Implementation of indigenous public policies and tensions to governance: evidences from the chilean case

Verónica Figueroa Huencho

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

ARTICLE

Implementation of indigenous public policies and tensions to governance: evidences from the chilean case

Verónica Figueroa Huencho

Institute of Public Affairs, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile

ABSTRACT

The search for good governance has become a challenge for the Latin American States in response to the demands of representation of indigenous peoples that have emerged as political actors in the last decades. In contexts of Nation-State and Weberian bureaucracies, the analysis of the indigenous policy implementation process shows the tension to governance models and the relevance to incorporate concepts as power, hegemony, or exclusion. From the Chilean case, this article analyzes the tensions, values, and interests that arise in governance contexts, based on an analysis model that shows the difficulties in defining the rules of governance, the processes of adjustment and cultural mismatch, the political and economic influence on the implementation process, between others. The main information arises from in-depth interviews applied to 44 key actors who have played a role at different stages in the process of implementation, along with press analysis and official documents.

Introduction

Governance, far from being a neutral concept, becomes an opportunity for a better explanation and understanding of the exclusions that affect indigenous peoples in Latin America. While societies have always required some form of collective direction, changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural order have produced different answers from the States to the fundamental questions about how to provide that direction (Pierre and Peters 2005; Bevir 2007), and how to face the challenges that arise from indigenous demands. Indigenous peoples have emerged as social and political actors since the mid-1990 s, pressing States for new forms of governance for better participation and representation, challenging the Nation-State model.

In response, some States have given Constitutional and/or legal recognition to indigenous people, creating a new public institutional network. However, this has not implied a profound change to the economic or political system, so that the rules of governance continue to respond to hegemonic logics (Davies 2014). This occurs in the Chilean case, where the promulgation of Law No. 19,253 in 1993, creates norms and rules about protection, promotion, and development of indigenous people but without changes to Nation-State model or political recognition at Constitutional level.

Figure 1. Source: Adapted from UNDP (1996), Hill and Hupe (2009)**, and** Pierre and Peters (2005).

Although the Chilean State has ratified International Rights, there is still a limited type of governance expressed in some spaces of social or cultural rights to indigenous peoples, without political representation, but intensifying interaction with other stakeholders, especially the private and business sector, evidencing asymmetries of power (Eagleton-Pierce, 2014). Thus, a challenge for governments has been to find adequate mechanisms for the realization of the rights enshrined in the Law without changing decision-making structures, focusing mainly in the implementation process where the role of public bureaucracy becoming relevant.

Although the Weberian bureaucratic model was valued and selected by most Latin American States because its 'apolitical and rational nature' (Seibel 2010), highlighting the cases of Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina or Colombia (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017), because of the greater diversity in their societies this model become a limitation to move toward better recognition of the minority rights, especially those historically excluded from State formation processes, as indigenous peoples (Figueroa Huencho 2017). To resolve indigenous demands, some governments have implemented strategies of representative bureaucracy as a way to concrete indigenous rights, creating specific institutions and organizations responsible for the formulation and/or implementation of public policies to indigenous peoples, promoting greater participation of indigenous managers and public bureaucrats, but without modifying the economic, political, or cultural bases that govern their societies. The premise is that it is enough that public organizations be a faithful reflection of the societies to which they orient their work if they to collect, represent, and reliably serve the needs of diverse citizenship (Riccucci and Meyers 2004; Sowa and Selden 2003).

These kinds of decisions, however, do not always achieve the expected results. This generates tensions and mismatch to governance rules, being important for the States to identify those institutional dimensions that can favor or affect the implementation process. Therefore, the analysis of the implementation of public policies from a governance approach is important and necessary, especially when it occurs in contexts

of uncertainty because of the emergence of new cultural and political identities that force governments to seek new strategies but also offers the opportunity to put on tension the concept of governance itself from the perspective of indigenous peoples.

Considering the principles of UNDP (1997) for good governance, together with the proposals from Hill and Hupe (2009); Pierre and Peters (2005) about processes of implementation of public policies in governance contexts, a model of synthesis and analysis is proposed, to identify and understand the tensions, values, and interests that may arise in this kind of institutional design, especially when involves different cultural backgrounds as the indigenous people who press for structural changes. In this way, the perspective of analysis of what happens within the 'black box' that involves the study of public policies in new environments such as governance (Schneider and Sidney 2009) is enriched.

The data is collected from the Chilean experience, analyzing the process of implementation of indigenous institutionality for the period 1990–2019, being the public policy of this type of more long-standing in the country but with important limitations. This public policy creates the National Corporation for Indigenous Development CONADI, the only public organization in Chile created to *'promote, coordinate and execute the action of the State for the indigenous peoples'* but without powers to formulate public policies. The case of Chile es interesting because it was one of the pioneer countries in Latin America that promoted modernization of its public administration applying the principles of New Public Management. Nevertheless, the demands of indigenous people, principally the Mapuche people, have pressed the government for greater recognition of their rights, and not only the introduction of representative bureaucracy[1] (Figueroa Huencho 2017).

The following sections of this article present a theoretical discussion from the analytical framework, the presentation of the analytical model derived from them, a description of the information and the method used to analyze the evidence and the results of the study and, finally, the conclusions.

Governance and indigenous peoples: new demands, new institutional arrangements

Elements for a good governance in diversity contexts

In increasingly diverse societies, governance has become a response of States to face new problems. Most of them require collective choices because it is difficult to resolve these problems individually (Peters 2011), and some means must be found to make and to implement decisions that require coordinated actions of different actors who seek to share spaces of power (Zurbriggen 2011). Therefore, governance includes the institutions, processes, and conventions in a society that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are made, and how to respond to the variety of interests that exist in it (Tommasi 2011).

However, governance does not occur in a *'tabula rasa'*, but also reflects customs, values, and adaptations of Latin American Nation-States (Olsen and Peters 1996), which has privileged uniform and centralized mechanisms of participation and representation of citizen interests as members of a homogeneous nation (Sekher and Kattumuri 2018). Following this model, Chile has been characterized as a unitary State, with a high level of

political and administrative centralism, and with a significant concentration of power at the Presidential level, who act like co-legislator (Mainwaring and Shugart 2002). This gives to public bureaucracy an important role in the implementation of public policies (Stein and Tommasi 2007).

