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Promoting quality education in Chile: the politics of reforming teacher careers

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ABSTRACT

Reformers in developing countries increasingly seek to raise education quality. Yet we know little about the politics of improving education. One significant and instructive case of reforms designed to boost education quality comes from Chile, where in 2016 the government enacted a sweeping reform of teaching careers. This paper first uses a quantitative analysis of appearances in the news to identify key stakeholders and then turns to process tracing to analyze how and when these stakeholders influenced reform dynamics. Comparatively, the Chilean case differs from similar reforms elsewhere in Latin America due to the absence of business, the strong role of policy networks, and the final negotiated settlement with the teacher union. Theoretically, the analysis confirms general theories that emphasize the roles of distributive politics and policy networks.

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I. Introduction

Where does high quality education come from? Many things can contribute, but recent research shows that teacher performance is a critical factor explaining student learning (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014a; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Bruns and Luque 2015; Rockoff 2004; OECD 2009; Kukla-Acevedo 2009). Improvements in teacher quality raise the probability of college attendance and the quality of the colleges that students attend. Also, students who get better teachers have steeper earnings trajectories (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014b). Lastly, the effectiveness of educational policies and of other educational inputs depend on the quality of the daily work of teachers (Goldhaber, Brewer, and Anderson 1999).

However, in many countries, and Latin America is no exception, teaching careers often offer few rewards and so diminish teacher motivation, cause good teachers to leave the profession (Imazeki 2005; Harris and Adams 2007; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2007), and discourage good students from choosing to study education in university (Corcoran 2007). These and other disincentives in turn negatively affect

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 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed [here](#).

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student learning. So, education reformers around the world have increasingly turned their attention to seeking ways to improve teaching and to recruit better teachers.

In Chile, the *Política Nacional Docente* (PND, National Teacher Policy) of 2016 totally revamped teacher careers.¹ The PND law covers all aspects of a life-time career from initial teacher preparation, to recruitment and induction, and then through five major steps (three required and two voluntary) on a comprehensive career ladder that culminates in the title of master teacher. The annual cost of the PND is projected to be nearly one percent of GDP. The process of enacting this reform was contentious and dramatic, but ultimately led to a compromise law that both government reformers and opponents like the teacher union supported. The bill passed congress in January 2016 with most articles approved unanimously, and implementation moved ahead quickly through the following two years of the Bachelet government.

How were reformers able to get such a sweeping reform enacted? In simplest form, our core argument is that three main groups had major influence, sequentially over time and in descending order of impact: (1) poor and middle class voters, (2) policy networks in education, and (3) the teacher union, *Colegio de Profesores* (hereafter Colegio), and some legislators in congress. The voters provided a strong but general mandate for reform, the policy network added specifics on the main changes to teacher careers in the reform, and the Colegio and congress negotiated some final adjustments to the proposed reform.

[Section II](#) provides some background on these actors, how they compare to protagonists in education reform elsewhere in Latin America, and how they relate to major theoretical approaches to education politics. [Section III](#) summarizes the main features of the reform. [Section IV](#) lays out the cast of characters that were most active in reform politics according to a quantitative analysis of their press appearances (see Appendix A in online Supplemental Data). This quantitative analysis does not tell us about the policy preferences and actual influence of the main stakeholders, but it does substantiate our claims that policy networks (in foundations, think tanks, and NGOs) were active and that business was not. [Section V](#) puts these actors in motion by following the chronology of reform over the course of the year 2015. This process-tracing section develops our core arguments about the actors and factors – poorer voters, the policy network, the Colegio, and some legislators – that affected the origins, design, and negotiation of the reforms to teaching careers.

II. Background, theory, and methods

The pro-reform electoral coalition did not emerge overnight, but developed over the decade prior to the PND passage. Chile is a small country with something of an education obsession. Few if any countries have experienced longer, deeper, broader political tumult over education than Chile did in the 2000s and 2010s: strikes, school occupations, electoral campaigns, street demonstrations, and intense public debate and media scrutiny. Beginning in 2006, demonstrations by secondary students (the revolt of the ‘penguins’) gave new urgency to issues of quality and equity of Chilean education.²

In 2011, university students and allied movements (secondary students, the teacher union, and others) took to the streets in scores of huge marches and demonstrations that regularly ended in violence. Student demands centered on free public education, quality education across all tiers of the system, an end to loopholes that allow

‘nonprofit’ universities to turn a profit, and a more affordable and accessible university system as a whole.³ These demonstrations fed into the electoral campaigns for president in 2013, with candidate Michelle Bachelet of the Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) coalition promising radical changes at all levels of education. Bachelet was elected with solid majorities in both houses of congress and a strong mandate for deep education reforms.

This electoral story fits general political economy theories that view education policy and spending as part of overall distributional politics. For example, Huber and Stephens (2012) view more redistributive outcomes as results of the power of labor and the left. In this view, significant investment in improving public primary and secondary education redistributes resources (and opportunity) to the poor and working class (see also Ansell (2010)). In Chile, the center-left coalition supporting Bachelet had a redistributive program and drew most of its votes from the poorer half of the electorate (Navia and Soto Castro 2015; UDP 2013). Reforms to teaching careers covered around 90 percent of enrollments (fully private schools were not affected), and so benefitted all but the richest families. However, the impact will likely be greatest in the underperforming municipal schools with higher proportions of poorer students.⁴ Although they fit the distributional aspects of the reforms, class models do not explain the specific focus on teacher careers nor the content of the reforms.

