecida de mí misma, de no rendirme y de seguir adelante, de ponerle weno, crecer y cumplir todo lo que me propuse. Estos dos últimos años fueron terribles, pero si se pudo. Gracias al universo por haber vivido al mismo tiempo que Pedro Pascal, Sam Fender, los Strokes, Marvel, Star Wars y every piece of media y música (y a mis vecinos por no alegar por escuchar música tan fuerte todo el día) que en su momento sirvió de distracción y entretención, sobre todo en los dos últimos años del terror.

Belén Espinoza Chacano

En primer lugar, quiero agradecerle por todo lo que ha hecho por mí al amor de mi vida, Diego. Gracias por soportarme en mis peores momentos de estrés, depresión, inseguridad, etc., y por acogerme en tu casa cuando no podía estar en la mía. Eres mi safe place en todo sentido, te amo mucho y gracias por ayudarme a echarle ganas a la vida.

Tampoco puedo dejar de agradecerle a TODAS mis amigas que me acompañarán hasta la muerte porque jamás las dejaré alejarse de mi: Ale, Javi, Javita y Lolito, gracias por entender que mi ausencia no se debía a que quería alejarme de ustedes, sino que a veces la vida me abrumaba demasiado como para comunicarme, sin embargo, siempre estuvieron ahí para mí y las amo mucho por eso. Por otro lado, están mis niñas preciosas Belén y Savka, que hacen que agradezca el haber escogido esta carrera porque de otra forma no las habría conocido. Gracias por tantos lindos momentos que espero jamás acaben, las amo mucho as well.

También le doy gracias a nuestra profesora Pascuala, que hizo que este año no fuera tan horrible. Gracias por alentarnos constantemente a ser mejores versiones de nosotres mismes, por guiarnos tan eficientemente y por darnos tanta alegría en el proceso porque según recuerdo, me reí de algún comentario suyo en todas las reuniones que tuvimos sin falta. A su vez, quiero agradecerle a este grupo por ser tan geniales, talentosos, y buena onda. Fue un gusto trabajar con ustedes y que nos vaya de pana a todes en el futuro. ❤️

Por último, me doy gracias a mí misma porque I didn't give up. La Darling del 2016 en su peor momento no se imagina lo poco que queda para que seamos felices al fin.
Finalmente, aunque jamás lo lean: gracias a Adele, Coldplay, Pedro Pascal, Dakota Johnson, Jamie Dornan, y a todos en el Marvel Cinematic Universe por darme la serotonina que me ayudó a superar cada año hasta el día de hoy.

Mención honorifica a mis gatitos Garfield y Dakota, les amo.

Darling García Vidal

Como la gran mayoría lo hace en esta sección en especial, me gustaría agradecer a toda la gente que ha sido parte de estos cuatro (largos) años en el programa, en especial a mi familia. También agradecer a mis amigos de la infancia: Luis, David, Seba y Gabriel, después de más de 10 años el apoyo se vuelve incondicional. También a Benja, Matías y Maripi, que hasta el final del proceso siempre se encargaron de motivarme y distraerme en los momentos más agobiantes de este último año. Así mismo, agradecer a amigxs tanto dentro fuera y dentro del campus, además conocidxs con los que haya intercambiado un par de palabras por ahí. Igualmente, a mis compañerxs de seminario, quienes trabajaron de manera exhaustiva hasta el último día, dándolo absolutamente todo para que el resultado de esta tesis fuese el óptimo. También agradecer a mi gata Venus, que, aunque no leerá esto, fue mi gran compañía durante estos años. Especialmente en las extensas noches.

Ah, y también agradecer a la Profe Pascuala, quien ha sido la profe más comprensiva y dedicada en estos cuatro años, y es probable que la gran mayoría de mis compañerxs comparta este mismo pensamiento. Su disposición no se la había visto a ningún otro docente en mi vida entera. Never change, Pascuala <3. También infinitas gracias a todos los docentes que hicieron la estadía universitaria más agradable

Sebastián Garrido Ramírez

Quiero agradecer a mi familia por apoyarme y tenerme fe desde que comencé este camino. Gracias a mi mamá por creer en mí hasta cuando ni yo misma puedo hacerlo y por darme ánimos en esos momentos donde creía que ya no valía la pena, gracias a la Ame, por ser la hermanita más dulce, por preocuparse de que estuviera tranquila y de que la tesis estuviera yendo bien, aunque ella no entendiera. Quiero agradecer también a mis abuelos, a mi tata por compartir su lugar de trabajo-inaccesible porque Virgo - para que hiciera mis cosas y por siempre hacerme reír, y a la Augusta por apoyarme y siempre tenerme cazuela cuando voy para su casa. Agradecer también a mi papá y a Leigh por darme un hogar por dos años, y a la Ñaña por darme a la distancia todo su amor de weli.

Gracias también a la Rocío, por su apañe y comprensión en todo lo que necesitara y por siempre subirme el ánimo con copuchas y cusqueñas jajaja. Gracias al Gato, por acompañarme en mis momentos más difíciles y enseñarme a andar en una ciudad completamente nueva para mí, también por creer en mí. Gracias también al Joaquín y a Gabriel, por acompañarme cuando era una provinciana pava recién llegada, y al Nico, por acompañarme y darme harto nanai y empuje para que no me rindiera.

Agradecer también a este grupo, por su buena onda y empatía, son personas maravillosas y sé que serán todes grandes lingüistas. Gracias también a la Profe Pascuala, por guiarnos, enseñarnos y apañar con lo que sea que necesitáramos, muchas gracias, profe, por esa alegría contagiosa que nos brindaba aun cuando estábamos más que agotados.

Gracias también a mí, por subirme el ánimo cuando no tenía ganas de nada, por seguir soñando y teniendo fe, y también por respetarme cuando tenía que parar.

Finalmente, agradecer a Shrek, Camilo Sesto y ABBA que, gracias a ellos, mantuve mi mental sanity.

Con felicidad para todo lo bueno y malo que venga :)

Camila Miranda Lara

Quiero agradecer primeramente a mi familia, que aunque la mayoría de las veces no lograron entenderme, aun así dieron lo mejor de sí para hacerlo. Por aguantar mis infinitas quejas y rabietas, y por seguir empujándome al final de este tedioso pero hermoso camino. Los amo, no hay palabras para describir mi gratitud por todo el amor y apoyo que me han dado.

A mis queridísimos compañeros Juan, Vale, Isa y Feñita, que sin ellos todo esto nunca hubiera sido posible. Gracias por su buena onda, su comprensión, sus largas conversaciones sobre cosas sin sentido que sólo nosotros entendíamos, por el pelambre infinito y jugoso, por las largas noches de trabajo, y sobre todo, por su maravillosa amistad. No saben cuán agradecida estoy del universo por haberlos puesto en mi camino, y este último gran paso no significa un adiós, porque creo firmemente que estamos más unidos que nunca.

A la profe Pascuala, que sin su confianza y palabras de aliento nunca hubiese tenido el coraje de creerme un poco más el cuento y avanzar con la cabeza en alto. Fue la mejor guía no sólo en temas de tesis, sino que también del proceso emocional que conlleva ser una estudiante desconfiada, nerviosa y ansiosa. Por su paciencia, por sus chistes, risas y mucho más.

Finalmente, el mayor de los agradecimientos va para mí. Por nunca rendirme, por mantenerme fuerte y por haberme apoyado en mi persona. Gracias por haberte refugiado en la música y los pequeños placeres de la vida, por tomarte tu tiempo y por qué no, unas cuantas copas de vino blanco. Por haber evolucionado como persona aunque sea un poco, aunque todavía falte mucho. Por alegrarte por tus pequeños logros, cosa que antes no hacías. Que este gran paso te abra las puertas a un gran futuro; sigue esforzándote, y hazlo cada vez más. Pero recuerda también que tomarte una pausa no significa el fin.

"Maybe I made a mistake yesterday, but yesterday's me is still me. I am who I am today, with all my faults. Tomorrow I might be a tiny bit wiser, and that's me, too. These faults and mistakes are what I am, making up the brightest stars in the constellation of my life. I have come to love myself for who I was, who I am, and who I hope to become" —Kim Namjoon, 2018

Francisca Urbina Droguett

Abstract

Emergency calls constitute a genre in which communication is highly affected by the different elements corresponding to the emotional context in which the calls take place (Thomas, 2013). This very specific situation and the linguistic strategies used by the call taker (dispatcher, negotiator, or policeperson) directly affect the caller's linguistic behavior due to the scripted call protocols (Zenes et al., 2020), which are intended to get clear responses from the caller to identify the gravity of a given event (Coulthard and Johnson, 2007). On that basis, this research aims to identify and characterize the cooperative and polite linguistic behavior of victims and shooters in emergency calls from hate crime related mass shootings. In order to do so, the caller's cooperative behavior was studied under Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle categories, and their polite behavior was analyzed under Brown and Levinson's (1987) proposal regarding Politeness in linguistic behavior, and Fraser's (1980) strategies of Mitigation.

To identify and characterize cooperative and polite behaviors, ten emergency calls made during and after four attacks between 2010 and 2019 in the US —four corresponding to victims and six, to shooters— were selected for examination. The transcript —and when available, the audio file— of each call was used to recognize and categorize the different instances of *Adherence* and *Aversion* to the *Cooperative Principle* categories, while Politeness was studied through the presence of *Face Threatening Acts* and *Mitigation* strategies.

Results suggested that victims were highly cooperative since they required immediate help, and they performed *Mitigation* strategies to soften the illocutionary force of their utterances as a way of effectively getting assistance. Furthermore, findings showed that *Politeness* was not suspended despite the urgency of the context. Shooters, in turn, demonstrated to be cooperative as they aimed to claim responsibility for the crime, and share their hate for different groups, thus having no need to give untruthful information. In addition, victims mostly produced *Negative Face Threatening Acts* in the form of bold requests, while *Positive Face Threatening Acts* were identified in all shooters in the form of insults to the call takers. Overall, victims utilized more *Mitigation* strategies than shooters. This research demonstrates that context is fundamental to determine which linguistic behavior is considered as polite or cooperative within emergency calls, as the interests of its participants are different and have a specific development depending on each communicative context and/or interaction.

Key words: Cooperative Principle, Politeness, emergency call, FTAs, forensic linguistics, mitigation, role, mass shooting, hate crime.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This investigation focuses on the cooperative and polite verbal behavior displayed by two types of callers, victims, and shooters, in the specific context of emergency calls made during hate crime related mass shootings.

Emergency calls as a genre have been extensively studied mostly in relation to its structure; from the linguistic strategies used by dispatchers and 911 operators to elicit information from callers, as well as to the emotional context in which a given call could have occurred —most of the time, focusing only on the calls made by the victims of a crime. For example, Cromdal et al. (2008) studied children's emergency calls and how this context affects the gathering of information to resolve the emergency, while Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) focused on how emotional displays of hysteria affect the processes of emergency calls. On the other hand, Imbens-Bailey and McCabe (2000) focused on the way narrative events and conversational requests by the caller develop in the emergency call of a single case study, whereas García and Parmer (1999) studied how the context of an emergency call can affect the credibility of the caller.

Past investigations have also centered on the dispatcher's protocols and how these could be improved to maximize their assistance effectiveness. Recent studies have examined dif£ferent discourse properties of emergency calls. Zenes et al. (2020) for instance, analyzed the effect of asking "tell me exactly what happened" in the retrieval of information from the callers, while Neusteter et al. (2019) reviewed the growth and development of the 911 calls processing system. Other recent works that were relevant for this research were those of Wade and Macpherson (2016), who focused on police communication, roles, and duties as an operator, whilst Cromdal et al. (2012) studied the procedures of openings by the operators in emergency calls.

In the context of emergency calls, some research has been done in emergency calls made by the perpetrators of a shooting analyzing their cooperative behavior (Manihuruk & Siregar, 2020). Less attention has been given, however, on callers' cooperative or uncooperative answers when providing information, on the caller's attempts to maintain the interactional harmony during a conversational exchange, or on how they employed linguistic strategies to do so, despite the urgency of their situation. For that reason, the present study will analyze the cooperative and polite verbal behavior of callers —victims and shooters— of emergency calls during hate motivated mass shootings in the US.

In order to do this, calls from four massive shootings in the US between the years 2010 and 2019 were analyzed. These were divided into calls made by victims, on the one hand, and shooters, on the other. The former includes calls made during the 2015 Charleston Church shooting in South Carolina (from which one call was analyzed), and the 2016 shooting inside Pulse Nightclub, Florida (from which four calls were analyzed). In the case of shooters, the calls examined were made during the 2010 Hartford Distributors shooting in Connecticut, where one call was analyzed; the 2019 shooting of Poway Synagogue, California, with also one call analyzed, and lastly, once again from the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting in Florida, four calls were analyzed (one between a dispatcher and the shooter, and the other three calls between the shooter and a negotiator).

The research questions in which this study was based were the following: How can the cooperative behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be characterized? How can the different polite behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be characterized? How can the different cooperative and polite behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be compared and contrasted? In line with these questions, the general objectives of this investigation are to identify and describe all the instances of cooperative behavior of victims and shooters in emergency calls; to identify and describe all the instances where polite behavior is manifested by victims and shooters in emergency calls; to identify and describe all the instances where polite behavior could be expected but is not manifested by victims and shooters in emergency calls, and to identify regularities in the cooperative and polite verbal behaviors of victims, of shooters, and across victims and shooters.

Results indicated that both roles adhered the most to Grice's (1975) category of *Quality*, which is explained by the victims' position of needing help, and the shooters' objective of sharing their hate-motivated message. Similarly, findings point out a high level of *Adherence* to *Relevance* in both roles, too. On the other hand, victims commonly *averted* Thomas (1995) *Quantity* most of the time due to repeating themselves in an effort to make sure they were heard, while the most averted category by shooters was *Manner,* as they often responded in a rather obscure manner. Victims averted categories by means of *Infringing* due to the chaotic environment that interfered with the communication between victims and operators, meanwhile shooters had the tendency of flouting them, with the aim of maintaining the control of the conversation. In the case of *Politeness* (Brown and Levinson, 1987), victims mostly attacked the operator's *Negative Face*, once again, given the particular situation they were in, whereas the shooters attacked their hearers' *Positive Face* ultimately to insult them and the institution

they represent. *Mitigation* strategies were present mostly in victims' calls, while in only one of the shooter's calls a few instances of *Mitigation* (Fraser, 1980) were identified.

1.1.   Forensic Linguistics

Emergency calls as a genre belong to the areas of research already established for Forensic Linguistics by Coulthard and Johnson (2007), and so it is fundamental to start with a brief introductory description of said field. The origin of this discipline can be traced back to 1968, when the Swedish linguist Jan Svartvik published a linguistic analysis of the confessions from the infamous Evans case (1949) titled "The Evans Statements: A Case for Forensic Linguistics", which was actually when this term was first coined.

The Evans case was worthy of investigation due to its context, and how the study of language could have been key to solving it. In 1949, Timothy Evans confessed to having killed his wife in 4 different, yet contradictory police statements which he later recanted. Evans was sentenced to death and executed in 1950. Three years later, 6 female bodies were found in his neighbor's yard, proving that Evans was in fact innocent. Svartvik's study was groundbreaking because he was able to formalize some grammatical stylistic inconsistencies between Evans' inculpatory statements and his regular grammatical style (Coulthard & Johnson, 2007). This was a milestone for the idea that the analysis of language as evidence can be crucial to solve a crime, and in this case, could have saved Evans' life.

From this point on, a new discipline dedicated to legal matters was born in the area of Applied Linguistics, allowing the creation of associations such as the International Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics (IAFPA) in 1991 and the International Association of Forensic Linguists (IAFL) in 1992. As is usual with Applied Linguistics, there is no commonly agreed delimitation of what a forensic linguist can do —especially internationally, given the varying legal frames in rule of each country. However, two broad areas of work can easily be identified: 1. Issues of authorship (such as plagiarism and the elaboration of authorship profiles derived from the study of forensic phonetics, speaker identification, and morphology) (Coulthard & Johnson, 2007) and 2. Problems of meaning and communication, which can be divided into linguistic production, the contextual situation in which the interaction takes place, the background knowledge of its participants, and also the analysis of other revealing elements such as graphology (Ramírez Salado, 2017; Coulthard & Johnson, 2007).

1.2. *Emergency calls and hate crime related mass shootings*

Emergency calls are a type of telephone interaction whose main objective is to ask for help and to give assistance to those calling. They have a clear definition of roles within their participants, turns, and organizational structures (Zimmerman, 1984), for which the duration of the call tends to be particularly short due to their goal-oriented nature of resolving an emergency in the quickest possible way (Cromdal, 2013). One of the main differences between regular calls and emergency ones is that the call taker in the latter type, namely dispatchers, 911 operators, negotiators, and the police, are trained to follow a particular organizational structure and protocols that have the final aim of eliciting information from the callers in the fastest, most efficient manner possible, so as to determine and adjust the way in which help can be provided, e.g., sending an ambulance to the place (Neusteter et al., 2019).

In the case of mass shootings, the call automatically becomes an emergency call if the shooting is still in progress at the moment of dialing or had just happened moments after a fatal attack has taken place. Therefore, to better grasp the contexts that could lead to making an emergency call under such specific circumstances, it is also pertinent to introduce what is understood by mass shootings and hate crimes, which is one of the most frequent motives behind these types of shootings (Altschiller, 2015). Authors usually agree on one definition to distinguish between shootings and mass shootings. For these, mass shootings are considered as such when the event involves the death of 4 or more individuals in a single incident (Fox & DeLateur, 2014; Lankford & Silver, 2019), which in turn would make a shooting an event that has left less than 4 fatal victims during an incident. Despite the general agreement behind this definition, discussions have emerged as to whether it still applies when considering the number of individuals killed in each instance of a mass shooting (Katsiyannis et al., 2018), as reducing the number of victims actually killed in a single event mean an increase in the number of registered mass shootings that have occurred recently in the US. As for hate crimes, Altschiller (2015) is emphatic in discussing the relevance of hate and prejudice in many of the mass shootings that have taken place in the US. These hate crimes are defined by the author as a criminally active bias against a particular social group, these groups being diverse, ranging from religion and political choice, to gender, among others.

1.3. *Cooperative Principle and Politeness*

To conduct this research, two foundational works from pragmatics proved useful: in the first place the *Cooperative Principle* (*CP*) proposed by the English philosopher Herbert Paul Grice in his most famous work "Logic and Conversation" (1975), which is based on the premise that

in an interaction, participants display different cooperative efforts so as to achieve their conversational objectives, and thus a participant's contribution should be made such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or the direction of the talk exchange they are part of. Under this principle, Grice distinguishes four categories: *Quantity*, *Quality*, *Relation* —also commonly referred to as *Relevance*—, and *Manner*. Though these concepts will be explained and described further in the text, for the present introductory purposes suffice it to say that the first category deals with the amount of information given, the second with the authenticity of the utterances, the third with how relevant the information is to the current topic of the conversation, and the last one with the way in which information is given, as it is supposed to be as clear as possible. These categories are expected to be followed to arrive at a common goal of the conversation, as will be explained in the necessary depth in the Theoretical Framework.

In the second place, Brown and Levinson's proposal on *Politeness* regarding linguistic behavior in their work "Some universals in language use" (1987) has the objective of identifying and describing a basic universal set of communicative strategies which are aimed to elicit a desired effect on the hearer. Different dimensions of *Politeness*, therefore, are also transcendental for other social sciences such as psychology and sociology, from which sociologist Goffman's concept of F*ace* emerges. Brown and Levinson elaborated on this notion and proposed that "face" is a property of the members of an interaction, which is understood as the "public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:61), the self-perspective of one's social image. At the same time, participants do no small amount of communicative work to protect their own and their interlocutor's two different "faces": the *Positive Face*, which refers to the person's desire for their image to be approved by others, and the *Negative Face*, which refers to one's own personal interests and the desire of carrying them out without being impeded by others.

Frequently in interaction, some acts constitute actual or potential threats to either the *Positive* or the *Negative Face* of the other. These threats to interactional harmony are known as *Face Threatening Acts* (*FTAs*) (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Nevertheless, Fraser (1980) proposed the concept of *Mitigation*, that indicates strategies which are aimed to reduce the expected undesired effects of an utterance that may harm the other's F*ace*. While *Mitigation* corresponds to a type of *Politeness—Negative Politeness* (Brown and Levinson, 1987)—, *FTAs* correspond to the concept of *Impoliteness*. It is important to mention that *Politeness* is not mandatory, and that one can be impolite without redress (Brown and Levinson, 1987). These

concepts and the difference between them will be further explained in the Theoretical Framework.

1.4. Structure of the text

The structure of this investigation is divided into four parts. Firstly, it will present the Theoretical Framework that discusses the main concepts which are the foundation for this research, such as Grice's *Cooperative Principle* and Brown and Levinson's notion of *Face*. Secondly, the Methodology will be presented to describe the corpus of emergency calls that was analyzed, the procedures through which the study was carried out, and the research questions and the objectives (general and specific) that guided this investigation. Thirdly, the results of the analysis of each call regarding victims and shooter's cooperative and polite behavior will be displayed in simple tables, exemplified, and discussed. Finally, conclusions drawn from the study will be presented, as well as its limitations and future projections.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Emergency calls

Emergency calls constitute one specific type of telephone interaction, whose main aim is to ask for help in the case of the caller, and to identify a problem and give assistance in the case of the call taker. The development of these calls follows organizational structures, conversational exchanges and order of utterances called turns (Zimmerman, 1984).

In emergency calls, callers are most likely to have an identifiable purpose and give the necessary information to make their request explicit to promptly receive help. In some cases, the information given by the callers is not enough to do so; this can be due to simply not knowing the details of the emergency, or to being a messenger for the actual victim, having only secondhand information (Wade & Macpherson, 2016). Call takers have protocols to elicit the information needed to identify the problem, evaluate it, and give the assistance needed, through thoroughly interviewing the caller (Wade & Macpherson, 2016).

2.2. Characterization of emergency calls as a genre

Emergency calls have an identifiable structure comparable, up to some general point, to common service calls or service-oriented telephone calls, whose main aim is to request or complain (Zimmerman, 1984), which makes this specific type seem like a familiar telephone interaction for most people (Imbens-Bailey & McCabe, 2000).

Unlike a regular one, an emergency call often will be the beginning of an investigation, particularly if the caller later becomes a suspect (Coulthard & Johnson, 2007). Considering this, having protocols for call takers in order to help to maximize the efficiency of the response and gathering of details is highly important (Wade & Macpherson, 2016). The environment in which the calls develop plays a crucial role together with the time of response, as the fast decision making of the call taker can be essential to stop an ongoing crime (Neusteter et al., 2019).

Emergency calls have a specific structure of turns between caller and dispatcher. The most common structure has 5 identifiable main constituents: (1) an opening sequence, (2) the caller gives the reason for the call, e.g., asking for help; (3) the dispatcher and the caller arrive at a satisfactory description of the emergency. In this stage, the caller may have to elicit further information from the caller, thus opening an "interrogative series"; (4) the dispatcher here may give a response to the emergency of the caller, and lastly, (5) the dispatcher closes the exchange (Zimmerman, 1984). The discourse of the caller in the second stage of an emergency call is also a definitive feature of this class of calls. This type of discourse can include one or more of the following three speech acts: *ask* and *demand* for help, and a *description* that tells the events of the emergency situation within a narrative mode (Imbens-Bailey & McCabe, 2000).

2.2.1. Differences between regular calls and emergency calls

A significant difference between a regular call and an emergency call is the specific structure of the latter. As seen before, an emergency call has a unique general and turn taking structure that differs from the most common call structure. A regular call's opening sequence consists of a summons / answer sequence (when the telephone rings) and an answering response (Hello?), identification / recognition sequence, a greeting sequence and the 'howareyou' sequence. On the other hand, the opening sequence of an emergency call starts with the identification of the entity taking the call (police, medical assistance, 911, etc.), where the standard opening "Nine One One Emergency" or the specification of the place such as "Mid-City Emergency" (Whalen and Zimmerman, 1987) serve as an initiator of a call; in contrast, in a regular call, especially these days, the identification of the caller or the person being called is, often, already visible in cellular phone screens. Another important difference is that emergency call-taking is characterized by the hybridity of mutual influence of speech and text, which means that call taking blends features of service calls, interrogation for the completion of the forms, storytelling, decision making, and evaluation of the emergency (Garner and Johnson, 2006, as

cited in Coulthard and Johnson, 2007), all of this with clear impact on the resulting structure of the emergency call text.

While caller and call taker roles in a regular call may be taken on by different types of participants in an almost unimaginable number of possible situations and for diverse reasons, emergency calls have distinct participants playing defined roles for caller (person in need of assistance) and call taker (dispatcher, policeperson, or negotiator, depending on the nature of the call). In the US, these calls are processed in the Public Service Answering Points, that function locally and independently from each other (Neusteter et al., 2019). Globally, emergency calls are operated by local police authorities, dispatch centers, and medical facilities, due to the highly specific context in which these calls are made (Cromdal, 2012).

In a regular call, the number of turns is equally distributed, while in the case of emergency calls the occurrence of having one turn per caller and dispatcher (caller-operator-caller-operator pattern) is rare (Imbens-Bailey & McCabe, 2000). This can be due to the environment in which the callers are making the call, or to their emotional distress. Dispatchers, then, may have to resort to different strategies to obtain the information needed to make decisions about the caller's emergency, as getting a complete response to be able to correctly interpret it is one of the most important responsibilities of a dispatcher (Zenes et al., 2020).

2.2.2. Roles in an emergency call

As mentioned above, participants in emergency calls have delimited and identifiable roles. One of the roles is the caller, that is, the civilians that make the calls to the emergency call centers. Callers can be victims of a crime, bystanders, witnesses, or even perpetrators. In the case of this study, the callers are divided into two subroles: victims and shooters.

Victims are those who are calling for institutional help —in this study, those calling amidst the chaos and desperation of an ongoing shooting. Their speech is not ruled by protocols, unlike the dispatchers', and in as few words as possible, the victims are expected to convey the nature of their emergency so the dispatchers can provide assistance (Imbens-Bailey & McCabe, 2000). Although victims are often cooperative with call takers, the environment in which the calls take place has an important impact on the emotional state of the callers, as the first information they give can be incomplete or irrelevant, focusing on quick answers or emotional claims (Zenes et al., 2020). As mentioned before, callers can also be the perpetrators of a crime. Two reasons why a perpetrator calls an emergency number are to surrender and to cause terror.

In the first case, a dispatcher can be enough to resolve the situation, while in the second case, a negotiator is needed to bring about a peaceful resolution (Regini, 2002).

In relation to call takers, these can serve both the interrogatory and dispatch functions. However, a call taker cannot function as a negotiator (Neusteter et al., 2019). Dispatchers are trained to overseeing, identifying the problems, making the decisions, and to using different strategies to obtain information from the callers, such as: effective listening, active listening, limiting unnecessary talking or interruptions, remaining objective to the message, paraphrasing what the caller says and using feedback given to the caller to make sure they understood them right, and not formulating an instant response (Belmont Police Department Dispatcher Training Manual, 2019). On the other hand, negotiators belong to a specialized team trained to deal with barricaded persons, suicidal persons, or hostage takers. Their main objective is to resolve the situation in a peaceful manner, with the lowest number of casualties possible, in situations where people are threatening to harm themselves or others (Regini, 2002).

2.3.   Hate crime-related shootings

Mass shootings related to hate crimes have been a major problem for the US government over the past few decades. According to the GVA (Gun Violence Archive), the number of mass shootings increased with the arrival of the global pandemic. Between April 2020 and July 2021, 343 mass shootings were reported, these resulting in 217 people killed (2021). The permissive gun control policies in effect in the US (or lack thereof) are undeniable explanatory factors for the increasing number of mass shootings and other gun-related crimes. This permissiveness in gun control regulation has generated substantial discussion in the media about mass shooting events. For the press, these incidents are highly publicized and generate public awareness, yet homicides generate little attention even though they account for most gun deaths in the US every year (Luca et al., 2020).

In the following section, key concepts will be presented and discussed in order to generate a better understanding of the context in which these emergency calls occur.

2.3.1.   Descriptions of shootings

Despite their shocking effect on the public, criminologists have not given much attention to the precise description of events of mass murder related to gun usage (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). The now growing interest of specialists in mass shooting events is related to how deadly shootings have become in recent decades (Lankford & Silver, 2020). This increase in the severity of the shootings in different locations of the US could be attributed to several factors: the search for

attention and fame (Lankford & Silver, 2029), the high rates of gun ownership and usage, in addition to its accessibility in the population (Luca et al., 2020), a worsening of mental health conditions in the community (Lowe & Galea, 2017; Rosenberg, 2017), and hate crimes (Altschiller, 2015).

The concept of "mass shooting" has been widely discussed by researchers recently, and most agree that the term is associated with events involving the death of 4 or more individuals in a single shooting episode (Fox & DeLateur, 2014; Lankford & Silver, 2019). Part of the complexity of these incidents arises from the fact that they unfold in different ways and with distinctive motivations from case to case. Despite the popular belief that shooters do their deeds spontaneously and indiscriminately, shooters in fact plan their acts well in advance, considering the place where the shooting will take place, what kind of people they will shoot at, and the possible factors that may influence the shooting (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). The motivations that lead shooters to carry out these acts are diverse; however, they are said to be based around 5 main themes: revenge, power, loyalty, terror, and profit (Fox & Levin, 1998).

Despite researchers' extended agreement on the definition of a mass shooting, observations and counterpoints can be made. For example, since mass shootings are considered as such when 4 or more individuals are murdered, the question arises as to whether unsuccessful mass murder attempts could be considered "mass shootings", given that it may be that no individual is actually killed or even seriously wounded (Katsiyannis et al., 2018). This type of observation becomes relevant, since by adding these attempted mass murders, the total number of mass shootings over the last few years would dramatically increase.

As indicated above, mass shootings have become increasingly lethal, especially during the last 15 years, with record breaking statistics regarding lethality. At Virginia Tech in 2007, shooter Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people. Subsequently, at the Orlando Pulse Nightclub in 2016, 49 people were shot and killed. This record was broken again in 2017 where 58 people were killed in a shooting during a music festival held in Las Vegas (Lankford & Silver, 2020).

2.3.2. Descriptions of hate crimes

As already anticipated, shooters are motivated by five main themes: revenge, power, loyalty, terror, and profit (Fox & Levin, 1998). However, from these five themes, many individual motivations can be discerned, which differ from shooter to shooter, ranging from paranoid outbursts to hate crimes. For Leander et al. (2020), most mass shootings cases are considered

to be acts based on and motivated by prejudice or bias against a certain minority group, which are usually classified as hate crimes.

Altschiller (2015) defines a hate crime as a "criminal offense committed against a person or property that is motivated in whole or in part by the offender's bias against a race, religion, ethnic/national origin group or sexual orientation group" (p.4). Some of the most affected groups by prejudice-hate based crimes include African American people, population with disabilities, the LGBTQ+ community, Arab and Muslim people, among many different social actors (Altschiller, 2015). However, there are also discussions of several communities that are also subject of hate crimes who are not usually associated with the previously mentioned ones. Examples of these minorities are homeless people, individuals with mental disorders, and even people with eating disorders (Altschiller, 2015).

Distinguishing a hate crime shooting from cases of extremism, classified as acts of terrorism by the American Government, is a complex task. The complexity lies in the fact that both types of crimes share certain characteristics, as both are intended to create fear in the population and generate collective chaos (Lim, 2009). Nevertheless, there is one aspect that substantially differentiates them: sending a message. In the case of hate crimes, shooters target their victims based on their membership to a certain social group, usually driven by prejudice. On the other hand, terrorism has a clear mission which is to send a message to the population or to the government, regardless of the individuals who will be affected by the shooting or attack (Taylor, 2019). The problem arises since crimes that have been labeled as hate crimes use extremely radical methods to spread fear among the population, methods that are usually attributed to terrorist acts (Brax & Munthe, 2017).