Since the mid-1990 s, Chilean governments have been implementing an agenda of modernization, applying the principles of New Public Management (NPM), becoming a Latin American reference in this area (Huencho, Verónica, and Navarrete 2010). This agenda was implemented in a neoliberal economic context that has produced a strong interaction between the political and economic systems, generating a limited governance model, but encouraging a modernization process of public administration based on economic rationality and efficiency (Olavarría-Gambi 2017). For indigenous peoples, this involved a limitation for proper recognition of their differences in public institutions, giving rise to 'cultural neoliberalism' (Bolados 2012).

Beyond these emphases, evidence characterizes Chilean public administration as a Weberian because it still maintains elements of the bureaucratic model (Longo 2013). This affects the capacity of the State to respond to new needs that arise from populations with diverse characteristics, as indigenous peoples, because the principles of efficiency, hierarchy, merit, and application of universal rules and regulations are strongly institutionalized (Farazmand, 2019). In Chile, the response strategy has been the recognition of minimal rights to indigenous peoples that have required, in turn, the creation of new institutions and rules, originating a framework of governance not always coherent. Thus, following Peters (2011), governance created to give participation to indigenous peoples is mainly focus on meso (organizational) and micro (behavioral) levels, and less on institutional (political rules) levels. In this way, Chile continues to respond to a colonial legacy that is not consistent with the needs and challenges of current governance (Riccucci and Van Ryzin 2016). For governments, the progressive incorporation of indigenous people in the bureaucracy and the creation of new public organizations focused on the implementation of indigenous policies have been assumed as a sufficient condition to promote democratic governance (Smith and Monaghan 2013).

From a normative perspective, UNDP (1996) proposes a framework to effectively move toward good governance, where the rules framework must meet, at least, the following criteria:

(a) Promotion of equitable spaces for participation in the decision-making process of all people, regardless of their gender, class or ethnicity;
(b) Efficiency in the systems of response to the demands, generating trust and acting with criteria of justice;
(c) Represent the diversity of visions, values, and positions in the institutional framework;
(d) Appropriate identification of the stakeholders involved in the network of institutional interrelations
(e) Implementation of transparency and accountability systems that favor control and social control;
(f) A clear regulatory and political framework, in line with the new human rights problems;
(g) Diversity among decision-makers

(h) Put the well-being of people at the center, contributing to it with equitable and inclusive actions.

In this way, good governance implies an interrelation between political and administrative factors, looking for ways of virtuous interrelation between different actors to achieve the objectives of societies, being a pillar of democratic values to stimulate institutional and administrative adaptations and reforms (Bevir 2007). Considering the diversity in societies representing by indigenous peoples, good governance should consider a representation of their interests, either by creating specific organizations, promoting the participation of indigenous people in managerial and/or decision-making roles, responding to their needs (Sheppard, 2004). However, these kinds of models require introducing elements that highlight the marginalization of indigenous peoples from the spheres of power, and the asymmetry that these peoples have with other stakeholders that represent the principles of western hegemonic culture. Therefore, concepts such as power, domination, exclusion, among others, must be considered in a governance model (Sauer 2011).

Policy implementation and its contribution to good governance

The search for good governance not only depends on the clarity of the political definitions that the State takes but also on the institutional and administrative design defined for its concretion. The decisions of the governments regarding the allocation of resources, the definition of the rules, as well as the incentives regarding 'who gets what, where, when and how', will influence the legitimacy reached by a governance proposal (Howlett and Ramesh 2014). Therefore, the process of implementing public policies acquires a fundamental role (Hill and Hupe 2009).

Although the interest in the analysis of public policy implementation is long-standing, its analysis in cultural diversity contexts is recent. The implementation can be defined as the process of implementing a public policy through a variety of mechanisms and procedures that involve different social actors, instruments, and resources, among other aspects, to achieve the objectives established by the State (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Olavarría-Gambi 2017).

In general terms, the implementation policy process responds to similar dimensions. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) point out that the success or failure of public policy will depend on the regulatory and management structure adopted in its implementation, and to what extent they respond to the characteristics of the target group. Vancoppenolle, Sætren, and Hupe (2015), reveal the organizational and inter-organizational behaviors, the level of skills and interests of the bureaucrats, the expectations of the interest groups, the incidence of power actors, between other elements.

Thus, we can assume that this process acquires particular characteristics in governance contexts where diversity is a characteristic, such as current societies. Considering these new expectations for governance models, Hill and Hupe (2009) propose that implementation process should be consistent in, at least, three areas of governance:

(a) *Directive governance* (one that has the political legitimacy to define the rules of the game). Here is import the legitimacy level of the problem to be addressed by public policy, the levels of support that arise from different stakeholders, and

the value or relevance that political actors, managers and/or public bureaucrats give to the subject of public policy. Their support is relevant because, in many cases, they must persuade other actors to support or to align with their objectives;

(b) *Constitutional governance* (the institutional structure defined for the realization of policy aspirations). Here is important the level of dependence of the policy on other stakeholders to achieve its results, which will affect the strategies from the public sector, as well as the efforts that must be devoted to this task. If there is adequate alignment, the implementation will be easy. The suitability of a governance model will, therefore, depend on the degree to which the managerial levels that must conduct its implementation, comply with the requirements of 'wanting' and 'powering,' that is, have the will to assume that leadership. At the same time, the existence of spaces of autonomy and discretion to do so. It is important to improve the professionalization and identify the personal competences of managers and/or bureaucrats that are required for the success of the policy. The objective in this area is to manage the results as 'shared results'.

(c) *Operational governance* (the processes and incentives generated to implement the public policy). A clear assignment of responsibilities and the definition of the competence's areas are important elements, especially for inter-organizational management and its relationships. This requires a strong relationship with the political levels where dialogue, empowerment and feedback interfaces must be created. User participation is essential, especially to ensure bottom-up policy feedback processes, and to favor the legitimacy of public action. Even when, in a governance context, the results of the implementation will not depend solely on the actions of the State, for users the responsibility and performance of governments are important.