To get at that content, our argument turns to policy networks. In this theoretical approach, policy experts in academia, think tanks, and other NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) with close, long-term connections among them influence policy by virtue of their expertise, information, and ability to facilitate consensus building on technical issues (Bruns and Schneider 2016; Kaufman and Nelson 2004).⁵ Chile has a large, visible, well-connected policy network of 40–50 experts in universities, think tanks, and foundations.⁶ These experts often conduct research for international agencies and advise or participate in the Ministry of Education. This network of education experts had strong influence on the content and details of the reforms to teacher careers. The policy network debated teacher careers and policy proposals for many years before the 2016 PND. In response to the 2006 revolt of the penguins, the government created the first of several commissions and panels (including representatives from civil society and policy experts) to make recommendations on reforming the education system including teacher careers. In 2010, the Piñera government convened another expert panel, and in 2012 the government sent a bill to congress (though Congress never passed it). Although members of the policy network may be close to left or right governments, they share a rough consensus on the core elements of the PND: attract better candidates for teaching careers, improve their university preparation, and provide clear progression through steps in a career based on regular evaluation.

Unlike reforms elsewhere in Latin America, final passage of the PND came through negotiation and compromise with the teacher union, *Colegio de Profesores* (hereafter *Colegio*) (Rivas 2015).⁷ Most other reforms to teacher careers – especially those focused on pay for performance – are either enacted over union opposition or blocked by unions, or both as reforms get enacted but are later scuttled when unions see a political opening to reverse or water down reforms (as in Mexico in 1990s or the state of Rio de Janeiro the 2010s (Grindle 2004; Risolia 2015)).

The participation by the Colegio does not fit with prevailing theories about teacher unions in education politics. Moe and Wiborg (2017) argue that teacher unions everywhere oppose performance-based reforms – like the PND in Chile – so the key explanatory factor is whether the political system overall offers more or fewer veto points that teacher unions can use to block the reforms.⁸ This framework could be applied generally to Chile where the Nueva Mayoria held a majority in both houses of Congress, and so denied the Colegio opportunities to use veto points in the legislative process. However, the negotiations and compromises that got both the union and congress to agree to the final reform package are outside Moe and Wiborg’s blocking theory.

Our core arguments thus draw primarily on the distributive, power-resource and policy-network theories. Significant reforms to teacher careers are costly, not just to increase salaries to recruit better teachers but also to cover the additional costs of evaluations, mentoring, non-teaching preparation time, and so forth. So, a necessary first step in Chile’s reforms is the strong support from poorer voters for the Nueva Mayoria’s redistributive campaign pledge to raise taxes in order to increase spending on education. The second main component of our argument is that policy networks and their close interaction with government reformers best explain the translation of Nueva Mayoria’s general campaign promises into the core elements of the PND including higher standards for entry, improved university training, and advancement by merit through defined career levels with increasing material and professional rewards. Lastly, the final tweaking by the Colegio and Congress does not fit any general theory but rather results more from the particular political context in Chile.

Chile’s experience with reforming teacher careers disconfirms several other general theories of education reform. For example, another political economy approach looks more at the structure of the economy and focuses directly on business. In principle, business could be expected to be a core ally in pushing education reform since it is the main consumer of the outputs of the educational system (as in the varieties of capitalism perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001)). More specifically, Kosack (2012) argues that when labor markets are flexible (as Chile’s were, at least compared to most of Latin America), then business should push for more and better education, as in Taiwan in the 20th century. However, this theory does not fare well in Chile where business was conspicuous by its almost total absence in recent episodes of education reform.⁹ Section VI assesses other theories disconfirmed by PND politics.

For evidence, Section IV provides a novel means for gauging the participation of various groups in politics and in civil society. As discussed later, we use Nvivo software to calculate the frequency of appearances of groups in reports related to the two major reforms in primary and secondary education of the Bachelet government: the PND and the Inclusion Law. Adding in the Inclusion Law is designed only to provide some comparative metric for assessing appearances by groups on the PND (and Section IV does not provide further analysis of the Inclusion Law). The great advantage of the Nvivo data is that they provide a quantitative measure of group involvement, compared to the looser and more imprecise assessments in many policy studies. The great limitations of a simple count of appearances is that it tells us nothing about the positions adopted by these groups nor about the impact they had on policy making.

For positions and impact, we turn to the process tracing in [Section V](#). This section pieces together from multiple sources the process of policy making from the student protests, through the Bachelet electoral campaign, into policy design in Mineduc, and then on to the interactions between Mineduc and groups in civil society, especially the Colegio, and culminating with the final three way negotiations among representations of Mineduc, Congress, and Colegio. Evidence for [Section V](#) relies heavily on policy and press documents and other secondary literature. Thus our main arguments are based primarily on the public record. As a further check on these arguments we conducted five ‘key informant’ interviews with people close to the policy process either within government or in civil society. Occasionally we weave in additional secondary insights and cite the relevant interviewee.¹⁰

Across all data sources and stages, the first goal was theory testing to gauge the relative influences of actors favored by the contending theories discussed earlier in this section (Bennett and Checkel 2014). This assessment led to our overall argument that various groups mattered at different stages and in different ways: poorer voters in providing a general mandate for education reform through Bachelet’s election, the policy network at a later stage in filling in the specifics of reforming teacher careers, and in late stages the teacher union and Congressional deputies in hammering out the final compromises. The first two arguments are potentially generalizable and have been found in educational politics elsewhere. The third is idiosyncratic and particular to Chilean politics during Bachelet’s second term. Our process tracing disconfirmed (hoop tests (Van Evera 1997)) alternative theories emphasizing the roles of business and policy entrepreneurs.

