THE EXISTENCE OF COMPENSATED EQUILIBRIUM

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Introduction

The purpose of this note is twofold. First and foremost, we wish to make Arrow and Hahn's proof of the existence of compensated equilibrium a little less mysterious by expanding and clusidating upon the various interconnecting steps presented in the text; and then we wish to present proofs of some important theorems in the realit of topology which the authors use and which, I presume, the general reader does not find so obvious. In particular, we shall prove that: (1) Any closed subspace of a compact space is compact space is compact space is compact and will discuss hriefly Tychonoff's theorem: the product of any non-empty class of compact spaces is compact. So as to not interfere with our principal task these proofs shall be presented in the Appendix, for the benefit of the inquisitive reader.

The Central Ideas

We start out by defining what we mean by a "compensated equilibrium".

Definition I

A price vector p*, a utility allocation u*, a consumption allocation x*, and a production allocation v*, constitute a "compensated equilibrium" if:

(a)
$$p^* > 0$$
;

$$(h) \left\| \sum_{h} x_h^* \right\| \leq \sum_{f} y_f^* + \sum_{h} x_h;$$

(c)
$$y_f^*$$
 maximizes $p^* y_f^*$ subject to $y_f \in Y_f$:

(d)
$$\mathbf{x}_{h}^{*}$$
 minimizes $\mathbf{p}^{*}|\mathbf{x}_{h}$ subject to $\mathbf{U}_{h}^{*}(\mathbf{x}_{h}) \geqslant \mathbf{u}_{h}^{*}$;

(c)
$$p^* x_h^* = M_h^*$$

The essential distinction between a competitive equilibrium (whose existence is the theme of the next section in the text) and a compensated one, is that while in the first case we wish to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, in the latter we set out to minimize expenditures mindful that our particular household's utility does not fall below a certain preassigned level.

Definition II

We define the budgetary surplus for household is s_h (p.w), as the difference between that household's income and its total expenditures, given p and a feasible allocation w:

$$\mathbf{s}_{h}^{-}(\mathbf{p},\mathbf{w}) = \mathbf{p}\mathbf{x}_{h}^{-} + \sum_{f}^{\mathbf{p}}\mathbf{d}_{hf}^{-}(\mathbf{p},\mathbf{y}_{f}) - \mathbf{p}\mathbf{x}_{h}^{-} = \mathbf{M}_{h}^{-}(\mathbf{p},\mathbf{y}) - \mathbf{p}\mathbf{x}_{h}^{-}$$

¹ Arrow, K. v. Hahn, F. (1971), General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco, Holden-Dav.

Note: The definition given in the text for s_h (p, w) has a misprint. The summation should not be multiplied by the vertor p.

Definition III

The set of "relative utility vectors" is defined by:

$$S_{H} = \{v \mid v \geqslant 0, \Sigma v_{h} = 1\}$$

Definition IV


The set of "punishable households" is defined by:

$$s_{\mathrm{B}} = \{v \mid v_{\mathrm{h}} \equiv 0 \text{ if } s_{\mathrm{h}} (p, w) \leq 0\}$$

This latter set fixes at zero the relative utility of a household if its expenses exceed its income. Lemma 5.3 assures us that these household's utility will in fact he set equal to zero.

Definition V

$$V(p, W) = S_H \cap S_R$$




Consider a price vector p, a relative utility allocation v and a feasible commodity allocation w; not necessarily consistent with each other. Let us focus, for the moment, our attention on v, the relative utility allocation. In lemma 5.3 it has been proved that there exists a continuous function u which maps v (ϵS_H) into the set of connegative Pareto efficient points also known as the Pareto frontier: U. We know; however, from theorem 4.4 that if u(v) is Pareto efficient there exists a price vector $p \ge 0$ for which the value of excess demand pz is nonnegative and which, essencially, given a preassigned level of utility, minimizes the household's expenditures, maximizes the firms's profits and satisfies the social budget constraint. In few words, there exists a price vector which supports the Pareto efficient allocation u(v). Call this price vector P(u),

Let us consider now the feasible commodity allocation w. Since u is Pareto efficient (i.e. feasible and not dominated by any other feasible utility allocation), surely there exists a feasible allocation, $\hat{W}(u)$ which does not dominate our original u.