The concepts explained above were introduced to give context regarding the ideas that will be mentioned throughout the investigation. In the following sections, the pragmatic concepts that will be used for the analysis, namely the Cooperative Principle and Brown and Levinson's notion of *Face*, will be introduced, explained, and exemplified. The relationship between these concepts and emergency calls will also be discussed.

2.4. *Cooperativeness and emergency calls*
2.4.1. Pragmatics and Cooperativeness

This investigation is framed within the field of pragmatics, a subdiscipline of linguistics that studies "language use, that is, the study of relation between language and context which is basic to an account of language understanding, and which involves the making of inferences which

will connect what is said to what is mutually assumed or what has been said before." (Levinson, 1983:5). Since both pragmatics and semantics hold "meaning" as an object of study, it is necessary to distinguish some of the differences between both fields. While the latter focuses on meaning in a literal, abstract sense isolated from context, the former explores how speakers are able to discern between explicit and implicit meaning in an utterance. Thomas (1995) further explains that "meaning is a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of meaning between speaker and hearer, the context of utterance (physical, social and linguistic) and the meaning potential of an utterance." (p. 22).

Pragmatics, then, focuses on the study of at least four types of meanings: non-literal, context-dependent, inferential, and/or truth conditional (Birner, 2013). Leech (1983) distinguishes three subfields of pragmatics: Pragmalinguistic, Socio-pragmatics, and General Pragmatics; for the purpose of this investigation, it is the latter that is of interest, as it deals with "the study of linguistic communication in terms of conversational principles" (p. 11). For this field, Grice's seminal contribution on conversational implicatures is central, as he attempts to explain how speakers retrieve meaning from utterances that hold no apparent significance by unconsciously following a set of categories —that will be discussed in more detail in section 2.3.2.

Pragmatics has a long tradition that can be traced to the Greek Sophists that developed a pragmatic philosophy of language that placed more attention on persuasion (Mey, 2013). In modern times, the development of the discipline was inspired by Ferge's work (1892, as cited in Mey, 2013), where this philosopher and mathematician established the differences between sense and reference. From then onwards, several theories that have contributed to research in pragmatics have been proposed, for instance, Austin's Speech Acts theory (1962, as cited in Thomas, 1995), which describes three distinctive acts (locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary), and the later contributions by Searle (1975, as cited in Thomas, 1995) that added five different categorizations into the illocutionary act (assertive, commissive, directive, declaratory and expressive); and last but not least, H.P. Grice's *Cooperative Principle* (1975) that will be essential to this investigation.

In *Logic and Conversation*, Grice (1975) acknowledges the apparent divergences in meaning between formal devices (those of propositional logic such as ~, ∧, ∨, etc.) and their analogs or counterparts in natural language (*not*, *and*, *or*, respectively). He states that, in the latter, there are many inferences and arguments that cannot be expressed in terms of the former; in other words, rules that hold for propositional logic may not hold for its natural counterpart. Therefore, for the author there is not a strict equivalence between formal and natural language,

but merely a set of conventional similarities. To bring light into this problem, he introduces the verb *implicate* and related nouns —like *implicature*— so as to clarify that in natural language, within a given talk exchange, one would have to choose to understand the meaning of an utterance between what it is being said and whatever implicature it may hold.

Some of these implicatures are certainly conventional, as the meaning of the words utilized in a sentence will determine what is being implicated on a general and previously agreed basis, but a whole new subclass of nonconventional implicatures arises when analyzing discourse due to the inherent ambiguity and flexibility of language. In this case, unconventionality refers to the idea that the meaning of an implicature does not depend solely on literal meaning but can be retrieved and completed from both the relevant context and the intention of the speaker. However, this raises the question of how speakers understand each other if they do not express explicitly what they mean. In order to provide an answer, Grice proposes that there must be an underlying principle that participants follow in a conversation, and thus the philosopher of language formulates his *Cooperative Principle* (*CP*), whose main premise is as follows: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (45), and will be explained in more detail in the following section.

Grice's *Logic and Conversation* is, to this day, one of the most important and foundational works not only for the philosophy of language, but also (and especially) for pragmatics. Despite facing criticism over the years, it is still considered by many linguists as the "the backbone of all pragmatics" (Mey, 2013). Moreover, inspired by Grice's work, other contributions such as Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (1994) —which aimed to explain the differences in the informative and communicative intentions of an utterance—, as well as Leech's *Politeness Principle* (1983) —that proposed six categories to illustrate why participants may choose not to adhere to *CP*— have undoubtedly enriched the field of pragmatics thanks to the initial disruption caused by the introduction of the Gricean categories. This had not only a direct effect on the field, but on many other contemporary disciplines throughout the years, affecting even modern computational approaches that study the behavior of natural language based on the fundamental interdisciplinary input from pragmatics, semantics, and philosophy (Schubert, 2020).

2.4.2. Grice's Cooperative Principle: the 4 categories

The importance of Grice's work lies in his description of a general principle (the *CP*) to determine how conversational implicatures are related, to some degree, to making cooperative

efforts given a common purpose in a conversation. Therefore, if there is an assumption that each participant is operating according to the *CP*, then the hearer is capable of retrieving the speaker's implicature, since a basic presumption is at work that each utterance aims to cooperate with the other in order to achieve a set of common —explicit or implicit— purposes, that could be either fixed from the start or may evolve during the exchange. This is why the author argues that exchanges are not "disconnected remarks" (45) but rather, as previously mentioned, they are hints of a cooperative effort between participants. Grice distinguishes four categories that are expected to be observed in a given interaction, namely *Quantity, Quality*, *Relation* —also known as *Relevance*— and *Manner*, under which fall various specific maxims and/or supermaxims that will be revised in the next subsection.

In addition, to clarify the ways in which a participant may or may not observe a maxim and/or supermaxim, the author provides a series of examples to demonstrate how speakers can fail to do so. That is to say, within a given talk exchange, participants could either incur in a *Violation* to a maxim by quietly and unostentatiously generating an implicature; *Opting Out* from the conversation by demonstrating an unwillingness to cooperate in the way a maxim requires; face a *Clash* by being unable to fulfill a maxim from one category without violating a maxim from another one or in facing the *Flouting* of a maxim by blatantly failing to comply with it. These types of situations inspired the work of Thomas (1995), who updated these categories and introduced new ones to describe the differences in failing to meet the maxims, which will be further discussed in section 2.3.3.

2.4.2.1. Quantity

This category relates to the *Quantity* of information to be provided in a conversational exchange and is guided by the following maxims:

- Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of exchange).
- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

According to Grice, the second maxim could be disputable because over-informativeness does not necessarily imply a transgression of the *CP* but can certainly be considered as a waste of time. It could also cause an indirect effect as the hearers may be misled into thinking that there is a particular point being made in providing extra information. This maxim is also closely related to a later maxim that concerns relevance, because its effect is

secure when the presence of the latter is observed. The philosopher exemplifies this situation as follows.

> (1) *Quantity Category - CP*
> Situation: A wants to know whether C is suitable for a job.
> A: I wonder if she is a good worker
> B: *Methinks the lady doth protest too much* (Grice, 1975:53)

Although in (1) B volunteers information that serves the purposes of A, it is arguable that such implicature could be considered as a certainty, as the maxim of *Relevance* is being transgressed, and in doing so, it also drags with it a transgression to the second maxim of *Quantity*. Additionally, among specific expectations connected with at least one of the maxims of *Quantity*, there is an analogue situation existing in the sphere of nonverbal communication, as the next example shows.

> (2) *Quantity Category - CP*
> Situation: A assists B mending a car.
> A: I need four screws
> B: (*Hands over four screws)* (Grice, 1975:47)

As seen in (2), A expects the contribution to be neither more nor less than is required, and B understands this implicature by handing over the exact needed number of screws, and not two or six screws, thus both maxims of *Quantity* are observed even when there is no talk exchange in this interaction.

2.4.2.2. Quality

The second category deals with the quality of an utterance under the supermaxim of 'Trying to make a contribution one that is true' (46), and two more specific maxims:

- Do not say what you believe to be false.
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

In this case, Grice lists four different recognized figures of speech to demonstrate the different ways in which the first maxim of this category can be flouted. The use of these examples permits a deeper comprehension of how an analysis of *CP* can be conducted, as the following situation embodies.

> (3) *Quality Category - CP*
> Situation: B betrayed A by revealing A's secret.

A: B is such a fine friend! (Grice, 1975:53)

Because there is a previously known context in example (3), it seems obvious that A is using irony as a resource to express something that is not believed to be true, due to the fact that the implicature points out to the contrary of what is being said, thus a *Flouting* of *Quality* can be identified. Moreover, among the expectations associated with at least one of the maxims of *Quality*, there is also a similar circumstance occurring on the sphere of nonverbal communication, as the following example illustrates:

(4) *Quality Category - CP*
Situation: A needs B to handle some ingredients.
A: I need sugar for this cake
B: (*Hands over salt)* (Grice, 1975:47)

In (4) the expected contribution was that of a genuine and not a spurious gesture of assistance, but since the action of handing salt could be interpreted as a falsely provided contribution with a clear different purpose than that of assisting in the cooking process, another type of *Flouting* to the category of *Quality* can be observed.

2.4.2.3. Relevance (or Relation)

This is the most criticized category of Grice's work, due to its subjectiveness and overall difficulty in the treatment of the definition of relevance as a concept (Mey, 2013). At the same time, this category is so important that it inspired the later work of Sperber & Wilson (1986), whose cognitive approach to pragmatics led them to consider that a speaker and the hearer must consider relevant the information they provide and/or hear in order to communicate with each other, and the information that is not considered of significance in the current context is simply dismissed. That is why they propose that "Relevance, and the maximization of relevance is the key to human cognition" (1994:91).

The single maxim that Grice proposes is the following:
- Be relevant.

By proposing a single maxim under this category, Grice himself is capable of anticipating the issues that may surface given the "terse" formulation, as it is left unclear what the types and levels of relevance are, and the ways in which what is understood by "relevant" may shift if the exchange requires so. Nevertheless, he does not propose a solution to these points. The category is exemplified by the author as follows.

(5) *Relevance Category - CP*
Situation: A asks B about C.
A: How is C getting into their job?
B: *Oh, quite well, I think; they like their colleagues, and they haven't been to prison yet.*
(Grice, 1975:43)

Even though in (5) B offers information that can be considered to serve the purposes of A, whatever B implied in their utterance is quite distinctive from what B actually said. Therefore, as the maxim of *Relevance* is being transgressed because many implicatures can be retrieved from the utterance, as it might be the case that C be the kind of person that is likely to yield to the temptations of their occupation or that C's colleagues be very unpleasant and treacherous people, the speaker B fails to follow the *CP*, as the answer (that C has not been to prison yet) is not relevant for the purposes of the question, and with it, it could also fail to meet other maxims of *Quality* and *Manner*. Moreover, among other types of expectations that are connected with the single maxim of this category, there is an analogue situation existing in the sphere of nonverbal communication, as the next example shows.

(6) *Relevance Category - CP*
Situation: A and B are cooking.
A: I need to mix these ingredients.
B: *Hands over a book.* (Grice, 1975:47)

As seen in (6), A expects the contribution to be appropriate to their immediate needs at each stage of the transaction in the cooking situation, and B makes it clear that they do not understand this implicature when handing over something very different from the needed ingredients, a book, which has nothing to do with cooking, and thus is not relevant. In this way, an instance of *Flouting* to the category of *Relevance* can be appreciated, even when there is no verbal exchange in this interaction.

2.4.2.4. Manner

The fourth and final category is not related to what is said (like the previous categories), but rather to how it is being said. Grice includes the supermaxim 'Be perspicuous' and four maxims:

- Avoid obscurity of expression.
- Avoid ambiguity.
- Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

- Be orderly.

As previously mentioned, Grice gives various examples to show the different ways in which one could fail to follow certain *CP* categories, and in this case, he includes a distinct situation for each maxim that fails to meet the supermaxim of being perspicuous, putting special emphasis on the maxim that indicates to avoid ambiguity. The understanding of this category is somewhat more straightforward, as obscurity of expression can be deduced from a given tone or general context in which an utterance is produced, while being brief is clearly related to the non-tedious length of an expression, and if there is not an orderly utterance, the turns of the interaction are evidently lost and thus, cannot be considered as an actual conversational exchange. The following example illustrates how the first maxim of *Manner* can be transgressed.

(7) *Manner Category - CP*
"I sought to tell my love, love that never told can be" (Grice, 1975:54)

Due to the fact that Grice was concerned only with deliberate ambiguity, he provides the situation seen in (7) as an example that could be considered to have a double ambiguity. This is so because it is part of a literary resource utilized by the poet Blake, where the phrase "my love" may refer to either a state of emotion or an object of emotion, and "love that never told can be" may mean either that love cannot be told, or that love that is told cannot continue to exist. Thus, there is no other alternative than to suppose that it is the poet's intention to be deliberate in his ambiguity, as interpretation in poetry is often a suggested matter and not always an explicit one. Moreover, among the expectations associated with at least one of the maxims of *Manner*, there is also a similar circumstance that can be observed on the sphere of nonverbal communication, as the following example illustrates.

(8) *Manner Category - CP*
Situation: A is out of gas and asks B for help.
A: I am out of petrol
B: *Points out to a nearby garage with a head mov*e (Grice, 1975:51)

In (8) the expected contribution is that of a clear utterance that also has to be performed with a reasonable celerity; however, even when the purpose of A may be served by B's expression, there is a certain obscurity in choosing only to point with a head movement to the solution of the problem because there is an implicature of non-willingness to help A, as B could have

perfectly uttered the sentence "*There is a garage around the corner*". Therefore, an instance of *Flouting* to the category of *Manner* can be observed as its first maxim is being transgressed.

All things considered, Grice's proposition of a general principle that allowed the study of conversational implicatures based on these four categories was, in fact, the basis of several later works of pragmatics that have explained in further detail the different ways in which a category may fail to be observed. Newer investigations have not only kept some of the initial categories for *CP* transgressions described by the philosopher of language, but also updated and reorganized these categories, which proved fundamental to conduct the analysis presented in this report. In the next section, both the original and the additional transgressions will be characterized and exemplified at greater length.

2.4.3.   Aversion and type of Aversion

As discussed above, the *CP* categories are not always observed. A speaker can fail to observe the categories' maxims for a number of reasons, which range from imperfect linguistic performance to the generation of a conversational implicature —that is, the addition of another level of meaning to the utterance. Grice (1975) distinguishes between two types of non-observance of the categories: violation, which is explained by the "supposition of a clash with another maxim" (p. 51), and exploitation, which supposes a conversational implicature (p. 52). For the purposes of this investigation, the categorization for the non-observance —from now on *Aversion*— of the *CP* categories will be based on Thomas' organization. Thomas (1995) distinguishes between 5 types of *Aversion*: *Flouting, Violation, Infringing, Opting out,* and *Suspending*, each corresponding to different ways of failing to observe a category.

For the present investigation, *Suspending* will not be considered in the analysis as a type of *Aversion*, as it was not considered relevant due to the lack of identified instances in the corpora. Suffice it here to say that *Suspending* takes place in an interaction when "there is no need to opt out of observing the maxims" (Thomas, 1995:76) because there is no expectation from any of the participants that they will be observed. For this reason, non-observance does not generate a conversational implicature. The 4 types of *Aversion* considered for the corpus analysis will be explained in the following subsections.

2.4.3.1.   Flouting

This type of *Aversion* takes place when the speaker overtly fails to observe a maxim of a determined category with no intention of deceiving or misleading, but of prompting the hearer

to search for meaning different from the explicitly expressed one, that is, with the deliberate intention of generating a conversational implicature (Thomas, 1995). To illustrate this type of A*version*, an example where the category of *Quality* is flouted will be presented:

> (9) *Flouting - Aversion*
> "Late on Christmas eve 1993 an ambulance is sent to pick up a man who has collapsed in Newcastle city center. The man is drunk and vomits all over the ambulance man who goes to help him. The ambulance man says: 'Great, that's really great! That's made my Christmas!'" (Thomas, 1995:55).

In (9), the ambulance man means the exact opposite of what was said, rendering the statement false and, at the same time, generating a conversational implicature.

2.4.3.2.   Violation

The *Violation* of a category is the "unostentatious non-observance of a maxim" (1995: 72). This means that when a speaker violates the maxim of a category, they are likely to generate an implicature that is intentionally misleading. The implicature can be expressed by saying a truth to imply an untruth (Thomas, 1995). An example can be found in (9):

> (10) *Violation - Aversion*
> "*Alice has been refusing to make love to her husband. At first he attributes this to post-natal depression, but then he starts to think she may be having an affair:*
> [...] 'Is there another man?'
> Alice raised her chin and looked at him squarely.
> 'No,' she said. 'There isn't another man.' [...]" (Thomas, 1995: 73)

Later, it is known that Alice was not having an affair with another man, but with a woman. However, nothing in her statement would lead her husband to believe that she was failing to disclose information. This *Violation* to *Quantity* carries an intention to mislead the hearer (Thomas, 1995).

2.4.3.3.   Infringing

The infringement of a maxim, which is not exemplified in the consulted source, takes place when the speaker fails to observe a maxim with no intention of misleading, deceiving, or generating an implicature. This *Aversion* arises from an "imperfect linguistic performance" (1995:74), rather than from the active intention of the speaker to generate a conversational implicature. It can occur because of a speaker's linguistic competence, a cognitive impairment,

or because the speaker is simply unable to produce an utterance that observes every maxim of every *CP* category (Thomas, 1995).

2.4.3.4. Opting out

This last type of *Aversion*, for which there is also no example available in Thomas' (1995) work, occurs when a speaker is unwilling to cooperate in a way that would observe the maxims in each *CP* category. It is usually caused in the interest of the speaker of not generating an implicature or appearing as non-cooperative. This type of *Aversion* generally occurs when the speaker cannot provide the information requested —for legal or moral reasons—, such as what happens with lawyers and priests and the professional secrecy they are sworn to (Thomas, 1995).

As seen above, the non-observation of *CP* categories not only occurs when the speaker generates a conversational implicature by adding extra layers of meaning to their utterance, lending the hearer the responsibility of finding these implicatures and interpreting them to understand what the speaker wanted to say. *Aversion* can also take place when the speaker is unable to produce a satisfying answer that *Adheres* to *CP* without the intention of generating an implicature, or when the speaker is unwilling to cooperate for legal or moral reasons.

2.4.4. Cooperative Principle in emergency calls

After having explained Grice's *CP*, the nature of emergency calls, and the basic characteristics of hate-motivated mass shootings, it is now possible to discuss the *CP's* usefulness in the examination of emergency calls from a pragmatic perspective, since effective communication —understood as the achievement of the participants' purposes in the exchange— and willingness to give information to emergency operators —dispatchers, police officers, or negotiators— is essential to provide the needed assistance. Likewise, the callers' *Adherence* and/or *Aversion* to the *CP* is relevant to comprehend the meaning behind the callers' utterances, as the conversational implicatures involved in their statements can make the difference when obtaining (or not) what they need from the call takers.

As mentioned before, emergency calls can be difficult to manage from the call taker perspective, as oftentimes the person requiring assistance may undergo severe emotional distress or extreme pain, which might interfere when providing information to the operator, therefore it may be expected that the *CP* be suspended. As Thomas (2013:62) explains, "there will be times when we may suspend our assumption that our interlocutor is operating according

to the same conversational norms as we are (…) to a drunk, to someone in pain or distress.". Nonetheless, because there is a lack of research on how the *CP* works in emergency situations, it may be the case that the communication between operator and caller —despite the latter's emotional state— is still characterized by observance of Grice's principle. After all, its main premise requires that the contribution made be as efficient, truthful, relevant, and brief as possible to comply with the caller's purpose that demands swiftness in order to receive assistance.

Research on the operation of the *CP* in emergency calls is anything but prolific. However, Boy & Siregar (2020) recently studied how the *CP* is followed in the context of emergency calls —or more precisely, in a negotiation. The authors examined the negotiation's transcriptions from the Pulse Nightclub shooting in 2016, to quantify the level of *Adherence* to *CP* categories and the number of times the suspect violates a category. Their results indicated a significant difference between *Adherence* and *Aversion* percentages, which suggests that the suspect relied on violating categories "to maintain control over the verbal exchange by limiting opportunities for the other speaker to balance or dominate the conversation". (p. 259). Despite these thought-provoking results, further research and discussion regarding *CP* in emergency calls is needed to support this statement.

Section 2.4 discusses what is understood by politeness in the field of pragmatics alongside the developments in that area and its main authors. Also, the discipline's central concepts, such as *Negative* and *Positive Face* will be explained and illustrated. Finally, the following section discusses the importance of politeness in the study of emergency calls.

2.5.   *Politeness and emergency calls*
2.5.1.   Pragmatics and Politeness

This section introduces the concept of Politeness as a pragmatic phenomenon and how its developments have been critical for the study of interactive linguistic behavior. Politeness is a strategy (or a series of strategies) employed by a speaker to cause a desired effect on the hearer, commonly oriented towards a positive outcome like promoting or maintaining relations (Thomas, 2013). Starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s, the examination of strategically employed forms of language in use have captivated the field of pragmatics, furthering its research of meaning in interaction, which considers context (physical, social, and linguistic) and intentionality behind linguistic structures as determinants for meaning (Thomas, 2013).

The pragmatic research of Politeness began under the influence of Grice's CP. Following its four categories, Politeness is set into operation if one or more of these categories

are flouted with the intention to be perceived as impolite (Thomas, 2013). Leech (1983) was first to attempt to model the phenomenon of Politeness across languages theoretically, introducing the Politeness Principle (PP) which tries to explain why speakers do not always follow the CP through a number of categories of their own making, which are Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy. According to Leech, these are simply statements of norms which speakers can be observed to follow as a means to an end (Leech, 2014).

As a response to Leech's PP, Brown and Levinson (1987) proposed a ground-breaking universalistic model to account for the basics of Politeness across languages and cultures, approaching polite behavior as a rational phenomenon in which Politeness comes into existence with the other's *Face* needs in mind (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Within Politeness theory, "face" is best understood as every individual's self-image, which has two aspects: "positive" and "negative", both explained in 2.1.2. Brown and Levinson introduced the notion that certain illocutionary acts can damage or threaten another person's *Positive* or *Negative Face*, known as "face-threatening acts" (FTAs), which urges the speaker to deploy certain strategies to reduce these possible threats, thus maintaining a convenient, mutually beneficial interactional harmony. However, Politeness is not obligatory; people can be non-polite as well (Leech, 2014). But according to Brown and Levinson (1987), while there is cultural variation in terms of interactional behavior based on the concept of "face", their model can easily capture the logic of Politeness in any language and culture.

Leech's and Brown and Levinson's "means-to-ends", strategic, rationalistic approaches constitute the origins of pragmatic-based research on Politeness; however, they were not exempt from criticism. Non-Western scholars such as Matsumoto (1988) pointed out that these theories rely too heavily on Western interactive culture by suggesting the notion that an individual freely chooses linguistic strategies subject to achieve a desired interpersonal effect in a given context. For instance, Brown and Levinson's concept of "positive" or "negative" *Face* as a "socially given self-image" is not applicable to Eastern cultures like Japan, whose social structure relies on hierarchical relations between people. In Japanese culture, the universality of *Positive* or *Negative Face* proposed by Brown and Levinson is not applicable because people are socially expected to act accordingly to their position in relation to others in the ranking, and to maintain said positions through language by employing Politeness strategies. In a society that encourages interdependence among individuals rather than individuality, speech acts that are considered *Negative FTAs* such as impositions or requests in Western cultures, are considered as an honor to perform in Japan because being asked by

someone of a higher position to do or to be responsible for something is regarded as an upgrade of one's current social position (Matsumoto, 1988). The high impact of these universalistic frameworks and their criticism could be referred to as the "first wave" of Politeness research.

The second wave of Politeness research understood this concept as a culture-based, individual phenomenon that co-constructed itself through interaction in idiosyncratic ways (Kádár, 2017). It focused on the close examination of naturally occurring data in very specific contexts, and not on the universalistic theory that the usage of Politeness strategies is premeditated as a means to achieve a predictable effect on the hearer. Authors such as Bravo (2004) and Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2004) criticized the universalistic model of Brown and Levinson, arguing that the very specific socio-cultural context should be the base of Politeness research to understand how socio-cultural factors influence the usage of Politeness strategies (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2004). Due to its fixation on idiosyncratic behavior, second wave research has tended to focus on Politeness as an isolated phenomenon —a form of behavior with no constraints, which is co-constructed freely as the interaction takes place (Kádár, 2017). This wave, despite pointing out the weaknesses of universalistic frameworks, has not left aside the possibility of creating models at a macro-level that could capture the production and evaluation of Politeness in speech acts.

While the first wave of Politeness research attempted to model Politeness across languages and cultures through universalistic frameworks, and the second wave attempted to approach it as an individualistic, idiosyncratic, interactionally co-constructed phenomenon, the third wave that is currently in development, strives to reach a middle ground where Politeness can be modeled across languages and cultures, without disregarding its examination as an interactionally co-constructed, situated phenomenon (Kádár, 2017). The study of Politeness and its more recent developments provided by researchers such as Culpeper (2011) or Kádár (2013) could be a path to satisfactorily explain the reason behind non-cooperative behavior in interaction in a given context.

2.5.2.   Face and Face Threatening Acts (*FTAs*)

The notion of *Face* from now on presented in this work is that of Brown and Levinson (1987). *Face* is understood as the visible image of oneself when communicating and interacting with others. It is attached to the emotional and social sense of self, hence it can be "lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:61). In other words, it can be said that *Face* is the public self-image, the aspects of ourselves that are shown to others when interacting with them in order to avoid humiliation and

keep the good perceptions others have of us intact, hence why depending on the situation one can also "lose face". In interaction people seek to maintain *Face* while also assuming others do the same: "everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:61), therefore if threatened, people will try to defend their *Face*. It is from this concept where the notions of *Positive* and *Negative Face*, *Face Threatening Act*, and *Mitigation* are introduced.

Maintaining *Face* is, then, one of the main concerns of every participant of an interaction. Every speaker has their own characteristics, that is, basic wants and desires ("face wants"). In general, every speaker knows the other's communicative desires and they try to satisfy each other's wishes, such as to not be bothered by others or to be valued for one's qualities, etc. Therefore, *Face* composes itself of two related aspects: *Positive* and *Negative Face*. *Positive Face* is the pursuit of acceptance or desirability of one's wants. It refers to one's self-esteem, the (individual) desire of a person for their personality to be admired, understood, approved of, liked, or ratified by others (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This includes the way a person wants to be perceived by their social group. One example of *Face* work oriented to pleasing *Positive Face* is the appreciation of individual achievements or possessions, such as praises and compliments. On the other hand, *Negative Face* is the want of non-imposition. It is the personal right of an individual to do as they please without being impeded by others. Examples of acts that may affect one's *Negative Face* include those that impede freedom of action, such as demands, orders, threats, and reminders —as well as giving thanks, compliments, and gifts, since these are acts that still expect a desired action from the hearer that they may not really want to carry out, thus impeding their freedom of action.

A *Face Threatening Act* (from now on *FTA*) is an act that threatens the *Face* of an individual. An *FTA* can challenge the *Face* of either the speaker or the hearer, and they can affect either the *Positive Face*, the *Negative Face*, and sometimes both at the same time. *FTAs* that threaten the *Positive Face* intend to portray that the speaker and the hearer of an interaction do not share the same desires, by "indicating (potentially) that the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants, etc." (Brown and Levinson, 1987:66). Said acts include expressions of disagreement, disapproval, criticism, etc. Moreover, those *FTAs* that challenge the *Negative Face* indicate that the speaker impedes the hearer's freedom of action. Said acts of imposition include orders and requests, suggestions, advice, reminders, threats, warnings, and dares, as well as those that predicate a future act of the speaker toward the hearer, e.g., offers and promises. They also include those that illustrate desire of the speaker toward the

hearer or the hearer's goods, e.g., compliments and expressions of envy or admiration; and expressions of strong (negative) emotions toward the hearer (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

Not all *FTAs* are intrinsically straightforward: blatant acts are of regular occurrence, but so are the subtle ones, too. Being subtle when executing an *FTA* does not mean a person is no longer threatening another's *Face* but is actually mitigating in their act. Fraser's (1980) conceptualization of *Mitigation* aims to reduce the unwelcome effects a speech act has on the hearer. It is hence a modification of a speech act and is composed of two types: self-serving and altruistic (Fraser, 1980). To mitigate is to soften the effects of speech acts that, as illustrated above, might threaten *Face*, and it does not intend to alleviate a previously existing troubled state but to ease what is to come. Fraser's (1980) strategies that intend to mitigate this unwelcome effect include indirectness, the use of distracting techniques, parenthetical verbs, tag questions, and hedges.

2.5.3. Politeness: Positive and Negative

An important factor that must be considered at the moment of analyzing *Politeness* in different communicative interactions are the cultural differences, since what may be considered as polite in one culture may not be considered polite in another. (Leech, 2014; Kádár, 2017). Within the concept of *Politeness* there is a distinction made between *Positive Politeness* and *Negative Politeness* (Brown and Levinson, 1987; Leech, 2014), each having the same aim, but using different politeness strategies. *Positive Politeness* gives 'positive value to the addressee' (Leech, 2014), therefore its strategies have to do with the act of flattering the other in order to maintain (or get) a positive result in the communicative interaction. One of the most common *Positive Politeness* strategies, proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987), suggests that the Speaker (S) notices and attends to the addressee's condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything which looks as though H would want S to notice and approve of it) (Brown and Levinson, 1987), in order to empathize with them hence creating a more pleasant interaction, for example:

> *You must be hungry, it's a long time since breakfast. How about some lunch?* (Brown and Levinson, 1987:103)

On the other hand, *Negative politeness* deals with *Mitigation*, in other words 'to reduce or lessen possible causes of offense' (Leech, 2014), as it is focused on preventing the utterance of having the slightest rough tone that may offend the H —for example, instead of saying "Say that again", preferring the mitigated form "Could you say that again?" (Leech, 2014). In that

example, the imperative utterance was mitigated by communicating it in the form of a question (Leech, 2014), thus giving clear option for H's rejection without affecting much one's *Face*.

Since language *Politeness* is directly related to the social function of language, its presence and level (exaggerations, repetitions, etc.) depend on the context:

> *Just suppose we are no longer in a concert hall, but in a football stadium. The footballer who scores a goal, instead of bowing meekly, is likely to execute some kind of war-dance, signaling his delight and self-congratulation. Instead of meekness, he shows exultation: "Wow! I am the greatest!" The crowd cheer him, but the cheers could have quickly changed to jeers and boos if he had committed a fatal error and deprived his team of victory. The difference between this and the concert is that the one occasion is almost a kind of ritualized war-fare, whereas the other is not.* (Leech, 2014:5)

In some contexts, then, and similarly to what happens regarding cultural differences, as mentioned above, certain language actions may be considered as polite, while others may not.

Finally, there are some cases in which there are no *Politeness* strategies (minimization of the *Face* threat) at all. For example, situations of urgency where the highest level of efficiency is needed in which the utterances "Help!" or "Watch out!" are most commonly present. In these cases, the use of *Politeness* strategies would only difficult the main urgent aim of the utterance (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This exception gains importance at the moment of analyzing communicative interactions that demand urgency, as it is the case of this research as it examines emergency calls.

2.5.4. Impoliteness and Face Threatening Acts (*FTAs*)

Since *Politeness* is concerned with the use of language and behavior to maintain a socially accepted appearance— and interactions—, *Impoliteness* deals with the use of language strategies to harm the 'face' or 'identity' of the other person in the communicative interaction (Culpeper, 2011), with the intention of defending personal interests, beliefs, attitudes, among others, or with the intention of threatening the other party's 'face wants' (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

Impoliteness has been understood as a matter of perlocutionary effects (Fraser and Nolen, 1981; Fraser, 1999), due to the subjective quality it has as something can be understood as impolite —or rude— by some people, but not by others. Culpeper (2005) proposes this idea in the following form:

> *Impoliteness comes about when:*
> *(1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or*
> *(2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behavior as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2).* (Culpeper, 2005:38)

Therefore, the *Face* of each participant of the communicative interaction —S and H — gains more attention as the previously mentioned harms (or attacks) are the form in which the Impoliteness strategies are represented. Following this idea, Brown and Levinson's concept of *FTAs* comes as a way of categorizing the different types of attacks made from one party to the other.