III. Summary of the national teacher policy (PND)

The PND was an ambitious and comprehensive reform. This section briefly describes the key elements that appeared in the final legislation. [Section V](#) analyzes the multiple alterations the law underwent from initial proposal through sequential revisions in Congress. The National Teacher Policy covers all pre-school and K-12 teachers who work in schools (municipal and private-voucher) that receive government funding (92 percent of enrollments). Previous policies on evaluation and performance pay affected only teachers in municipal schools (44 percent of teachers).¹¹ The PND incorporates as well all teachers in private-voucher schools (47 percent of teachers) and constitutes more centralization and government intervention into the private-voucher sector. Thus, the PND covered over 90 percent of teachers and students.

More specifically, the PND is a systemic and integral policy that includes (see [Figure 1](#)):

- (i) Higher entrance requirements and new accreditation for teacher preparation programs (*pedagogía* in Chile). The PND establishes minimum student attainment on university admission tests and grades in high school. Before, there were no minimum entrance requirements. Also, all teacher training programs must be accredited by a national commission.
- (ii) Mentoring. The PND provides for one year of mentoring for every incoming teacher (with extra pay for mentors and mentees).
- (iii) Professional Development System for long-term career advancement. The system has three required steps (Beginning, Early, and Advanced) and two further voluntary steps (Expert I and Expert II) and provides for increased salaries and




Figure 1. A systemic and integral policy.

professional opportunities at each level. To climb through the career levels, teachers must demonstrate pedagogical skills measured through a portfolio and through disciplinary and pedagogical knowledge in the subjects they teach (measured through a written test).

The portfolio is designed to allow teachers to provide evidence of their best pedagogical practices and consists of three modules: (1) pedagogical materials based on planning and implementing an 8-hour teaching unit, designing an exam for this unit, and responding to a set of questions about teaching practices, including a self-evaluation; (2) a video recording by an accredited cameraman of a regular class; and (3) professional evaluation outside the classroom, including learning and professional development, collaborative work with other teachers, and production of teaching materials.¹² Experienced teachers grade the portfolios at assessment centers in selected universities around the country.

If the evaluations detect shortcomings, then schools can offer in-service training to teachers (with central financing). The law also sets maximum time limits for teachers to progress through the first three obligatory steps on the career ladder. Teachers who do not pass in the maximum time can no longer teach in publicly funded schools. As discussed in Section V, these time limits and associated sanctions for missing them were contentious issues in negotiations with the Colegio. The PND also increases non-teaching, preparation time from 25 to 35 percent of the work week (though 35 percent

is still on the low end in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (OECD 2014, 480). Non-teaching hours were high priorities for teachers (CPP 2015, 41) and became a special point of contention in the last phases of negotiating the PND.

Overall, this career system rewards better teacher performance and provides incentives for continuous professional development. Figure 2 shows the substantial pay increases associated with movement to each higher level.¹³ The PND raises starting salaries by a third, and after 16 years teachers at the highest level can earn more than 50 percent over the previous maximum salary (the line second from the bottom in Figure 2). Promotion through the different steps allows teachers to take on new responsibilities and diversify their roles. Some of these roles are remunerated (for instance to be a mentor), others are associated with non-teaching hours. Thus, there are monetary and non-monetary incentives as teachers progress through the different steps of the system.

Once in full operation, the Ministry of Education estimated that this new career system would cost US\$2.3 billion per year. This constitutes a huge increase in new spending equivalent to .9 percent of GDP and 3.8 percent of total public spending (Mineduc 2015). As discussed in Section V, the Bachelet government passed a major tax reform in 2015 to raise government revenues by three percent of GDP in order to be able to pay for the PND and other ambitious education reforms like free university education for poorer students. In sum, the PND provides for higher standards, better training and mentoring, regular evaluations, and stronger incentives and rewards for attracting and retaining talented teachers.




Figure 2. Salary scales associated with career stages.

Source: (Mineduc 2017). Notes: (1) Monthly salaries in US\$ of January 2017. (2) salaries in Advanced, Expert I, and Expert II levels are attainable only after some years of experience.

IV. Key stakeholders

This section provides a topography of the political landscape (which for many reformers can be a minefield) as well as a cast of characters who are protagonists in the narrative in [Section V](#) and some who are conspicuous by their absence. This topography is crucial for comparative analysis because the range of stakeholders and their interests and power vary widely across countries. True, teacher unions are almost everywhere loud and powerful (though the degree of politicization varies (Schneider 2018)), but the levels of organization and interest, and therefore influence, of other groups like parents, students, think tanks, foundations, and business are more variable. Also, two anomalies in business in Chile are rarely seen elsewhere. First, despite high levels of organization (Schneider 2004), traditional business associations shied away from participating in education reform. Second, unlike all but a handful of other education systems, nearly 2/3 of enrollments are in privately-owned schools, and the well-organized private-voucher schools in particular constitute a distinctive landmark in Chile's political topography (Mizala and Schneider 2014).