These areas of governance allow incorporating the proposals of Pierre and Peters (2005), for whom the implementation process must consider, at least, the following elements:

(a) *Processes*: understood as steps defined in one or several organizations to achieve the objectives of the policy. These processes may involve internal interactions or link with other organizations or stakeholders, even outside of public administration;

(b) *Selection of objectives*: what and which problems will be solved with this public policy, involving in an active way the users. This always will be a government responsibility;

(c) *Decision making*: as spaces to define with certain levels of flexibility, how to achieve the goals of the policy. This implies, among other things, the selection of instruments and the combination of public and private action considering the most appropriate to achieve the objectives;

(d) *Resource mobilization*: it implies the need to identify and mobilize public and private resources to achieve the objectives. The people involved, their capacities and competencies, whether from the public, private sector or the users of the policy, should also be considered;

(e) *Feedback*: as the creation of devices to measure and evaluate, qualitatively and quantitatively, the implementation process. The State must be receptive to that feedback and must have the mechanism to receive and process it.

Finally, is important to point out that from a representative bureaucracy, the implementation process will also depend on several conditions: that indigenous managers have high levels of discretion when implementing policies; that policies be valued by indigenous peoples, that decisions generate positive impacts, among others (Meier 1993; Keiser et al. 2002). In addition, there must be coherence between the political and strategic levels, where indigenous policies must have an important role (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). To Cornell and Kalt (2000), the implementation process from an indigenous perspective involves not only effectiveness but also legitimacy, where the definitions of power, the mechanisms to adopt and implement decisions, and who have the prerogative to participate must respond also to indigenous cultures.

Therefore, these propositions about governance and implementation process can constitute a contribution to the analysis of indigenous policies. However, it will be important to identify those cultural, economic, social, historical, and/or political elements that influence implementation processes and its limitations when their interrelations when with other elements of governance are not considered. In this way, not only the current analytical frameworks are enriched, but also the decision-making process is improved because of the promotion of equitable relationships with indigenous peoples. In addition, it can serve as a guide to explain the causes and consequences of the process of implementing indigenous policies in specific cases, contributing to theoretical development in this field (Bovens and T´Hart 2016).

The analytical model proposed for indigenous policy implementation processes in governance contexts is as follows (see Figure 1):

Methods and data

This article analyzes the implementation of indigenous policy in Chile from a governance approach based on the analysis model proposed, which leads to characterize it as an explanatory and exploratory case study, since it is not intended to confirm hypotheses but rather build knowledge from a model that becomes the main guide for inquiries in order to understand larger cases (Gerring 2007). Following Barzelay et al. (2003), the analysis of cases in public policy refers to *'experiences in which events involve interventions that can lead to changes in a policy'* (p. 23). Yin (1994), points out that this strategy is appropriate when the research question asks 'how' or 'why' a certain phenomenon occurs to find the best explanation (among others) (Yin 1994, 5).

The unit of analysis is the process of implementing the indigenous public policy called 'Indigenous Law' or Law N°19.253. As a data collection technique, the in-depth interview was mainly used, which was applied between the months of August 2017 and November 2019 to 44 key actors, including political authorities, experts and scholars, congress members, advisors, CONADI's directors and leaders of rural and urban indigenous associations (see Table 1). The interviewees were identified following the criteria of theoretical sampling (aimed at collecting information necessary to establish comparisons of actors, events, relevant activities and analytical categories) and theoretical

Table 1. Distribution of Interviewees.

Type of interviewee	Quantity
Ministers	6
Undersecretaries	5
Advisors	8
Experts/Scholars	5
CONADI Directors	9
Indigenous leader	7
Congress members	4

Source: Author´s records

saturation (which avoids collecting information that does not add value to the examination of any category analytical) (Valles 2007, 356).

The analysis of these interviews was carried out using the NVIVO software. To ensure internal validity, the data triangulation method was used, which seeks to obtain information from various sources in order to determine if the results obtained in the research process are convergent from the information collected from different perspectives (Martínez 2006). Therefore, the results of these interviews have been complemented with other sources of information, among which are the review of documentary sources, as well as the review and analysis of written media published in Santiago and in the regions with greater presence indigenous since 1993 to date.

Main findings

Political legitimacy of governance

Initial factors of legitimacy of governance

The relationship of the Chilean State with indigenous peoples has been conflictive. Since its birth, it has enacted laws and policies to forcibly incorporate indigenous peoples into the 'national project'. In 1845, the 'colonization law' was passed that gave indigenous lands to settlers and landowners. In 1866, the 'reduction law' established the ownership of indigenous lands, limiting their tenure. In 1931 the 'Austral Property Law' recognized the definitive ownership of land to settlers, companies, and private farmers. At that date, the indigenous territory had been reduced from 5 million hectares to no more than 500 thousand, forcing the first migrations to the cities. During the Pinochet dictatorship, in 1978 the Decree-Law 2.568 was promulgated to divide indigenous lands and to reduce the number of indigenous communities (Figueroa Huencho 2017). Between 1927 and 1973, 168 communities disappeared completely and their lands were turned over to private (Bengoa, 2000).

In 1989, the presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin (President for the period 1990–1994) and the National Council of Indigenous Peoples signed the 'Nueva Imperial Agreement', where Aylwin committed to approving a law to recognizes Indigenous Peoples' rights. Returning to democracy with Aylwin as President, indigenous peoples seek to materialize the campaign commitments. However, some sectors do not support progress in this area, and this controversy marked the discussion of Law 19.253 (former advisor, 2018). But, as a minister said, the priority for the government was to ensure 'minimums of governability' rather than putting indigenous politics at the

center of political agenda. For that reason, what was expected to be achieved with this new policy, or the institutional changes that would mean its implementation, were not necessarily clear (former minister, 2017). Therefore, indigenous peoples try to move the agenda toward the recognition of their rights in the Law, more than try to change the framework of rules and objectives at political level, looking in that way to break with a historical 'asymmetric relationship with the State' (scholar, 2017). However, there were many objections from conservative sectors at that time who saw with fear the possibility of breaking with the nation's values (scholar, 2019).

As a way to limit the possible scope of this institutionality, the government decides to create a special commission formed by representatives of different social, political, scholar, business, and ecclesiastical sectors, among others, to discuss the content of Law (indigenous leader, 2018). According to some interviewees, the government representatives were clear that substantive issues for indigenous peoples should be left off the political agenda, looking to advance in 'governability' and not hinder the discussion. Thus, from the beginning, they took the explicitly political decision in this regard, affecting the expectations of indigenous people (scholar, 2018).