FTAs are subdivided into those which threaten a person's *Positive Face* (the desirable self-image, which is also likable for the others), and those which threaten their *Negative Face* (personal interests, defense of beliefs) (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Within this distinction, Brown and Levinson (1987) present a series of categorizations of different situations and speech acts that are understood as *FTAs* (due to the vast quantity of categorizations, only those which regard the analysis of this research will be displayed):

- Acts that threaten the addressee's (H's) *Negative Face*'s want as the Speaker presses them to perform/ or not A (act). In this category are found: a) orders and requests, b) suggestions and advice, c) reminders, d) threat, warnings, dares.

- Acts that show S's negative evaluation of some characteristic of H's *Positive Face*. In this category are found: a) expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complaints and reprimands, accusations, insults; b) contradictions or disagreements, challenges.

- Acts that show S's indifference to H's feelings. In this category are found: a) expressions (out of control) emotions; b) irreverence, mentioning taboo topics including those that are inappropriate in the context; c) bringing of bad news about H, or good news (boasting) about S; d) raising of dangerously emotional or divisive topics as politics, race, religion, women's liberation; e) blatant non-cooperation in an activity; f) use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial encounters.

Finally, *Impoliteness* does not represent an absolute absence of *Politeness*, as *Politeness* is not obligatory (Culpeper, 2011; Leech, 2014). Impolite utterances can be present within a communicative interaction without necessarily intending them as an act of *Impoliteness*, as there has to be an attack to the *Positive Face* or *Negative Face* of one of the parties in the interaction for it to be considered as *Impoliteness*.

2.5.5. Politeness in emergency calls

Emergency call takers are trained to be communication professionals able to display the institutionally expected demeanor of polite and helpful agents, prepared to talk with callers in stressful situations (like mass shootings), managing to elicit critical information from them in a calm, courteous, and direct manner (Tracy & Tracy, 1998) through a routinary protocol of interaction. In an emergency call context, callers use two linguistic strategies to elicit a response: a demand or a request for help, or a description of the emergency. Emergency call takers, or *dispatchers* from now on, need clear responses in order to decide whether it is necessary to dispatch an officer according to the gravity of the events (Coulthard and Johnson, 2007), heavily relying on the caller's *Adherence* to the *CP*, which can be affected by external factors such as context and emotional state.

Highlighting the importance of the context in which the call is made and having in mind what was already described in 2.4.4, the absence of *Politeness* strategies to elicit a response might harm the 'face' or 'identity' of others (in this case the dispatcher) in emergency calls. Callers find themselves in situations of stress oftentimes mixed with anxiety, which might lead to impolite responses. Section 2.4.4 illustrates impolite acts that are commonly used during an emergency call. Said acts, and more specifically, *FTAs*, are commonly present in the examples given in the Results and Discussion section below.

But threatening or attacking *Face* is not always a conscious act. Depending on the caller and the call's purpose, the intention behind an utterance becomes clearer. For example, in the Results and Discussion section it will be seen that, even when victims during mass shootings perform *FTAs* by making requests or straight-forward demands from dispatchers, victims also make the effort to *mitigate* said acts to reduce the unwelcomed effect on the dispatchers, so they can demonstrate that there is not an intention to be impolite to them as callers are in need of the dispatchers' assistance. On the other hand, 911 calls made by shooters might sometimes present instances of intentional impoliteness, as given the situation their purpose is not to reduce negative reactions, but to ignite and fuel them.

In the next section, the methodology for the development of the corpora analysis will be described and explained, and the corpora description, research questions, and objectives will be presented as well.

3. Methodology

The following section, first, explains how the data was collected, selected, and organized. Subsequently, the calls constituting the corpora will be briefly described considering the main characteristics of each criminal case, establishing whether the call involved interaction between dispatcher/negotiator-shooter, or between dispatcher/negotiator-victim. The social context in which these shootings took place will then be described. Finally, the research questions and the general and specific objectives of this investigation will be presented.

3.1.   Procedures

Having decided to work with emergency calls in the context of mass shootings, the first step was to identify cases in which calls were made during and after the attacks, prioritizing those in which both the audio and the transcription were available to the public. However, in specific cases like Orlando victims' calls, no audio was available. Furthermore, as these events had similar characteristics related to the motive, shootings identified as hate crimes were the last criterion. Regarding the precision of the location, the publicly available cases that were used to build this corpus were coincidentally found in different states from the US. Secondly, from this initial search, only the emergency calls that met two selection criteria were selected for analysis, namely, having clear audio files or transcriptions available —Orlando victims' calls being the exception to this rule—, and the length of the calls had to be over 100 words otherwise they would be too short to analyze. In the case of Pulse Nightclub shooting that had multiple transcripts available, it was decided to choose four to analyze through a semi-systematic selection, that is to say, corpora were randomly chosen among the material that was considered appropriate for this research.

After obtaining the transcripts for the ten calls, it was decided to analyze them under Grice's *CP* categories, considering the instances of *Adherence* and *Aversion* as well as type of *Aversion*. Regarding this matter, it was further proposed that to describe the cooperative behavior of each participant, it was necessary to analyze each instance in relation to *CP*. In relation to *Politeness*, Brown and Levinson's concepts were used to analyze the polite behavior of victims and shooters. For this purpose, a matrix was designed with the aim of observing how each aspect was displayed in the call, and to facilitate making connections between them. This matrix was later simplified into tables to present the results for each call. It must be noted that since the ten calls had different lengths, results regarding linguistic behavior were always interpreted in relation to the internal proportions of each emergency call.

3.2. *Description of corpora*

The corpora that will be examined in this investigation consists of ten calls from four different hate crime related mass shootings, which will be presented in chronological order in the next section. The calls are subdivided into two groups of victims and shooters', and each will contain a brief description pointing out basic aspects such as length, place, and time in which the call was taken (if this information was available). Calls will then be analyzed in the Results & Discussion section regarding the *CP*, politeness, and *FTAs* and *Mitigation*, to conclude with relevant observations which will lead to a further understanding of the study.

3.2.1. Victims

3.2.1.1. Charleston Church Shooting, South Carolina (2015)

On June 17th, 2015, at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, North Carolina, a 21-year-old white American man named Dylann Roof opened fire with a handgun at approximately 9:00 p.m. The shooter killed nine members of ages 26 to 87 from the Church's Bible study group —also known as "The Emanuel Nine"—, while five other people managed to survive the attack. The corpus consists of a call made by Polly Sheppard, a surviving victim that asks for help while she was hiding under a table in the lower level of the church. The call was taken at approximately 9:05 p.m., and it was 5:12 minutes long with a total of 607 words. The call transcription was taken from ABC4 news website (2016).

The reasons behind Roof's actions were stated on his website, where a white supremacist manifesto was posted on February of the same year —in which he also expressed his interest in Charleston for carrying out his idea—, along with pictures of himself displaying the Confederate flag and burning the flag of the United States. The perpetrator's racist thoughts were based on the idea that the African American people had corrupted the American society, so he carried out the shooting in a traditional, holy setting for the African American community with the intention to "send them a message".

3.2.1.2. Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida (2016)

On June 12th, 2016, at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, 29-year-old Afghan American man Omar Mateen entered the club at 2:02 a.m. while armed with a semi-automatic rifle and a handgun. He shot around 102 innocent victims, leaving 49 deceased, 53 injured, and another five people with non-gunshot related afflictions. The corpora that will be analyzed corresponds to four emergency calls that were made between 2:03 am and 3:00 am, when the shooting was

still in progress. In total, four calls were selected from this shooting. Transcripts were retrieved from the Orlando city website (2019), which holds the official records from the shooting.

The first call was taken by a male operator named Joe at 2:03 am, the caller being a female victim hiding in a closet with several other people, all unharmed. This is the longest call from Pulse Nightclub transcripts with 1,272 words in total. Then, the next two selected 911 calls were taken by the same female dispatcher, named Arnesta; the first one had 670 words, it occurred at 2:03 am and was made by a male victim who presumably was hiding in the bathroom of the club. The second one was made by a man who was shot in the leg and its time remains unknown. This is the shortest call from Pulse Nightclub with 178 words. The last chosen call, with a total of 312 words, was made by a person —whose sex cannot be clarified during the conversation— who had been shot in the arm, and that was hiding in a bathroom inside the club with about 20 other people. The Fire Department alongside a dispatcher, whose characteristics are unable to identify, responded to the call.

3.2.2. Shooters

3.2.2.1. Hartford Distributors Shooting, Connecticut (2010)

On August 3rd, 2010, Omar Sheriff Thornton, a 34-year-old African American man, arrived at his workplace (Hartford Distributors) in Manchester, Connecticut, at approximately 7 a.m. after being called in for a disciplinary meeting for being caught stealing beer from the truck he used to drive. After the meeting, he pulled a semi-automatic pistol from his lunchbox and started shooting for approximately three minutes. An estimated 40 workers were in the facility at the time, and the shooting resulted in the killing of eight workers and wounding two others. The shooter eventually committed suicide by shooting himself in the head after the violent episode. The data corresponds to a call between the gunman and a 911 male dispatcher. The call is 03:59 minutes long and the total of words spoken during the call was 681. The transcript of the call was obtained from the Hartford Courant website (2011). Details about the shooting were acquired from The New York Times and NBC news.

According to the shooter, and in conversation with his family members, his motives were possibly based on the alleged racial discrimination by his co-workers, although emotions of fear and frustration due to his eventual dismissal from the company could also be assumed as triggering factors. As claimed by his uncle, the shooter's cell phone contained images of the word "nigger" and a hangman's noose written on a Hartford Distributors toilet wall. However, other minority workers who were interviewed by the police said that the workplace was not a

racist one, hence the investigation concluded that the shooter mistakenly convinced himself that he was a target of his primarily white co-workers.

3.2.2.2.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida (2016)

As described before, during the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando on June 12th, 2016, 29-year-old Afghan American Omar Mateen entered the club at 2:02 a.m. and shot around 102 innocent victims, leaving 49 deceased, 53 injured, and another five people with other types of afflictions. The corpus that will be analyzed corresponds to the single 911 call made by Mateen and three negotiation calls with the negotiator from the Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) assigned to the case, Sergeant Andy Brennan. The official transcripts and audios of the calls were obtained from the Orlando city website (2019).

The first call made by Mateen is 00:52 seconds long, being the shortest one of the corpora, and the total of words interchanged is 63. The second call corresponds to the first call between the CNT assigned to the case and the shooter. The call is 09:21 minutes long and was made at 2:48 AM, with a total of 920 words exchanged. The second call between Mateen and the negotiator is 16:05 minutes long, the longest out of the three with a total of 1,092 words. The third call between the shooter and the negotiator takes place at 3:23 a.m. The call is 1:53 minutes long, the shortest in length out of the four calls with a total of 166 words.

The motive behind this mass shooting was related to nationalism due to Mateen's insistence in spreading a ceasing fire message to the United States to stop the attacks on Syria and Iraq, besides his multiple pledges of allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

3.2.2.3.   Poway Synagogue Shooting, California (2019)

On April 27th, 2019, at the Chabad of Poway Synagogue in Poway, California, 19-year-old white American John Earnest opened fire on the scene at approximately 11:23 p.m. with a semi-automatic rifle. The gunman shot into a room that had at least a hundred people inside, leaving one fatal victim and three others injured, including the Rabbi of the congregation and an 8-year-old girl. The corpus that will be examined consists of the emergency call made by the shooter himself to report the situation 4 minutes after it happened, where the participants are identified as a 911 dispatcher, a local Sheriff's Department representative, and the caller himself. The call is 12 minutes long, and the total number of words is 1,191. The transcript was obtained from NBC San Diego news website (2019)

As stated extensively in a manifesto that was published by Earnest on an online forum just moments before the shooting, the reasons behind his atrocious acts were clearly connected to ideas from a similar mass shooting that had taken place in New Zealand only a month prior to this attack. Anti-Semitic, nationalist, and racist behaviors were there justified by articulating a Christian salvation explanation through a 'cleansing/purge' of Jew population.

3.3. *Research questions and objectives*

3.3.1. Research questions

This investigation questions and objectives are the following:

1. How can the cooperative behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be characterized?
2. How can the different polite behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be characterized?
3. How can the different cooperative and polite behaviors of victims and shooters in emergency calls be compared and contrasted?

3.3.2. Objectives

3.3.2.1. General Objectives

1. Identify and describe all the instances of cooperative behavior of victims and shooters in emergency calls.
2. Identify and describe all the instances where polite behavior is manifested by victims and shooters in emergency calls.
3. Identify and describe all the instances where polite behavior could be expected but is not manifested by victims and shooters in emergency calls.
4. Identify regularities in the cooperative and polite verbal behaviors of victims, of shooters, and across victims and shooters.

3.3.2.2. Specific Objectives

1. Identify the categories of CP that are most commonly adhered to by victims and by shooters.
2. Identify the categories of CP that are most commonly averted by victims and by shooters.
3. Identify the type of aversion most commonly manifested by victims and by shooters.

4. Identify the instances of Face Threatening Acts to Negative Face manifested by victims and shooters.

5. Identify the instances of Face Threatening Acts to Positive Face manifested by victims and shooters.

6. Identify the instances of Mitigation manifested by victims and by shooters.

7. Compare and contrast the instances of adherence between victims and shooters.

8. Compare and contrast the instances of aversion between victims and shooters.

9. Compare and contrast the most common types of aversion between victims and shooters.

10. Compare and contrast the instances of FTAs to Negative Face manifested by victims and shooters.

11. Compare and contrast the instances of FTAs to Positive Face manifested by victims and shooters.

12. Compare and contrast the instances of Mitigation manifested by victims and shooters.

4. Results and Discussion

In this section, the results of this investigation and a brief discussion will be presented. These will be organized around the role of the caller, i.e., between victims and shooters, to ensure clarity in the display of the information and, for each role, the corresponding calls will be presented in chronological order of occurrence. For each call, three tables will be shown regarding Grice's *CP* categories in terms of *Adherence* or *Aversion* to *Quality*, *Quantity*, *Relevance,* and *Manner* occurring in a given turn, as well as the specific *Type of Aversion* (*Flouting*, *Violation*, *Opting Out*, or *Infringing)* (Thomas, 1995) utilized to transgress one or more categories. Simultaneously, according to Brown and Levinson's (1987) definition of *FTAs,* the calls will be analyzed with regard to either *Positive* or *Negative Face Threat*, additionally the presence of *Mitigation* strategies (Fraser, 1980) will be identified in the same matters of Facework— they will be addressed as *Mitigation of Threat to Negative Face* (*MTNF*) and/or *Mitigation of Threat to Positive Face (MTPF)*. Each table will be explained and discussed individually through relevant extracts.

4.1. Victims' emergency calls

4.1.1. Charleston Church Shooting, South Carolina

This call occurred at 9:05 P.M, during the shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church on June 17th, 2015, in Charleston, South Carolina. There were two participants in this call: the 911 dispatcher, and a female victim who was hiding in the lower level of the church at the moment of the call.

The audio file showed that the duration of the call was 5:12 minutes. The interaction had 67 turns in total and was 607 words long. Out of the total turns, 35 correspond to the dispatcher, while 32 correspond to the caller. Regarding word distribution, the dispatcher spoke 390 words, and the victim 217 words throughout the call.

Results obtained from the analyzed data will be presented in several tables depicting *Adherence* and *Aversion* to Grice's categories (1975), Face Threatening Acts (*FTAs*) and *Mitigation* to said acts if applicable.

4.1.1.1. *CP*: Adherence and aversion

In this call, the caller was highly cooperative since 106 instances of *Adherence* to *CP* categories were identified. Out of the total instances, the most typically adhered categories were *Relevance* and *Quality*, both with 31 instances, *Manner* with 24 instances, and finally *Quantity* with 20 instances.

Table 1
Charleston Church Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
20	31	31	24	106

The following example shows a communicative interaction of four turns from the call, which presents instances of *Adherence* to the *CP* categories that are displayed in Table 1:

(1) *Charleston Church Shooting*
10 **DISPATCHER:** Where are you inside the church?
11 **VICTIM:** In the lower level.
12 **DISPATCHER:** You're in the lower level, where is the shooter?
13 **VICTIM:** He's in, in the office.

The caller's high cooperation can be identified in different parts of the interaction, as she answered the questions as thoroughly as possible, even considering the highly stressful context in which it was given, since the call was made when the shooter was still firing. In this instance, the caller gave precise and clear answers— in turns 11 and 13— to the questions asked by the dispatcher, thus adhering to the categories of *Quantity* and *Manner*, providing, at the same time, useful information for the dispatcher. The caller also included authentic and relevant information in her responses regarding the questions asked by the dispatcher, thus adhering to *Quality* and *Relevance*. Therefore, this was an instance in which the caller adhered to every *CP* category.

Table 2
Charleston Church Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	10	0	0	5	15
Violation	1	0	0	2	3
Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	11	0	0	7	18

As Table 2 shows, there was a total of 18 instances of *Aversion* to *CP* throughout the interaction and only two categories were averted during the call: *Quantity* and *Manner*. The most averted category was *Quantity* —with 11 instances— mostly due to the unasked additional information given by the caller, followed by *Manner* with 7 instances. On the other hand, the categories of *Quality* and *Relevance* did not present any instances of *Aversion*.

Regarding the categories of *Aversion*, only two were presented: *Flouting* and *Violation*. *Flouting* produced 15 instances, from which 10 correspond to *Quantity* and 5 to *Manner*, whereas *Violation* was present in 3 instances, from which 1 corresponds to *Quantity* and 2 to *Manner*.

(2) *Charleston Church Shooting*
51 **DISPATCHER:** Is there a door that leads downstairs?
52 **VICTIM:** There's two doors, they're open.
53 **DISPATCHER:** They're open. Are you able, are you able to shut and lock those doors safely?
54 **VICTIM:** I can't move, I don't wanna see him.

In the previously exemplified instance, the caller flouted both categories of *Quantity* and *Manner*. First, in 51 and 52 the dispatcher asked a question that should have been answered with "yes" or "no"; nevertheless, the caller gives more information than asked, thus averting the category of *Quantity* 'Do not make your contribution more informative than is required' (Grice, 1975), while clearly remaining relevant. *Flouting* was also averted as the caller gave extra information that could be helpful for the dispatcher, then there was an 'intentional' (Manihuruk and Siregar, 2020) attitude in the instance of *Aversion*. Second, in 53 and 54 the caller did not answer the question as expected under the *CP* margins, but she responded by giving information about her feeling of fear, thus uttering an implicature so the dispatcher can infer the answer, which was "no", presenting then an instance of *Flouting* to the category of *Manner* 'Avoid ambiguity' (Grice, 1975) as she gave an ambiguous answer. *Quantity* was also flouted since the caller, again, gave more information than asked— by saying how she felt— but, also, did not directly give the requested information, thus giving less information than asked.

4.1.1.2. Face attack and mitigation

Table 3
Charleston Church Shooting. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	7	0	6	13

This call produced only 13 cases of *FTAs* and *Mitigation*, from which 7 corresponded to the former and 6 to the latter, and every instance corresponded to attacks to the *Negative Face*. Furthermore, all 13 instances were presented in the form of a dire request from the caller.

(3) *Charleston Church Shooting*
2 **DISPATCHER:** 911 what's the address of the emergency?
3 **VICTIM:** It's Emanuel Church there's been people shot down here, please send somebody right away.

In this interaction, the caller pressed the dispatcher to send help to where she was, thus presenting an instance of *Negative FTA* as requesting help may 'put some pressure on H to do (or refrain from doing) the act A' (Brown and Levinson, 1987), H being the dispatcher, and A the act of "sending help"; nevertheless, it is important to note that the act of requesting help is the main objective of an emergency call, thus it does not necessarily has to be considered as an *FTA*, yet for this analysis it is considered as one since, pragmatically, it is still a request. In relation to *Mitigation*, this call presented an instance of *MTNF* as the caller displayed strategic effort to mitigate the potential threat to the dispatcher's *Negative Face,* due to her personal interest and benefit, by placing the adverb "please" at the beginning of the sentence as she may understand the possibly threatening tone of her dire request— which is understood by the term 'sentence-initial disclaimer' (Fraser, 1980) that refers to the existence of a mitigating word or sentence at the beginning of an imperative sentence.

Interestingly, even though the situation was clearly pressing and dangerous— due to the risk of being overheard by the shooter—, the caller took the usually necessary communicative measures to mitigate an *FTA* to the dispatcher's *Negative Face* that, undoubtedly, may be most comprehensible under the given circumstances.

As mentioned before, all the other instances of *FTAs* and *Mitigation* occur in the same kind of sentences and speech acts —mitigated requests—, except from the following instance which is an unmitigated order:

(4) *Charleston Church Shooting*
62 **DISPATCHER:** Inside the building, what's the best way to get to you?
63 **VICTIM:** Just come in the back door. Here someone comes.

In (4), there is an instance of a *Negative FTA* as the caller gave a direct order to the dispatcher, and despite that the dispatcher asked that question that was correctly and succinctly answered by the caller, the latter did not mitigate her blunt order. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account the specific context of this interaction, as the caller had heard steps that could have

been the shooter approaching the place where she was hiding, thus perhaps panicking and feeling pressure, which most likely made her focus on her own safety— not being overheard by the approaching person— and not on mitigating measures oriented to the dispatcher's *Negative Face*.

4.1.1.3. Relevant observations

On the one hand, regarding the *CP*, the caller was highly cooperative. She especially observed *Quality* and *Relevance,* as she gave truthful and relevant information even considering the immensely pressing situation in which she was during the interaction, as she mostly answered within the margins of *CP* throughout the call even when external elements were more pressing as in the instance exemplified in (1). On the other hand, *Aversion* to *CP* categories was mostly given as *Flouting*, as the caller's answers showed more information than asked, and some also were indirect answers in which the caller responded to the dispatcher's question in an indirect way as for the dispatcher to infer the intention of it, as in the case of (2).

Even though the caller frequently flouted the categories of *Quantity* and *Manner*, she especially adhered to *Quality* and *Relevance*, as she did give truthful and relevant information but not always under the margins of the categories of the firstly mentioned categories. This shows that the averted categories —*Quantity* and *Manner*— are related to the form in which information is said, and not to the veracity and pertinence of the information as the categories which correspond —*Quality* and *Relevance*— were indeed adhered to; for instance, that may suggest that given the context in which the communicative interaction took place, the caller's communicative interest was more focused on giving truthful and important information rather than on the way that information was given.

In terms of *Politeness* analysis, the caller displayed only *Negative FTAs* instances and in very similar interactions, since she repeatedly made requests to the dispatcher as seen in (3), putting pressure on the dispatcher to do something and, thus, attacking her *Negative Face* as she pressed the dispatcher to carry on an action, "sending somebody", thus threatening her 'freedom of action' (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Besides, all those instances —except from the one exemplified in (4)— also displayed *Mitigation* in the similar form of the already referenced 'sentence-initial disclaimer' (Fraser, 1980). Therefore, even though the caller urgently requested help from the dispatcher, she made use of mitigating communicative measures, something that is highly interesting given the context of the communicative instances already described.

To conclude, it can be said that the caller was highly cooperative and polite. On the one hand, her high level of politeness is particularly interesting given the stressful situation in which the interaction takes place as, even though the caller must have been feeling afraid and distressed, she still makes efforts to display politeness strategies; and, on the other hand, the *FTAs* instances were displayed only in requests and in one order, which is understandable given the kind of communicative instance it was —a call between a 911 dispatcher and a victim of an ongoing shooting— since the help that was requested by the caller is expected to be provided by the dispatcher.

4.1.2.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida
4.1.2.1.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1

The first call was made by a female victim. Information on the duration of the call could not be retrieved, as no audio file was available and only transcripts were made public. The verbal interaction between the victim and the operator had 122 turns, with an exchange of 1,272 words in total. Out of the 122 turns, 61 corresponded to the victim and 61 to the operator, presenting a total of 515 and 757 words uttered in total by each, respectively.

The contextual information that could be recovered from the transcripts indicates that the victim was hiding in a closet with 8 other people inside the club when the call took place. Despite being desperate and anxious, the caller demonstrated to be highly cooperative following Grice's *CP* categories (1975).

4.1.2.1.1.   CP: Adherence and aversion

Table 4
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
27	46	44	39	156

As mentioned above, the victim was highly cooperative. Data collected shows a total of 156 occasions of *Adherence* to *CP*, from which *Quality* and *Relevance* stand out as the categories

with the highest rates of *Adherence*, with 46 and 44 instances each. *Manner* and *Quantity* follow with 39 and 27 instances, respectively.

> (5) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
> 82 **OPERATOR:** Do you still have someone at the door? Can you press the button if you hear them?
> 83 **VICTIM:** I don't hear anything.
> 84 **OPERATOR:** You don't hear 'em? Okay. (Pause).

This extract occurred after a series of shooting sounds near the place where the victim was hiding. Moreover, the caller mentioned that someone was also approaching. Based on early turns, it could be responsibly inferred that the caller was feeling anxious and desperate, but still gave a complete response to the operator, and chose to vocalize her response despite being given the opportunity to answer non-verbally. The victim risked being heard by the shooter and being possibly attacked but did not fail to give the operator a complete (and mostly polite) answer. This extract positioned itself within the margins of all 4 *CP* categories, as turn 83 provided the necessary amount of information (*Quantity*); it was a true statement based on the caller's possession of information (*Quality*); avoided obscurity of expression: what was said did not mean anything else besides what was being said (*Manner*), and the answer was relevant given the context (*Relevance*).

Table 5
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
Aversion Categories	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
Flouting	2	0	1	1	4
Violation	6	6	6	6	24
Opting Out	1	0	0	1	2
Infringing	19	5	6	10	40

| Total | 28 | 11 | 13 | 18 | 70 |

Table 5 shows a total of 70 instances of *Aversion* to *CP*. The category that presented the most instances of *Aversion* was *Quantity,* with 28 instances, most of them caused by the constant repetition of information most probably due to the stress and fear the caller was experiencing. Next was *Manner* with 18, *Relevance* with 13, and lastly, *Quality* with 11 instances of *Aversion*. We must note again that similarly to *Quantity*, the remaining instances of *Aversion* are most likely explainable in the context the victim was in.

The type of *Aversion* (Thomas, 1995) with the highest number of occurrences was *Infringing* with 40 in total, followed by *Violation* and *Flouting* with 24 and 4 instances, respectively. In this call, only 2 instances of *Opting Out* were found.

> (6) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
> 50 **VICTIM:** It's not like a -- it's like a (inaudible) Hello?
> 51 **OPERATOR:** Yes, ma'am, I'm here. I'm here.
> 52 **VICTIM:** Okay. I wanted to make sure.

In (6), the caller infringed all 4 categories. The lack of cooperation and the incapacity of uttering a clean sentence was unintentional, caused by external elements. The operator had already made clear that the police were on their way, and that in fact, they were already there trying to solve the situation. The caller was still hiding in the closet, and in this case specifically, she kept talking due to stress and fear that the operator might end the call (turn 52).

However, some specific instances of *Aversion* that were identified could be explained only under the light of the pressing context and how dangerous it was to be overheard by the shooter nearby. In these, the caller was not answering any questions and so her turn was unrequested, but still put her life at risk by being heard by the shooter. Her contribution was neither relevant nor necessary, as seen in the following interaction:

> (7) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
> 25 **OPERATOR:** Okay. Okay. Just let me know if you hear anything else, okay?
> 26 **VICTIM:** No problem. I'll let you know if I hear any shots.
> 27 **OPERATOR:** Okay.
> 28 **VICTIM:** *I can't believe anybody would do this, that it's not that hard to kill people.* [emphasis added].

In turn 28, the caller's intervention was uncalled for. She had already given the operator the information needed, so this turn violated (Thomas, 1995) all 4 categories.

4.1.2.1.2.   Face attack and mitigation

Table 6
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	4	0	6	10

During the call, only 4 instances of *FTAs* were found. All 4 of them correspond to *Negative Face.* Regarding *Mitigation*, 6 instances of *MTNF* were found. The example below shows a *Negative FTA.*

(8) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
89 **OPERATOR:** Just stay in there and try to stay quiet.
90 **VICTIM:** Oh, man. Are there officers in the building, like inside or something?

In this extract, the caller put pressure on the operator by bluntly asking when the police would come. This represents an expression of restraint that does "not intend to avoid impeding H's freedom of action" (Brown and Levinson, 1987), "H" being the operator in this case. The remaining instances of *Negative FTAs* had all the same purpose as turn 90: knowing when the police would come to save the victims.

In relation to *Mitigation*, most instances had the same purpose as the ones explained above. The caller was eager and urging to know when the police would be arriving, and also wanted to know if the operator was still on the phone. The caller then attempted to ease the unwelcomed effect, as she had repeatedly asked the same question several times by saying what is emphasized in turn 42 below. This way, the victim's utterance enclosed what Fraser considers *Altruistic Mitigation*, or an utterance that is driven by fear to cause discomfort to others (1980, 345).

(9) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
40 **VICTIM:** Do you know if they are almost here or if have they been dispatched?

41 **OPERATOR:** No. The officers are there. They are making sure everything is secure before I want you to come out. So I just want you to stay where you are, but the officers are there already.
42 **VICTIM:** *I'm just making sure* [emphasis added].

It is expected that during an emergency call the victim would tend to ask for help relentlessly. However, the efforts of the victim to always be polite and mitigate possible *FTAs* when asking for help are noteworthy. Even when their life is at risk, save for exceptions, people are polite until the last minute, and most times being polite supposes a longer utterance, hence more time, and consequently, seconds that can change the turn of events. In this specific case, the caller hiding in the closet risked being heard by the shooter, putting her and the people's lives she was hiding with in danger.

4.1.2.1.3.   Relevant observations

It is necessary to note that Call 1 was the longest call in the corpora analyzed, hence the instances of *Adherence* and *Aversion* were more frequent than in other calls based on the extension of the transcripts. However, here and for all the calls analyzed, internal proportions can still be discussed and interpreted under the qualitative examination here carried out. It must be noted that all calls have different durations, and that totals later presented do not clarify internal proportions that were already mentioned when it corresponded.

The caller was highly cooperative following the *CP*, which is normal given the context and the purpose of the call. What can be highlighted and that also be brought into question is that the caller mostly used polite sentences to answer or ask questions. Moreover, when not interrupted by external factors (such as shooting sounds or step sounds approaching the closet), she gave the operator all the crucial information required for him to do his job. Overall, all categories showed *Adherence* and *Aversion* throughout the call.

Regarding politeness, as seen in (7), some instances contributed neither to the conversation nor to the situation, as they did not provide the necessary information for the operator to do his duty, that is, providing help. In turn 28 the victim employed what Brown and Levinson (1987) define as *Point-of-view operation*. This *Positive Politeness* strategy illustrates that even though sentences are influenced by their context of utterance, "including the role of participants in the speech event and their spatio-temporal and social location" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:118), some utterances have different indexical centrings. Said utterances implement polite functions by supposedly 'taking the role of the other', and those that "attempt to bring together or merge the points of view of speaker and addressee" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:119) are common of *Positive Politeness*. The examples given by Brown and Levinson do

not entirely correlate with this extract of the corpora since they do not portray similar situations to an emergency call, however they proved useful to the analysis. It can then be concluded that by making unnecessary comments based on the context of the call, the caller (speaker) tried to get along with the operator (hearer), and hence attempted to not necessarily merge their points of view but to reduce the distance between them and assert empathy. Turn 28 does not represent an *FTA and* does not relate to *Mitigation* but seems rather a form of, besides what has already been explained, coping with extreme anxiety and stress that the context weighed down on the victim. In sum, this analysis provides yet more evidence for the long-standing pragmatic truth that what can be considered polite or (un)cooperative heavily depends on the specific contextual variables of the specific speech situation (and its more general generic variables) under examination.