The following pages analyze the major stakeholders and provide overall measures of their engagement with reform politics measured by the number of times each group appeared in press reports related to PND and to the prior Inclusion Law (which prohibited profits, student selection, and co-payments in private-voucher schools). Appendix A in online Supplemental Data provides details on the quantitative data used in all figures in this section, but for now it is important to note that the source was a daily press briefing prepared in the Ministry of Education. The great advantage of this source is that it draws reports from all major print, radio, television, and online outlets in Chile and so is not biased by the political leanings of any single media outlet. The figures in this section compare press appearances in both PND and Inclusion Law which provides a good indicator of what issues were most important to each group. Overall, except for the Colegio, most groups were far more engaged with the Inclusion Law than with PND. Adding the Inclusion Law in these graphs is intended only to provide some comparative benchmark for assessing interest in the PND and to document the general point that policy engagement by groups in civil society varies across policies. Space constraints preclude further analysis of the Inclusion Law.¹⁴

The number of mentions in the media does not tell us about the preferences or influence of each stakeholder, which we add in from the process-tracing analysis. It is though a better indicator of how much stakeholders were willing to invest in making their preferences known. The comparison of PND and the Inclusion Law shows that many groups chose to invest more in the latter. However, the absence in the media, especially of business and international organizations, does correspond to their small roles in the policy process analyzed in [Section V](#) (and confirmed by interviewees). Moreover, the policy process in Chile is generally quite open and the press very active, so it is unlikely that a group with major influence on the PND would have gone undetected.

Of course, media outlets and reporters cannot cover everything and make choices about which groups to cover, which likely biases them to reporting more on those groups perceived to be more influential like ministries, large political parties, and the Colegio. So, for example, bigger political parties appear in the media more often than

small parties. However, a very wide array of groups make some appearances and often more often on the Inclusion Law than PND, making it more plausible to expect media appearances to vary with the interest of the group in participating. Moreover, most of the following graphs compare appearances by similar kinds of groups. In the end though, confirmation for the patterns of participation in the media comes from the process tracing in [Section V](#).

The main driver of the reform was the executive branch. Bachelet put together her electoral campaign and support coalition (*Nueva Mayoría*, New Majority) in the wake of over two years of frequent student demonstrations and street protests. Consequently, education reform was high on their agenda. To coordinate education reforms, Bachelet appointed Nicolas Eyzaguirre (former finance minister 2000–06) to the Ministry of Education (commonly referred to as Mineduc). Although Eyzaguirre had no background in education policy, he was well respected as both an economist and as a skilled political negotiator. Eyzaguirre wasted no time. In his first year, 2014, he got the very controversial Inclusion Law through congress and into law, worked on the design of the PND, and sent a bill on the PND to congress in April 2015 (and reformed pre-school education as well).

In terms of news on education reforms, Eyzaguirre and Bachelet were constantly in the press with over 3,000 appearances each, far more than any other actor involved, especially on the PND. Although not surprising, it merits emphasis that Bachelet was nearly as visible as Eyzaguirre (only about 10 percent fewer appearances). Presidents elsewhere often shy away from politically costly education reforms and let their ministers lead the process (and take the heat), but Bachelet was heavily engaged in education reforms.

Education reform was high profile politics throughout Bachelet's term, so political parties were visible actors in reform politics ([Figure 3](#)). As detailed further in [Section V](#), the passage of the PND and the previous Inclusion Law entailed congressional hearings, negotiations among parties, and floor debates over periods of months in both houses of congress. Overall, parties were much more active in debates over the Inclusion Law than the PND, but the relative ranking of parties was largely the same across the two reforms. For all parties save the Communist Party (PC), press appearances on the Inclusion Law were at least five times higher than for PND, as it was for most other stakeholder groups considered in this section. In simplified terms, the PND is directly about quality in education while the Inclusion Law deals more centrally with regulation, equity, and privatization. The latter themes are much more disputed in education politics and generate much more investment by politicians.

Among parties, the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and Independent Democratic Union (UDI) were the most active, followed by the more leftist Socialist Party (PS) and Party for Democracy (PPD). However, if we compare the percentage of appearances per party for each law with the size of the party's delegation in Congress, the visibility of most parties is at or below their proportion of seats in the legislature (see [Figure 4](#)). The major exception was the DC, whose number of appearances far exceeded its proportion of seats in Congress both on the Inclusion Law and especially on the PND. The PC was also more visible but by a much smaller margin.

[Figure 5](#) compares the press appearances of the main actors in civil society that participated actively in education policies. As with other stakeholders, all groups save




Figure 3. Press appearances by political parties on the inclusion law and PND.

Note: For the party acronyms, see Appendix C in online Supplemental Data. Except for the UDI and RN, the other parties listed belonged to the Nueva Mayoría coalition. In terms of partisan placement, the UDI and RN are on the right, the DC is center-left, and the other parties are on the left.




Figure 4. Percentage of press appearances by party, law, and size of congressional delegation.

the Colegio were more visible on the Inclusion Law than PND. Compared with the rest of Latin America, civil society in Chile is relatively well organized and active in politics, especially in education (Bruns and Luque 2015; Schneider, Cevallos, and Bruns 2019). Most other countries have strong teacher unions, a range of foundations, and churches active in education. Where Chile differs is in its active student and parent organizations, think tanks, and associations of private schools.¹⁵ In addition, as discussed in Section V,




Figure 5. Press appearances by civil society organizations.
(percentage of appearances by all groups for each law)

representatives from many of these civil society groups, 20 associations in all, banded together to form the group that drafted the Plan Maestro proposal on teacher careers.