For that reason, this Commission mainly advanced in the creation of a bureaucratic organization: National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI). This is a public organization under the supervision of Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, responsible for coordinating and executing the State action in benefit of the development of indigenous people in economic, social and cultural matters, as well as promoting their participation in national life. In this way, a complex figure for governance is created, because CONADI doesn't have competences to formulate public policy. It only acts as a coordinating body for the decisions of the governments at bureaucratic level (former CONADI director, 2019).

CONADI doesn't have political power, and that difficult the implementation process since the formulation is deposited in different sectoral ministries who not always clear of its objectives in this matter, mainly because those who decide are not indigenous (indigenous leader, 2018). It is important to point out that, at this moment, it doesn't exist in Chile a Minister of Indigenous Affairs or similar, so the indigenous public policy is not centralized at a political level.

The expectations of the indigenous peoples were not fulfilled with the role assigned to CONADI. The law gave it an eminently bureaucratic character with little capacity for effective decision (indigenous leader, 2017). It was not defined either a system to designate exclusively indigenous people as managers for this organization or a quota system to have more indigenous people in this institutionality, either CONADI or related ministries. The appointment of the CONADI Director is of exclusive confidence of the President (scholar, 2018). Also, given the strong existence of Weberian bureaucracy principles, indigenous knowledge is not valued as expertise or a way to improve the implementation process. As one interviewee points out 'CONADI is always in tension, between what communities expect from it and what governments require us to do . . . it is difficult for CONADI to be a valued entity' (former CONADI director, 2017).

It is important to note that this institutional design, far from control the demands of indigenous peoples, had the opposite effect. The unfulfilled expectations, the little political relevance of CONADI, the lack of progress in the recognition of political, linguistic, and cultural rights, as well as the problems to restore ancestral territory, influenced the birth of

multiple indigenous movements, mainly Mapuche (Pairican and Alvarez 2011). With this, the Initial factors of the legitimacy of governance, from the indigenous people's perspectives, were limited. As one interviewee points out *'the incidence of indigenous politics will be greater if we advance in political rights. The adjustments that have been given so far are cosmetic, have not meant substantive changes. We need the approval of a law that creates the Ministry of Indigenous People. Decisions like that can make a structural change to the institutional framework'* (congress member, 2017).

Current legitimacy of governance: government actors

While the government was seeking the opposite effect, the null advance in other areas served as a catalyst to new demands of indigenous people that still are looking to political, economic, and territorial rights, which often to collide to other policy areas, especially economic. From a systemic perspective, this affects the decision-making process of governments, because not always understand the nature of their demands or value indigenous cultures as equal, privileging other areas of the government agenda (former undersecretary, 2017). This hegemonic vision has defined that, for most governments from 1993 until now, the solution to indigenous demands limited to the institutional framework created in Law 19.253. Indigenous peoples have not been political actors because there have been no systems of representation systems that allow their access to the position of a political decision, so the advance has been made at the programmatic level, in the implementation of policies more than at the political-institutional level.

One criterion in the implementation process is to designate indigenous people as Directors of CONADI, but that is not a rule. Other criteria have been hiring indigenous peoples in public administration but only in organizations related to CONADI. So, the representation in bureaucracy is limited only to indigenous issues, even when its implications affect other areas of public policy: '*The idea that the indigenous and the knowledge of our cultures is important, is a way of expertise, is a pending subject in public administration ... that kind of knowledge can improve the quality of different kinds of policies*' (indigenous leader, 2018).

As a way to maintain an equilibrium with other areas, governments have tried to canalize the demands of indigenous peoples through CONADI, but that is not possible because this is a transversal policy, and have economic, demographic, social and political implications (congressman, 2018). The Chilean economic matrix is based on the exploitation of natural resources, which constitute 90% of exports. This generates a dependency of the economy on extractive companies, many of which are in territory claimed by indigenous communities (CNID 2018). Thus, there is a strong interrelation between the political and economic system, where indigenous politics becomes a problem for governments.

In an effort to contain these demands, the main Office of CONADI is not in Santiago (Capital City) but still remain in the Araucanía Region, where the ancestral territory of the Mapuche people is located. '*This was logical in the 1990 s, but now it must be at the center of political power, in Santiago*' (indigenous leader, 2018). Indigenous representation in the public bureaucracy requires, therefore, a systemic look so as to not affect negatively the credibility or the legitimacy of this issue (former advisor, 2018). However, the Chilean case shows the problems of focusing strategies only at this level.

While there is no real valuation of indigenous issues, the scope of governance will be limited and weaknesses. Efforts and resources allocation will be wasted. The political levels must understand that indigenous demands have changed, are more sophisticated now, and can affect the democratic legitimacy of the entire system if are not attending. '*Still there is a fear at the political level of what the recognition of rights for indigenous peoples can make. If the Chilean State does not assume as plurinational, the current institutionality will continue to show its limitations*' (former CONADI director, 2018).

Current legitimacy of governance: other stakeholders

The implementation of the Indigenous Law requires the intervention and participation of multiple stakeholders, who in some cases have an active role as policy implementers, and in others, they act as legitimizers of this institutionality with their perceptions or public opinions. Although from the governmental sphere it appears as a problematic field of politics, civil society has been sensitive to indigenous demands and support the increase in the recognition of their rights (former minister, 2018).

The results of some public surveys support this. For example, the Foundation Chile 21-CRITERIA (2016) survey showed that 56% of respondents were in favor of recognizing the existence and contribution of indigenous peoples in the Political Constitution. Likewise, in the Third National Survey of Human Rights of NHRI (2015), 84.4% of the respondents qualified as 'quite important or very important' for indigenous peoples to receive constitutional recognition. The recent survey by the CADEM Consultant (December 2019), shows 92% support for the existence of specific representation systems for indigenous peoples. Finally, the Intercultural Studies Center CIIR Survey (2019) shows that 1 in 5 Chileans identifies themselves with the cause of indigenous peoples.