A price vector P(u) and a feasible allocation $\hat{W}(u)$ thus found define immediately budgetary surpluses and consequently a new set of relative utilities V(p, w).

We can represent the above ideas by means of the following diagram



Note that the mapping so constructed lends itself very nicely for the use of some sort of fixed point argument. That is, we start with a relative utility allocation and, as the above arguments show, we map back to the set of relative utility allocations. We will show that there exists at least one point in the set of relative utility allocations which, together with a vector of prices and a feasible commodity allocation, are mapped back into themselves by the above correspondence.

Definition VI

We define the k 2 dimensional unit simplex:

$$S^{k-1} = \{ p \text{ in } R^k \mid \sum_{i=1}^{k} p_i = 1 \}$$

Lemma I

A k-1 dimensional unit simplex is a compact convex set.

Pf:

Let
$$x_1, x_2, \dots, x_i, \dots | x_k, be \ge 0$$
 for all i and $\sum_{i=1}^k | x_i = 1$

Let $x^1=(x_1^1,\ldots,x_k^1)$ and $x^2=(x_1^2,\ldots,x_k^2)$ be two elements in the k+1 dimensional simplex. Then, for $\lambda\in(0,1)$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} [\lambda x_{i}^{1} + (1 - \lambda) x_{i}^{2}] = \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{k} x_{i}^{1} + (1 - \lambda) \sum_{i=1}^{k} x_{i}^{2} = \lambda + (1 - \lambda) = 1$$

So the k-1 dimensional unit simplex is indeed convex.

By construction it is clearly bounded since, in fact, any ponit on the simplex is no more than one unit away from the origin. Closure of the simplex follows if we observe that points on it do not get arbitrarily close to any point outside of it. Hence compactness,

Important Observation. The compactness of S_H can be established in a different manner. In the previous section it was shown that v(u) maps U' (the Pareto Frontier) into the unit simplex S_H . Furthermore v(u) is continuous and the Pareto frontier is compact. Since continuous images of compact sets are compact, it follows that S_H is compact. This theorem, which was used by the authors to show that the set of feasible utility allocations is compact is proved in the Appendix (See Theorem II).

The domain on which our correspondence P(u(v))X - V(p, w)X - W(u(v)) is defined in $s_h = X - S_H = X - W$ which is the cross product of two compact convex sets with W which, by theorem 4.2, we know to be compact and convex. The statement "Hence, the domain is compact and convex" is very, very far away from heing obviously true. That the product of any non—empty class of compact spaces is compact, also known as Tychonoff's theorem, to use the words of a famous mathematician, 'is perhaps the most important single theorem of general topology'. (See the brief discussion in the Appendix, Theorem III).

Theorem A. The cross product of two convex sets is convex.

Pf:

Let
$$(x_1^1, x_2^1)$$
 and (x_1^2, x_2^2) be two points in $X_1 \times X_2$.

We wish to show that $a(x_1^1, x_2^1) + (1 - a)(x_1^2, x_2^2) \in X_1 \times X_2$, $a \in \{0,1\}$

Now,
$$a(x_1^1, x_2^1) + (1-a)(x_1^2, x_2^2) = (ax_1^1 + (1-a)x_1^2, ax_2^1 + (1-a)x_2^2)$$
.

But x_1^1 and x_1^2 are $\in X_1$, and since X_1 , is convex we know that $ax_1^1 \pm (1-a)x_1^2 \in X_1$.

Likewise x_2^1 , x_2^2 are $\in X_2$ and since X_2 is convex we know that $ax_2^1 + (1-a)x_2^2 \in$

 $\mathbf{X_2}$. This implies:

$$(ax_1^1 + (1-a)x_1^2, .ax_2^1 + (1-a)x_2^2) \in X_1 \times X_2$$
 and so $X_1 \times X_2$ is convex.

It then follows by induction that the product of any finite class of convex sets is convex.

Tychonoff's theorem together with above theorem then justify the statement that the domain on which the correspondence is defined is compact and convex. Now, let us make a few observations about our correspondence: $P(u(v)) \times V(p, w) \times W(u(v))$.