Think tanks and research centers are also more developed in Chile than elsewhere in Latin America (Mendizabal and Sample 2009). This is again partly the result of how education politics have long been so politically salient and contentious. But it is also a reflection of the fairly sophisticated and technical nature of the debate, as well as the large amounts of high quality data on education (that have drawn researchers from around the world). While most countries in Latin America have lots of purely private schools (usually 10–20 of secondary enrollments), none have as many private schools with public funding (vouchers) which enroll more than half the students in Chile (Larrañaga and Rodríguez 2014; Verger, Moschetti, and Fontdevila 2018). And, the associations of private and private-voucher schools were among the most active on the Inclusion Law. That the Colegio is the only stakeholder to appear more often with reference to the PND than the Inclusion Law is not surprising. What is surprising is that the Colegio was also so active in debates on the Inclusion Law, because the core components of the law (no profit, no selection, and no co-payment) applied to private-voucher schools not the municipal schools where nearly all Colegio members teach.

Students associations led the street demonstrations and also appeared regularly in the press. University students were more concerned about university reforms, and appeared less often than the associations of secondary students. Like most other civil society actors, secondary students appeared far more often in relation to the Inclusion Law than the PND, though appearances by secondary students in the press were proportionally more related to PND than most other stakeholders in this section. In contrast, the parents associations had surprisingly little to say about reforming teacher

careers, confirming in part the general pattern of weak mobilization of parents around quality reforms.¹⁶

In a strict sense, private-voucher schools could be counted in the business wing of civil society (though some are non-profit or church-run). Private-voucher schools – like most other private, independent actors – value highly their autonomy. And, over the past decades of reforms to the education system, private-voucher and private schools have become quite well organized. Both the Inclusion Law and PND were designed explicitly to regulate and in fact prohibit core practices like selecting students or charging copayments. As expected, the opposition of these associations was strong and consistent (interviews with leaders of private-voucher schools associations, see Appendix B in online Supplemental Data).

At first glance, it is surprising that the Catholic church would be so engaged with the Inclusion Law since profits and copayments would presumably not matter much to a charitable organization (see Figure 5).¹⁷ However, the church, it turned out, cared deeply about being able to select students from appropriately Catholic families, and the church staunchly opposed the no-selection element of the Inclusion Law. Like the parent associations, the Church had little to say about the PND.

Among the groups in Figure 5, all could be characterized as interest groups (associations of teachers, students, parents, private schools, and the church) except the foundations and think tanks which form part of the policy network. Overall, foundations and think tanks also appeared more often on the Inclusion Law than PND, though, significantly, they were the second most visible group after the Colegio on the PND and much more than the other groups in Figure 5. This pattern fits with the finding in Section V of the greater influence of the policy networks compared to interest groups.

Given the importance of policy networks Figure 6 further disaggregates foundations and think tanks. Since the 1990s, research on education in Chile has expanded dramatically. There is more social-science bibliography on Chilean education than any other country in Latin America, especially if adjusted for population. This is partly the result




Figure 6. Press appearances by think tanks and research centers.

See Appendix C in online Supplemental Data for acronyms.

of Chile's radical voucher reforms of the 1980s which generated a lot of international interest, but more fundamentally due to the investment by researchers at universities and think tanks in Chile. Each new government since the transition to democracy in 1990 enacted significant education reforms which provided ample material for research and debate for what emerged as a large group of researchers in the education policy network and a substantial group of well-established research centers, most of which were active in debates on PND and the Inclusion Law (Figure 6). As with other stakeholders, most research centers had more to say about the Inclusion Law than PND. Figure 6 also shows how much more visible CEP (Center of Public Studies) was than other centers; CEP appeared more frequently on the Inclusion Law than all the other centers combined. However, on PND, participation was more balanced across research centers. Among the think tanks, CEP and LyD (Liberty and Development) are funded by, and closely associated with, big business, and were mostly critical, especially LyD, of the reforms. LyD opposition to Bachelet reforms is more ideological and against any restrictions on choice in the education system while CEP views are more technical and critical of elements of reform design. The others are in general academic research centers affiliated with universities and were less likely to side strongly with or against the government.

Foundations were less visible individually in the press (Figure 7) though they were important collective supporters of Plan Maestro (Section V and Appendix D in online Supplemental Data). Among foundations, Educación 2020 appeared the most often in the press, more than all the other foundations combined on the Inclusion Law. Elige Educar (Choose Teaching) shows a revealing difference from almost all other actors from civil society in appearing much more often with reference to PND than to the Inclusion Law, and on PND more often than Educación 2020.¹⁸ Elige Educar is an NGO devoted to promoting the entry of talented young people into teaching careers, for whom the PND was the key policy reform. Overall, Elige Educar was a big supporter of PND.

Business was strangely absent in public debates on education reforms. Some Chilean businesses may have channeled their views through foundations and think




Figure 7. Foundation appearances in the press.

tanks, but major business associations were absent.¹⁹ Most of the national sectoral associations stayed out of the press, and only the peak-level confederation, CPC (*Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio*, Confederation for Production and Commerce), appeared, but only 38 times, far below all the other groups in civil society and below all but the smallest political parties. This relative silence is puzzling from a comparative perspective; in 2010s in other Latin American countries (such as Mexico and Brazil), as well as in the United States (Rhodes 2012; Bruns and Schneider 2016), business associations and businesses were more visible and active in supporting education reforms.

In sum, while the impetus for, and design of, education reform came from the executive, press reports show that congress, political parties, interest groups, think tanks, foundations, and others in the policy network were also very engaged in debating these reforms.²⁰ Among interest groups in civil society, the Colegio was by far the most visible actor in press appearances on both laws, though much more on PND. Business (despite its organizational depth) was conspicuous by its absence. The comparison between the two laws is revealing. Had the press analysis looked only at PND it would have given the impression that civil society was quite active and engaged in reforming teacher careers. It was, but much less so than the engagement with the Inclusion Law. In other words issues of private school autonomy and equity in the Inclusion Law engaged civil society more than the issue of teaching quality in PND, save for Colegio and Elige Educar. The next section analyses the process of lawmaking to show which groups had an impact and where.