In the case of companies, the relationship with indigenous peoples is still problematic because there are interests in conflict. While some companies are incorporating dialogue with communities as part of their social responsibility strategies, this depends on the voluntary of each company (scholar, 2019). Thus, a profound change is required. In Chile, most of the land claimed by indigenous peoples is in the hands of forest companies. In the La Araucanía region, of its 435 thousand hectares, 170 thousand belong to the CMPC holding company and 35 thousand to the Arauco company, of which the Mapuche Communities indicate that 150 thousand must be restituted.[2] In the north, the mining industry has contaminated waters and affected their use and disposal by indigenous communities (Romero 2019). Therefore, the business sector is not only an economic but also a political actor, which in Chile finds an important space in the subsidiarity of the State.

This has influenced the emergence of new indigenous movements that demand substantive changes to the economic model, with territorial identities and a diverse agenda that includes ecological and political, seeking to exercise their self-determination rights (Svampa 2012). For some interviewees, here is the biggest challenge in terms of governance (former advisor, 2018). Having the support of civil society is relevant to indigenous policy, but this must be translated into effective decisions that seek to increase the level of incidence of indigenous policy, to advance in the participation of indigenous people in decision-making (scholar, 2017). A greater presence of indigenous experts in public spaces would also help to break the prejudices and biases that still persist

regarding indigenous peoples and their capacities, demonstrating that they have technical competencies to participate in decision-making (indigenous leader, 2018).

Political-strategic alignment of governance

Level of articulation with political level and feedback

Given that the emphasis of the State's actions in Chile has been on the implementation of indigenous policy, a fluency in communications between management levels and political authorities would be expected as a way to anticipate and contain demands. But the current governance structure creates an important gap for managers to find spaces for dialogue, influence and/or feedback with policymakers. CONADI don't have political powers to formulate the policy, so its directors still are valuated just as bureaucrats with little capacity to access to government agendas (former CONADI director, 2018). Except on some occasions when the demands of indigenous peoples were increased and affect the national agenda, the political level open dialogue spaces with indigenous directors or bureaucrats (former advisor, 2018).

Given this gap, it has been the individual characteristics of CONADI directors that have influenced the articulation with these levels, open an informal relationship space more than formal. In this way, there have been CONADI directors with many problems to maintain this relationship permanently and they feel isolated from decision-making and others who have been able to maintain a clearer relationship with the political level, but who attribute this to their political militancy or their influences in their respective political parties, or because they know the political authorities on a personal level, or because they have leadership skills that have facilitated the management of this agenda (former CONADI director, 2019). In one way or another, this tends to increase the ignorance of the political class regarding indigenous peoples.

The above has an impact on feedback, which is virtually non-existent. It has been some specific events rather than a formal politic that has promoted specific spaces of articulation and communication, where the ethnicity of CONADI directors has been valued 'momentarily' as an expert to explain the demands of indigenous peoples or to favor a response agenda. But this is not a permanent channel to obtain clear guidelines for action. Therefore, it is here that bureaucratic representation at the managerial level is important to generate spaces for change in institutional design (former CONADI director, 2018).

Knowledge of the governance structure

The level of dispersion from formulation to implementation has had a negative impact on the complete knowledge of networks and interrelations involved in indigenous policy, both for political and bureaucratic levels. The CONADI Director is not always informed about initiatives or programs from other ministries, which makes it difficult to monitor the results or impact of those interventions. Even when CONADI does not have administrative responsibility, in the face of indigenous users, the demands of responsibility are transferred to this institution (former CONADI director, 2018).

Indigenous policy is formulated in sectors such as education, health, housing, agriculture, all under supervisions of different ministries, which makes it difficult to know all the available programs if CONADI's collaboration is not requested (former advisor,

2018). These generates confusion in recipients, who do not know the formal channels of communication with the bureaucracy (former CONADI director, 2018). To resolve this, some directors acting motivated by their feeling of ethnicity representation, looking to favor a better performance. However, these informal spaces have also led to the promotion of personal agendas or particular interests, affecting the outcome of the policy (former minister, 2018).

Levels of autonomy

Since Law 19.253 does not give CONADI political powers, limiting its levels of autonomy has been a strategy used by governments, especially to control the relationship with communities, concentrating at political levels much of the power of decision. CONADI's dependence on the Ministry of Social Development does not allow it to act proactively to resolve sensitive issues for indigenous peoples, such as the resolution of claims related to territorial restitution (former advisor, 2018). The areas considered strategic for the government are not delegated to CONADI, leaving little space to innovate indigenous managers who cannot always respond to urgent demands, waiting for the authorization from the ministerial level (former CONADI director, 2019).

One strategy to deal with the limitations of the governance model could be to empower indigenous managers in implementation giving them autonomy, so that they can use that cultural knowledge to improve the results of the policy. However, the level of influence they have is minimal throughout the entire process (scholar, 2019). Also, given that the relevant decisions are taken at the political level, this leaves CONADI directors as mere informants, obliged to give explanations to relevant stakeholders about decisions in which they have not participated, and affecting their own belonging to an ethnic group. Thus, bureaucratic representation becomes a problem, as indigenous people delegitimize in front of their own communities (indigenous leader, 2019).

Finally, the current governance designs a structure of participation to indigenous people that also limits the autonomy. This structure is the National Council of CONADI.[3] Its principal goal is to promote representation of these peoples in the bureaucracy but does not generate a virtuous relationship with CONADI or other organizations, because exists in a limited governance model (scholar, 2018). This National Council have some decisional powers that affect the internal management of CONADI, such as defining some politics in organization, approving the budget or defining the allocation of funds (former minister, 2018). However, it is not an effective structure for participation of indigenous peoples, at least in the public bureaucracy.

Levels of interaction with stakeholders

The implementation of this policy requires the participation of multiple public, private and civil society stakeholders, which are characterized by belonging to a different range of areas. For that, they do not always fully know the policy or reality of indigenous peoples. Within the public sphere, there are currently at least 18 ministries that have programs or policies aimed at indigenous peoples, most of them related to CONADI at an administrative rather than strategic level (scholar, 2018). For some interviewees, the separation between the process of formulation and the implementation of the policy itself has influenced not only the lack of coherence between political and administrative decisions

but also the delegitimization of the action that CONADI. For indigenous people or some stakeholders is criticized by its inefficiencies, slowness and/or poor achievements in areas relevant to them (former CONADI director, 2017).