4.1.2.2. Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2

This call occurred at 2:03 a.m. during the shooting at Pulse Nightclub on June 12th, 2016, in Orlando, Florida. There were three participants in this interaction: the operator, a dispatcher, and the caller. The latter was a victim who was inside Pulse Nightclub at the moment of the shooting. There was no audio file available for this call, but transcripts suggest that the caller was a male.

The interaction had 83 turns in total and was 670-words long. Out of the total turns, 10 corresponded to the dispatcher, 42 to the operator, and 31 to the caller. Regarding word distribution, the analysis showed that the dispatcher spoke 97 words, the operator 474 words, and the victim 99 words throughout the call.

4.1.2.2.1. *CP*: Adherence and aversion

The caller was highly cooperative, showing a total of 76 instances of *Adherence* to *CP*. Table 7 presents the apportionment of the total of instances into each of the categories. Out of the total of *Adherence* instances, *Relevance* and *Manner* represented the categories that the caller most adhered to, with 21 instances each, leaving *Quality* next with 20 and *Quantity* with 14 instances.

Table 7
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories

Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
14	20	21	21	76

(10) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2*
20 **OPERATOR:** Incident 2043 (inaudible) in progress at 1912 shooting that's still occurring on South Orange Avenue at Pulse Nightclub. Can you give me a description of the person that's shooting?
21 **VICTIM:** I can't.

In this call, the caller's cooperation was seen even in difficult situations where higher, or complete *CP Adherence* was impossible due to the limited amount of information the caller had about the situation he was in. Still, as can be seen in (10), the caller was willing to give a highly relevant response in a clear manner within the margins of expected *Quality* and *Quantity* in turn 21, despite his inability to give the information asked for by the operator in turn 20.

Regarding *Aversion*, table 8 displays the analysis results, where 16 instances were found. The category with the most *Aversion* instances was *Quantity* with 9 instances, most of them caused by the repetition of information due to the tense and dangerous situation that the caller was experiencing at the moment of the call. The categories that follow are *Quality* with 3 instances, and *Relevance* and *Manner* with 2 instances each.

Table 8
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

Aversion Categories	Cooperative Principle Categories				Total
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Flouting	1	1	1	0	3
Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0
Infringing	8	2	1	2	13

Total	9	3	2	2	16

It is significant to mention that 13 out of the 16 instances of *Aversion* corresponded to *Infringing* and only one to *Flouting*. The occurrences of *Infringing* were caused by the caller's inability to exhibit a more cooperative behavior due to the stressful situation he was in, thus, he had "no intention of deceiving" or "generating an implicature" (Thomas, 1995), causing then a simple infringement to *CP*.

> (11) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2*
> 36 **OPERATOR:** Okay. White, black or Hispanic?
> 37 **CALLER:** He's inside.

In respect to the 3 instances of *Flouting,* they were produced in the same turn, as seen in (11), when the operator asked a question and he answered with an unrelated utterance, flouting on *Quantity, Quality,* and *Relevance*.

> (12) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2*
> 58 **OPERATOR:** I'm still here with you. When it's safe to do so let me know and I'll continue with you.
> 59 **VICTIM:** He's coming. He's coming. They are still shooting.

In (12), the caller was adhering to the categories of *Quality, Manner,* and *Relevance*, but there was an *Aversion* to *Quantity.* This was considered an *Aversion* as repetition made this aspect of the utterance an uncooperative one. It fell into the category of *Infringing* because the lack of cooperation was not intentional, as it was caused by environmental factors, in this case, the active shooting that was going on and was making the caller repeat the information he had just given. Therefore, as Thomas (1995) stated, the lack of desire of implicature and failure to observe the maxim made this an "imperfect linguistic performance."

4.1.2.2.2.   Face attack and mitigation

Table 9 condenses the findings in this call regarding *FTAs* and *Mitigation,* where only 3 instances were found. It is important to note that *Positive FTAs* and *MTPF* occurrences were not found in this call.

Table 9
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	3	0	1	4

This call presented only 3 instances of *FTAs,* all corresponding to *Negative Face*, and 1 instance of *MTNF* as well. It is important to note that the 3 instances of *FTAs* occurred in consecutive turns and virtually in the same line, making an equivalent request:

(13) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2*
65 **VICTIM:** (whispering)
66 **OPERATOR:** I'm sorry, if you can say it again without being heard.
67 **VICTIM:** Tell me when the officers are inside.
68 **OPERATOR:** The officers are inside, okay. Stay where you are for the moment.
69 **OPERATOR:** You say don't bring the officers inside?
70 **VICTIM:** I said tell me when the officers are inside.

In this extract, 2 of the 3 *FTAs* instances were displayed. From the context, it can be inferred that turn 67 was a repetition of turn 65 because in turn 66 the operator asked for clarification. Turns 67 and 70 can be considered *FTAs* to the operator's *Negative Face* as they are commands presented without redress (Brown and Levinson, 1987) or *Mitigation*, thus threatening the personal freedom of the operator.

The only case of *Mitigation* was observed when the operator asked a personal question and the caller set the boundaries of what he wanted to share:

(14) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2*
80 **OPERATOR:** You didn't see any of them? Okay. Okay. What's your name?
81 **VICTIM:** Please don't ask me that.

As shown in (14), the operator was asking a personal question and the caller did not want to give a reply, and so he mitigated his negative response, making his statement a markedly polite —yet rather uncooperative— one.

4.1.2.2.3.   Relevant observations

The analysis shows this call was highly cooperative and that where not, this was due to the extremely dangerous situation the caller was in, not because he was actively choosing not to cooperate. *Relevance* and *Manner* play an important role in this call, as they were the categories which the caller adhered to the most. This could be explained since, despite the high levels of repetition he deployed, the caller was still giving important and relevant information about the shooting that was going on, and in a clear manner. The same could be said of *Quality,* the next most adhered category, since the information the caller provided was truthful despite incompleteness, and the caller let the operator know whenever he could not provide the information requested, keeping his contributions veritable. As for *Quantity*, the least adhered to *CP* category, it can be stated that the *Aversions* to this category were always *Infringing* since the repetition of the information was caused by the extreme situation the caller was experiencing, and not because of the existence of a conversational implicature in his utterances, showing that the caller was willing to be cooperative in order to get the help he needed from the authorities.

Regarding *Face Attack* and *Mitigation,* the outcome was similar to that observed in *CP*, as the caller was polite throughout most of the interaction. There was no evidence of *Positive FTAs* and, as stated above, the *Negative FTAs* occurred in a repeated clarification of a request. The reason for the lack of *Positive FTAs* was that, by mitigating any possible threats, the caller was working to ensure he was going to get the help he needed from the operator. Finally, *Mitigation* was observed as a cooperative device. This relationship between *CP* and *Mitigation* arises as the latter was used to not incur on an *FTA* in order to maintain a cooperative tone during the interaction. The use of *Mitigation* and the few instances of *Negative FTAs* evidence the level of *Politeness* that the victim chose to deploy regardless of the life-threatening situation he was involved in; he displayed *Face* protection mechanisms to ensure a polite interaction with the operator, and only failed to do so in a clarification instance where the victim's linguistic choices were made prioritizing making himself understood and not being polite.

4.1.2.3.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3

This call is 178 words long, and it is the shortest call in the corpus. Its length in minutes was not possible to determine given the absence of the original audio. The call involves three participants: the operator, the dispatcher, and the caller. The transcript consists of a female operator taking the call of a man that has been shot in the leg inside the Pulse Nightclub at the

moment of the shooting. No more information can be drawn from the call transcription as the caller struggles to reply given the nature of his injuries. The interaction had 28 turns, where 16 corresponded to the operator, 7 to the caller, and 5 turns to the dispatcher. Regarding word distribution, the analysis showed that the operator uttered 131 words; the victim 26 words, and the dispatcher 21 words throughout the call.

4.1.2.3.1.   *CP*: Adherence and Aversion

Table 10 displays the instances of *Adherence* to CP, out of 14 turns the caller adhered to *Quality* every turn, *Quantity* and *Relevance* are present in the same 3 turns and finally *Manner* was the least adhered category with only 1 instance.

Table 10
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories

Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
3	7	3	1	14

First in relation to *Adherence*, the caller showed to adhere every turn to the category of *Quality*, as all the information he provided was true —e.g., his legs are in fact injured—, he states a fact for which he has adequate evidence and did not claim anything he believed to be false. On the other hand, *Quantity* and *Relevance* are adhered 3 times out of 7 turns. These 3 instances occur first when the caller provided the initial information needed to identify the exchange as an emergency call, second when he stated that his legs were injured, and finally when he said "please" asking for help. In these exchanges, both categories are adhered to as he gave precise information that was relevant for the operator to provide the necessary assistance.

> (15) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3*
> 5 **OPERATOR:** Hello, sir, can you tell me what's happening, where you are?
> 6 **VICTIM:** My legs, my legs hurt. (Shooting sounds)

Example 15 illustrates how the call was mostly developed. The caller was only able to mention that his legs were wounded. For that reason, this call cannot be categorized as cooperative because the communication between the caller and the operator was not entirely effective, as

the nature of his wounds and the context of the call interfered in the interaction and hindered the process of efficiently looking for and providing help. In fact, the operator managed to identify him as a Pulse Nightclub shooting victim through the use of technology that allowed them to place him inside the club, but they were unable to associate him with the shooting based solely on the information provided during the call.

Table 11
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	0	0	0	0	0
Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0
Infringing	4	0	4	6	14
Total	4	0	4	6	14

In relation to *Aversion*, example (15) demonstrates how he adhered to the category of *Quality*, therefore the remaining three namely *Quantity*, *Relevance* and *Manner* were averted. Among these three, *Manner* showed less *Adherence*, with 6 instances of non-*Adherence* out of 7 turns. This can be explained because the caller struggled when giving information, and the maxims of "Be orderly" and "Avoid ambiguity" were not followed. The way in which his answers were formulated were not clear enough to fully satisfy the category of *Manner*. This is supported by the fact that the operator was unable to fully comprehend the situation and repeatedly asks for further explanations—as shown in example 14 with the phrase "Hello sir?".

Furthermore, there were 4 out of 7 instances of *Aversion* of the categories of *Quantity* and *Relevance*. This occurs because he keeps repeating "My legs", thus the quantity of information given was not sufficient to meet the communicative needs in this context. Likewise, *Relevance* was absent in those instances because, though it can be argued that all the information provided was relevant, in this context *Relevance* must be understood in relation to what the operator asks to provide help. Thus, the repetition of the phrase "my legs" was no longer relevant once the emergency was established, and it was required that the caller gave more details about his current situation.

In relation to the most common type of *Aversion*, in this call every instance was one of *Infringing*, this due to the emotional distress the caller was under, and the loud noises detailed in the transcripts that interfere in the communication between caller and operator. *Infringing* as explained by Thomas (1995) occurs when "the speaker's performance was impaired in some way (nervousness, drunkenness, excitement), (...) because the speaker was constitutionally incapable of speaking clearly, to the point, etc." (p.91). This would be the case, as the speaker was impaired to respond due to his injuries and the context in which he was situated. For this reason, it was expected that neither *Flouting* nor *Violation* existed, as given the urgency of the call the victim would not risk creating implicatures to deceive or to delay giving information to the operator.

4.1.2.3.2.   Face attack and mitigation

In Pulse Nightclub Call 3, there were no instances of *FTAs* or *Mitigation* strategies, as shown in Table 12.

Table 12
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	0	0	0	0

In contrast to the previously analyzed calls, this was characterized by the desperation of the caller given the severity of his injuries. Although all victims' calls are comparable in terms of their lives being at risk, in this particular call the victim could not afford to lose any time when asking for help, or the seriousness of the gunshot could lead him to his death. As seen in (14),

the communication between the victim and the operator was restricted to the caller's repeated statements about his wounded legs, therefore both his physical and mental state were at risk, not allowing the caller to attempt using any linguistic strategy to either perform a *FTA* or to mitigate his requests for help. Thus, the aspect of *Politeness* was suspended due to the urgency of the call.

Results suggest that there might be a relationship between the *Aversion* to *Manner* and the absence of *FTAs* and *Mitigation*. The caller's wounds interfered with the clarity of his message, thus influencing *Adherence* to *Manner,* therefore if when uttering "my legs'' he attempts to mitigate a request for help, this meaning cannot be conveyed due to the lack of clarity from the caller. Likewise, any attempt of using *FTAs* cannot be identified due to the obscurity of expression from the caller.

4.1.2.3.3.   Relevant observations

The analysis of this call was significant because it gives an insight into emergency calls where the caller's ability to reply was highly restricted due to the severity of his wounds. Moreover, it offers some specific insights as to which *CP* categories are adhered to the most when in maximally desperate situations. Results indicate that *Quality* was commonly adhered to, as in this very specific context there seems to be no reason for the victim to answer with a statement, they believe to be false; in fact, it was crucial for them to reply with the truth to not hinder the operator's task.

Another observation was that the instances of *Adherence* provided information regarding which categories were most typically followed in this type of context. Leaving aside *Quality* that has already been mentioned, the caller seemed to especially adhere to *Quantity* and *Relevance* over *Manner,* as desperation interferes with how the caller expresses himself, and the stress made it harder for him to answer in a brief, clear, and organized manner. Furthermore, *Quantity* and *Relevance* are related because, for the operator to efficiently provide the help being demanded, the victim must provide relevant yet sufficient information, as giving less or more information than required would also not be relevant considering the urgency of the situation. The fact that the results showed the same number of *Adherence* to *Quality* and *Relevance* was particular to this call, due to the need to find meaningful information in a brief and inevitably confusing call. However, this further indicates that despite the complex and stressful nature of the context, the caller was able to follow *CP* categories, which suggests that there was indeed a cooperative effort from the caller, as his —apparent— "disconnected remarks" (Grice, 1975:45) do convey key information to the operator.

In relation to *Politeness*, the absence of *FTAs* can be interpreted under the light of the short length of the call; the few exchanges between the caller and the operator did not allow for the appearance of *FTAs* or instances where *Mitigation* was needed. This could also be linked to the transgression of the category of *Manner*, that hinders the clarity of the utterances. Therefore, both *Mitigation* and *FTAs* were rarely identified. It is worth mentioning that since there was a lower *Adherence* to *CP*, a relation with *FTAs* cannot be made. In other words, the few instances of cooperation of this call are not enough to draw other responsible observations regarding its connection with the absence of *Face* attacks.

4.1.2.4.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4

This last call from Pulse Nightclub shooting is 312 words long and, as before, its length in minutes is not specified due to the absence of the original audio. Three participants were involved in the interaction: a first operator from Orlando Fire Department (OFD), a second operator, and the caller. The victim, whose sex in neither revealed nor retrievable, was hiding in the bathroom at the moment of the shooting and was shot in the arm. The interaction had 35 turns, from which 19 corresponded to the OFD operator, 14 to the caller, and 2 to the second operator. Regarding word distribution, the analysis showed that the OFD operator spoke 223 words, the victim 76 words, and the second operator 13 words throughout the call.

4.1.2.4.1.   *CP*: Adherence and aversion

Table 13 summarizes the instances of *Adherence* to *CP*, and it displays how the caller adhered mostly to every category, with the exception of *Quantity*, as there were 3 instances where there was an *Aversion* to said category.

Table 13
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
11	14	14	14	53

Overall, the caller was highly cooperative in relation to what the operator asked him. This was surprising considering that this victim was also requesting help due to an injury, a comparable situation to that of Pulse Nightclub Call 3. However, in this case the caller was able to answer in most cases with sufficient information, being relevant to what he was asked, and answering

in a brief and clear manner. It seems that the victim was aware that in order to be helped more efficiently, the formulation of their answers had to be concise and in relation to what the operator needs, which explains the high *Adherence* to *CP* even in this clearly adverse situation.

> (16) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4*
> 13. **OFD OPERATOR:** Where are you in the club? Are you at the Pulse Nightclub?
> 14. **VICTIM:** Yes. I'm in the bathroom.

As illustrated in example 16, the caller managed to answer by adhering to every category of *CP*, despite being in a complex and highly stressful situation. Moreover, the victim did not respond with a mere "yes" to the question but adds the sentence "I'm in the bathroom" to further (and relevantly) clarify the information given. This was particularly useful in the mass shooting context, where loud noises and screaming clearly interfere with communication. Thus, this demands the repetition and/or further detailing of the answers from the callers to ensure comprehension from the operator so that they can send the help needed. Turn 14, at the same time, shows ample cooperativeness, as the victim provided an unrequired but relevant answer to facilitate the operator's task, despite the caller's life being at risk, this with an undeniable relevant purpose: that of being found and helped with as much celerity as possible.

Table 14

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	0	0	0	0	0
Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Opting Out	1	0	0	0	1
Infringing	2	0	0	0	2
Total	3	0	0	0	3

Few instances of *Aversion* were identified. The 3 instances found were related to *Quantity,* as there were cases when the operator asked them for specific information and the caller responded with less information than expected, not adhering to the maxim "Make your contribution as informative as required". In this context, this was of great importance, given the fact that the information they provided was key to dispatch help swiftly and effectively.

(17) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4*
21 **OFD OPERATOR:** Okay? Anda clean, dry cloth. Put your shirt on it and hold some pressure. Okay. And you said you're shot in the arm? How many people in the bathroom with you?
22 **VICTIM:** I have no idea.
23 **OFD OPERATOR:** I'm sorry?
24 **VICTIM:** (Inaudible)
25 **OFD OPERATOR:** Okay. How many people in the bathroom with you?
26 **VICTIM:** There's one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten -- there's about twenty people here.

Example 17 shows one of the instances classified as *Aversion* to *Quantity*. The reply "I have no idea" was understandable since the caller was probably focusing on their wounded arm rather than on the people present in the room. Nonetheless, it was considered an *Aversion* to *Quantity* because the caller could provide the information required, and it was given eventually in turn 26. Considering that *Quantity* requires the contribution to be informative for the purposes of the exchange, it demanded for the caller to make efforts to reply if assistance was needed promptly. It seems that in this exchange the caller was faced with a clash with another category (Grice, 1975) as he knew that giving an approximate number, thus giving more information than necessary, would result in the transgression of *Quality*. Therefore, this further suggests that callers placed more importance on *Quality* than on *Quantity* when giving information to operators.

Out of the 3 instances of *Aversion*, 2 were cases of *Infringing* because the caller was unable to hear correctly what was being asked due to the background noises, such as shooting sounds or screaming —as detailed in the transcriptions. The remaining one corresponded to *Opting Out,* that refers to the "unwillingness to cooperate in the way the maxim requires*"* (Thomas, 1995: p. 75). Example 16 was classified as *Opting Out* because it was expected that given the purpose of the interaction, the caller would have answered by giving the required amount of information for the operator to understand the on-going situation; however, the victim refused to reply, thus not cooperating according to the maxims that compose the category of *Quantity*.

4.1.2.4.2. Face attack and mitigation

Table 15 describes the number of instances of *FTAs* and *Mitigation*. The call had 2 instances of *Negative FTAs* and one instance of *Mitigation of Threat to Negative Face (MTNF)*.

Table 15
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	2	0	1	3

Findings indicate that the caller was polite with the operator as there were no *Positive FTAs*, but rather *FTAs* took place because the victim refused to provide the information even though the caller was capable of answering correctly.

> (18) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4*
> 29 **OFD OPERATOR:** Okay. They are on their way. They will be there shortly. I don't want anybody to leave the room. Everybody stay in the room until the police come and get you.
> 30 **VICTIM:** (Inaudible)
> 31 **OFD OPERATOR:** I'm sorry?
> 32 **VICTIM:** I'm good. I'm good here. I wanted to make sure there's someone on the way. I got
> 33 **OFD OPERATOR:** The police and the paramedics are on their way, okay? They will be there shortly.

This extract exemplifies how *Mitigation* was commonly present in victims' calls, as they tried to request the operator to send someone to the place of the shooting to rescue them; however, to soften the illocutionary force of this utterance, he added the mitigator "I wanted to make sure", an "I-mitigator" that according to Li (2016) "decreases the weight of the imposition" (76). Therefore, the caller showed awareness of the *Negative Face* needs of the operator, as he consciously mitigated his potentially over-demanding requests, even in the dire, stressful context in which the suspension of *Face* work would be naturally expected —and most certainly understood.

4.1.2.4.3. Relevant observations

In terms of *CP,* this caller was highly cooperative, as they adhered to three out four categories in every turn. What makes this call different from the other victims relates to the *Aversion* of *Quantity*: even though the previous analysis indicates that victims tended to provide more information than needed, in this call this category was infringed because less information was given. A relation between *Quantity* and *Relevance* was not present in this call, as opposed to Pulse Nightclub Call 3, where they were connected due to the repetition of utterances with no further relevance in the interaction. Contrastingly, in this exchange *Quantity* was adhered to less than *Relevance,* as the category was averted by means of retaining information that seemed relevant to the context. In relation to the type of *Aversion*, *Infringing* was most frequently identified, suggesting that callers failed to observe a maxim not due to an intentional effort to generate implicatures, but because the context restricted their participation in the exchange, by not being able to hear correctly or to respond correctly. (Thomas, 1995)

Regarding *Politeness,* 2 instances of *Negative FTAs* and one occurrence of *Mitigation* were identified. It was noted that when *FTAs* took place there was a non-observance of the category of *Quantity*, as refusing to give information was considered a *Negative FTA*, given that Brown and Levison (1987) define *Negative Face* as the right of an individual to not being impeded by others, and by not giving the requested information, the caller was impeding the operator from rendering the much-needed assistance properly. In relation to *Mitigation* this occurred in a highly cooperative exchange, therefore, it seemed that at least in this call, *Mitigation* required a high *Adherence* to *CP* to take place. However, it must be emphasized that these results cannot be generalized to all the victims' calls analyzed, as there was one instance of this strategy present in the call.

It is important to notice that in this corpus there were no threats to *Positive Face*, which suggests that the caller's intention was not to attack the operator's "public self-image or personality" (Brown and Levinson:62) but rather the *Negative Face* by declining to comply with the operator's demand. Moreover, in relation to *Mitigation* the caller made the effort to soften their utterance, to avoid threatening the operator's *Negative Face* by impeding their freedom of action (Brown and Levinson, 1987) even if the victim was in physical pain due to their arm wound. This illustrates how even in contexts of emergency politeness was not entirely suspended, as it can be a useful strategy to hasten the process of requesting help.

4.1.2.5. Victims' cooperative and polite verbal behavior: final comments

The analysis of the emergency calls made by victims present in the Pulse Nightclub and Charleston Church shootings showed various similar results. First, in relation to *Adherence* the two categories with most instances of *Adherence* were *Quality* and *Relevance*. This can be attributed to the fact that it was crucial for victims to give information that was true and relevant to what was asked in order to receive the assistance they needed. In contrast, the categories with more *Aversion* were *Quantity* and *Manner,* as the victims tended to repeat the information making their contribution more informative than required, which Grice considers an act of non-adherence to *Quantity*. The victims also struggled to answer in a straightforward manner due to the stressful context, making unclear contributions at times, therefore, *Infringing* the category of *Manner*.

An interesting observation that can be made regarding *Relevance* and *Quantity* is that these were the *CP* categories with most and least *Adherence* instances, respectively. That is to say, despite the frequent and unrequested repetition of information given by the victims, the significance of their utterances was highly relevant to the operators and dispatchers, as the information provided was helpful to the gathering of information to send help in each case and kept the caller on the line with the dispatcher and ensure their safeness.

Furthermore, the most common type of *Aversion* differed in the two shootings. In Pulse Nightclub Shooting, *Infringing* was commonly identified, and it was related to the inability to cooperate due to emotional distress or contextual issues, while in Charleston Church Shooting it was *Flouting,* related to the conversational implicatures of the victim's utterances which she expected the dispatcher to understand, as she gave responses which implicated something that was not explicitly said. The context in which each shooting took place was different, as one occurred in a Church's Bible study, and the other in a nightclub, and that was a factor that may have altered the victims' ability to cooperate. On the one hand, in the Charleston Church Shooting, the acoustics of the place and the reduced group of people made it difficult for the victim to hide and to speak on the phone without being heard. On the other hand, in the Pulse Nightclub shooting there was a higher number of people present, it was louder due to the chaos of the shooting, and the space had more places to hide, all of which factors that allowed some victims to speak for longer periods of time.

In relation to *Face Attack* and *Mitigation*, in the corpus there were instances of *FTAs* in its totality to *Negative Face*, with a total of 16 instances in the 5 calls examined. Most instances were due to the anxiety and stress the context weighted down on the victims, hence they tended to unintentionally threaten the operator's *Negative Face* by making bold requests, making sure if the operator was still on the phone, and others. *Mitigation*, in turn, predominated in the calls

made by victims, with a total of 14 occurrences —all to *Negative Face*—, which can be explained by the victims' tendency to avoid being direct with their requests to the operators, despite being anxious for help to come. The absence of constant instances of *FTAs* and the predominant presence of *Mitigation* are evidence of the high levels of politeness in the victims' interactions as they made choices in their speech that allowed lower instances of *FTAs* in their productions. Additionally, *Mitigation* strategies were observed in instances with high *Adherence* to *CP*, therefore it seems to be a cooperative device utilized by victims to maintain both cooperation and politeness during the exchange.

Regarding *Politeness*, in Pulse Nightclub Call 1, example 7 was worth highlighting since it showed that by making small comments not related to asking for help (which is the call's main purpose), the caller (speaker) tried to reduce the distance between them and the operator (hearer) and assert empathy. Turn 28 was not an *FTA* but seems rather a form of coping with extreme anxiety and stress that the context weighs down on the victim.

These results are not accidental, as the callers chose to avoid *Positive FTAs* and instead use *Mitigation* in order to get the responses they needed from the operators and dispatchers. The callers needed to get help, and the strategy they chose to get it was remaining polite despite the urgency, since far from being familiar with what was clearly an unfamiliar situation, they may have in mind the needs associated to regular calls, where being polite goes a long way to obtaining the results pursued in the communicative exchange. By being polite, then, victims did the necessary linguistic work they assumed essential for the operators and dispatchers to be more receptive to their calls. This further indicates that politeness is not suspended in emergency situations, but rather it is a useful linguistic strategy to achieve the purposes of the exchange.

4.2. Shooters' emergency calls

In the following section, the calls made by the shooters to the emergency services will be analyzed and discussed. As with the victims', the calls were arranged in chronological order.

4.2.1. Hartford Distributors Shooting, Connecticut

The call is 03:59 minutes long and consists of 53 turns, where 26 correspond to the shooter and 27 to the 911 dispatcher. The total of words spoken during the call was 681, where the shooter used 434 words while the male dispatcher, 247.

4.2.1.1. *CP*: Adherence and aversion

Table 16 shows evidence that despite the short length of the linguistic exchange between the dispatcher and the shooter, the latter seemed to be reasonably cooperative in certain situations, giving a considerable amount of information that appeared to be of critical importance to the dispatcher. Nevertheless, as will be seen later on, the shooter was not consistent enough with his level of cooperation.

Table 16
Hartford Distributors Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
16	20	13	13	62

Table 16 shows that the shooter was more adherent to *Quality* and *Quantity*, while *Manner* and *Relevance* had the same number of instances. It is worth mentioning the absence of a high predominance of a certain category, but rather a fairly even distribution of *Adherence* to all the categories.

In certain situations, the shooter presented himself as a highly cooperative individual, answering numerous dispatcher's questions, and adhering to all *CP* categories. A clear example of the suspect being cooperative was seen in turns 9 to 12, where the dispatcher asked the shooter whether he was in possession of a gun. In this instance, the categories exemplified are all the ones proposed by Grice (1975): *Quantity*, *Quality*, *Manner*, and *Relevance*.

(19) *Hartford Distributors Shooting*
 9 **DISPATCHER:** Yeah. Are you armed, sir? Do you have a weapon with you?
10 **SHOOTER:** Oh yeah, I'm armed.
11 **DISPATCHER:** How many guns do you have with you?
12 **SHOOTER:** I got one now, there's one out, one out in the uh, the uh, factory there.

Another scenario in which the shooter displayed cooperative behavior was visible between turns 29 and 36, where he was asked different questions by the dispatcher on different topics: the time of his arrival to the factory and the type of weapon he was carrying at the time. In this case, the shooter also adhered to all *CP* categories, revealing himself as a highly cooperative individual in more than a single instance.

(20) *Hartford Distributors Shooting*

29 **DISPATCHER:** Yeah, now, um, what time did you get there today?
30 **SHOOTER:** Um, It was about 7 o'clock.
31 **DISPATCHER:** Yeah. This morning?
32 **SHOOTER:** Yeah, about 7 a.m., yeah, they told me to come early today.
33 **DISPATCHER:** What type of weapon do you have?
34 **SHOOTER:** I got a Ruger SR9, 15 shot.
35 **DISPATCHER:** A Ruger? SR9?
36 **SHOOTER:** Automatic, yeah.

Despite the cooperative behavior that the shooter showed on several occasions, this did not seem to follow a defined pattern or a special purpose, since after the turns mentioned in examples 19 and 20, he decided to break this cooperative attitude, violating several categories.

Regardless of the high level of cooperation that the shooter exhibited at some points during the call, it was frequently interrupted by many other instances where he both deliberately and unintentionally chose to violate various categories. The results concerning the *Aversion* of Gricean categories are presented in Table 17.

Table 17
Hartford Distributors Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	4	4	7	7	22
Violation	3	1	4	4	12
Opting Out	1	1	1	1	4
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	8	6	12	12	38

Table 17 shows the predominance of *Aversion* in both *Manner* and *Relevance*, indicaing that the shooter completely deviates from the main topic several times, issuing statements that were not relevant to the dialogue and the progression of the interaction with the dispatcher. In

addition, he was also not clear with his statements, adding obscurity and ambiguity to the dialogue. An example where the shooter decided to flout all the Gricean categories can be seen in example 21, where he diverges from the main topics.

(21) *Hartford Distributors Shooting*
17 **DISPATCHER:** No they're not. We're just gonna have to get you to relax.
18 **SHOOTER:** I'm relaxed, just calm down.
19 **DISPATCHER:** … to have you, you know, turn yourself over.
20 **SHOOTER:** We're just talking, *you're gonna play something on the news*, you know. I'm gonna be popular, right [inaudible] the right thing. SWAT team just rolled by in army gear. You don't know where I'm at, but, I don't know, maybe you can trace it from this phone call. But, yeah, *these people here are crazy, they treat me bad from the start here, racist company*. They treat me bad, I'm the only black driver they got here. They treat me bad over here, they treat me bad all the time.

This was a highly illustrative example since, in the last turn of the extract, the shooter decided to flout all four Gricean categories to explain some of the reasons behind the shooting he carried out minutes before the call. Although the shooter's interventions had not been cooperative in the previous turns, in turn 20 the shooter completely deviates from the initial direction of the conversation, especially after the dispatcher made a statement and not a question. His turn goes from his intention to broadcast his speech to the news: "*you're gonna play something on the news*", through a comment to the SWAT team that was entering the building, to the alleged racism that took place internally in the distributors warehouse: "*these people here are crazy, they treat me bad from the start here, racist company*". The *Flouting* of all categories by the shooter in response to the dispatcher's statements and questions has an explanation: on these occasions the shooter opted to deviate entirely from what was happening in the interaction, and generally did so to explain his motives and ideas. The *Flouting* of these categories also implied no cooperation with the dispatcher, who was seen repeatedly trying to obtain key information.

As to types of *Aversion,* it was possible to state the predominance of *Flouting* over the others, while *Violation* also had a considerable productivity. *Opting Out* was deployed only once during the entire call, while *Infringing* was not present at all. The prevalence of *Flouting* showed the shooter's intention, considering that the shooter had probably called the police with a clear message in mind. If *Violation* had been the prominent one, it could have been possible to assume involuntariness in violating the categories; however, *Violation* still appeared a considerable number of instances during the dialogue, revealing that not all the shooter's statements were clearly planned, and thus suggesting a certain amount of improvisation in his discourse (Thomas, 1995).