V. Reform process: policy networks, interest groups, and final compromises

This section traces the process of the PND reform from the original design through multiple modifications introduced through negotiations with Congress and the Colegio (see Table 1). As noted in the introduction, the short story is one that starts with the strong electoral mandate for the Bachelet government to improve education quality that the policy network helped turn into a specific proposal on revamping teacher careers.

Table 1. Timeline of Reform Process for PND, 2014-16.

2014	
January	Work starts in Ministry of Education on reforming teacher careers
July-October	Plan Maestro open consultation meetings
November	Plan Maestro delivers proposals to the Ministry of Education
2015	
January	Congress approves Inclusion Law
April	Ministry of Education sends PND bill to Chamber of Deputies
June-July	Colegio de Profesores goes on strike against PND (1 June to 27 July). Colegio, Government, and Nueva Mayoría members on Education Committee negotiate compromise proposal
July	Chamber of Deputies approves compromises. Colegio votes to end strike
August	Executive sends revised bill to Chamber
October	Chamber approves bill and sends to Senate
December	Executive sends revised bill, including changes proposed by senators, to Senate
2016	
January	Senate and House approve revised bill, most articles unanimously
April	Law is enacted

Note: Appendix E provides details on the major revisions in 2015.

Then, at the end of the policy process, some parties and politicians in Congress and the Colegio tweaked aspects of the final law, but without altering the core features of more selective recruitment, improved training, career advancement by merit, and enhanced material and professional rewards, and applied to teachers in all schools receiving public funding, not just those in municipal schools.

Although the PND was the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform ever to teacher careers in Chile, the reform process followed a path common to previous education reforms: the Ministry of Education designs the reform (consulting along the way with Colegio and experts in Chile's well-developed policy network), sends the bill to Congress, then negotiates with Congress and the Colegio, and incorporates some revised compromise positions. When the Colegio and Mineduc sign off on this revised reform, Congress then moves quickly to approve it, often by large majorities. Following this pattern, prior governments enacted a series of reforms through the 1990s and 2000s that introduced various forms of teacher evaluations and performance pay (Mizala and Schneider 2014). Thus, going into 2015, stakeholders knew there were precedents for significant reform and for negotiated compromises.

Although the PND followed a similar route, the government by 2015 had more at stake. Understanding the priority and urgency the Bachelet government gave to education reform requires backing up to consider the student protests that dogged her predecessor and fed into the electoral campaign of Bachelet and the Nueva Mayoría. In 2011, in Sebastián Piñera's second year as president, students took to the streets in what became several years of student mobilization and street protests against the education system. Over the following four years there were scores of demonstrations involving many times hundreds of thousands of protesters. By any standard, this was impressive organization and sustained mobilization. Moreover, public opinion sided with the demonstrators (Bellei and Cabalin 2013). Overall, these demonstrations helped push Piñera's favorability rating lower and galvanized opposition to his government.

For the 2013 elections, Bachelet assembled a coalition of parties similar to that of the Concertación (the center-left coalition from 1990 to 2010) but also comprising several small left parties, including the Communist Party. The inclusion of the Communists is important because Jaime Gajardo (the head of the Colegio, 2007–2016) and Camila Vallejo (former president of the Student Federation of the Universidad de Chile during 2011 and by 2015 president of the education committee in the Chamber of Deputies) were both in the Communist Party. These connections turned out to be crucial in the decisive months of strikes and negotiations in mid-2015.

In December 2013, Bachelet won the second-round run-off election by a huge margin (62 percent of the vote), and the Nueva Mayoría won majorities in both houses of Congress. This unprecedented victory provided an imposing mandate for reform and made the Ministry of Education a crucial arena for turning the campaign platform into policy. Eyzaguirre was a prominent and experienced minister, but he had no previous connection with education policy, except at a distance when he was finance minister (2000–06). For this reason, he relied on the policy network for ideas on how to design the new teaching career. Eyzaguirre appointed a core group of internal advisors (some with close links to various Nueva Mayoría parties) and contracted external advisors to work on particular reforms. These external advisors were mostly academics and independent sympathizers of the Nueva Mayoría. Overall, this core 'change team' included

many veterans of the policy network who had long worked on education policy with previous center-left Concertación governments.

The imposing electoral mandate, majorities in congress, and an experienced, high power minister meant that reforms faced veto points (central to Moe and Wiborg's arguments) that opponents could leverage to block reforms. The power and direction derived from the election also meant that policy entrepreneurs were not major actors in the Chilean story. Where governments lack electoral mandates or unified government, reform impetus depends on policy entrepreneurs who piece together coalitions and support (Grindle 2004).