However, the weaknesses of the governance model created with Law 19.253 are also expressed in the relationship to stakeholders, mainly communities that claim land restitution. Given that CONADI manages the funds and criteria to resolve land disputes, but does not have political power or autonomy, most of these decisions are resolved at the political level (informally), but CONADI as the 'front office'. This increases discontent over the slowness and, in some cases, the lack of transparency in the criteria used to prioritize some communities over others. The diversity of indigenous peoples existing in Chile must also be considered who face differentiated problems: access to land, scarcity of water, administration of archeological sites, loss of language, geographic dispersion, among others (former advisor, 2018).

Strategic-administrative alignment of governance

Margin for process definition and resource allocation

The limitations at political legitimacy and political-strategic levels, also affect the alienation between strategic and administrative levels. The high level of decentralization in decision-making impacts CONADI processes, as well as the generation of programs in different public organizations that, in many cases, are resolving the same issues but without connection (former director, 2018). However, CONADI has had little chance of influencing the adjustments made in other programs over which it has no attribution. Even when the law defines that it should coordinate efforts in this area, most ministries act independently, generating high levels of discoordination (former minister, 2018). This is very well explained in the words of a former minister '*From CONADI, we sought to strengthen housing policies . . . and it happened that we came to visit these homes built in the ninth region by the respective Ministry, in rural areas, and you find that the houses had no floor . . . the indigenous families took it out because they need to be linked to the land . . . they had no circular shape, so important also for these towns, they had nowhere to place the central stove . . . it was not just about delivering homes, they should be with identity. So . . . it's not just overcoming poverty*'.

Thus, efficiency is one of the main problems of indigenous policy implementation, increasing the perception of the inefficiency of CONADI (former CONADI director, 2017). This generates tensions in indigenous personnel in particular, as they often feel challenged by users with whom they share other spaces, such as indigenous associations or territorial communities (indigenous leader, 2018). As a way to minimize this, the strengthening of the skills of CONADI staff has been relevant in director's agenda. Initially, these staff were integrated by indigenous leaders with experiences in their territories who became part of CONADI, but without professional certification. In the opinion of some managers, this has also limited the possibilities of improvement of the institution. However, efforts have been made to move toward an organization that meets the criteria of management excellence, beyond its indigenous belonging (former CONADI director, 2017).

Finally, a complex issue at this level has been the availability of resources, where CONADI's budget is mostly used to purchase land (approximately 65%). Therefore, even

when CONADI doesn't have political power, the law assigns it the difficult task of prioritizing territorial demands and allocating part of its budget to buy land from settlers or landowners whose lands are claimed by indigenous communities. This is a 'stone in the shoe' for directors and one of the main weaknesses of indigenous institutionality. But, also, is a way to keep political level out of these conflicts, with the understanding that it is an administrative procedure (former CONADI director, 2018).

Participation and relationship with targeted indigenous users

An unresolved aspect of CONADI design is the true participation of indigenous users. For some, CONADI has become a space in dispute, as targeted users feel that there is no true representation of their interests, limiting their effective participation as culturally differentiated citizens, but also as users (indigenous leaders, 2019).

This limited participation is seen as an obstacle to the exercise of other rights that have been recognized by international organizations, ratified by the State of Chile. The current international rights framework is greater than that existing at the time when this law was promulgated, but the Chilean institutionality is the same. As one former minister points out, *'the country was not prepared for a profound change ... the demands of these peoples may be just, seeking an egalitarian society, but this process was for 20 more years ... everything could not be changed'*. However, this aspect has not been reformulated and becomes a limitation of good governance.

Another aspect is the territorial dispersion of indigenous peoples, which are currently mostly in urban areas. This has changed their realities, but also their aspirations for participation. However, the institutional framework has not adapted to this new scenario. There are differences between urban indigenous demands (mainly related to political recognition) and those that come from rural areas (mainly focused on land management) (former minister, 2019). A former advisor points out: *'the characteristics of indigenous people in urban cities make it difficult to design adequate public programs, because rural areas, with their demands for land or water, take advantage of the political agenda'*.

The diversity of indigenous peoples is also another element that affects the relationship with users. From the Weberian perspective, targeted users are homogenous citizens, and this affected the fact that when designing indigenous institutions, indigenous peoples were understood as an equally homogeneous entity. However, in Chile, there are 9 territorially and culturally differentiated indigenous peoples (former CONADI director, 2019. Although actions have been generated to adapt the processes, measurement systems still tend to standardize the results, affecting diversity or adaptability to users culturally differentiated. Attention protocols or topics to address, among others, do not always find spaces in the bureaucracy as currently defined (former CONADI director, 2018).

Conclusions

The analysis of the Chilean case provides important evidence about the limitations that the implementation process of indigenous policies. The adoption of a general analytical model of governance has helped to show the relevance to include different dimensions, as asymmetries of power or historical relationship between indigenous peoples, the nation-State, and other stakeholders. In this case, the design of governance to recognize indigenous peoples and their demands is put into tension by not incorporating new

rules, procedures, and also representation spaces appropriate to the diversity that these peoples represent. In this way, the close relationship between governance and democratic legitimacy is demonstrated, where the existence of gaps not only affects the one area of governance (as policy implementation process) but also the role that governments play and other actors.

The model of Nation-State influences the dynamics of policy implementation, especially when it seeks to limit the representation spaces of indigenous peoples. Law 19,253 was understood as a sufficient measure to respond to the demands of indigenous peoples, without generating an agenda that would allow progress in other areas of recognition of political rights or new institutionality. However, the strategy of maintaining the focus of indigenous policy only on implementation, mainly at the bureaucracy level, has been insufficient.

Thus, the experience of implementing indigenous policy in Chile could be considered a policy failure, being necessary to modify the economic, political, or cultural bases that govern our society. The claims of Indigenous Peoples have intensified in recent times, where the murder of indigenous leaders and the revitalization of indigenous movement are evidence.[4] In Chile, the 2015 CASEN survey shows that 18.3% of the Indigenous population is poor versus 11% of the non-Indigenous population. Poverty in the Mapuche population is 24.34%. 78.6% of the Indigenous population does not speak or understand their own language.

The introduction of bureaucratic representation spaces shows that it is not effective as a strategy if it is not accompanied by an assessment of the scope of public policy that favors permanent political support, as well as the allocation of resources and efforts to make it consistent with other areas of public policy. Likewise, the persistence of Weberian bureaucratic values and the framework that gives a long history of institutional development within the frameworks of the nation-state are shown as barriers to good governance, preventing real autonomy and the possibility of enriching the formulation process implementation from the perspective of diverse actors such as indigenous peoples. As long as the areas of formulation do not understand the diversity of indigenous peoples, and the impact of the centralization of power, progress or improvement will be scarce.