FTAs and *Mitigation* instances were also identified in the Hartford Distributors shooting emergency. The following results were obtained:

Table 18
Hartford Distributors Shooting. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
0	5	0	0	5

From the results displayed in Table 18, the number of *FTAs* is worth mentioning. There were no instances of *Positive FTAs* of both the dispatcher and the shooter, while 5 *Negative FTAs* towards the *Face* of the dispatcher were identified. The absence of *FTAs* towards the dispatcher's *Positive Face* was justified since the shooter was not focused on making complaints or criticisms, but rather on delivering his message and ideas, and avoiding being interrupted. During the call, the shooter seemed upset due to the dispatcher's constant indications for him to remain calm, as can be seen in the following example.

> (22) *Hartford Distributors Shooting*
> 16 **SHOOTER:** These cops are gonna kill me.
> 17 **DISPATCHER:** No they're not. We're just gonna have to get you to relax.
> 18 **SHOOTER:** I'm relaxed, just calm down.

A comparable situation occured later in the call in (23), where the dispatcher continued urging the shooter to regain his composure in order to give a final resolution to the situation.

> (23) *Hartford Distributors Shooting*
> 41 **DISPATCHER:** Yeah, we wouldn't want to do it like that, Omar. You know, it's already been a bad enough scene here this morning, we want you to relax.
> 42 **SHOOTER:** I'm relaxed though, I'm done.

Every time the dispatcher made the same petition to the shooter, he repeatedly received the same response, making communication with him much more difficult.

As for *Mitigation*, Table 18 showed that not a single *Mitigation* scenario could be identified during the whole call. In this call, no instances of *Mitigation* were witnessed due to how straightforward the shooter was in certain moments of the discussion. Moreover, during

the whole dialogue it was not possible to identify any attempt to repair these instances of *FTAs*, and neither was his attitude towards the dispatcher polite and disposed to remedy any negative comment or situation, since the shooter was not particularly concerned with redressing these comments, but was rather interested in transmitting his own message.

4.2.1.3. Relevant observations

Based on the findings previously presented, it is safe to assume that the shooter only adhered to all the categories in the *CP* to continue the thread of the discussion with the dispatcher and then proceeded to flout all the categories to explain his ideas and motives so they could be broadcast to the mass media. These cooperative instances did not work in any identified sequence; therefore, it was difficult for the dispatcher to anticipate how the shooter would react during the call, and besides, it was the shooter himself who decided to control the interaction. This behavior was justified to keep the dispatcher's attention so that he could take into consideration what the shooter was trying to convey: his motives, ideas, and intentions behind the recent shooting. To deliver these ideas, the shooter diverged from the leading direction of the exchange since this direction would not consider his ideas and motives. Due to that diversion, he transgressed a considerable number of categories, especially *Manner* and *Relevance* while maintaining a low number of *Aversion* instances in *Quality.*

From the results obtained in Tables 16 and 17 about *Adherence* and *Aversion*, some relations could be identified. As for Table 16, the prevalence of *Quality* followed by *Quantity* suggested that the shooter was seeking to provide what he honestly believed to be truthful information, such as the existence of racism in the factory or the intention to no longer shoot more people. Likewise, the number of *Quantity Adherence* instances indicated that the shooter tried to work within certain limits, where he intended to remain as informative as possible, delivering the necessary amount of information within the context, likely due to the limited time he had available before the arrival of enforcement forces at the building where the shooting occurred and where he was also hiding, as shown in example 19. Nevertheless, there also existed the chance that the shooter intended to provide this information in a quick and concise way in order to move on to topics that were more relevant to his goal. But as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the shooter did not operate in a constant and regular manner, so his behavior became dubious. The lack of consistency of his attitude made the shooter-dispatcher communication even more complex and challenging given the context in which the call took place.

It is also important to highlight the absence or low recurrence of certain types of *Aversion*, such as *Opting Out* and *Infringing*. The prevalence of *Flouting* in Table 17 indicated that the shooter was deliberately trying to deliver an underlying message. As for *Violation*, several instances could be detected, which also accounts for a degree of involuntariness in committing these types of *Aversion* (Thomas, 1995). While these instances of *Violation* constituted a considerable portion of *Aversion*, they represented almost half of the instances of *Flouting,* which highlights the prevalence of *Flouting* during the call. Towards the end of the call, it was possible to detect the only instance of *Opting Out*, a moment in which the shooter seemed to be more concerned about the imminent arrival of the police, so the expected response was not the desired one, as can be seen in the next example in turn 48: "*I got uh, I shot, uh oh.*" Although the shooter was not shot by the police, the shooter was no longer mainly concerned about the dialogue with the dispatcher but focused on the possible arrival of the police. Although the transcript was not clear about his disengagement from the call, the actual audio of the call was clearer about the shooter's status.

An additional relevant observation regarding *Manner* and *Relevance* is that these types of *Aversion* were present in 12 of the 26 shooter's turns, which puts into perspective the number of times the shooter completely deviated from the topic of conversation. In nearly half of the turns, the shooter produced discourse that was neither relevant nor clear to the interaction with the dispatcher. Moreover, in these turns the shooter was not concise enough with his statements, adding ambiguity to his speech.

In terms of *FTAs* and *Mitigation*, the presence of 5 *Negative FTAs* towards the dispatcher out of the shooter's 26 turns was a considerable number considering how the call between the two develops: the shooter's rather unstructured attempts to cooperate, and the dispatcher's efforts to keep gathering information about the shooting while also trying to keep the shooter calm. It was especially in those instances where the shooter attacked the dispatcher's *Negative Face*, as it was seen in example (21), where instead of calming down, the shooter himself demanded the dispatcher to calm down. From such occurrences of *FTAs*, no instances of *Mitigation* were identified since the shooter had no intention to redress these threats towards the dispatcher's *Face*. His attitude was hostile at moments, and as Fraser (1980) states, he showed no attempt to reduce "the harshness or hostility of the force of one's actions" (p. 342). The shooter was not inclined to offer an apology for his aggressive behavior when asked to calm down, a situation that was consistent in each case where an instance of *FTAs* was present.

4.2.2.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida

The first 911 call made by shooter Omar Mateen of Pulse Nightclub's shooting was made at 2:35 AM, Sunday June 12th, 2016. This was the first contact with the shooter. The call is 00:52 seconds long, being the shortest one of the corpora, and consists of 9 turns between the shooter and a 911 operator, where 5 turns corresponded to the 911 operator and 4 to the shooter. The total of words interchanged is 63, 21 by the 911 operator and 42 by the shooter.

4.2.2.1.1.   *CP*: Adherence and aversion

The analysis of this specific call showed that the most respected CP category was Quality. As very early in the call the shooter promptly expressed that his prime intention was to claim responsibility for the shooting in the name of the Islamic State. Because of this willingness to call and claim responsibility, it was expected of him to be highly cooperative (even if it is generally not expected for criminals to cooperate with the police), thus adhering to the categories of CP; however, this was not the case of this call.

Table 19
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
0	4	2	0	6

As seen in table 21, there were no instances of full *Adherence* to the four categories of *CP*. This did not mean that the shooter was not getting his point across; on the contrary, his answers are true and initially gave some information about the reasons behind the shooting. In example 29 the shooter was *Opting Out* of the categories of *Quantity* and *Manner* while adhering to *Quality* and *Relevance*. He was being cooperative with the 911 operator as he was delivering his message for the first time here:

> (24) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
> 1 **OPERATOR:** 911. This call is being recorded.
> 2 **SHOOTER:** This is Mateen [speaking in another language]. I want to let you know I'm in Orlando and I did the shooting.

In this brief call, the *CP* categories that were flouted the most were *Quantity* and *Manner,* both of which were not being adhered to at all by the shooter. This was because in the four turns in which the shooter gave information, this was either too vague, often speaking in another language that the hearer (the dispatcher) could not understand; or too little and unspecific, thus transgressing the first maxim of *Quantity*: "Make your contribution as informative as required" (Grice, 1975:45), also refusing to elaborate further on his claims. However, for an initial stage the shooter did give some information as to why he did the shooting and where he was, but as mentioned before, it was expected of this shooter to be cooperative as this was the only contact with him that was initiated by him.

For the analysis of the *Aversion* of the categories of *CP*, the categories proposed by Thomas (1995) proved to be useful to examine the degree of cooperativeness —or lack thereof— of the shooter. In this set of categories, the one that was present the most in the call was *Flouting*.

Table 20
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

Aversion Categories	Cooperative Principle Categories				Total
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Flouting	2	0	1	2	5
Violation	1	0	1	1	3
Opting Out	1	0	0	1	2
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	0	2	4	10

As shown in Table 21 and Table 22, the category of *Relevance* was being respected and transgressed an equal number of times. This may be explained considering that the shooter was not trying to answer questions, but trying to give his own message, being relevant only in his first turn in the call where he delivered his political message, and when he was asked again something he already gave an answer to, as in "Where are you at?". As aforementioned, all his statements adhered to the category of *Quality*, and in the same way all of them transgressed *Quantity* and *Manner*, as can be seen in example 30.

(25) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1*
3 **OPERATOR:** What's your name?
4 **SHOOTER:** My name is I Pledge of Allegiance to (unidentifiable name) of the Islamic State.

4.2.2.1.2. Face attack and mitigation

No *Positive* or *Negative FTAs* were found, which can be due to the intention of the shooter to make this call to claim responsibility for the shooting on behalf of the Islamic State rather than a negotiation initiated by the police. The way the shooter spoke in this call was straightforward about what he wanted to communicate and not giving more information than he was willing to give.

The specific context of this call can explain the lack of *FTA*s present, since as mentioned before, this was the only call of this shooter that was initiated by him, and where the interactive counterpart was a 911 operator and not a negotiator, as was the case of the shooter's calls that followed. His intention was not being thwarted by the operator, as it would be in the calls with the negotiator, and the shooter was in control of the information he was giving and the way he was giving it, as the operator only asked to follow up questions rather than demands for more information.

Furthermore, there was also a lack of *Mitigation* as, for the same reasons of the lack of *FTA*s, the shooter was straightforward in the way he communicated without need to mitigate his interactive threats. Additionally, it must be kept in mind that this call was extremely short in length and, although the shooter spoke more than the 911 operator, he had a clear message that he wanted to deliver which was probably previously prepared.

4.2.2.1.3. Relevant observations

The examination of this brief call shows that *Quality* was always adhered to, while *Quantity* and *Manner* were transgressed in every turn. This pattern of categories being transgressed and adhered seemed to be consistent in the way the shooter delivered his message while, also, not

committing any *FTA*. The category that was left, *Relevance*, was being equally transgressed and adhered by the shooter, which suggested that the shooter engaged with the conversation only when he chose to and not when he was being asked for information. The length of the call also indicated that as soon as he delivered the information he wanted to give, he hung up.

The fact that this was the only call initiated by the shooter, without waiting for any question to be first addressed to him, seemed related to the identified lack of *FTAs* because, as stated before, his message was probably planned before he called 911, which made him stick to his prepared words without threatening neither the *Positive* nor *Negative Face* of the 911 operator. Furthermore, as mentioned before, in this call the shooter was determined to give limited information of his pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State, without adding information to create more fear, as he did in the other calls, and also without specifying further on his claims. He did so without resorting to *FTAs* but giving little to no information in response to the questions of the 911 operator.

4.2.2.2. Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1

The second call corresponds to the first call between the negotiator from the Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) assigned to the case and the shooter. The call was 09:21 minutes long and was made at 2:48 AM, while the shooter was barricaded in the bathroom. In these 09:21 minutes, 54 turns were taken, out of which 26 were produced by the shooter and 28 by the CNT negotiator. The shooter spoke 352 words, while the negotiator 564 words, making a total of 920 words exchanged. This would be the first negotiation call out of three.

4.2.2.2.1. *CP*: Adherence and aversion

As Grice explained, conversations, to some degree, can be understood as a meaningful exchange of cooperative efforts and similar purposes shared by the speakers (1975). In the case of calls with a shooter, as this exchange not a regular conversation, it is not expected that the speakers (shooter and police) have similar purposes. In this call the *CP* category that was respected the most was Quality; this may be due to this being the first time that the shooter had the opportunity to give an explanation to his actions. Although, as mentioned before, the two speakers have similar purposes of obtaining information (in the case of the negotiator) and spreading his message (in the case of the shooter), this does not mean that the latter was highly cooperative. On the contrary, the shooter adhered to almost every category of *CP* only when he was delivering his message as this was his immediate aim, and the only aim that was shared

with the negotiator. In a general analysis of the call the ultimate aims of the negotiator and the shooter conflicted with each other. This means that the shooter may have seemed cooperative at times but, overall, he was being uncooperative.

Table 21
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
11	16	12	12	51

The shooter also showed cooperativeness when he gave extra information that was not even been requested by the negotiator. However, this information was not always truthful, as his intention was also to cause terror and threaten with other possible future violent attacks. This second case was shown in example 31, where he adhered to every category but *Quality,* most likely due to the context in which this turn was produced, since as mentioned before the shooter was cooperative when giving his political message. However, this particular piece of information was more intended to cause fear rather than a real threat, as he continued talking yet avoiding giving evidence of the alleged bombs, thus transgressing the first maxim of *Quality* "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence". (Grice, 1975:46). While it is true that the shooter could have been convinced of the existence of the vehicles with bombs following the maxim "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice, 1975:46), in the analysis of this turn that idea was ruled out as subjective, as the bomb threats were dropped after this call and the shooter's adamant opinion against the US bombings.

> (26) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1:*
> 20 **NEGOTIATOR:** Okay. I understand that and I'll pass that along. Can you tell me what vehicle? Because I don't want to see anybody get hurt.
> 21 **SHOOTER:** No. But I'll tell you this, they can take out whole city block almost.

In the case of *Aversion*, the category that was being transgressed the most was *Quantity*. This may be due to the shooter often fluctuating between giving little to no information about what he was being asked, and sharing more information than expected, usually by his own initiative. The type of *Aversion* that was present the most on this call was *Violation*, since the shooter oftentimes ostentatiously failed to adhere to the categories more than he blatantly refused to adhere to them (Thomas, 1995).

Table 22

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	3	5	4	5	17
Violation	8	1	6	5	20
Opting Out	4	4	4	4	16
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	15	10	14	14	53

Table 24 shows that *Opting Out* (Thomas, 1995) is the only type of *Aversion* with an even number of instances of each category of *CP* being transgressed. This seems to be due to the fact that when this type of *Aversion* was present, it was mainly because the shooter was bluntly refusing to give information or not even trying to acknowledge the requests of the negotiator.

An illustration of the shooter being cooperative only when trying to give his message is shown in example 32, where he flouted every category as he is intentionally choosing not to respond to the negotiator, even changing the topic:

(27) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1*
43 **NEGOTIATOR:** Well, I'd like you to stay on the phone with me please, okay? Are you there? Please stay on the phone with me so I can help pass along your concerns.
44 **SHOOTER:** If you bring the bomb dog they are not going to smell shit.

4.2.2.2.2. Face attack and mitigation

The FTA that was present the most on this call was Negative FTA. This call was the beginning of an attempt to ask for further information about the reasons for the shooting and to bring about a peaceful resolution of the situation from the negotiator's side; however, the shooter was not so willing, hence the presence of FTAs.

Table 23
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
2	3	0	0	5

More than attacking the *Face* of the negotiator, in this call the shooter attacked the US and its institutions' *Face*. As seen in example 33, the shooter tended to defy the negotiator to perform or not a future action that was being belittled or ridiculed:

> (28) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1*
> 45 **NEGOTIATOR:** Well, I understand that.
> 46 **SHOOTER:** You can't smell it. Bring you little American bomb dog, they are fucking outdated anyway.

In this example, an important aspect to highlight is the use of the adjective "fucking", as even though it is a part of the shooter's efforts to ridicule the efficiency of the bomb dog, it functions in this sentence to intensify the impact of "outdated".

Although it was mentioned before that the most common type of *FTA* present in this call is the *Negative FTA*, it is important to show how the shooter also attacks the *Positive Face* of the negotiator. In the case of the *Positive FTA,* contrary to what happens in the example of *Negative FTAs*, the attacks were directly aimed to the negotiator in an attempt to humiliate and criticize his knowledge on the shooter's cultural beliefs and traditions, as seen in 34:

> (29) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1*
> 33 **NEGOTIATOR:** I'm here. I'm listening. I'm here, I'm listening.
> 34 **SHOOTER:** It's the last month of Ramadan if you ever know about that.

In this call, just like the one before, *Mitigation* was not present due to the intention of the shooter to deliver his message in a clear and straightforward manner, not taking into account the *Face* of the negotiator. However, *FTA*s were present also because of the intention of the shooter to maintain control of the information given, often repeating the same words or message such as "they need to stop the U.S. air strikes". The way the shooter spoke is straightforward, as aforementioned, and his message seemed rehearsed, hence his tendency to stick to it, not

trying to soften or ease the delivery of it. Furthermore, this was the first interaction between a negotiator and the shooter, which had an impact on the shooter's need to give his message unchanged and clear, as his prime aim was to deliver it to the authorities by repeatedly asking the US Government to stop the airstrikes.

4.2.2.2.3.   Relevant observations

It is important to highlight that in the results of the analysis of *CP*, the total of *Adherence* and the *Aversion* of *CP*, the latter was only higher by two cases of *Aversion*. This small difference only occurred in this negotiation and may be due to this being the first interaction with the negotiator, which means that the shooter was still somewhat willing to engage in the conversation, contrary to what he will do in the 2 following negotiations.

Another important aspect were the ways in which *FTAs* appeared in this call. As previously stated, the shooter attacked not only the *Positive* and *Negative Face* of the hearer, but also —and especially— what the negotiator represents: official institutions and, ultimately, the US. *FTAs* to the *Positive Face* occurred in instances where the shooter wanted to belittle and ridicule the efforts and intelligence of the negotiator, and in both cases, they were aimed at the negotiator. On the other hand, in the case of *FTA* of the *Negative Face*, they can be both aimed at the negotiator and to the institutions. This may be explained because of his dislike towards the US, using this opportunity to further comment on his disapproval of their past actions.

As context is critical for interpretation, it is significant to mention that in the audio register of the call, a voice can be heard in the background saying "bomb dogs" before turn 46, in example 33. This detail was not considered because the analysis was centered on the conversation between the negotiator and the shooter; nevertheless, it was an important addition to the context of the example. Furthermore, in this turn, the shooter was trying to challenge the hearer to perform a future action, thus threatening the liberty of action of the institution by belittling the performance of the bomb dogs beforehand. The shooter also showed distrust of the negotiator, which led to denying the negotiator's effort to obtain information.

One last relevant observation was the number of words exchanged by the shooter and the negotiator. As aforementioned, the shooter spoke 352 words, while the negotiator spoke 564 words, making a total of 920 words. This was relevant because although the shooter's number of words was far lower than the negotiator's, he was able to transgress a significant number of times *CP* categories, and also, a large portion of these words were being repeated over and over again, reducing the diversity of the content of his turns.

4.2.2.3. Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2

The second call between the Orlando shooter and the negotiator was 16:05 minutes long, the longest in duration out of the three negotiation calls with the shooter. It consisted of 58 turns, with the negotiator leading the conversation with 31 turns, followed by the shooter with 27. The total of words interchanged between both subjects was 1092, 265 were produced by the shooter and 827 by the negotiator.

4.2.2.3.1. *CP*: Adherence and aversion

The call presented the highest number of *Adherence* to the *CP* out of the three negotiation calls. The shooter focused on his own communicative intentions, not cooperating with the negotiator's, mainly because the shooter's turns were strictly inclined towards his own purpose. The conflict of interests between both participants impeded a successful interaction because the expectations that come with an interchange were not met for either of the participants. Out of the 60 instances of *Adherence* that were found in this call, the category of *Quality* was the most adhered to with 17 identified instances, followed closely by *Quantity* with 15, leaving *Relevance* and *Manner* at last with 14 instances of *Adherence* each.

Table 24
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2. Cooperative Principle - Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
15	17	14	14	60

Adherence to *Quality* was predominantly higher than to the other categories, which indicate the existence of an objective that drove the shooter to be truthful when it came to his statements, which were mainly related to his sociocultural message. Due to the fact that conversations require to let communicative intentions be known to the receptor in order to influence on them (Grice, 1975), the shooter adhered to the *CP* exclusively around his communicative intentions, leveraging the exchange towards them and never to the negotiator's attempts of approach.

Relevance and *Manner* closely followed *Quality* with 14 instances each, which reinforced the idea that the shooter only engaged in the exchange when he was guiding it. In

(35) the shooter adhered to all categories since he purposefully drove the attention towards himself by stating his motive for the mass shooting, instead of answering the negotiator's question in turn 11. The shooter adhered to *Relevance* only because the negotiator submitted to the sudden change of topic, accepting the new direction of the talk exchange in a new attempt to engage the shooter to the interaction, and ultimately make him cooperate under the shooter's own terms —i.e., his sociocultural message.

> (30) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2*
> 11 **SHOOTER:** Tell me what's going on right now, Omar.
> 12 **SHOOTER:** Yo, the air strike that killed Abu Wahid a few weeks ago–
> 13 **NEGOTIATOR:** Okay.
> 14 **SHOOTER:** That's what triggered it, okay?
> 15 **NEGOTIATOR:** Okay.
> 16 **SHOOTER:** They should have not killed Abu Wahid.

As previously stated, the shooter's objective seemed to be to instill fear through his actions and used the negotiator as a medium to justify them, which explained why the shooter would want to maintain control over the conversation and stay focused on making contributions strictly related to his message. This resulted in highly cooperative statements like those in (35) when they were related to the shooter's communicative intentions, as well as in *Aversions* to the *CP* due to the shooter's unwillingness to make cooperative efforts oriented to the negotiator's communicative intentions. The call presented a total of 49 instances where the *CP* was heavily transgressed. *Relevance* was the second least adhered to by the shooter with a total of 15 instances (the number of times the shooter deviated from the topic of the exchange), almost equal to the number of instances where the shooter was in fact relevant by definition and was interpreted to be highly cooperative (when he was in control of the interaction), resulting in an uncooperative interaction after all.

Table 25
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	2	2	3	4	11

Violation	5	1	3	5	14
Opting Out	6	6	6	6	24
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13	9	12	15	49

Table 27 shows that the shooter's preference was to opt out of any possible approach from the negotiator to make the shooter cooperate, with 24 instances in total, which illustrated that the conversation was almost one-sided despite the negotiator being the participant with most turns in the call. The category with most *Aversions* was *Manner*, with a total of 15 instances. These were transgressed by means of *Opting Out* and violating said category, which means that the shooter's cooperative course of action was highly motivated towards impeding the negotiator to actively participate in the interaction.

In (36) below, the shooter violated all categories of the *CP* except for *Quality* since his statements were related to his sociocultural message but were not relevant to the interaction as a whole. The shooter's intentions have been clearly and repeatedly stated during the call, becoming a constant obstacle for successful communication rather than valuable information. The *Violation* of the categories *Manner* and *Quantity* were seen mainly in what can be considered as sudden outbursts of emotion, which were unrelated to the shooter's message but were more inclined towards his personal sentiments. This resulted in not-well-thought-out statements commonly filled with mild attacks towards the hearer, as seen in turns 36 and 38, showing a tendency towards neglecting the *CP* as the call got deviated from the shooter's purpose as the night progressed, and death was getting nearer.

(31) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2*
36 **SHOOTER:** Tell -- tell the fucking -- the air strikes need to stop.
37 **SHOOTER:** I'm doing that. I'm passing that message along, immediately.
38 **SHOOTER:** You see, now you feel, now you feel how it is.

4.2.2.3.2. Face attack and mitigation

12 instances of *Positive FTAs* were identified in this call, which constituted the highest number of *FTAs* out of the other 3 negotiation calls from the Pulse Nightclub mass shooting. No

Negative FTAs were identified because, despite the fact that the negotiator's attempts to communicate were constantly flouted, the negotiator's role was to ease the course of the exchange between him and the shooter by adjusting solely to his demands, in an attempt to reach a mutual agreement. On the other hand, no mitigating instances were identified seemingly owed to the shooter's constant tendency to deviate from the *CP* and towards bold on-record strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987) rather than to avoiding or mitigating *FTAs* towards his hearer.

However, *Positive FTAs* attack the person's social image, disregarding the way in which they would like to be perceived (Brown and Levinson, 1987), something that the shooter constantly did in order to regain control of the interaction and to make the negotiator feel powerless over the current situation, considering that both speakers were already acquainted with each other's purpose (i.e. the negotiator tried to reach an agreement with the shooter, and the shooter had no intention to stop his course of action until his message was heard), from which it is safe to assume that the shooter purposefully rejected making cooperative efforts towards reaching a middle ground with the negotiator because that was not the shooter's purpose to achieve that night.

Table 26
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
12	0	0	0	12

In (37), all categories of the *CP* were being purposefully flouted in order to belittle the negotiator's attempts to establish efficient communication with the shooter, including acts that could be regarded as childish, and explicit forms of insulting towards the negotiator. The shooter resorted to this course of action only when he felt threatened by the negotiator's attempt to make him provide details that could facilitate his detention. By deliberately keeping the negotiator in the dark through constantly evading his questions, the shooter exercised control over the situation in terms of time and topic of conversation.

(32) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2*
39 **NEGOTIATOR:** I understand your concern, Omar. Do you have somebody that you brought with you that we need to check on and make sure they are not injured?
40 **SHOOTER:** *No. No. No. No. No. No, Mr. Hostage Negotiator, don't try your bullshit with me.*

Successful communicative interactions usually consist of both speakers exposing their communicative intentions in a manner that is respectful of the other's boundaries (Grice, 1975). However, the shooter had no regard for the negotiator's intentions and turned the conversation almost one-sided, not cooperating with the negotiator's questions but using his own turns to deviate the exchange towards the shooter's communicative intentions, but not towards what was actually expected of him to say, hindering effective interactive communication.

Following up (35)'s highly cooperative instance where the shooter directed the dialogue towards him by confessing his motive, an unexpected *FTA* appeared in the shooter's next turn (as seen in (38)). Considering the shooter's political affiliations and high disregard towards the US, the shooter attacked the negotiator's *Positive Face* by implying that he was ignorant towards certain matters, like the conflict in the Middle East that triggered this mass shooting. The shooter's allegation regarding the negotiator's ignorance was an aggressive attempt to regain control of the conversation, allowing no place for further questioning from the negotiator in that matter, who immediately tried another course of action from there, in fear of triggering more aggressive behavior from the shooter as seen in turn 18.

(33) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2*
16 **SHOOTER:** They should have not bombed and killed Abu Wahid.
17 **NEGOTIATOR:** I understand.
18 **SHOOTER:** Do your fucking homework and figure out who Abu Wahid is, okay?
19 **NEGOTIATOR:** I understand that. What I need to find out is are you injured? Omar?

4.2.2.3.3. Relevant observations

A relevant observation from the corpus was the marked difference between the number of words uttered by the negotiator (827 words) compared to the shooter's 265. This feature was not exclusive of this call; however, the three analyzed negotiation calls presented more turns from the negotiator than the shooter, a phenomenon that could be linked to his role during the dialogue. The negotiator's role was considerably different from the one of a police officer or a 911 operator, because his objective was not to subjugate the perpetrator or to follow a protocol in order to obtain information, but to gain his confidence and reach a mutual agreement to stop a conflict in process.

Due to the constant *Aversions* of *CP*, and the almost one-sided nature of these negotiation calls, the negotiator's role was to insist on establishing rapport with the shooter in order to ease things for both the shooter and the individuals affected by him, including victims and authorities. The negotiator's insistence in maintaining the dialogue and the shooter's reluctance to speak beyond his own intentions were two forces incompatible for effective communication, due to the fact that both speakers forced their communicative intentions onto each other, disregarding the *CP* entirely.

Despite the negotiator's constant exercise of active listening (which involves minimal responses, pauses, paraphrasing and mirroring of the speaker's turns, etc.) (Coulthard and Johnson, 2007), the expected effect on the shooter —i.e., to encourage him to speak— was not reached unless the topic got directed to the shooter's message. The lack of cooperativeness from the shooter forced the negotiator to try different approaches, exposing his objective to the shooter, and hindering the exchange of information even more.

4.2.2.4.   Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3

The fourth and last call between the shooter and the negotiator took place at 3:23 a.m. and was the last contact with the shooter before his subsequent death inside Pulse Nightclub at 5:00 a.m. approximately. The call was 1:53 minutes long, the shortest in length out of the four calls with the shooter. It consisted of 15 turns, 8 taken by the negotiator and 7 taken by the shooter. With a total of 166 words, the shooter spoke 54 words while the negotiator spoke 112.

4.2.2.4.1.   *CP*: Adherence and aversion

Aversion to the *CP* was more typical than *Adherence* in this call, with a total of 17 transgressions in only 7 turns by the shooter. The call presented 14 instances of *Flouting* of all categories of the *CP* and 3 violations to all categories except for *Quality*, as seen in Table 30. On the other hand, only 11 instances of *Adherence* were identified, the category of *Quantity* being the most productive one, as shown in Table 29. However, the shooter did not answer as expected by the hearer in any of his turns, which meant that although the shooter was mostly adhering to all categories, this did not indicate that he was being highly cooperative or that what he was saying was relevant to the objectives of the ongoing interchange.

Table 27
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3. Cooperative Principle - Adherence

	Cooperative Principle Categories			
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
3	4	2	2	11

The shooter flouted all of the negotiator's questions with exception of one instance, where all categories but *Quality* were violated, meaning that the shooter purposefully avoided all the negotiator's attempts to solve the situation peacefully as the night progressed. As seen before, he was highly cooperative only when it came to delivering his message, resulting in several instances where he changed the course of the dialogue, as in (39), where the shooter purposely avoided the former negotiator's open question and turned the subject towards himself and his message in order to control the interaction once again.

> (34) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3*
> 9 **NEGOTIATOR:** Tell me what's going on now, Omar?
> 10 **SHOOTER:** What's going on is that the air strikes need to stop.
> 11 **NEGOTIATOR:** Yes.
> 12 **SHOOTER:** They need to stop.
> 13 **NEGOTIATOR:** The air strikes need to stop.
> 14 **SHOOTER:** They need to stop killing people.

Table 28
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	3	3	4	4	14
Violation	1	0	1	1	3
Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0

Total	4	3	5	5	17

Unlike victims, shooters repeated information not because stress and/or desperation interfered in the *Manner* (to be brief, clear, and organized) in which they provide said information, but to impose their premeditated message as a topic in the interaction and regain its control every time they could. Over informativeness was not necessarily an *Aversion* to *Quantity* but it was a waste of time for those involved in an interaction, and a clear attempt to mislead them into thinking the speaker was making a point in between their excess of information, which was not commonly the case (Grice, 1975). In this call, the shooter adhered to *Quantity* because his premeditated message provided a fair amount of information, flouting it only when he uttered a simplified version of the message as in turn 12 in (39). In the case of victims, *Adherence* to *Quantity* implied *Adherence* to *Relevance* as well, since providing more or less information than required was considered irrelevant considering the urgency of the situation. However, shooters adhered to *Quantity* but transgressed *Relevance*; the repetition of a premeditated message could provide sufficient information and be truthful (adhering to *Quality* as well) but in this case, it was not relevant to the interaction as the shooter actively ignored the negotiator's inquiries, deviating the exchange towards his message to control the conversation and gain time.

On the other hand, the shooter tended to adhere to the *CP* when expressing his feelings of frustration or anger towards the negotiator, using these outbursts as diverters of the exchange, once again, deliberately hindering its course. In (40) there was a unique instance where the shooter was both highly cooperative yet threatening to the negotiator's *Positive Face* (the only instance of *FTA*, in fact), adhering to all categories but *Relevance,* because of the sudden change of topic and avoidance of the negotiator's question.

(35) *Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3*
12 **NEGOTIATOR:** What's going on? I couldn't get ahold of you for a while.
13 **SHOOTER:** You're annoying me with these phone calls and I don't really appreciate it.