Bachelet's campaign platform made promises to create a new teacher career, but left the crucial details undefined.²¹ However, the team designing the PND did not start with a tabula rasa. Lengthy discussions of reforming teacher careers had been ongoing for over a decade in previous governments. Policy proposals were well advanced already in Bachelet's first term (2006–2010), but did not make it into final legislation. Harald Beyer, Piñera's minister of education in 2012, also drafted a bill for teaching careers, but it did not make it through Congress. In all there were a half dozen or so earlier proposals with many elements in common that Eyzaguirre's PND team could draw on.²²

Many experts from universities, think tanks, and foundations, as well as former top appointees in Mineduc – the policy network – participated in these multiple commissions and proposals.²³ The core elements of the PND came from a consensus within this policy network on the need for better recruiting, improved teacher preparation, and stronger career incentives provided by progressive career steps (with higher salaries) based on evaluations. These core ideas cannot be traced to specific academic theories, particular political parties, groups of technocrats, foreign models, or interest groups like associations of parents or of private schools. By contrast, something like the voucher reform of 1981 can be directly traced to the writings of Milton Friedman through a handful of technocrats in the previous dictatorship in Chile (Carnoy 1998). In a very different, democratic context, the PND grew out of a decade of debates in the policy network through commissions, expert panels, and work on (ultimately stalled) legislative initiatives. Chile's strong partisan cleavages of course run through the policy network. However, this divide manifests itself not over the desirability of a new law on teaching careers but rather over whether the law should include private-voucher schools and whether evaluations should be left to schools or centralized. On these dimensions, the center-left side of the network won (through Bachelet's resounding victory) and carried out the centralized evaluations of the PND that cover private-voucher schools.

Among interest groups, one of the most well organized and active groups was the Colegio, the teacher union. Of the roughly 100,000 teachers (44 percent) in municipal schools, around half belong to the Colegio.²⁴ Although the Colegio had proportionally fewer members than teacher unions in much of the rest of the world (Schneider 2018), it had significant organizational capacity. The Colegio could mobilize members for street demonstrations, and their strikes shut down almost all municipal schools as they did for 57 days in 2015. The Colegio's preferences on the PND were fairly predictable: more preparation time (non-teaching hours), union participation in designing evaluation instruments, higher starting salaries, and retirement bonuses. However, and in contrast to many other teacher unions, the Colegio accepted the principle of evaluation

and had cooperated since the early 2000s with the teacher evaluations in municipal schools (Mizala and Schneider 2014), though they wanted to include other items in the evaluation and to reduce the number of evaluations included in the PND.

Within the overall agenda of educational reform, the Bachelet government decided to prioritize in its first year taxation and reforming the voucher sector through the Inclusion Law. Increasing taxes by a very ambitious three percent of GDP was, the Nueva Mayoría felt, an essential first step towards costly reforms to the voucher system, to teacher careers (with estimated cost close to one percent of GDP), and to university financing. Tax reform brought the government into deep, ongoing contention with business, and business was well organized to dispute the reform (Fairfield 2015). The ability of the government to enact reform over such strong opposition signaled, for future reforms, the strength of the coalition and its determination to reform education.²⁵

The politics of the Inclusion Law (no student selection, no co-payments, and no profits in voucher schools) unfolded over the course of the first year of government in 2014 until its final Congressional approval in early 2015. The Inclusion Law brought the government into conflict with a different set of stakeholders (as shown in the press appearances in Section IV), mostly the private-voucher schools and their associations, but also the Catholic Church and parent associations. Although these reforms did not directly affect unionized teachers (almost all in municipal schools), the Colegio strongly supported the reforms. From the perspective of the reform politics that followed in 2015, the Law of Inclusion showed again the determination and cohesion of the Nueva Mayoría as well as an unusual case of the Colegio allying with government reformers.²⁶

Unlike controversies over profits in state-subsidized schools, reforming teacher careers was not a big rallying point for street demonstrations before the Bachelet government. However, educational quality was, and improving quality usually entails improving teaching, and that led to promises noted earlier in Bachelet's electoral campaign. New legislation on teacher careers had been an issue in the first Bachelet government (2006–10), and Bachelet appointed a commission to study the issue and make recommendations. The Colegio had supported the general idea of significant reforms to teacher careers, in part because it argued that government initiatives in evaluations and performance pay should be tied to clearer career progression.

Eyzaguirre, ministry staff, and outside experts (including [co author]) took up where these proposals left off. Since the ministry led with the Inclusion Law, this gave the team working on teacher careers more time out of the limelight to design and debate the proposal over the course of 2014. In the early months, the ministry team met with other outside experts from think tanks and universities to brainstorm about the reform design. This consultation offered the policy network an initial opportunity to shape early discussions on policy design. Ministry staff was also in regular contact with the Colegio through 2014, meeting every two weeks or so. At the time though, the Colegio was mostly interested in negotiating shorter-term issues on working time, salaries, and pensions.²⁷

At the same time that ministry staff was working on a bill, 20 civil society organizations came together to prepare their own set of proposals in the Teacher Plan (*Plan Maestro*). This was a remarkable case of collective work among diverse organizations including the Colegio, teacher preparation institutions, academic research centers, foundations, and associations of university and secondary students (see Appendix D in online Supplemental data for a full list).²⁸ This collective action was remarkable not

just for the number of associations involved, but also the range of political sympathies (from the Colegio president's affiliation to the Communist Party on the far left to the center-right leanings of CEP), as well as the range of interests from the owners of private schools, to students, to the Colegio. They coordinated a Consultative Council (with representatives from each of the 20 organizations) in charge of guiding the discussion and articulating agreements, a Base Forum that built the proposal (guided by input from the Consultative Council), and citizen meetings in the north, center and south of Chile that provided input and broader debate. Given the wide range of civil society organizations involved, it is again surprising in comparative and theoretical terms that no representatives of business (outside of education) were included.