On the other hand, the strong interrelation between the political and economic systems impacts on the implementation, which has been met with resistance on the part of indigenous peoples themselves, affecting demands such as territorial restitution. This shows the need to move toward greater representation of indigenous peoples, which, necessarily, requires changes to the governance defined so far. The analytical model applied in this case evidence that if changes are not generated at the level of legitimation, it is very difficult to obtain results only in the implementation process.

Finally, following what was stated by Ostrom (2007), the value of this article lies in the application of general models to specific cases to favor a better understanding of the variables that affect diverse realities but have points of convergence, as occurs with America Latina (Bovens and T´Hart 2016). With this, progress is being made in the search for answers to develop good governance, generating learning spaces for both scholars and practitioners, thus strengthening coexistence in multicultural contexts.

Notes

1. In Chile, the 12.8% of the population of the country is considered to belong to an indigenous people, of which one: (a) 79.8% was recognized as Mapuche, (b) 7.2% Aymara, (c) a 4.1 Diaguita, (d) a 1.5 Quechua, (e), a 1.4 Lican Antai, (f) a 0.9% Colla, (g) a 0.4 Rapa Nui, (h) a 0,1% Kawesqar and (i) a 0.1% Yagan.
2. https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/las-empresas-forestales-se-sientan-la-mesa/492587/.
3. This Council is chaired by the director and composed of representatives of 5 Ministries (General Secretariat of the Ministry of the Presidency, Social Development, Agriculture, Education and National Assets), three indigenous councilors appointed by the President and eight indigenous representatives elected directly by the communities.
4. http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/derechoshumanos/images/InformeAnual/2019/03_Derechos_humanos_de_los_pueblos_indigenas.pdf.

Recent publications

- Figueroa Huencho, Verónica and Araya Orellana, Juan Pablo (2020). 'Representative Bureaucracy: Exploring the Factors that Inhibit Active Representation in Indigenous Managers from a Latin American Case'. *International Journal of Public Administration*. DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2020.1773496. online: 10 junio 2020.
- Figueroa Huencho, Verónica; Lagos, Cristian; Manríquez, Mónica; and Rebolledo, Jame (2020). 'Implementation challenges in public policies towards indigenous peoples: the impact of health policies in urban contexts'. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*. DOI:10.1080/07256868.2020.1779201. online: 16 junio 2020.
- Figueroa Huencho, Verónica (2019). 'Governance and indigenous peoples: new challenges to their conceptualization and implementation'. In Farazmand, A. (ed.) *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*. Florida: Springer International Publishing AG.

Disclosure statement

Notes on contributor

Verónica Figueroa Huencho Associate professor at the Institute of Public Affairs (INAP), University of Chile. Public administrator of the University of Chile (2001). Ph.D. in Management Sciences (ESADE-Universidad Ramón Lull) (2007). Visiting scholar at the Center for Latin American Studies (Stanford University, 2013) and at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (Harvard University, 2020). Her main line of research is governance, and the process of formulation and implementation of indigenous public policies in contexts of diversity.

ORCID

Verónica Figueroa Huencho 🆔 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5422-6043

References

Barzelay, M., F. Gaetani, J. Cortázar, and G. Cejudo. 2003. "Research on Public Management Policy Change in the Latin America Region: A Conceptual Framework and Methodological Guide." *International Public Management Review* 4 (1): 20–42.

Bengoa, J. 2000. *La Emergencia Indígena En América Latina*. Santiago (Chile): Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Bevir, M. 2007. *Encyclopedia of Governance I*. UK: Sage Publications.

Bolados, P. 2012. "Neoliberalismo Multicultural En El Chile Postdictadura: La Política Indígena En Salud Y Sus Efectos En Comunidades Mapuche Y Atacameñas." *Chungara, Revista De Antropologiʹa Chilena* 44 (1): 135–144.

Bovens, M., and P. Tʹ Hart. 2016. "Revisiting the Study of Policy Failure." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23 (5): 653–666.

CIIR. 2019. Encuesta "Estudio longitudinal de relaciones interculturales." Santiago: Centro de Estudios Interculturales e Indígenas. Accessed 3 August 2019. http://www.elri.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ResultadosPrimeraOla.pdf

CNID. 2018. *Reportes De Futuro. Tres Preocupaciones Urgentes Para Chile*. Santiago: CNID.

Cornell, S., and J. P. Kalt. 2000. "Where's the Glue: Institutional and Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development." *Journal of Socio-Economics* 29 (5): 443–470. doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(00)00080-9.

CRITERIA. 2016. Encuesta Nº 2 "Otra mirada ciudadana." Fundación Chile 21. Santiago. Accessed 3 August 2019. https://msgg.gob.cl/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/152104-Encuesta-Diciembre.pdf

Dahlström, C., and V. Lapuente. 2017. *Organizing the Leviathan: How the Relationship between Politicians and Bureaucrats Shapes Good Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, J. S. 2014. "Contesting Governance Hegemonies: Developments in Critical Theory and Practice, Part 2." *Critical Policy Studies* 8 (2): 129–132. doi:10.1080/19460171.2014.909200.

Eagleton-Pierce, M. 2014. "The Concept of Governance in the Spirit of Capitalism." *Critical Policy Studies* 8 (1): 5–21. doi:10.1080/19460171.2014.883854.

Farazmand, A. 2019. "Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis." *Public Organization Review* 10 (3): 245–258. doi:10.1007/s11115-010-0137-0.

Figueroa Huencho, V. 2017. "Institucionalidad Pública, Participación Y Representación Política De Los Pueblos Indígenas En Chile." In *El Pueblo Mapuche En El Siglo XXI: Propuestas Para Un Nuevo Entendimiento Entre Culturas En Chile*, edited by I. Aninat, V. Figueroa, and R. González, 227–264. Santiago de Chile: CEP.

Gerring, J. 2007. "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by C. Boix and S. Stokes, 90–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hill, M., and P. Hupe. 2009. *Implementing Public Policy*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks.: SAGE Publications.