4.2.2.4.2. Face attack and mitigation

This call presented only 1 instance of *Positive FTA*, with no instances of *Negative FTAs* or *Mitigation,* possibly due to its short length and little to no instances of cooperative behavior beyond the same communicative traits from previous calls. Once again, the shooter kept the tendency to deviate the interaction towards his sociocultural message but judging from his

statements it can be said that on this occasion, the shooter felt under pressure greatly affecting his attitude towards the negotiator.

Table 29
Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
1	0	0	0	1

The context of this call and its length were important factors to consider for its analysis, due to the fact that this was the last call between the shooter and the negotiator before losing all contact with the shooter still inside Pulse Nightclub. Considering this, it was safe to assume that the shooter's emotional state was progressively decaying, making him more impatient and frustrated for not fulfilling his purpose, which was to send a message to the US through his drastic actions. As seen before in (40), this was one of the few instances where almost all categories of the *CP,* but *Relevance* was respected indicating that the shooter, independently of the stressful situation he was in, was aware of his speech production and flouted the *CP* when it was convenient to dominate the verbal exchange.

In this case, the shooter's general frustration to the situation got channeled through his response to the hearer, because he was not only using his turn to speak as an opportunity to deviate from the topic raised by the negotiator, but to purposely attack his *Positive Face* (the façade of being an approachable and trustworthy agent) and discourage him from still trying to elicit information out of the shooter by expressing his sentiments towards the negotiator in a clear way. These factors are crucial to understand how emotional responses seem less prone to adhere to the *CP* due to the fact that communication requires a mutual understanding and consideration to the counterpart's communicative intentions and expectations, and by virtue of how in this case these expectations were not being met from either participant, the shooter acted rudely to express his discomfort towards the hearer.

4.2.2.4.3.   Relevant observations

As always in pragmatic studies, when it comes to the analysis of corpora from mass shooting-related phone calls, it was essential to examine how specific context-related factors affected linguistic production. The last negotiation call from the Pulse Nightclub shooting exemplified this, as in its less than 2 minutes, two context-related aspects crucial to understand the nature of the responses in this exchange could be identified: firstly, that both speakers found themselves in the final moments of the incident in which the call took place (2 hours before the shooter got killed), and secondly, the emotional state in which both the negotiator and shooter found themselves.

In the case of the Pulse Nightclub shooter, the highly stressful context in which the shooter was in took a toll on his behavior. With each call, the shooter's emotional state decayed progressively, turning his attitude from a calm state into hostility. The negotiator's attempts at making the shooter cooperate and the shooter's imminent detention were important factors to consider when analyzing the shooter's turns, and how these affected their nature. All 7 turns that the shooter took in this call presented some type of *Aversion* towards the *CP* and attacks to the negotiator's *Positive Face*, most of them being conscious attempts to avoid the negotiator's investigative purpose, and to disregard his desire to look approachable as any negotiator's role urges them to be. The shooter was not interested in attacking the negotiator's *Negative Face* by threatening his freedom of action (not until the shooter perceived that their exchange was going nowhere), because he understood that the negotiator was the only medium through which he could pass his sociocultural message to let it be known. Also, unlike victims that mitigated their speech acts even in situations of distress, shooters did not bother to use *Politeness* strategies when requesting or demanding actions from their hearers because they felt in control of the situation at hand, contrary to victims whose vulnerable position made them evade anything that could hinder their access to receive help.

The aggressiveness in the shooter's last statements acted almost as a defense against the negotiator's constant attempts to solve the issue at hand (which would result in the shooter's undesired detention), affecting the shooter's effective linguistic production in the sense that the categories of *Quality* and *Quantity* were no longer adhered to because the shooter lost focus on his objective and no longer felt in control of the situation. His nervousness was an obstacle to deliver his message in a clear manner, as was indeed his only objective in the first two negotiation calls with higher quantities of *Adherence* to the *CP*. It was for this that it was crucial (in fact, inescapable) to consider the specific context features, as well as the intention of perpetrators and institutional agents, to analyze mass-shooting related interactions.

4.2.3. Poway Synagogue Shooting, California

The 911 perpetrator's call of the Poway Synagogue's shooting was made only 4 minutes after the crime took place. It lasted 12 minutes and consisted of 134 turns between a male shooter and a 911 dispatcher, where 63 turns corresponded to the former, 34 turns to the latter, and 36 turns were produced by two different representatives of the San Diego Police Department. The total number of words in this interaction was 1,191, where 642 were spoken by the shooter, 326 by the 911 operator, and 219 by police officers.

From both the transcript and the audio, it was understood that this call was made while the shooter was first driving away in an attempt to flee the scene, and immediately afterwards trying to park in a visible spot in order to help the police to find him, as he intended to surrender himself to the authorities. Despite having just committed his crime at the moment of making the call, the caller seemed rather calm and constantly gave useful information to the dispatcher, with some minor exceptions that will be explained in the following sections.

4.2.3.1. CP: Adherence and Aversion

Regarding the *CP*, the table below allows to formalize some ideas.

Table 30
Poway Synagogue Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Adherence

Cooperative Principle Categories				
Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	Total
61	61	56	48	226

As Table 18 shows, the caller showed a highly cooperative behavior since he adhered in 226 opportunities to all Gricean categories, observing especially *Quality* and *Quantity*, with 61 instances of *Adherence* each. This could be explained by the fact that the shooter made it clear from the very beginning that his intention was to claim responsibility for his crime and to surrender to the police and, therefore, in the process of making contributions during his questioning, he frequently adhered to said categories by being as informative as required and providing truthful statements. Other categories closely followed the same behavior pattern, such as *Relevance* —with 56 instances— and *Manner* —with 48 since the caller expressed himself with clarity and made perspicuous utterances during most of the exchange. Thus, a highly cooperative behavior was regularly observed, as the following example shows.

(36) *Poway Synagogue Shooting, California.*
  98 **SDPD:** And what clothing are you wearing?
  99 **SHOOTER:** Uh, I'm wearing – (Unintelligible.) Pants, brown shirt, chest rig, wear glasses.
100 **SDPD:** Are you wearing a hat?
101 **SHOOTER:** Nope. Brown hair.

As seen above, the shooter not only offered well-formulated responses by adhering to the four categories and following its respective supermaxims and maxims but presented a high level of cooperation by voluntarily providing pertinent information that had not even been asked for by the police officer (specifically, spontaneously adding information of his hair color). In this example, it could be disputed that one of the maxims under *Quantity* was being transgressed as the shooter was over informative in turn 101; however, as it was actually information that helped his identification as a suspect, the only implication that could be deduced was that of a solid cooperative effort.

Table 31
Poway Synagogue Shooting. Cooperative Principle – Aversion and Type of Aversion

	Cooperative Principle Categories				
	Quantity	Quality	Relevance	Manner	
Aversion Categories					Total
Flouting	2	2	7	13	24
Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Opting Out	0	0	0	2	2
Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2	2	7	15	26

In contrast, the least respected category was *Manner*, with 13 instances of *Aversion,* as the caller communicated with a certain obscurity due to his attitude against the repetitive questioning of the dispatcher and the police's inability to locate him. Table 19 also shows that

the second most averted category was *Relevance*, as in 7 of the shooter's turns, he often insisted that the reason behind his crime was related to an attempt to defend his country against Jewish people, even though he was being asked to give information that was unrelated to his motive. Few instances of *Aversion* of *Quantity* and *Quality* were observed since cooperation started its downfall in the form of short and disrespectful utterances, only after being constantly asked for answers that the caller had already given. All of the previously described aversions correspond to a clear predominance of *Flouting*, as the turns in which the shooter transgresses *CP* categories were deliberately produced so as to have a direct effect on the police.

No instances of *Violation* or *Infringing* were observed in the call, since there was always an intention of generating an implicature (Thomas, 1995) and therefore the presence of involuntary *Aversions* to the categories were non-existent during the shooter's turns. Only in 2 opportunities an *Aversion* to *Manner* was observed while *Opting Out,* since there was an unwillingness to keep cooperating by abruptly interrupting the conversation, as the caller could not believe that the police did not have the ability to find his location by tracking his phone (see section 4.3.2.3, (26) for more details). In the following extract, several transgressions of *Flouting* can be noticed.

> (37) *Poway Synagogue Shooting, California.*
> 55 **CHP:** What do you see?
> 56 **SHOOTER:** Sonic, gas station, 7-Eleven
> 57 **CHP:** I'm sorry, you're across from where? What kind of gas station?
> 58 **SHOOTER:** Uh, there's a Chevron on one side and, uh, 76, it says?
> 59 **CHP:** And you said that there's a 7-Eleven nearby?
> 60 **SHOOTER:** Yeah. Man, you guys take a long-ass time. (Long pause.) You realize you're fighting with the wrong people, right? You're serving a government that's gonna kill all of you.

In this example, while the caller's first turns adhered to all *CP* categories by engaging in clear, truthful, brief, and relevant utterances, after the dispatcher asked for the third time the same kind of question, in turn 60 the shooter drastically changed his behavior and transgressed all said categories. Despite that in this occasion the shooter made irrelevant statements about the government for which he lacked adequate evidence and insulted the quality of the dispatcher's job by adding more information than required in an obscure manner, this exchange was one of the few instances in this call that did not follow the expected behavior for a perpetrator of a mass shooting. This was because, as seen in other calls examined in this investigation, shooters commonly tended to not cooperate by constantly transgressing at least one or more maxim and/or submaxim in most of their turns, but in the case of this particular shooter, *aversions* were in fact an exception to his frequent cooperative behavior.

4.2.3.2.   Face attack and mitigation

In the Poway Synagogue's shooting call, it was also possible to identify different instances of *FTAs* and *Mitigation*, as shown in Table 20.

Table 32
Poway Synagogue Shooting. Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

Face Threatening Act		Mitigation		
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
10	0	0	8	18

Table 20 shows 10 instances of *Positive FTAs* and no presence of *Negative FTAs*, probably because in the few occasions that the caller complained, he did so as a result of both the 911 operator and the police's interventions (as they were constantly repeating the same questioning that protocol mandates), and also due to the fact that the shooter did not intend to interfere with the dispatcher's personal freedom, since his purpose throughout the whole call never changed: he simply wanted to surrender himself to the police. Meanwhile, in respect to the use of *Mitigation* strategies, a total of 8 mechanisms to mitigate the potential harshness of his utterances were identified, where 8 instances of *MTNF* were identified, while no occasions of *MTPF* were observed.

In relation to *FTAs*, the caller threatened only the *Positive Face* of the hearer, in this case, against both the 911 dispatcher and the police officer to whom later the call was transferred, mainly to attack the operators' "self-image or personality" (Brown and Levinson, 1987) due to his above-mentioned disdain at the institutions' inability to locate him, despite the fact that he was obviously being more cooperative than required in order to surrender himself. This situation can be appreciated in the following example.

(38) *Poway Synagogue Shooting, California.*
82 **SDPD:** What kind of car are you in?
83 **SHOOTER:** Do you guys not have the ability to –
84 **SDPD:** What kind of vehicle are you in?
85 **SHOOTER:** To locate my phone?

Besides committing *FTAs* against the positive image of these institutions and the quality of their work, the shooter also insulted his own victims' attempt to defend themselves against the shooting. In the next examples, a series of *FTA*s and a *MTNF* strategy were identified as the caller loses his patience as the call progresses and bragged about his shooting skills in comparison to one of his victims'.

> (39) *Poway Synagogue Shooting, California.*
> 102 **SDPD:** Okay, and I want to make sure that you're stopped there, right?
> 103 **CALLER:** Yes. Jesus Christ, you guys suck at your job.
> 104 **SDPD:** So, what happened?
> 105 **CALLER:** I opened fire at a synagogue. *I think* I killed some people. *Another man returned fire with a pistol. He sucked ass though. He didn't hit me at all*. Went back in my car – drove away.

As the emphasis in italics show, the shooter's *Positive FTAs* were not only targeted at the police officer, but at for the shooter's victims too, since it was known by context that this crime was thoroughly planned as the perpetrator wrote a 6-pages manifesto, which was published in a very well-known Internet forum, and his ultimate goal was to be acknowledged as a heroic figure that was supposedly trying to right the wrongs of Jewish people worldwide, attacking with great intensity the *Positive Face* of that particular religious and ethnic group. Moreover, this particular shooter was the only one in all the calls analyzed that used profanities to add emphasis to his utterances by complaining about the poor abilities of the dispatcher and the police, and also expressing his annoyance as he got evidently tired of trying to help in his identification, as seen in the following extract.

> (40) *Poway Synagogue Shooting, California.*
> 126 **SDPD:** All right. Which direction is your vehicle facing?
> 103 **CALLER:** It's facing… Dude, I don't fucking know.

As seen in example (28), after yet again another case of question repetition, the shooter still showed a hint of an attempt to cooperate with the police officer, but he quickly abandoned his initial intention because of the tiredness that each turn exchange seemed to produce on him, as little by little every repeated question made him lose his patience a bit more. This was observed in both the use of swear words and his ironic intonation (affecting the maxim of *Manner* regarding obscurity of expression), which added severity to a couple of the identified *Positive FTAs*, a situation that still seemed understandable due to the specific problem that was just described. Meanwhile, no instances of *Negative FTAs* were found, as the caller never made pressuring statements or any commands without redress (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

In relation to the use of *MTNF* strategies, several instances of "I"-mitigators were identified, observing 8 cases in which the caller aimed to minimize the seriousness of his answers in an attempt to decrease the weight of imposition of his utterances (Brown & Levinson, 1978), as seen previously in example (26) with the use of the phrase "I think". No instances of *MTPF* were observed as the shooter did not use mitigators when having a clear intention to insult the dispatcher and/or the police, which meant that the study of his turns could not have had any other interpretation rather than the previously identified conclusions drawn from the blunt implicatures of the caller's utterances.

4.2.3.3. Relevant observations

In general terms, regarding the *CP*, this was the most cooperative caller out of the three shooters' calls already examined. This could be associated with the length of the call, since this lasted for more than ten minutes in comparison to the briefness of other calls analyzed in this investigation, but it could also be related to the number of *Adherence* instances that were identified, divided by the total of his turns. That is to say, on average, almost 90% of the shooter's utterances showed a willingness to keep a cooperative behavior, since his goal was most focused on helping the police to locate him rather than on spreading his hate message or on claiming responsibility for the crime.

It is also worth stressing that the affirmation of this particular caller being the most cooperative person was not only valid when analyzing the role of shooters, but it also applied even when including the study of those calls made by victims. This was an unexpected finding due to the pattern observed in both other shooters' calls, where they had a similar non-cooperative attitude, and the victims' cooperative intentions whose occurrence and consequent *Adherence* to the *CP* was limited by fear and other factors related to the nature of their calls, thus making this shooter the most cooperative caller in the corpus analyzed.

Although *Aversion* instances were indeed present in this call, most of the call occurred fluently and without interruptions thanks to the perpetrator's highly cooperative behavior and his ability to give useful information to both the dispatcher and the police, despite a constant repetitiveness of questioning that could have certainly had a greater impact on the caller's attitude. In the few *Aversion* cases identified, it was found that there was a typical relationship between the non-observance of a *CP* category and the non-presence of at least one of the *FTAs,* whether it was related to *Positive Face* or the use of *Mitigation* strategies.

Regarding the above-named concepts, some unexpected results indicate that although this shooter was the most cooperative caller, he was also the one that committed the most

Positive FTAs. This was yet again likely related to the repetition of questions and the stated disbelief in the police's inability to find the perpetrator, even when he was willing to provide useful information to achieve said goal in almost every turn. The caller was also the only one that explicitly used profanity to add emphasis to the observed *FTAs,* while at the same time being capable of utilizing several I-mitigators in his *Positive Face Mitigation* in his answers, making his behavior and thus, the analysis of this call, one of the most difficult to study as he showed very contrastive patterns.

4.2.4.   Shooters' cooperative and polite verbal behavior: final comments

Throughout the analysis of the four calls of the shooters, some similarities could be identified. In the case of *CP*, the category that was adhered to the most was *Quality,* which may be attributed to the similar motivation of the three shooters, that was, to claim their responsibility for the shooting, and in the case of Hartford and Orlando, to give the reasons behind the shooting as well as trying to spread a deeper message. This need to deliver their message, however, did not mean that the shooters were completely cooperative with the dispatchers and negotiator, as their intentions clashed with those of the dispatchers/negotiator. Furthermore, regarding *Aversion*, another coincidence could be seen as the most transgressed category for all three shooters was *Manner*. In the case of the shooters of Orlando and Hartford, *Manner* was transgressed mostly because of the ambiguity of their answers, whereas the shooter of Poway transgressed this category because of the obscurity of expression in his answers.

As for *FTAs,* although there were no identifiable patterns between the three shooters, it was possible to observe certain coincidences. In the case of *Positive FTAs*, the shooters of Orlando and Poway manifested these kinds of behavior in their attitude towards the hearers and the institutions they represented, ultimately attempting to ridicule them, although the latter also performed these kinds of attacks as a spontaneous reaction to the repetition of questioning occurring during the call. Meanwhile, when analyzing *Negative FTAs*, these were present only in the case of the shooters of Orlando and Hartford, since they often stated that they did not want to be bothered after the constant insistence or requests from the dispatchers and negotiator; however, in the case of Orlando, there were a few instances when the shooter performed *Negative FTAs* himself, in order to diminish the Police Department's ability to perform certain actions. In contrast, in the case of Poway, no instances of *Negative FTAs* were found, as the shooter was still responsive and willing to give information despite the dispatcher's, negotiator's, and the police's insistence.

4.3. *Comparison and contrast: shooters' and victims' emergency calls*

4.3.1. Similarities and differences in cooperativeness

For this section, three different tables will be displayed. These tables are a simplified version of the matrix that was used in the development of the corpora analysis (see Methodology), and each carries the unified data of victims' and shooters' calls regarding a specific aspect of the investigation.

Table 32
Cooperative Principle - Adherence

VICTIMS					SHOOTERS				
CALL	Qn	Ql	R	M	CALL	Qn	Ql	R	M
Charleston Church	20	31	31	24	Hartford Distributors, Connecticut	16	20	13	13
Pulse Nightclub, Cal 1	27	46	44	39	Poway Synagogue, California	60	61	56	48
Pulse Nightclub, Call2	14	20	21	21	Pulse Nightclub, Shooter's 911 Call	0	4	2	0
Pulse Nightclub, Call 3	2	7	2	0	Pulse Nightclub, Negotiation 1	11	16	12	12
Pulse Nightclub, Call 4	11	14	14	14	Pulse Nightclub, Negotiation 2	15	17	14	14
					Pulse Nightclub, Negotiation 3	3	4	2	2
TOTAL	74	118	112	98	TOTAL	105	122	99	89

Table 32 shows the *Adherence* to *CP* categories in each call. The individual analysis of each call showed three relevant similarities in the comparison of these results. First, there was a similar level of *Adherence* in victims and shooters to each category of the *CP*. Second, both victims and shooters presented high *Adherence* to *Quality*, which indicates that they appeared to be truthful in their utterances for the most part, as both parts needed to provide information for which they did not lack adequate evidence. This was somehow anticipated, as the purpose

of massive shootings 911 calls does not seem to easily lend itself to lack of truthfulness. Third, and related to the second observation, victims and shooters showed less *Aversion* to *Quality* than to any other category. This seemed to be due to, in the case of the victims, not wanting to give more information than that they were sure of, as the help they needed depended on that exchange of information, while in the case of the shooters, their intention to give a pre-planned message limited the range of topics in the interaction, in the sense that, the information they provided had to be clear and precise in order to justify their actions and impending outcome, within a limited period of time before being detained or taken down. Basically, there was no time to provide additional information or to deceive the caller because of the context's urgency, which impedes reaching a common purpose between participants beyond the shooter's primary communicative intention because, normally, shooters actively try to control the verbal exchange.

Table 33 exhibits *Aversion and Type of Aversion* to *CP.* In this table, it is possible to observe the levels of *Aversion* to *CP* categories, and also which type of *Aversion* corresponds to each *CP* category.

Table 33
Cooperative Principle - Aversion and Type of Aversion

| | | Cooperative Principle Categories | | | | | | | Cooperative Principle Categories | | | | |
| | | VICTIMS | | | | | | | SHOOTERS | | | | |
	Aversion Categories	Qn	Ql	R	M	Total		Aversion Categories	Qn	Ql	R	M	Total
Charleston Church	Flouting	10	0	0	5	15	Hartford Distributors	Flouting	4	4	7	7	22
	Violation	1	0	0	2	3		Violation	3	1	4	4	12
	Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0		Opting Out	1	1	1	1	4
	Infringing	0	0	0	0	0		Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Pulse Nightclub Call 1	Flouting	2	0	1	1	4	Poway Synagogue	Flouting	2	2	7	13	24
	Violation	6	6	6	6	24		Violation	0	0	0	0	0
	Opting Out	1	0	0	1	2		Opting Out	0	0	0	2	2
	Infringing	19	5	6	10	40		Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Pulse Nightclub Call 2	Flouting	1	1	1	0	3	Pulse Nightclub Shooter's 911 Call	Flouting	2	0	1	2	5
	Violation	0	0	0	0	0		Violation	1	0	1	1	3
	Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0		Opting Out	1	0	0	1	2
	Infringing	8	2	1	2	13		Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
	Flouting	0	0	0	0	0	Pulse Nightclub	Flouting	3	5	4	5	17
	Violation	0	0	0	0	0		Violation	8	1	6	5	20

Pulse Nightclub Call 3	Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0	Negotiation 1	Opting Out	4	4	4	4	16
	Infringing	4	0	4	6	14		Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
Pulse Nightclub Call 4	Flouting	0	0	0	0	0	Pulse Nightclub Negotiation 2	Flouting	2	2	3	4	11
	Violation	0	0	0	0	0		Violation	5	1	3	5	14
	Opting Out	1	0	0	0	1		Opting Out	6	6	6	6	24
	Infringing	2	0	0	0	2		Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
							Pulse Nightclub Negotiation 3	Flouting	3	3	4	4	14
								Violation	1	0	1	1	3
								Opting Out	0	0	0	0	0
								Infringing	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	55	14	19	33	121		Total	46	30	52	65	193

Regarding the differences found between victims and shooters, two important observations could be made. The first deals with the *CP* categories with more instances of *Aversion*. On the one hand, victims showed more *Aversion* to *Quantity* caused by the repetition of the same information, unlike shooters whose most transgressed categories were *Relevance* and *Manner*. These differences can be justified by the stressful and complex situation the victims were in, where tension and fear hindered their ability to give the necessary information without reiterating certain aspects of it that were already stated, in fear of not having expressed themselves well enough to receive help from the emergency services. In the case of shooters, it is key to consider the position in which they were in; as perpetrators of the shooting, they were in control of the situation until the authorities successfully interfered. Dispatchers/negotiators work with any piece of information they can elicit from the shooters, which was hard to do due to the shooters' constant manipulation of the exchange balanced towards their own communicative intentions.

It is important to note that every call from the victims of the Pulse Nightclub shooting evidenced that most of the *Aversion* instances to *Quantity* were classified as *Infringing*, because the callers had no intention to make any conversational implicatures and they were only incurring in "imperfect linguistic performances" (Thomas, 1995:74). Regarding the Charleston Church shooting, the *Aversion* was caused mostly by *Flouting*, which means that the caller's intention was generating conversational implications with her utterances. This contrast can be attributed to the differences in the context of the calls, as Charleston Church Shooting occurred in a church and the caller was alone in a place she knew well, while Pulse Nightclub Shooting callers were mostly in groups in a place they were not familiar with.

On the other hand, shooters presented more *Aversion* to *Manner* and *Relevance* due to the common intention to attribute the shooting to themselves and to express their discontent towards specific groups, regardless of the intervention of the dispatcher/negotiator. The most common type of *Aversion* to both *Manner* and *Relevance* was *Flouting* since shooters wanted to take credit for the shooting and express their beliefs. The act of *Flouting* was committed deliberately to mislead the hearer and gain time; leveraging the exchange toward themselves through constant deviations from the main thread of the conversation allowed the shooters to deliver their political messages and underlying intentions, limiting the hearer's participation at the same time.

Secondly, an important difference was found regarding the most common types of *Aversion* to *CP* between victims and shooters. Whereas victims had *Infringing* as their most common type of *Aversion*, shooters presented no instances of the same type. This occurred because victims were in distress, and thus their emotional state interfered in the exchange as they failed to observe the maxims, or they had no desire to create an implicature (Thomas, 1995). In contrast, shooters had *Flouting* as their most common type of *Aversion*, while victims presented only 11 instances of the same type. This can be caused by the differences in the context of the calls: while victims called to ask for help, and tended to give their messages in a clear way with no hidden meaning in their utterances, shooters called to announce they were responsible for the tragedies and to explain the reason behind their actions; however, they consciously generated conversational implicatures in their statements to deceive or mislead their hearers in order to prolong the exchange and gain time before getting detained, while also actively avoiding or deviating from questions made by the dispatchers/negotiator.

4.3.2.   Similarities and differences in face attack and mitigation

Table 34 displays the data collected from the analysis to *Face Attack* and *Mitigation*. A clear difference in the performance of *FTAs* can be observed between victims and shooters, where victims had more instances of *Negative FTAs*, and shooters exhibited more instances of *Positive FTAs*. It is also important to note that victims presented more instances of *Mitigation* than shooters.

Table 34
Face Threatening Acts and Mitigation

	VICTIMS	SHOOTERS

	Face Threatening Acts (FTAs)		Mitigation				Face Threatening Acts (FTAs)		Mitigation		
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Total
Charleston Church	0	7	0	6	13	Hartford Distributors	0	5	0	0	5
Pulse Nightclub Victim 1	0	4	0	6	10	Poway Synagogue	10	0	4	8	22
Pulse Nightclub Victim 2	0	3	0	1	4	Pulse Nightclub Shooter's 911 Call	0	0	0	0	0
Pulse Nightclub Victim 3	0	0	0	0	0	Pulse Nightclub Negotiation 1	2	3	0	0	5
Pulse Nightclub Victim 4	0	2	0	1	3	Pulse Nightclub Negotiation 2	12	0	0	0	12
						Pulse Nightclub Negotiation 3	1	0	0	0	1›
Total	0	16	0	14	30	Total	25	8	4	8	45

After the individual analysis of *Politeness*, a relevant connection between victims and shooters was identified. There was a significant difference of instances of *Negative FTAs* with 16 occurrences in the victims' interactions and 8 occurrences in the shooters' productions. An important observation to be made regarding this aspect was: victims present *Negative FTAs* in four out of five calls, and shooters produce these instances in two out of six calls, indicating a clear difference in the subjects' communicative intentions at the time they spoke to the authorities. On the one hand, victims made use of *Negative FTAs* to pressure the operator into sending help promptly, whereas shooters did so to impose or demand (instead of requesting as victims usually do) an action from the dispatchers/negotiator, such as demanding them to pass their message or to tell them how to act or not, as shooters intend to show their discomfort on the insistence of requests made by dispatchers and negotiators.

Regarding *Mitigation*, there was a considerable number of differences between victims and shooters. In the first place, four out of the five victims' calls had *MTNF*, which suggests that despite victims being in a context of immediate danger, where it could be counterproductive to make use of *Mitigation*, they still mitigated their utterances to "decrease the weight of the imposition" (Li, 2016) and as a strategy to receive assistance as swiftly as possible. Additionally, a relation between *Mitigation* and *CP* was found, as victims made use of *MTNF* to avoid *FTAs* as well as transgressing a category. Therefore, it could be pointed out that *Mitigation* acts as a strategy to both display polite behavior as well as maintaining cooperation during the exchange. Meanwhile, out of the six shooters' calls, only one of them performed *Mitigation* strategies, as his purpose was to surrender to the police without incurring any danger to himself or to others, unlike the other shooters that had no regard for the authorities' boundaries or expectations whatsoever.

Finally, there was a clear difference in the numbers of *Positive FTAs* between shooters and victims. It was observed that in the shooters' interactions, 25 instances of *Positive FTAs* were produced, and no instances were found in the victims' interactions. This may be caused because at the moment of the call, the operators, dispatchers, and negotiators are representing a system and an institution, hence, when the shooters were incurring in *Positive FTAs* to the person on the other side of the line, the focus of the attack was not on the operator.

4.3.3.   Final observations and comments

In regard to the analysis of both the victims' and shooters' calls, a fundamental finding worth mentioning is the significance of the category of *Relevance*, as each of these roles transgressed said category, but for very different reasons and purposes. First, on the victims' side, though most of the information provided by callers was considered relevant, some utterances were classified as an *Aversion* to *Relevance* if the information provided was repeated, as in this context, said category was understood in relation to what the operator needed to render assistance. Contrastingly, in some instances shooters averted *Relevance* by ignoring the operator's or negotiator's questions with the aim of transmitting their motives as to why the shooting was committed, only adhering to this category if the subject was related to their sociocultural message, which was commonly brought up by the shooters themselves every turn they could. Nevertheless, overall results show that *Relevance* was highly adhered to by both victims and shooters, therefore, this seems to sustain Sperber and Wilson's (1994) proposal — inspired by Grice's *CP*— that "communicated information comes with a guarantee of

relevance" (p. 91) as even in calls where the person was impaired to answer, relevant information was found by the operator.

In relation to *Politeness*, it is worth noting that no instance of *MTPF* was found, neither in victims' nor in shooters' calls. This may be related to the fact that 911 operators, as well as negotiators, are trained to answer emergency calls, and even though they give their name when answering a call, they are not identified. Furthermore, as the conversations involve two strangers talking to one another without any information about each other, none of them know any particular characteristic, personality, preferences, or personal desires of the person on the other line. Operators' training supposes that their main objective is to get the necessary information from callers, in order to be able to evaluate the emergency and give the correct assistance. On the other hand, negotiators are trained to de-escalate a dangerous situation bringing about a peaceful resolution. Both of these roles leave their own personal desires and wants aside. Following the notion of *Positive Face* by Brown and Levinson (1987), it can be said that because of these reasons, 911 operators and negotiators do not have an individual *Positive Face* while they are working, as the calls' purpose do not follow their own personal interests, nor do they have the necessity for their personality to be admired, approved, or liked. Hence *Mitigation* to this *Face* was by no means possible.

As a final observation, the findings of this investigation also support the long-standing claim that what can be considered cooperative or polite, highly depends on the context in which the interaction takes place, and on the specific purposes of each speech situation. In the case of victims, seeking help remained as their main objective, hence they tried to be as informative as possible, while avoiding threatening the operators' *Face* for the same reason. Anxiety and stress predispose victims to expect a rapid response, thus they tended to give as many details of the situation as possible; to avoid threatening *Face*, *Politeness* and *Mitigation* served as main tools to achieve this goal as well, as they soothe negative responses (which supposes understanding the victim's position and to rapidly provide help). In the case of shooters', they tended to be as cooperative as victims, or even more, but their purpose was different. Shooters in the calls analyzed cooperate because, as mentioned above, they had nothing to lose, and they intended to be informative to blurt out their hate toward specific groups, ethnicities, etc. In some cases, they even tried to surrender to the authorities (as seen in Poway Synagogue, California) as they had already accomplished their objective, that was minority centered mass homicides, and establishing a position of power over the authorities.

5.   Conclusions

This section will synthesize the main results and findings of this research, to then acknowledge the limitations faced when conducting this investigation, Finally, projections for further research will be presented.

5.1.   General summary

The purpose of this research was to conduct an analysis of the linguistic behavior of victims and shooters during hate crime related mass shootings, more specifically, to analyze their cooperativeness and politeness during the calls. For that purpose, Grice's Cooperative Principle (1975) and Brown and Levinson's (1987) ideas on *Politeness* (that also introduce the notion of *Face Threatening Acts* (*FTAs*) were used as the basis to conduct the analysis. The following aspects were examined: *Adherence* and *Aversion* to the *CP*, type of *Aversion* according to Thomas' categorization (1995), the instances of *FTAs* to *Positive* and *Negative Face*, and the instances of *Mitigation* strategies employed by both roles.