- (1) Theorem 4.6 states that P(u) is compact and convex for fixed u and upper semi-continuous in u. Since u(v) is continuous in v (see Section 5.2) it follows that P(u(v)) is compact and convex for fixed v and upper semi-continuous in v.
- (2) Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 5 in the same chapter imply that \hat{W} (u(v)) is compact and convex for fixed v and upper semi-continous in v.
- (3) $V(p, w) = S_H \cap S_B$; where S_H is compact and convex and S_B is closed and convex. Arrow and Hahn state that these properties of S_H and S_B guarantee the compactness of V(p, w) (by Theorem A we know that V(p, w) is convex). To be fully honest and in our desire not to accept anything without proof we could attempt to show that either: (a) the intersection of a compact and a closed set is compact or (b) that S_B is also bounded.

None of the two alternatives appeal to me. If we could prove instead that a closed subspace of a compact space is compact then since $V(p,w) \in S_H$ and V(p,w) is closed (intersection of two closed sets is closed) and S_H is compact it would follow instantly that V(p,w) is compact. This proof is provided in the Appendix (See Theorem 1).

The upper semi-continuity of V(p,w) is provided in the text and requires no further elucidation. We only state that the continuity of $s_{[i]}(p,w)$ is the crucial tool.

So our correspondence is the cross product of three sets which are compact, convex and upper semi—continuous. Therefore the correspondance itself is compact, convex and upper semi—continuous. (I must admit that here the reader might say: "you have not proved that the cross product of two upper semi—continuous sets is upper semi—continuous". True. Lacking a rigorous proof one might appeal to the readers mathematical intuition by saying that taking cross products is itself a continuous operation. One should then not be surprised that such a continuous operation leaves undisturbed the basic properties of the original sets; in this case their upper semi—continuity.

We now are ready to state a theorem which will be of fundamental importance in what remains of this note:

Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. Let C a compact convex set and g(x) and upper semi-continuous correspondence defined on C such that $g(x) \in C$, g(x) convex, for each x in C. Then there exists x in C such that x* is in g(x*).

Thus there exists a point
$$(p^*, v^*, w^*) \in s_h \times S_H \times \widehat{W}$$
 such that $(p^*, v^*, w^*) \in P(n(v^*)) \times V(p^*, w^*) \times W(n(v^*))$

Now write $p^* \in T_H(v^*)$ and rewrite (1) as:

$$\mathbf{p}^* \in \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{u}^*), \ \mathbf{v}^* \in \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{p}^*, \mathbf{w}^*), \ \mathbf{w}^* \in \widehat{\mathbf{W}}(\mathbf{u}^*),$$

We now proceed to show that (p*, v*, w*) satisfies the conditions for a compensated equilibrium stated at the beginning of this note.

The Conclusions

First, we know that since u^* is Pareto efficient the, by theorem 4.4 there exists a vector p with the following properties: (a) $p \ge 0$; (b) $p \ge 0$ for all $z \in Z(u^*)$; (c) $p \ge 0$ for all $z \in Z(u^*)$. Since $p^* \in P(u^*)$ the above theorem implies that $p^* \ge 0$.

Furthermore since $w^* \in \widehat{W}(u^*)$ and \widehat{W} is the set of feasible allocations it follows that w^* is feasible (i.e. $z(w^*) \le 0$) which implies:

$$\sum_{h} x_{h}^{*} \leq \sum_{f} y_{f}^{*} + \sum_{h} \overline{x}_{h}$$

Also, w* feasible and $p^* \in P(u^*)$ suggest that part (d) of theorem 4.4 is satisfied which, automatically assures that the third and fourth parts of definition lare satisfied. That is:

- (c) y maximizes p*yf subject to yf \(Y_f \)
- (d) \mathbf{x}_h^* minimizes $\mathbf{p}^*\mathbf{x}_h$ subject to \mathbf{U}_h $(\mathbf{x}_h) \ge \mathbf{u}_h^*$.

Likewise the social budget constraint also holds:

$$\sum_{h} p^* x_h^* = \sum_{h} [p^* \bar{x}_h + \sum_{f} d_{hf} (p^* y_f^*)] ==>$$

$$\sum_{h} \left[p^* \, \overline{\kappa}_h + \sum_{h} d_{hf} \, (p^* \, y^*) - p^* \, \kappa_h^* \, \right] = \sum_{h} s_h \, (p^*, w^*) = 0$$

Now,
$$p*x_h^* = M_h^* ==> M_h^* - p*x_h^* = 0$$
 for all $h ==> s_h^* (p*, w*) = 0$ for all h

We know that it is impossible for all households to incur in budgetary deficits simultaneously since that would imply that $v_h=0$ for all $h=>\sum\limits_h v_h=0\neq 1$.