Howlett, M., and M. Ramesh. 2014. "The Two Orders of Governance Failure: Design Mismatches and Policy Capacity Issues in Modern Governance." *Policy and Society* 33 (4): 317–327. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2014.10.002.

Huencho, F., O. Verónica, and B. Navarrete. 2010. "Política De Modernización De La Gestión Pública En Chile 1990-2006: Evidencias a Partir De Un Modelo De Análisis." *Convergencia* 57 (18): 61–99.

Keiser, L. R., V. M. Wilkins, K. J. Meier, and C. A. Holland. 2002. "Lipstick and Logarithms: Gender, Institutional Context, and Representative Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 96 (3): 553–564. doi:10.1017/S0003055402000321.

Longo, F. 2013. "Diez Años De Alta Dirección Pública En Chile." In *XVIII Congreso Internacional Del CLAD Sobre La R Eforma Del Estado Y De La Administración Pública*. Uruguay: Montevideo.

Mainwaring, S., and M. Shugart. 2002. *Presidencialismo Y Democracia En América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.

Martínez, P. 2006. "El Método De Estudio De Caso. Estrategia Metodológica De La Investigación Científica." *Pensamiento & Gestión* 20: 165–193.

Mazmanian, D., and P. Sabatier. 1989. *Implementation and Public Policy*. MD: University Press of America.

McCubbins, M., R. Noll, and B. R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law Economics and Organization* 3 (2): 243–277.

Meier, K. 1993. "Representative Bureaucracy: A Theoretical and Empirical Exposition." *Research in Public Administration* 69 (2): 1–35.

NHRI. 2015. Third National Survey of Human Rights 2015. Santiago: National Human Rights Institute. Accessed 3 August 2019. https://www.indh.cl/indh-presenta-encuesta-nacional-de-derechos-humanos-2015/

Olavarría-Gambi, M. 2017. "Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Chilean Policy on Public Management Modernization." *Central European Journal of Public Policy* 11 (1): 41–54. doi:10.1515/cejpp-2016-0030.

Olsen, J., and G. Peters. 1996. *Lessons from Experience. Experiential Learning in Administrative Reforms in Eight Countries.* Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Ostrom, E. 2007. "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework." In *Theories of the Policy*, edited by P. A. Sabatier, 21–64. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

Pairican, F., and R. Alvarez. 2011. "La Nueva Guerra De Arauco: La Coordinadora Arauco Malleco En El Chile De La Concertación De Partidos Por La Democracia (1997-2009)". Revista www.izquierdas.cl 10: 66–84.

Peters, B. G. 2011. "Governance as Political Theory." *Critical Policy Studies* 5 (1): 63–72. doi:10.1080/19460171.2011.555683.

Pierre, J., and G. Peters. 2005. *Governing Complex Societies. Trajectories and Scenarios.* UK: Palgrave McMillan.

Riccucci, N., and G. Van Ryzin. 2016. "Representative Bureaucracy: A Lever to Enhance Social Equity, Coproduction, and Democracracy." *Public Administration Review* 20 (20): 1–10.

Riccucci, N., and M. Meyers. 2004. "Linking Passive and Active Representation: The Case of Front-Line Workers in Welfare Agencies." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14 (4): 585–597. doi:10.1093/jopart/muh038.

Romero, H. 2019. "Extractivismo En Chile: La Producción Del Territorio Minero Y Las Luchas Del Pueblo Aimara En El Norte Grande." *Colombia Internacional*, no. 98: 3–30. doi:10.7440/colombiaint98.2019.01.

Sauer, B. 2011. "Governance as Political Theory: Through the Lens of Gender. A Response to B. Guy Peters." *Critical Policy Studies* 5 (4): 454–457. doi:10.1080/19460171.2011.628070.

Schneider, A., and M. Sidney. 2009. "What Is Next for Policy Design and Social Construction Theory?1." *The Policy Studies Journal* 37 (1): 103–118. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2008.00298.x.

Seibel, W. 2010. "Beyond Bureaucracy. Public Administration as Political Integrator and Non-Weberian." *Public Administration Review* 70 (5): 719–730. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02200.x.

Sekher, M., and R. Kattumuri. 2018. "Understanding Governance as a Process." In *Governance and Governed Multi-country Perspectives on State, Society and Development*, edited by M. Sekher and R. Kattumuri, 15–24. Singapore: Springer.

Sheppard. M. 2004. "Representative bureaucracy." In *Encyclopedia of public administration and public policy*, edited by D. Schultz, 368. Routledge.

Smith, A., and K. Monaghan. 2013. "Some Ceilings Have More Cracks: Representative Bureaucracy in Federal Regulatory Agencies." *The American Review of Public Administration* 43 (1): 50–71. doi:10.1177/0275074011420997.

Sowa, J., and S. Selden. 2003. "Administrative Discretion and Active Representation: An Expansion of the Theory of Representative Bureaucracy." *Public Administration Review* 63 (6): 700–710. doi:10.1111/1540-6210.00333.

Stein, E., and M. Tommasi. 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of State Capabilities in Latin America." In *Conferencia Anual Del Banco Mundial Sobre Economía Del Desarrollo: Más Allá*

De La Transición, edited by F. Bourguignon and B. Pleskovic, 1–39. Washington, DC, Estados Unidos: Banco Mundial.

Svampa, M. 2012. "Consenso De Los Commodities, Giro Ecoterritorial Y Pensamiento Crítico En América Latina." *OSAL Observatorio Social De América Latina* 32: 15–38.

Tommasi, M. 2011. "Latin America: How State Capacity Determines Policy Success." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 24 (2): 199–203. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01528.x.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1997. *Governance for Sustainable Human Development.* New York: UNDP.

Valles, M. 2007. *Técnicas Cualitativas De Investigación Social: Reflexión Metodológica Y Práctica Profesional.* Madrid: Editorial Síntesis.

Vancoppenolle, D., H. Sætren, and P. Hupe. 2015. "The Politics of Policy Design and Implementation: A Comparative Study of Two Belgian Service Voucher Programs." *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 17 (2): 157–173. doi:10.1080/13876988.2015.1006831.

Yin, R. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* California: Sage.

Zurbriggen, C. 2011. "Gobernanza: Una Mirada Desde América Latina." *Perfiles Latinoamericanos* 19 (38): 39–64.