Firstly, in regard to *Adherence* and *Aversion,* results showed that both roles adhered the most to *Quality*. Victims, on the one hand, had no reason to provide statements that were not true given that they were in a life-threatening situation. Therefore, truth was crucial to not obstruct the operator's task of sending help swiftly and efficiently. One the other hand, the shooter's reasoning behind their *Adherence* to *Quality* seems to be explained as the three shooters shared the objective of communicating their political message, and so they had little to no interest in saying what they did not believe to be true.

Victims and shooters share similarities in their cooperative behavior in emergency calls, as results show that *Relevance* was highly adhered to by both roles since they attempt to give truthful and relevant information in most of the exchanges with the operator —or negotiator. This can be attributed to the fact that emergency calls severely restrict the utterances produced by participants, and it was the operator who must detect relevant information amidst the chaos of the call. This seems to support Sperber and Wilson's (1994) ideas regarding relevance, i.e., that what is interpreted in an exchange of information directly relates to what is first and foremost considered relevant for the speakers' shared context.

In terms of *Aversion*, the least adhered and therefore the most transgressed category differed in both roles. Victims averted *Quantity* the most, as they were either over informative or withheld information due to the stressful context. This result proved that victims tend to prioritize *Quality* over *Quantity* when giving information to operators, since truthful

information can help them to receive assistance faster, while transgressing *Quantity* does not seem to hinder the operator's task. Contrastingly, the most averted category by shooters was *Manner*, as their answers did not need to be brief, orderly, and unambiguous —unlike victims, who needed to answer as clearly as possible in order to receive help quickly. Shooters are in control of the situation, and their underlying aim beyond delivering their message may be to gain time before their detention, a task that can be easily fulfilled by prolonging the exchange through the use of linguistic strategies, misleading the hearer into thinking that at some point, they will get valuable information if they keep paying attention to whatever the shooter was saying.

Secondly, regarding the type of *Aversion*, results show another difference between roles. Victims averted categories mostly by means of *Infringing*, that is to say, they involuntarily failed to observe a maxim due to the complex and pressing context that limited their capacity to express themselves freely, since with each interaction they were at risk of being shot. This means that they had no intention of averting categories with the purpose of generating implicatures. Therefore, victims were less likely to flout categories, and violations were not found in the analysis, since they had no motives to blatantly transgress a category. These results contrast with those of shooters', who commonly flouted categories with the sole intention of creating conversational implicatures, which means that there was a conscious attempt to mislead the dispatchers/negotiator in order to gain time by playing with their expectations. As a result, shooters showed no instances of *Infringing,* since their linguistic performance was not impaired by the context (Thomas, 1995), but rather their transgressions were made with a specific purpose.

Thirdly, in relation to FTAs, victims mostly attacked the operator's *Negative Face* since the stress and anxiety of the shooting context caused victims to make bold requests to pressure the operator into sending help faster. However, no threats to anyone's *Positive Face* were identified since callers had no intention to attack their "public self-image or personality" (Brown and Levinson:62). In contrast, *Positive FTAs* were identified for all shooters to insult and mock operators and/or negotiators, this in order to insult their roles, and ultimately humiliate the institution they embody. Nonetheless, these expressions of rudeness were identified mostly in the shooters' final moments, which is due to them feeling cornered and stressed because they are aware of their impending detention. On the other hand, shooters rarely attacked *Negative Face,* as they only made use of these *FTAs* when they made direct requests to their hearers, such as demanding them to spread their message, or to do their jobs in a certain manner.

Finally, *Mitigation* strategies were present exclusively in victims' calls, who on several occasions made use of *Mitigation of Threat to Negative Face (MTNF)* to soften the illocutionary force of their utterances when asking for help. Their behavior displays a tendency to make use of these linguistic strategies to remain polite towards operators despite the urgent context, since they most likely associate emergency calls with regular calls, where the use of politeness seems to increase the chances of obtaining the desired result pursued in the interaction —e.g., to receive help as fast as possible. Furthermore, it was observed that *Mitigation* occurred alongside high *Adherence* to *CP*, thus *Mitigation* was identified as a cooperative device since it was utilized to avoid incurring in *FTAs*, while also maintaining a cooperative behavior in the exchange with the objective of achieving the call's main goal, that is asking for help, and receiving said help as fast as possible, while attempting to suppose minimal to no threat to the operators' *Negative Face.*

In contrast, shooters overall made no use of *Mitigation*. As perpetrators, there was no obvious need for them to mitigate their requests or impositions, nor to be polite towards operators/negotiators in order to receive something from them, due to the fact that shooters are in control of the situation. They understand that their role gives them power over others, including the authorities, that work to solve the issue at hand peacefully by looking for a mutually beneficial agreement with perpetrators at first. Besides, these shooters have an ideological motivation, namely, hatred towards a group, religion, or culture, which operators and negotiators are the representatives of, therefore, the shooters show to have the intention of being threatening.

As a final point, the analysis of these emergency calls provided further evidence that context was crucial to determine what can be considered (un)cooperative or (im)polite, since each specific context will have different characteristics and speakers must adapt to them and make use of linguistic strategies in different ways to finally obtain their ultimate aim of the interaction. For victims, despite the restricted context in which they made the call, remaining cooperative and polite was essential to facilitate the operator's task. For shooters, being cooperative and attacking the dispatcher/negotiator *Positive Face* was a way to give their political message while mocking the institutions that were trying to arrest them.

5.2.   Limitations

The present study had some major limitations, most of which are related to the corpus. First, since this study took place in Chile, retrieving transcripts from different US police departments supposed a series of complications, as most data was either not available to the general public,

available to US citizens only, or was released to the press incomplete. Moreover, shooters' calls were difficult to find since it was uncommon for the perpetrators to willingly make this type of call, and the present study focuses on hate crimes shootings only, which further narrowed down the corpus selection criteria. Furthermore, this study was limited to an analysis of victims and shooters from the US since in Chile no transcripts from emergency calls are accessible to the public, and thus a contrastive analysis, interesting as it may be, remains an unlikely projection.

Interesting as they are, some intonational features in speech of victims and shooters escaped the scope of this research, since several calls that were part of this investigation had no audio available to the public. The audio could have been useful when analyzing the calls following Grice's categories, *FTAs*, and *Mitigation*, as the implicatures in intonation possibly change some of the results. Additionally, the initial project contemplated carrying out sentiment analysis (Pang & Lee, 2004) to identify the most frequently utilized semantic families in the speech of victims and shooters. However, this useful complementary analysis was finally left aside so as to focus more on *CP* and politeness only.

5.3. Projections

Considering the limitations of this study regarding the difficulty to find data of hate crime related shootings from other countries, it would be interesting to analyze shooters and victims' linguistic behavior in different emergency contexts where danger is not as imminent as in shootings to observe if victims' cooperative and polite behavior continues to operate in the same way. The comparison between politeness behavior across cultures would be of particular interest since Brown and Levinson's notion of *Face* has been criticized for being applicable only in the Western (and more specifically, the Anglo) culture, therefore research regarding if their concepts of *Positive/Negative Face* are still relevant should be done, especially in highly specific contexts as proposed by Matsumoto (1988) or Bravo (2004). Additionally, analyzing the notions of *Face* in different cultures could lead to being a step closer to achieving an individual model of politeness for each one of them, and to comprehend how said aspect functions in every language.

Likewise, as the results of this investigation are limited to four mass shootings, further research can be done to compare the linguistic behavior between victims and shooters on massive shootings with different motives, as their level of cooperation may vary depending on the reason behind carrying out such crime. Also, research can be done to assess the validity of one of the main findings, regarding the prioritization of *Relevance* in emergency calls.

As mentioned above, certain aspects had to be excluded from the investigation. First, intonation was not further explored since obtaining the audio for every call was not possible. Therefore, further research regarding intonation in emergency calls can provide significant information of the victims and shooters cooperative and polite behavior, as some implicatures can be understood solely through type of intonation.

Despite this research's main focus on pragmatics, certainly computational linguistics can provide additional insights through the use of sentiment analysis and other types of text mining, so as to identify subjective information (positive, negative, or neutral) that could improve the analysis of the underlying intentions behind a given utterance. The emergency calls data may help newly developed automatic systems to classify an incoming call by caller type shortly after the initial caller utterance, which in turn would allow a dispatcher to give targeted responses depending on the previously identified type of caller (Young et al., 2016).

5.4.   Final comments

Mass shootings have sadly become recurrent tragedies not only in the US, but in different parts of the world, probably thanks to the massification of worldwide news in recent years, among many other factors. This can lead to occasionally glorifying perpetrators, while leaving aside the high number of people who get to live a traumatic experience or lose their lives at the hands of the shooters.

These tragedies, although helped the conception of this study, must be considered punishable acts of hate that should receive strict control and supervision from the respective authorities. Moreover, gun violence should be condemned to a more dramatic level, since in the US guns are in great part accessible to most adult people, ranking number one in firearms per capita (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021) In this year alone, and while working on this study, more than 658 shootings took place in the U.S. up until the 10th of December of 2021 (Gun Violence Archive). This further proves that nowadays mass shootings are a great part of the American culture, and because of this single fact alone, to prevent these tragedies it should be of vital importance for the US government as well as to create new and harsher gun regulating laws. Mass shooting drills in schools and poorly informing the population about how to act in shootings are not real measures against these crimes, as it is the same as educating a victim but not stopping the killer. If harsher measures are not taken, thousands of lives will continue to be taken.

For that reason, emergency calls constituted an interesting genre especially in this context, since for victims the interaction with the operator may be their last resource to save

their lives, and for shooters a way to express their motives before arrest or being shot by the police to stop the mass shooting.

It is to be expected that these findings will shed light on how Grice's *Cooperative Principle* and Brown and Levinson's works on *Politeness* —some of the most important works in the field of pragmatics— are useful for the analysis of how participants in an exchange manage to achieve their purposes, despite being in a severely stressful context that is emergency calls during mass shootings. On that note, it must be highlighted how callers, despite the extremely dangerous situation they were in, still remained polite towards the operator in order to receive help faster. Demonstrating how these linguistic principles are especially relevant for victims who are in a complex and restricted context, to make each utterance significant for the operators to render assistance and save their lives.

References

Altschiller, D. (2015). *Hate crimes: A reference handbook*. ABC-CLIO.

Associated Press. (2010). 9 dead in shooting at Conn. beer distributor. *NBC News*. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38535909

Belmont Police Department. (2019). Dispatcher Training Program. Updated June 21, 2019.

Birner, B. (2013). *Introduction to pragmatics*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Brax, D., & Munthe, C. (2017). The philosophy of hate crime: A primer. In E. Dunbar, A.

Blanco, D. A. Crèvecoeur-MacPhail, C. Munthe, M. Fingerle, & D. Brax (Eds.), *The psychology of hate crimes as domestic terrorism: U.S. and global issues: Theoretical, legal, and cultural factors* (pp. 159–176). Praeger/ABC-CLIO.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). *Politeness: Some universals in language usage.* Cambridge University Press. Coulthard, M., & Johnson, A. (2007). *An Introduction to Forensic Linguistics Language in Evidence*. Routledge.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021, July 14). U.S. gun policy: Global comparisons. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-gun-policy-global-comparisons

Cromdal, J., Osvaldsson, K., Persson-Thunqvist, D. (2008). Context that matters: Producing 'thick-enough descriptions' in initial emergency reports. *Journal of Pragmatics.* 40: 927–959.

Cromdal, J. (2013). *Conversation Analysis and Emergency Calls.* The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics.

Cromdal, J., Landqvist, H., Persson-Thunqvist, D., & Osvaldsson, K. (2012). Finding out what's happened: Two procedures for opening emergency calls. *Discourse Studies*, *14*(4), 371–397.

Culpeper, J. (2005). Impoliteness and entertainment in the television quiz show: The weakest link. *Journal of Politeness Research. Language, Behaviour, Culture*, *1*(1).

Culpeper, J. (2011). *Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence.* Cambridge University Press.

Emanuel AME 911 call: 'He's coming, he's coming, he's coming, please!'. (2016, December 15). *ABC News 4.* https://abcnews4.com/news/crime-news/emanuel-ame-911-call-hes-coming-hes-coming-hes-coming-please

Fox, J. A., & DeLateur, M. J. (2014). Mass shootings in America: Moving beyond Newtown. *Homicide Studies: An Interdisciplinary & International Journal, 18*(1), 125-145.

Fox, J. A., & Levin, J. (1998). Multiple homicide: Patterns of serial and Mass Murder. *Crime and Justice*, *23*, 407–455.

Fraser, B. (1980). Conversational mitigation. *Journal of Pragmatics*, *4*(4), 341–350.

Fraser, B. (1999). What Are Discourse Markers? *Journal of Pragmatics*, 31, 931-952.

Fraser, B., & Nolen, W. (1981). The association of deference with linguistic form. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, *1981*(27).

Gold L. H. (2020). Domestic Violence, Firearms, and Mass Shootings. *The journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, *48*(1), 35–42.

Gómez, A., & Bravo, D. (2004). *Pragmática sociocultural: Estudios sobre el discurso de cortesía en español*. Ariel.

Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan. (Eds.), S*yntax and Semantics,* 3, 41-58. New York: Academic Press.

Garcia, A.C. and Parmer, P.A. (1999), Misplaced Mistrust: The Collaborative Construction of Doubt In 911 Emergency Calls. *Symbolic Interaction*, *22*, 297-324.

Imbens-Bailey, A., & McCabe, A. (2000). The Discourse of Distress: A Narrative Analysis of Emergency Calls to 911. *Language & Communication*, *20*(3), 275–296.

Leavenworth, J. (2010). Transcript of Omar Thornton's 911 Call. *Hartford Courant.* https://web.archive.org/web/20110611211837/http://www.courant.com/community/manchester/hc-connecticut-shooting-911-call-tran20100805,0,4070970,full.story

Kádár, D. Z., & Haugh, M. (2013). *Understanding politeness*. Cambridge University Press.

Kádár, D. Z. (2017). *Politeness, impoliteness and ritual: Maintaining the moral order in Interpersonal Interaction*. Cambridge University Press.

Katsiyannis, A., Whitford, D. K., & Ennis, R. P. (2018). Historical Examination of United States intentional mass school shootings in the 20th and 21st centuries: Implications for students, schools, and Society. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, *27*(8), 2562–2573.

Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (2004). ¿Es universal la cortesía? In Gómez Antonio, & Bravo, D. (2004). *Pragmática sociocultural: Estudios sobre el discurso de cortesía en español*. Ariel.

Lankford, A., & Silver, J. (2019). Why have public mass shootings become more deadly? *Criminology & Public Policy*, *19*(1), 37–60.

Leander, N. P., Stroebe, W., Kreienkamp, J., Agostini, M., Gordijn, E., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2019). Mass shootings and the salience of guns as means of compensation for thwarted goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116*(5), 704–723.

Leech, G. (1983). *Principles of pragmatics*. Longman.

Leech, G. (2014). *The pragmatics of politeness*. Oxford University Press.

Levinson, S. C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge University Press.

Li, Q. (2016). Mitigating Mechanism of Discourse Markers. *Canadian Social Science, 12*, 74
78.

Lowe, S. R., & Galea, S. (2017). The Mental Health Consequences of Mass Shootings. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse*, *18*(1), 62–82.

Luca, M., Malhotra, D., & Poliquin, C. (2020). The impact of mass shootings on gun policy. *Journal of Public Economics*, *181*, 104083.

Manihuruk, D. B., & Siregar, A. T. (2020). Cooperative Principles in Negotiation: A Case Study of the Pulse Shooting Tragedy. *English Journal Literacy Utama*, *4*(2), 255–260.

Matsumoto, Y. (1988). Reexamination of the Universality of Face: Politeness Phenomena in Japanese. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 12, 403-426

Mey, J. L. (2013). A brief sketch of the historic development of pragmatics. *Oxford Handbooks Online*.

NBC 7 Staff. (2019). Suspected Gunman Calls 911 After His Attack on a Poway Synagogue Claiming to 'Defend My Nation'. *NBC 7 San Diego.* https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/john-earnest-chp-sdsd-sdpd-phone-call-911-poway-synagogue-shooting/1965606/

Neusteter, S. R., Mapolski, M., Khogali, M., & O'Toole, M. (2019). *The 911 Call Processing System: A Review of the Literature as it Relates to Policing*. New York: Vera Institute of Justice. www.vera.org/publications/911-call-processing-system-review-ofpolicing-literature.

Orlando Government. (2019). *Pulse Tragedy Public Records.* https://www.orlando.gov/Our-Government/Departments-Offices/Executive-Offices/City-Clerk/Pulse-Tragedy-Public-Records

Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2004). A sentimental education. *Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics - ACL '04*.

Ramírez Salado, M. (2017). Antecedentes de la lingüística forense: ¿Desde cuándo se estudia el Lenguaje Como evidencia? *Pragmalingüística*, (25), 525–539.

Rivera, R. & Robbins, L. (2010). Troubles Preceded Connecticut Workplace Killing. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/nyregion/04shooting.html

Schubert, L. (2020). Computational Linguistics. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Spring 2020th Ed.

Taylor, H. (2019). Domestic terrorism and hate crimes: Legal definitions and media framing of mass shootings in the United States. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, *14*(3), 227–244.

Thomas, J. (1995). *Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics*. London: Longman.

Tracy, K., & Tracy, S. J. (1998). Rudeness at 911 reconceptualizing face and face attack. *Human Communication Research*, *25*(2), 225–251.

Victor, D., & Bryson Taylor, D. (2021, December 1). A Partial List of Mass Shootings in the United States in 2021. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/article/mass-shootings-2021.html

Wade, N. & Macpherson, A. (2016) Call Taking Basics for Emergency Services - Police. Surrey, B.C.: Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Whalen, J., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1998). Observations on the Display and Management of Emotion in Naturally Occurring Activities: The Case of "Hysteria" in Calls to 9-1-1. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *61*(2),141–159.

Whalen, M. R., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Sequential and institutional contexts in calls for help. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *50*(2), 172.

Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (1994). Outline of relevance theory. L*inks & Letters,* 1, 85–106.

Young, V., Rochon, E., & Mihailidis, A. (2016). Exploratory analysis of real personal emergency response call conversations: Considerations for Personal Emergency Response Spoken Dialogue Systems. *Journal of NeuroEngineering and Rehabilitation*, *13*(1).

Zenes, S., Roller, N., Olola, C., Scott ,G., Gardett, I., Stiegler, P., Lindfors, R. (2020). Evaluating the effect of proper use of "Tell me exactly what happened" on Chief Complaint selection and information gathering at Emergency Police Dispatch. *Ann Emerg Dispatch & Response. 22*(1), 4-8.

Charleston Church Shooting, South Carolina
June 17th, 2015

VICTIM: Please answer. Oh God.

DISPATCHER: 911 what's the address of the emergency?

VICTIM: It's Emanuel Church there's been people shot down here, please send somebody right away.

DISPATCHER: Emanuel Church?

VICTIM: Emanuel AME 110 Calhoun.

DISPATCHER: And there's people shot?

VICTIM: Yeah he shot the pastor, he shot all the men in the church please come right away.

DISPATCHER: Are you safe..

VICTIM: He's still in there I'm afraid, he's still in there.

DISPATCHER: Where are you inside the church?

VICTIM: In the lower level.

DISPATCHER: "You're in the lower level, where is the shooter?

VICTIM: He's in, in the office. Please send somebody, please send..

DISPATCHER: Yes I've got officers en route to you, don't hang up, I want you to stay on the line with me, you stay as quiet as possible, do you hear me? Dispatcher: What is, what is your name, Ma'am?

VICTIM: Polly Sheppard.

DISPATCHER: Alright Miss Polly, like I said my partners getting some help on the way while I get this information from you, okay, you stay on the line with me.

VICTIM: He's coming, he's coming, he's coming, please!

DISPATCHER: Okay, Ma'am, are you able to, if he's coming I need you to be as quiet as possible. Is there something you can hide under?

VICTIM: I'm under the table."

DISPATCHER: Did you see him at all?

VICTIM: Yes, a 21-year-old white dude. We got some people very hurt.

DISPATCHER: Yes Ma'am. And you said you were able to see the gun, you know what kind of gun it was?

VICTIM: No, I don't know, I don't know anything about guns.

DISPATCHER: Okay, that's okay. And where are the weapons now?

VICTIM: Scattered in his hand, he's reloading.

DISPATCHER: He's reloading? Okay I need you to bare with me okay, how many shots has he fired?

VICTIM: I don't know there's so many. Three different rounds or...

DISPATCHER: Do you know what his name is?

VICTIM: No, no.

DISPATCHER: Do you know what color shirt he had on?

VICTIM: Grey.

DISPATCHER: Do you know what color pants he had on?

VICTIM: Jeans.

DISPATCHER: But you don't know his name?

VICTIM: No, no, no.

DISPATCHER: Okay, who is that?

VICTIM: There's another lady talking to you guys, but there's so many people dead I think, oh my gosh.

DISPATCHER: You said there's so many people dead?

VICTIM: I think they're dead, yeah.

DISPATCHER: Okay and I just want to make sure, you're up at Emanuel AME Church, 110 Calhoun Street.

VICTIM: AME 110 yes.

DISPATCHER: You're doing a great job Miss Polly and I've got help coming to you, okay, I just need you to stay on the line with me. Is there a vehicle that he might leave in that you know?

VICTIM: I don't have any idea...

DISPATCHER: What door did he come in?

VICTIM: He came in the back door, when all this started. He's out of the church.

DISPATCHER: How many people are in the building?

VICTIM: I don't have an idea, there's about 10 of us.

DISPATCHER: Are you all in the same area, or are there people upstairs?

VICTIM: No in the same area.

DISPATCHER: Is there a door that leads downstairs?

VICTIM: There's two doors, they're open.

DISPATCHER: They're open, are you able, are you able to shut and lock those doors safely?

VICTIM: I can't move, I don't wanna see him.

DISPATCHER: Okay. If you don't feel like you can move then I don't want you to move, okay?

DISPATCHER: Miss Polly are you or anyone else in immediate danger?

VICTIM: (inaudible)

DISPATCHER: Okay are you able to get yourself to safety?

VICTIM: No. I'm still under the table.

DISPATCHER: Can you talk to me freely?

VICTIM: No I can't...

DISPATCHER: Inside the building, what's the best way to get to you?

VICTIM: Just come in the back door. Here someone comes.

DISPATCHER: You can hear somebody coming?

VICTIM: Yeah I have to pipe down.

DISPATCHER: Okay I want you to be quiet. (FEW SECONDS LATER)

DISPATCHER: What's going on Miss Polly?

<div align="center">

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida
June 12th, 2016

</div>

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1

OPERATOR: Orlando Police. This is Joe on a recorded line.

VICTIM: Hi. I'm at Pulse a nightclub and they are shooting guns, Pulse Nightclub in Orlando. They are shooting bullets right now.

OPERATOR: Okay. Do you see who has the gun, ma'am?

VICTIM: No, I'm in a closet right now, they are just shooting, they are spraying bullets right now. They are spraying bullets.

OPERATOR: Okay. We have a lot of officers on the way there right now. Stay where you are.

VICTIM: They are shooting bullets right now, my life is important. Okay - -

OPERATOR: Ma'am, the police are on their way right now. Did you see if anyone was shot?

VICTIM: I'm in a closet right now. I don't know what transpired. I don't know if the gun shots (audible).

OPERATOR: Okay. Ma'am, what's your name?

VICTIM: (censored)

OPERATOR: (censored) are you alone in the closet?

VICTIM: No. There's about eight people in here.

OPERATOR: Okay. Is anyone with you hurt?

VICTIM: No. We're all good. We're just in the closet. But there's bullets, but it's consistent. It seemed like an extended (inaudible) because it's not like a shooting it's not, like, you know what I mean (inaudible).

OPERATOR: Stay where you are. You still hear gunshots right now?

VICTIM: It just stopped just now.

OPERATOR: Do you still hear them now?

VICTIM: No. Not - -

OPERATOR: All right. I want you to stay where you're at because the officers are still on the way there. We have officers there now. I want you to stay where you are until they tell you to come out.

VICTIM: Okay.

OPERATOR: Just stay on the phone for a minute here. Okay. You don't have to hang up, just stay on the phone.

VICTIM: Okay.

OPERATOR: And nobody in the room with you saw if anybody was shot?

VICTIM: No, nobody was shot. We were in the closet. Everybody here in the closet is okay.

OPERATOR: Okay. Okay. Just let me know if you hear anything else, okay?

VICTIM: No problem. I'll let you know if I hear any shots.

OPERATOR: Okay.

VICTIM: I can't believe anybody would do this, that it's not that hard to kill people.

OPERATOR: No, I understand, ma'am. We just want to make sure you're okay. Stay on the line. Stay in the closet. Which closet are you in?

VICTIM: I'm not sure. I just ran to the nearest one.

OPERATOR: Okay. Can you lock the door?

VICTIM: No, there's no lock in here either.

OPERATOR: Okay. Just let me know if you hear anything else. Do you hear anyone talking, anyone yelling, anything outside?

VICTIM: No. Nothing outside, no bullets were shot (inaudible)

OPERATOR: Okay. Did you see who had the gun?

VICTIM: No. All I heard was shots and I dropped.

OPERATOR: Okay. Can you ask the people that are with you if they saw who had the gun?

VICTIM: We're all trying to be extra quiet because we --

OPERATOR: Okay. That's fine, ma'am. That's fine.

VICTIM: Do you know if they are almost here or if have they been dispatched?

OPERATOR: No. The officers are there. They are making sure everything is secure before I want you to come out. So I just want you to stay where you are, but the officers are there already.

VICTIM: I'm just making sure.

OPERATOR: It's okay. I understand.

VICTIM: Okay.

OPERATOR: We have about eight officers out Just stay -- what are you hearing?

VICTIM: Nothing right now.

OPERATOR: Okay. I don't want anyone -- I don't want anyone to come out or open the door until I tell you it's okay, okay?

VICTIM: Yeah, we put a chair up against the door to be safe.

OPERATOR: Okay.

VICTIM: It's not like a -- it's like a (inaudible) Hello?

OPERATOR: Yes, ma'am, I'm here. I'm here.

VICTIM: Okay. I wanted to make sure.

OPERATOR: I understand.

VICTIM: Okay. Okay. Shooting more bullets, more bullets.

OPERATOR: Ma'am, what was that banging?

VICTIM: More bullets are fired, more bullets.

OPERATOR: You heard more shots?

VICTIM: Two more bullets.

OPERATOR: Just stay quiet.

VICTIM: Okay, okay, okay. Shhh.

OPERATOR: The officers are there, they are coming in now. Just stay where you are, okay? - - did you hear anything else? --?

VICTIM: Yeah. Yeah. There's more bullets just fired. More bullets were just fired.

OPERATOR: Okay

VICTIM: More bullets, more bullets, more bullets fired.

OPERATOR: Just stay down with the door closed, okay?

VICTIM: Keep your head down, keep your head down. I just heard some screaming. Are you sure officers are dispatched? Are you sure?

OPERATOR: They are there, --, they got to go in and they are looking for the people, but they got to be safe too.

VICTIM: A lot of people are getting shot, you know what I mean? I'm not trying to be one of them.

OPERATOR: I'm staying on the phone with you. I want you to stay where you're at.

VICTIM: (Heavy breathing)

OPERATOR: Try to stay quiet. I can't imagine what you're going through. Just stay quiet and stay in the room, okay?

VICTIM: Everybody shhh. (Heavy breathing) (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: All right, -- the police, are there. Just stay where you're at.

VICTIM: We haven't moved. Oh, my God, more bullets, bullets, bullets fired. (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: Oh, my God, someone is at the door.

OPERATOR: Someone is at the door to the closet? Do you know where you are in the club?

VICTIM: In the -- in the -- you go in, you go straight and you go out to the backstage. Shhh. (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Okay. Are they trying to get in?

VICTIM: I don't know. I don't know.

OPERATOR: Just stay quiet, stay quiet, okay?

VICTIM: Okay. (Heavy breathing) (Pause)

OPERATOR: Do you still have someone at the door? Can you press the button if you hear them?

VICTIM: I don't hear anything.

OPERATOR: You don't hear 'em? Okay. (Pause)

OPERATOR: Okay. Just stay on the phone. I'm going to put you on for one second to get a 911 call. (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: More bullets fired, more bullets

OPERATOR: More shots?

VICTIM: Bullets fired, bullets fired, more bullets fired.

OPERATOR: Just stay in there and try to stay quiet.

VICTIM: Oh, man. Are there officers in the building, like inside or something?

OPERATOR: The officers are there, they are in the building, and they are -- they got to approach it a certain way. I just want you to stay where you're at, okay?

VICTIM: I just want to know, that's all.

OPERATOR: We have about nine officers there, ma'am.

VICTIM: (Inaudible)

OPERATOR: Okay. Just try -- I understand, just try to stay quiet, okay. I don't want anyone to hear you if they are still in there.

VICTIM: Someone is yel1ing, someone is yelling.

OPERATOR: Okay. Do you hear anything right now?

VICTIM: Just the people. There's a little bit of yelling, though.

OPERATOR: Okay.

VICTIM: (Heavy breathing) (Pause)

OPERATOR: Just try and stay quiet. If you hear anything, let me know. But officers are in the building now.

VICTIM: No. Hello?

OPERATOR: I'm here.

VICTIM: How do you know if it's the shooter or the officer coming through the door?

OPERATOR: Are they through the door to your closet or the door to the - -

VICTIM: I'm just making sure. We have a chair ready to hit somebody and I don't want the cop to come in and hit the cop.

OPERATOR: Is someone trying to get into where you are right now?

VICTIM: Right now no one is trying to enter.

OPERATOR: Okay. Just don't do anything. If you hear someone at the door, just let me know and I'll see if it's an officer, okay? But they are not coming in your door yet.

VICTIM: All right. Thank you. (Whispering)

OPERATOR: Are they trying to come through the closet?

VICTIM: Yeah, I hear something. I hear something right here, right here, they are definitely there.

OPERATOR: Okay. Just stay where you're at. Stay where you're at. (Pause) Okay. You hear anything right now?

VICTIM: No. I hear nothing right now.

OPERATOR: Okay, just stay where you're at.

VICTIM: Any update?

OPERATOR: They are in the building right. They are looking for him. Just stay where you're at, okay?

VICTIM: Okay.

OPERATOR: We have over a dozen officers out there. There's lots of officers.

VICTIM: Okay. Thank you.

OPERATOR: Mm-hmm. All right. - -, hold one second, I'll be right back on the phone with you. We've got calls coming in. Just stay where you are.

VICTIM: All right. (End call)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 2

OPERATOR: 911 emergency, you're on the line with Arnesta. Hello, Orlando Police Department. Does anyone need any police, fire or medical? Hello, Orlando Police Department.

VICTIM: We have a shooting. Hello?

OPERATOR: Yes, sir. Do you need the police?

VICTIM: Yes. We need -- there's a shooting over here at Pulse Nightclub.

OPERATOR: Where are you? Pulse Nightclub?

VICTIM: Yes. There's a huge shooting going on right now.

OPERATOR: Okay. We're going to get some help for you. What's the location of where Pulse is? What's the nearest cross street?

VICTIM: Orange Avenue. (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Is that shooting that I'm hearing in the background? Sir, is that still shooting?

VICTIM: (Inaudible)

OPERATOR: Is that a gun I'm hearing?

VICTIM: Yes.

OPERATOR: Stay on the line. Let me get a dispatcher on the phone with us. Don't hang up. One moment.

DISPATCHER: Can you give me the description of the person that's shooting?

VICTIM: I'm not --

OPERATOR: Sir, can you give me any descriptions?

VICTIM: I can't. I can't -- (Dial tone) (Ringing)

OPERATOR: Okay. We have help on the way. Stay on the call. Can you tell me who's shooting?

DISPATCHER: Go ahead.

OPERATOR: Incident 2043 (inaudible) in progress at 1912 shooting that's still occurring on South Orange Avenue at Pulse Nightclub. Can you give me a description of the person that's shooting?