Hence the only thing to prove is that $s_h(p^*, w^*) \ge 0$ for all h. Suppose not. Then there exists at least one h for which it is true that:

$$u_h(p^*, w^*) < 0 ==> v_h^* = 0 ==> u_h^* = 0.$$

Recall; however, that we have assumed that there exists a possible consumption vector $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_h$ in $X_h(\mathbf{u}_h)$ such that $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{hi} \leq \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{hi}$ for all $i, \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{hi} \leq \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{hi}$ if $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{hi} \geq 0$, where $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_h$ is the initial endowment for household h. That is, it is possible, (for h), to consume less of good i than household h is endowed with.

So $\hat{x}_h \in X_h$ $(u_h^*) = X_h$ (0) and since x_h^* minimizes expenditures $p^* x_h$ subject to $x_h \in X_h$ $(u_h^*) = X_h$ (0) it follows that:


$$p^* x_h^* \le p^* \bar{x}_h^* \le p^* x_h^* \le M_h^* = > M_h^* - p^* \bar{x}_h^* \ge 0 = = >$$
 $s_h (p^*, w^*) \ge 0 = = > contradiction.$

This then establishes the validity of the last condition in our definition of compensated equilibrium, namely that:

$$p * x_h^* = M_h^*$$

We can then conclude:

Theorem B. Under the assumptions made, a compensated equilibrium exists.




APPENDIX

Definition (a). Let X be a topological space. A class $\{G_i\}$ of open subsets of X is said to be an "open cover" of X if each point in X belongs to at least one G_i ; that is $t^iG_i \cong X$.

Definition (b). A "compact" space is a topological space in which every open cover has a finite subcover.

Theorem 1. Any closed subspace of a compact space is compact.

Proof. Let Y be a close subspace of a compact space X and let the collection of sets $\{G_i\}$ be an open cover of Y. Note that each of the G_i 's is open in the relative topology of Y and is the intersection with Y of an open subset H_i of X (See Figure 1). That is $G_i = Y \cap H_i$. Since Y is closed, Y' is open and the class made up of Y' and $\{H_i\}$ is an open cover of X (i.e. given any point in X, say x, then either x is in Y or x is in H_i for some i). But because X is compact this open cover has a finite subcover. If we can show that Y occurs in this subcover we are done. If Y' occurs in this subcover we discard it. What is left is a finite class of H_i 's whose union contains X. This implies that the corresponding G_i 's form a finite subcover of the original open cover of Y.




Theorem II. Any continuous image of a compact space is compact.

Proof: Let $f: X \longrightarrow Y$ be a continuous mapping of a compact space X into an arbitrary topological space Y. We must show that f(X) is a compact subspace of Y.

Let $\{G_i\}$ be an open cover of f(X). As above, each G_i is such that $G_i = f(X) \cap H_i$: that is, it is the intersection with f(X) of an open subset H_i of Y. Recall now that since f is continuous, the inverse image of H_i will be an open set in X; furthermore the set $\{f^{-1}(H_i)\}$ will be an open cover of X and since X is compact it will have a finite subcover. The union of the finite class of H_i 's of which the sets in the finite subcover are the inverse images clearly contains f(X), so the class of corresponding G_i 's is a finite subcover of the original open cover of f(X). Hence f(X) is compact. (See Figure II).

Figure II



A proof of Tychonoff's Theorem ("The product of any non-empty class of compact spaces is compact") shall not be presented inasmuch as it requires two other difficult theorems: (1) A topological space is compact if and only if every class of closed sets with the finite intersection property has non-empty intersection; and (2) A topological space is compact if very class of subbasic closed sets with the finite intersection property has nonempty intersection.

A class of subsets of a non-empty set is said to have the "finite intersection property" if every finite subclass has non-empty intersection.

For a proof of Tychonoff's theorem the interest reader may consult, for instance, G.F. Simmons' "Introduction to Topology and Modern Analysis" (Mc Graw-Hill), 1963.