VICTIM: I can't

OPERATOR: Okay

DISPATCHER: Are they inside or outside?

OPERATOR: Are you inside or outside of the club? Sir, can you tell me if they are inside or outside of the club? Sir? (Shooting sounds) Sir, We have help on the way. Can you give me some assistance? Can you tell me if the shooter is inside or outside?

VICTIM: (Breathing)

OPERATOR: Sir? (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Sir, we're going to get some help for you. Have you or anyone been hit?

VICTIM: (Whispering)

OPERATOR: Okay. Is he inside -- I know you're trying to stay quiet. Is he inside?

VICTIM: (Whispering)

OPERATOR: Sir? (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Sir, can you tell me if they are inside or outside?

VICTIM: Inside**.**

OPERATOR: Inside?

VICTIM: Yes.

OPERATOR: Okay. White, black or Hispanic?

VICTIM: He's inside.

OPERATOR: I understand. I understand you have to whisper. But can you just -- if you can tell me any information so I can let the police know what we're looking for. Can you tell me if the person is white, black or Hispanic?

VICTIM: (Whispering) (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Sir, are they still inside shooting?

VICTIM: Yes.

OPERATOR: Okay. (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Are they still inside, sir?

VICTIM: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know.

OPERATOR: You don't know. Okay. When you did see them, did you notice what they looked like?

VICTIM: I did not see them. I did not see them.

OPERATOR: You did not see them.

DISPATCHER: That's okay. That's okay.

OPERATOR: Do you know if anyone was hit?

DISPATCHER: Quiet.

OPERATOR: I'm sorry.

DISPATCHER: He needs to stay quiet if he thinks they are still in there. Just stay quiet.

OPERATOR: Okay.

DISPATCHER: We have a lot of officers there, so I just want him to be safe.

OPERATOR: Okay. (Shooting sounds)

DISPATCHER: Okay. I do have officers coming into the building now. Stay down wherever you're hidden, just stay there.

VICTIM: All right. (Shooting sounds) (Pause)

OPERATOR: I'm still here with you. When it's safe to do so let me know and I'll continue with you.

VICTIM: He's coming. He's coming. They are still shooting.

OPERATOR: They are still shooting? Okay. (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: (Whispering)

OPERATOR: Are they still inside the building shooting?

VICTIM: Yes.

OPERATOR: Okay. (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: (Whispering)

OPERATOR: I'm sorry, if you can say it again without being heard.

VICTIM: Tell me when the officers inside.

OPERATOR: The officers are inside, okay. Stay where you are for the moment.

OPERATOR: You say don't bring the officers inside?

VICTIM: I said tell me when the officers are inside.

DISPATCHER: Do you know if there was just one person shooting?

OPERATOR: Sir, if you can, just let her know, with the phone, can you maybe tap in how many shooters, like push a button?

VICTIM: (Whispering)

OPERATOR: Sir?

VICTIM: Yes.

OPERATOR: Okay.

VICTIM: Bring the officers inside.

OPERATOR: We're going to have officers inside. We have several officers there. Can you tell me how many shooters you saw?

VICTIM: I didn't see any

OPERATOR: You didn't see any of them? Okay. Okay. What's your name?

VICTIM: Please don't ask me that.

OPERATOR: That's okay. That's not a problem. Just stay on the phone with me. Let me know when officers are there. (Shooting sounds)

DISPATCHER: Arnesta, if you want to get another phone call, I can stay with this guy. (Dial tone) (End call)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 3

OPERATOR: 911 emergency, you're on a recorded line with Arnesta. Have you been helped? (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: My legs.

OPERATOR: Hello, sir?

VICTIM: My legs.

OPERATOR: Hello, sir?

VICTIM: My legs. My legs. My legs.

OPERATOR: Sir, what's wrong with your legs? Tell me what's happening with your legs. Sir? Hello? Hello, sir? Sir, can you talk to me, tell me what's happening with your legs (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Hello, sir?

VICTIM: Please. (Crying) (Shooting sounds) (Crying)

OPERATOR: Hello, sir, can you tell me what's happening, where you are?

VICTIM: My legs, my legs hurt. (Shooting sounds)

OPERATOR: Hello, sir?

VICTIM: (Crying) My legs are hurt. (Inaudible) (Yelling) (Background yelling)

OPERATOR: Hello, sir?

VICTIM: (Shooting sounds) (Crying) (Yelling)

OPERATOR: Hello, sir? (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: (Crying) (Yelling) (Shooting sounds)

VICTIM: My legs. My legs.

OPERATOR: Hello, sir? (Yelling) (Shooting sounds) (End call)

OPERATOR: 911. (Busy signal) (Dial tone) (Phone ringing) (Busy signal) (Ringing)

DISPATCHER: Answer number?

OPERATOR: Can I get an answer to an emergency immediate, please, for 2046

DISPATCHER: 2046?

OPERATOR: Yes.

DISPATCHER: All right. Okay. Could it be for the –

OPERATOR: I'm not sure. I put the alpha into the call as well. His face was showing on Delaney Avenue. All I can get is a face to it.

DISPATCHER: Yeah. Is he still on the line?

OPERATOR: No. He never was on the phone. It was an open line with him just saying, "my leg, my leg."

DISPATCHER: Okay. Thank you.

OPERATOR: You're welcome (End call)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 4

VICTIM: (Inaudible) I'm injured.

OFD OPERATOR: This is the Orlando Fire Department. What's the address of the emergency?

VICTIM: Pulse. I'm hurt. I'm shot.

OFD OPERATOR: Orlando Fire.

OPERATOR: It's Pulse Nightclub.

OFD OPERATOR: We already have multiple units responding for the shooting.

OPERATOR: We've got the injured party on the line with you.

VICTIM: I'm bleeding out. Hello?

OFD OPERATOR: It's the Fire Department.

VICTIM: I'm bleeding out.

OFD OPERATOR: I've got the paramedics on the way. Where are you inside the club?

VICTIM: Huh?

OFD OPERATOR: Where are you in the club? Are you at the Pulse Nightclub?

VICTIM: Yes. I'm in the bathroom.

OFD OPERATOR: You're in the bathroom? Okay. Where are you injured?

VICTIM: My arm, my whole arm is bleeding.

OFD OPERATOR: Okay. Can you get a clean, dry cloth or towel and hold it on the wound and hold a firm, steady pressure?

VICTIM: No. (Inaudible)

OFD OPERATOR: Okay. How about a shirt? Take your shirt off and put it on the wound.

VICTIM: Okay.

OFD OPERATOR: Okay? And a clean, dry cloth. Put your shirt on it and hold some pressure. Okay. And you said you're shot in the arm? How many people in the bathroom with you?

VICTIM: I have no idea.

OFD OPERATOR: I'm sorry?

VICTIM: (Inaudible)

OFD OPERATOR: Okay. How many people in the bathroom with you?

VICTIM: There's one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten – there's about twenty people here.

OFD OPERATOR: Twenty people in the bathroom. Okay. All right. We do have the paramedics and police they are on their way. They are coming as fast as they can. Is there anybody else in there injured besides you?

VICTIM: No. Nobody is injured but me.

OFD OPERATOR: Okay. They are on their way. They will be there shortly. I don't want anybody to leave the room. Everybody stay in the room until the police come and get you.

VICTIM: (Inaudible)

OFD OPERATOR: I'm sorry?

VICTIM: I'm good. I'm good here. I wanted to make sure there's someone on the way. I got

OFD OPERATOR: The police and the paramedics are on their way, okay? They will be there shortly.

VICTIM: Okay. Thank you.

OFD OPERATOR: Okay. (End call)

Hartford Distributors Shooting, Connecticut

August 3rd, 2010

DISPATCHER: State Police.

SHOOTER: Is this 911?

DISPATCHER: Yeah, can I help you?

SHOOTER: This is Omar Thornton, the, uh, the shooter over in Manchester.

DISPATCHER: Yes, where are you, sir?

SHOOTER: I'm in the building. Uh, you probably want to know the reason why I shot this place up. This place here is a racist place.

DISPATCHER: Yup, I understand that

SHOOTER: They treat me bad over here, and they treat all the other black employees bad over here too, so I just take it into my own hands and I handled the problem — I wish I coulda got more of the people.

DISPATCHER: Yeah. Are you armed, sir? Do you have a weapon with you?

SHOOTER: Oh yeah, I'm armed.

DISPATCHER: How many guns do you have with you?

SHOOTER: I got one now, there's one out, one out in the uh,0 the uh, factory there.

DISPATCHER: Yup. OK, sir.

SHOOTER: I'm not gonna kill nobody else, though.

DISPATCHER: Yeah, we're gonna have to have you surrender yourself somehow here, not make the situation any worse, you know what I mean?

SHOOTER: These cops are gonna kill me.

DISPATCHER: No they're not. We're just gonna have to get you to relax

SHOOTER: I'm relaxed, just calm down.

DISPATCHER: … to have you, you know, turn yourself over.

SHOOTER: We're just talking, you're gonna play something on the news, you know I'm gonna be popular, right [Inaudible] the right thing. SWAT team just rolled by in army gear. You don't know where I'm at, but, I don't know, maybe you can trace it from this phone call. But, yeah, these people here are crazy, they treat me bad from the start here, racist company. They treat me bad, I'm the only black driver they got here. They treat me bad over here, they treat me bad all the time.

DISPATCHER: This is a horrible situation, I understand that…

SHOOTER: You don't need to calm me down, I'm already calmed down. I'm not gonna kill nobody else — I just want to tell my story so that you can play it back.

DISPATCHER: You're gonna help me get you out of the building, OK?

SHOOTER: All right, I'm a, I get — don't worry about that, I got that taken care of, I don't need anybody to talk me into getting me out. …

DISPATCHER: Where in the building are you, Omar?

SHOOTER: I'm not gonna tell you that. Where they find me, that's when everything will be over.

DISPATCHER: Yeah, just, you know, where are you located, are you up in the offices?

SHOOTER: Where they fired me, everything be all right. … Manchester itself is a racist place.

DISPATCHER: Yeah, now, um, what time did you get there today?

SHOOTER: Um, It was about 7 o'clock

DISPATCHER: Yeah. This morning?

SHOOTER: Yeah, about 7 a.m., yeah, they told me to come early today.

DISPATCHER: What type of weapon do you have?

SHOOTER: I got a Ruger SR9, 15 shot.

DISPATCHER: A Ruger? SR9?

SHOOTER: Automatic, yeah.

DISPATCHER: Is it a rifle?

SHOOTER: No, no, it's a pistol. I like pistols too, they are my favorites.

DISPATCHER: Now, uh, you're gonna make the troopers and the people come in and catch ya? You're not gonna surrender yourself?

SHOOTER: Well — I guess, I guess uh, maybe I'll surrender … nah. They come and get me, have them come get me.

DISPATCHER: Yeah, we wouldn't want to do it like that, Omar. You know, it's already been a bad enough scene here this morning, we want you to relax.

SHOOTER: I'm relaxed though, I'm done.

DISPATCHER: Yeah, we don't want any more, any more, uh, you know, people to lose their life, here.

SHOOTER: I'm not gonna kill nobody else.

DISPATCHER: OK.

SHOOTER: I'm not coming out, I'm not coming out, they gonna have to find me. Probably use some dogs or whatever, I don't know what you're gonna do. Anyway.

DISPATCHER: How much ammunition you have with you?

SHOOTER: I got uh, I shot, uh oh.

DISPATCHER: What was that?

SHOOTER: It's all right. I guess it's got me … I have to take care of business. Tell my people I love them, and I gotta go now.

DISPATCHER: Omar. I really want you to help me stop this situation. OK?

SHOOTER: OK.

DISPATCHER: If you work with me we'll get this to stop, OK? Omar? Omar? Omar? OK … [To others] Still alive …

<div align="center">

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Florida
June 12th, 2016

</div>

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Call 1

911 OPERATOR: 911. This call is being recorded.

SHOOTER: This is Mateen (Speaking in another language). I want to let you know I'm in Orlando and I did the shooting.

911 OPERATOR: What's your name?

SHOOTER: My name is I Pledge of Allegiance to (Unidentifiable name) of the Islamic State.

911 OPERATOR: Okay. What 's your name?

SHOOTER: I pledge my allegiance to (Unidentifiable name) on behalf of the Islamic State

911 OPERATOR: Where are you at?

SHOOTER: In Orlando

911 OPERATOR: Where in Orlando? (End)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 1

NEGOTIATOR: 0247

SHOOTER: Hello.

NEGOTIATOR: Hello, there. Hi there, there is Orlando Police. Who am I speaking with, please?

SHOOTER: You're speaking to the person who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of (Unidentified name)

NEGOTIATOR: Can you tell me where you are right now so I can you get some help?

SHOOTER: No. Because you have to tell America to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. They are killing a lot of innocent people. What am I to do here when my people are getting killed over there. You get what I'm saying?

NEGOTIATOR: I do. I completely get what you're saying. What I'm trying to do is prevent anybody else from getting - -

SHOOTER: You need to stop the U.S air strikes. They need to stop the U.S. air strikes, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I understand

SHOOTER: They need to stop the U.S. air strikes. You have to tell the U.S government to stop bombing. They are killing too many children, they are killing too many women, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Here is why I'm here right now. I'm with the Orlando police. Can you tell me what you know about what's going on tonight?

SHOOTER: What's going on is that I feel the pain of the people getting killed in Syria and Iraq and all over the Muslim (Unidentified word).

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. So have you done something about that?

SHOOTER: Yes, I have.

NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what you did, please.

SHOOTER: You already know what I did.

NEGOTIATOR: Look, I'm trying to figure out how to keep you safe and how to get this resolved peacefully because I'm not a politician, I'm not a government. All I can do is help individuals and I want to start with helping you.

SHOOTER: By the way, there is some vehicles outside that have some bombs just to let you know. Your people are going to get it and I'm going to ignite it if they try to do anything stupid.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I understand that and I'll pass that along. Can you tell me what vehicle? Because I don't want to see anybody get hurt.

SHOOTER: No. But I'll tell you this, they can take out whole city block almost.

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Tell me, in the club do you have injured people with you that brought with you?

SHOOTER: I'm not -- I'm not letting you know nothing.

NEGOTIATOR: I'm trying to offer you help.

SHOOTER: Well, you need to know that they need to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. The U.S is collaborating with Russia and they are killing innocent women and children, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I hear what you're saying.

SHOOTER: My homeboy Tamerlan Tsarnaev did his thing on the Boston Marathon, my homeboy (Unidentified name) did his thing, okay, so now it's my turn, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Let's start. My name is Andy. What's yours?

SHOOTER: My name is Islamic soldier, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. What can I call you?

SHOOTER: Call me Mujahideen, call me the Soldier of the God.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Okay. So that's a lot for me to say, so can I just -- can I just call you something else? Do you have a name, a nickname?

SHOOTER: Just to let you know --

NEGOTIATOR: I'm here. I'm listening. I'm here, I'm listening.

SHOOTER: It's the last month of Ramadan if you ever know about that.

NEGOTIATOR: Yes, I do. I understand.

SHOOTER: I fasted the whole day today. I fasted the whole day and I prayed.

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Okay. What I'm trying to do is make sure that you and no one else suffers any further injury, okay? I can help you.

SHOOTER: I have a vest.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. You have a vest. I understand that. Okay. And so what kind of vest are you talking about? Is it a bullet-resistant vest? Is it a bomb vest?

SHOOTER: No. It's what they used in France

NEGOTIATOR: It's what they used in France.

SHOOTER: I got to go.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I'd like you to stay on the phone with me please, okay? Are you there? Please stay on the phone with me so I can help pass along your concerns.

SHOOTER: If you bring the bomb dog they are not going to smell shit.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that.

SHOOTER: You can't smell it. Bring you little American bomb dog, they are fucking outdated anyway.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, tell me, I presume from what you're saying you're wearing a bomb vest?

SHOOTER: No.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, you said you're wearing a vest.

SHOOTER: No, I'm not.

NEGOTIATOR: So what are you wearing?

SHOOTER: Yeah, like, you know, to go out to go out a wedding.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I'm not trying to joke with you, I'm trying to be serious and get this peacefully resolved. Okay? So are you wearing a bomb vest? Okay. What can I call you? Let's

go back to that. Let's start with that. Okay. I understand you're a soldier, I understand you're an Isis, I understand you're Mujahideen and you pledge your allegiance to someone whose name I can't pronounce. I apologize for that, okay? Can you start with that? Are you an American citizen? Are you a local citizen? Are you a resident of Orlando? Hello? Are you there? I'm right here. You need to talk to me. You have to talk to me. I'm still here. Are you there? Talk to me please. Are you there? Sir, are you there? We need to talk. We need to try to resolve this peacefully. I don't want to see you or anybody else get injured. Please help us. So you say there's a vehicle outside with a bomb. Is there more than one vehicle? Are there other shooters? Tell me what's going on, please. Tell me what's going on. I'm here. I'm listening. I'm here. I'm listening.

NEGOTIATOR: I'm still here. I'm trying to help you. Okay? I need some help from you. We need to get this resolved peacefully. And we need your help to do that. I know you want to get this resolved peacefully. I'm listening, but you need to talk to me. I need you to talk to me. This is a serious matter and I want to take it seriously and I want to listen to what you have to say, but I can't do that if it's a one-sided conversation. Are you there? (End)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 2

NEGOTIATOR: Hello.
SHOOTER: Hello.
NEGOTIATOR: Hi there, there is Orlando Police calling you back.
SHOOTER: (Inaudible)
NEGOTIATOR: I'm sorry, again, my name is Andy, what's yours?
SHOOTER: Andy
NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Tell me what's going on there right now, because I'm not there. I'm trying to help you. Okay? I'm trying to help you. Tell me what's going on right now. I don't want to see anybody get injured including you. So let's start. Are you injured? Sir, are you injured? I'm trying to help you. I don't want to see this go further. Please let us peacefully resolve it with your assistance. Can you hear me? Can you hear me? Hello? Can you hear me? This is Andy from Orlando Police. Are you there?
(Ringing) Please leave your message for 772 --
(Ringing) Please leave your message for 77 --
(Ringing) Please leave your message for 7 --
(Ringing) Please leave your message --

(Ringing)

SHOOTER: Hello.

NEGOTIATOR: Hello, Omar. This is Andy from Orlando police.

SHOOTER: Mm-hmm.

NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what's going on right now, Omar.

SHOOTER: Yo, the air strike that killed Abu Wahid a few weeks ago --

NEGOTIATOR: Okay.

SHOOTER: That's what triggered it, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: Okay.

SHOOTER: They should have not bombed and killed Abu Wahid.

NEGOTIATOR: I understand

SHOOTER: Do your fucking homework and figure out who Abu Wahid is, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. What I need to find out is are you injured? Omar?

SHOOTER: That's none of your business.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but if you're injured I want to get you some help.

SHOOTER: No.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Do you have somebody with you?

SHOOTER: That's none of your business.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Tell me what you want me to pass along. Because I can't sit here and do research. I want to pass along "Tell them to stop bombing in Syria".

SHOOTER: Yes. The air strikes need to stop and stop collaborating with Russia. Okay?

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I can pass that along.

SHOOTER: And let it be known, let it be known in the next few days you're going to see more of this type of action going on, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I understand that. I can pass that along. Where is that going to happen?

SHOOTER: It's none of your business. Just let it be known it's going to be done in the nameof the Islamic State, even though it's not fucking air strikes, it's fucking strikes here, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. I understand that. So tell me what happened tonight? How did this go down for you?

SHOOTER: This went down, a lot of innocent women and children are getting killed in Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan, okay?

NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. You're upset about the bombing in Syria and Afghanistan and you want the bombing and the killing to stop. I understand your concern. I share that

concern. I want to pass your message along. Tell me what else you'd like me to pass along, please.

SHOOTER: To stop, tell them to stop.

NEGOTIATOR: I will do that. I will do that. So can you tell me how we can peacefully resolve this tonight? I'd like to see you come out, I'd like to talk to you some more.

SHOOTER: Tell -- tell the fucking -- the air strikes need to stop.

NEGOTIATOR: I'm doing that. I'm passing that message along, immediately.

SHOOTER: You see, now you feel, now you feel how it is, now you feel how it is.

NEGOTIATOR: I understand your concern, Omar. Do you have somebody that you brought with you that we need to check on and make sure they are not injured?

SHOOTER: No. No. No. No. No. No, Mr. Hostage Negotiator, don't try your bullshit with me.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I'm trying to help you. And you don't want people to get injured, I presume that means if you brought somebody with you, you don't want them hurt. Is that correct?

SHOOTER: None of your business, homeboy.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Omar, can I get you to come outside and talk to my people there at the scene so we can peacefully resolve this?

SHOOTER: No.

NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Because I'm not there, but I have people there that would love to talk to you. Can you put down your weapon and come down outside and talk to them, please?

SHOOTER: You want to know what type of weapon I have too?

NEGOTIATOR: If you want to tell me.

SHOOTER: Or you want to know how many weapons I have?

NEGOTIATOR: I can take that too. I'm all ears, Omar. I have no agenda other than to help you pass along this message.

SHOOTER: So what year -- so what year did you graduate from the police academy?

NEGOTIATOR: I'm sorry?

SHOOTER: What year did you graduate from the police academy?

NEGOTIATOR: Sir, this is about you, okay? I'm here to help you. I'm here to pass along your information. Okay? You don't want to know ancient history about me. Tell me how I can help you. You asked me do I want to know about weapons? Sure, tell me about your weapons. Omar? I'm trying to help you. I can't do that if you won't give me something to pass along to the people that are in power which is I presume what you want to happen out of all of this. I don't want to see you or any of your associates get hurt, I don't want to see anybody else get

hurt in the United States or anywhere else around the world. So tell me how you and I can work together to get this peacefully resolved now. Omar? Omar, you get to talk to me. Omar? Listen to me, I don't want to see you get injured. Omar, can you hear me? Are you there? Omar? You and I have to talk. We have to work together. Omar, I need to pass along what your concerns are. Omar?

(Ringing) I got 0315. Please leave your message for --

(Ringing) Please leave your message for --

NEGOTIATOR: Ringing, 0316. One ring.

SHOOTER: Hello?

NEGOTIATOR: Omar? Listen, this is Andy from the police again. I don't want to mess up your message. You come out and you can tell it yourself. I'll arrange media or whatever you want. It's got to be a first step.

SHOOTER: Look, you're annoying me with a lot of your phone calls. I call you (Inaudible).

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but obviously, you know, it's my job, I need to be in contact with you. I'm your communication lifeline to everyone that's outside. I'm trying to pass along your message and I don't want to screw that message up. You tell me you don't want people to get hurt, I presume that includes you. Tell me your message and I will pass that along. You don't want the bombings. Tell me about it. I'll write it down. Omar? Omar, please talk to me. I want to get your message out. I want to pass along what you have to say. I can't do that if you won't talk to me. (End)

Pulse Nightclub Shooting, Negotiation 3

(Ringing)

NEGOTIATOR: Omar.

SHOOTER: Yeah?

NEGOTIATOR: What's going on? I couldn't get a hold of you for a while.

SHOOTER: You're annoying me with these phone calls and I don't really appreciate it.

NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but the fact that you appreciate it or not doesn't matter at this point. We need to talk and we need to stay - -

SHOOTER: Don't say things likes that, no. No. No. No. No. No. No.

NEGOTIATOR: No, I'm treating you like an adult. We need to stay in constant contact.

SHOOTER: No. No. No. No. No. No. No.

NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what's going on now, Omar?

SHOOTER: What's going on is that the air strikes need to stop.

NEGOTIATOR: Yes.

SHOOTER: They need to stop.

NEGOTIATOR: The air strikes need to stop.

SHOOTER: They need to stop killing people.

NEGOTIATOR: I've heard that and I want you to come outside and tell us that yourself so the message rings true from you without me passing along your message. I'm doing that, but I need you to come outside with no weapons. Omar? Hang up, 3:25.

(Ringing)

(End)

Poway Synagogue Shooting, California
April 27th, 2019

CHP: (Unintelligible.) Hello, 911?

SHOOTER: Yeah, I just shot up a synagogue. I'm in my car right now.

CHP: Are you the suspect?

SHOOTER: What's that?

CHP: You said that you what?

SHOOTER: I just shot up a synagogue. I'm defending my country. I'm in my car. You should come get me. I'm driving.

CHP: Where are you at?

SHOOTER: Uh, Rancho Bernardo. I'm on Bernardo Center Drive right now. I'm still driving right now.

CHP: Okay, where you're at, pull over.

SHOOTER: Sure.

CHP: Where are you pulling over at?

SHOOTER: Um, you can track it -- you guys can track my phone, right?

CHP: Okay, you're calling from (Phone Number)?

SHOOTER: Yeah.

CHP: What is your – what's your name?

SHOOTER: John Earnest.

CHP: John, and your last name is Earnest?

SHOOTER: Yes.

CHP: And where are you pulling over at?

SHOOTER: I can't pull over right now.

CHP: Where – where are you at?

SHOOTER: I'm in Rancho Bernardo.

CHP: Where at, though? (Long pause.) Where – where in Rancho Bernardo?

SHOOTER: I don't know.

CHP: Do you know what street you're on?

SHOOTER: Nope.

CHP: What kind of car are you in?

SHOOTER: Honda Civic 2012.

CHP: What – what color Honda Civic are you in?

SHOOTER: Grey.

CHP: Do you still have weapons on you?

SHOOTER: They're in my car, but I won't use them. I'll get out of my car when I see you guys. Oh, I see you guys right now. Hold up, I'm gonna pull over.

(Long pause.)

(Police sirens.)

CHP: Who borrowed my log? Okay.

SHOOTER: You guys just passed me.

CHP: Hey, hey, Erica, Erica, Erica, give me, somebody filed my log. Can you let Sheriff's know that the suspect is not gonna fire on… a – they just passed him. He's in a gray Honda Civic. He's getting out of his vehicle. He will not fire on 'em. H-hello, John?

SHOOTER: Yeah?

CHP: Okay, hold on one moment. (Long pause)

CHP: Okay, John, um, do you know where you're at?

SHOOTER: Yeah. I'm right by West Bernardo Drive. I'm on Rancho Bernardo Road, though.

CHP: You're on West Bernardo?

SHOOTER: I'm right by the crossing, yeah.

CHP: And what kind of weapons do you have on you, John?

SHOOTER: I have an AR-15 and a Wesson M&P-15. (Unintelligible.) My weapons will be left inside the car.

CHP: And what kind of vest do you have on?

SHOOTER: Oh, it's just a chest rig.

CHP: A what?

SHOOTER: It's a chest rig with ammunition.

CHP: Are you military?

SHOOTER: No, I am not. I'm just trying to defend my nation from the Jewish – the Jewish people.

CHP: How old are you, John?

SHOOTER: 19. They're destroying our people. I'm trying to show them that we're not gonna go down without a fight. We're not gonna – (Unintelligible.)

CHP: Okay, John. I'm gonna try to get you retransferred over to San Diego Sheriff's Depar- (Long pause.)

CHP: John, what – do you see any buildings around you?

SHOOTER: Yeah.

CHP: What do you see?

SHOOTER: Sonic, gas station, 7-Eleven.

(Long pause.)

CHP: I'm sorry, you're across from where? What kind of gas station?

SHOOTER: Uh, there's a Chevron on one side and, uh, 76, it says?

CHP: And you said that there's a 7-Eleven nearby?

SHOOTER: Yeah. Man, you guys take a long-ass time. (Long pause.) You realize you're fighting with the wrong people, right? You're serving a government that's gonna kill all of you.

CHP: Okay, John, stay on the line. What I'm gonna do – I'm gonna try to get you transferred over to the Sheriff's Department, okay? Hold on one moment for me, okay? (Long pause.)

CHP: Hey C- uh, this is CHP. I have your suspect on landline of, uh, shots fired.

SDPD: What's the location?

CHP: John, go ahead and talk. Sheriff's on the line.

SHOOTER: There's the crossroads between West Bernardo Drive and, I believe, Rancho Bernardo Road. Right by a 7-Eleven and a Chevron and a 76.

SDPD: Hello, 911?

CHP: Sheriff's, this – this is CHP. Your suspect is on the line. Go ahead.

SDPD: Hi, this is the Sheriff's Department.

SHOOTER: Yeah.

SDPD: What's your name?

SHOOTER: John Earnest.

SDPD: What's going on?

SHOOTER: I'm defending my nation against the Jewish people who are trying to destroy all white people.

SDPD: Where are you right now?

SHOOTER: I'm at the intersection of West Bernardo Drive and Rancho Bernardo Road.

SDPD: West Bernardo and what?

SHOOTER: I believe it's Rancho Bernardo Road. I can't see it, though.

SDPD: So, you're at Bernardo and Rancho Bernardo?

SHOOTER: No, I'm at the intersection of West Bernardo Drive and Rancho Bernardo Road. I believe it's Rancho Bernardo Road, but I can't see it -- it's on the side.

SDPD: Are you in a vehicle?

SHOOTER: Yes, I am.

SDPD: What kind of car are you in?

SHOOTER: Do you guys not have the ability to –

SDPD: What kind of vehicle are you in?

SHOOTER: To locate my phone?

SDPD: What kind of vehicle are you in?

SHOOTER: Honda Civic, 2012, grey.

SDPD: What weapons do you have?

SHOOTER: AR-15, Smith and Wesson M&P-15 – in the passenger seat. I'm not gonna use it.

SDPD: Okay, are there any officers with you right now?

SHOOTER: No, there are not. (Unintelligible.)

SDPD: Okay, are you stopped or moving?

SHOOTER: I am stopped. I've been here for a long-ass time.

SDPD: And you're inside the vehicle right now?

SHOOTER: Yes, I am.

SDPD: Are you at the intersection or are you in a driveway somewhere or?

SHOOTER: I'm on the side of the road. Yeah, I'm pretty much as close to a business you're next to – the 76 gas station and also a Phil's BBQ.

SDPD: And what clothing are you wearing?

SHOOTER: Uh, I'm wearing – (Unintelligible.) Pants, brown shirt, chest rig, wear glasses.

SDPD: Are you wearing a hat?

SHOOTER: Nope. Brown hair.

SDPD: Okay, and I want to make sure that you're stopped there, right?

SHOOTER: Yes. Jesus Christ, you guys suck at your job.

SDPD: So, what happened?

SHOOTER: I opened fire at a synagogue. I think I killed some people. Another man returned fire with a pistol. He sucked ass though. He didn't hit me at all. Went back in my car – drove away.

SDPD: Are you injured?

SHOOTER: I don't think so.

SDPD: And where exactly are the guns right now?

SHOOTER: Uh, there's only one gun. It's in my passenger seat.

SDPD: Is the gun loaded right now?

SHOOTER: I believe not.

SDPD: Do you have extra ammo for that gun?

SHOOTER: I do. It's on my chest rig right now. Once I see you guys, I'm gonna get out of my car. I will have the chest rig on with the ammo, but the gun will be left inside the car.

SDPD: Okay, can you take that chest rig off?

SHOOTER: I mean, it's pretty hard. I can take the ammo out of it.

SDPD: Why don't you do that. (Pause.) And what's your first name again?

SHOOTER: John. (Sighs.)

SDPD: Last name?

SHOOTER: Earnest. E-A.

SDPD: What's your birthday?

SHOOTER: June 8, 1999.

SDPD: Anybody else in the car with you?

SHOOTER: Nope, just me.

SDPD: Okay. Why'd you do it?

SHOOTER: Because the Jewish people are destroying the white race – they have been for a long time, and no one's doing anything about it. Something has to be done.

SDPD: All right. Which direction is your vehicle facing?

SHOOTER: It's facing… Dude, I don't fucking know.

SDPD: Do you know which direction, like –

SHOOTER: To the right of me –

SDPD: North or south or west?

SHOOTER: To the right of me is a Phil's BBQ.

SDPD: Okay.

SHOOTER: Oh, I see one of your cars. (Long pause.)

SDPD OFFICER JONATHAN WIESE (in background): On the ground! (Unintelligible.) On your stomach! Hands behind your back!