During four months in mid-2014, the Plan Maestro group organized a national conversation on reforming teacher careers. By the end of these deliberations, the movement was able to produce a book with twelve agreed principles and more than hundred proposals (PlanMaestro 2015). In November 2014 representatives from Plan Maestro delivered the proposals to the Minister of Education. Later, during the discussion of the bill in Congress they had the opportunity to voice their concerns about it, suggesting some adjustments. Congress in turn picked up on some ideas from Plan Maestro not fully incorporated into the ministry's first bill. For example, groups in Plan Maestro strongly supported increasing non-teaching hours. The ministry bill did not include substantial increases due largely to cost concerns, but Congress later increased them in the final law.²⁹

That the proposals of the Plan Maestro were similar to the Ministry bill means less that civil society imposed its vision on ministry planners but more that both groups were working from the same template shaped by the previous years' debates in the broader policy network. The Plan Maestro brought together in sustained dialogue the main interest groups and key players in the policy network (foundations and think tanks). Their deliberations made clear to policy makers areas of consensus and divergence (most spelled out explicitly in the final document). The Plan Maestro gave career reform greater visibility and demonstrated the commitment of nearly all the main players in civil society to the cause of reforming teacher careers. Lastly, the Plan Maestro pushed ideas like additional increases in non-teaching hours onto the final agenda.

In April 2015, soon after the Inclusion Law passed, the Ministry sent the PND bill to Congress. Among parties, the main ensuing debate on the PND, from the point of view of the right-wing parties (UDI and RN), was that the law implied a centralization of human resource management, giving less room to the school leaders to assess, reward, and promote their teachers. This centralization was also a concern for some Christian Democrats (DC), mainly in the Senate. From the point of view of the political parties belonging to the Nueva Mayoría (PS, PPD, PRSD, MAS, PC, DC), the main concern was that the PND implied too many teacher assessments throughout their careers, that these assessments did not consider collaborative activities among teachers, and that the law did not have enough incentives to work with socioeconomically vulnerable students. Both right and left parties also had concerns about teachers' working conditions, mainly the number of teaching hours.

As in other countries with major career reforms, a big political question how the teacher union was going to react to the government's bill. There were grounds to expect

the Colegio to support it. The Colegio was an active participant in Plan Maestro and had maintained close contact with the Ministry of Education. And, the bill included large salary increases and other significant benefits for teachers. The initial reaction of the Colegio was muted. Colegio president Gajardo wrote a column/blog post in which he gave general support for the bill, though the column was equivocal, calling the bill ‘an important advance, but with serious deficiencies.’³⁰ However, by May dissident factions within the Colegio were first pushing stronger opposition and then actually going out on strike themselves. In order not to lose control, Gajardo then called a national strike on June 1st which shut down most municipal schools. Gajardo and his more moderate faction wanted to negotiate some issues in order to get the bill passed, but the more radical, dissident wing in the Colegio demanded that the whole bill be withdrawn and scrapped.³¹

As the strike dragged on into June, members of the Nueva Mayoría in the Education Committee in the Chamber, especially its president Camila Vallejo, called for three-way negotiations among the Colegio, the Ministry, and Education Committee. This was an unprecedented move in the long history of negotiated reforms, made possible in part by the fact that both Vallejo and Gajardo belonged to the Communist Party which was part of the governing coalition, Nueva Mayoría. A side benefit for the ministry was that it could negotiate with the Chamber and the Colegio simultaneously rather than sequentially, as it had traditionally.³²

The three-way agreement signed in June 2015 included over a dozen changes to the bill. These modifications loosened some of the requirements for advancing through the career stages, but did not undermine the core provisions of differentiated pay scales with movement among them dependent on disciplinary and pedagogical evaluations. Some of the main changes included: eliminating the probation period in the original bill; increasing to 8 years the time to pass the first evaluation to be promoted to the second career step; reducing the number of tests teachers have to take (e.g., teachers who do well on disciplinary tests do not have to take them again); adding teachers’ collective work in the evaluation portfolio (Module 3 discussed in [Section III](#)); and making the career system voluntary for teachers within 10 years of retirement (see Appendix E in online Supplemental Data for a fuller list of changes). These lengthy and ultimately successful negotiations merit highlighting because they are so rare in other cases in Latin America of reforms to teacher careers where governments more often act unilaterally. Several factors (considered in the next section), including a track record of previous bargaining, favored a negotiated outcome in Chile.

These negotiated changes did limit the government’s ability to move underperforming teachers out of the profession in their first years, but it did not change the principle that teachers who could not pass evaluations would be removed from the classroom. In fact, even before the implementation of PND, previous evaluations had led to the dismissal of around 200 teachers (interview Rodolfo Bonifaz, 17 January 2017). These numbers are of course tiny, but they likely already affect the expectations of many teachers, especially new teachers.³³ By 2015, two thirds of teachers in one survey thought that teachers should be removed from the classroom after up to three negative evaluations (CPP 2015).

In spite of all these changes, the Education Committee voted to send the bill to the full Chamber with a negative recommendation, mainly because some Deputies wanted to

increase the proportion of non-teaching hours to more than 35 percent. To solve the impasse the Ministry of Education agreed to increase non-teaching hours in vulnerable schools (with children from low-income families) from 35 to 40 percent (starting in the first 4 school years). After this last negotiation, the Chamber passed the bill in October 2015 with 65 votes in favor, 11 against and 30 abstentions, and sent the bill to the Senate.

The Senate was mostly concerned over how the reform would affect private-voucher schools and introduced some changes to allow voucher schools more flexibility. Some of these changes included allowing schools with good performance to create their own induction procedures for new teachers and removing requirement for seniority pay to give schools greater leeway in collective bargaining. The Senate also tightened some of the restrictions that the three way (Ministry, Colegio, and Chamber) negotiations in June had loosened. For example, the Senate bill reduced from 8 to 6 years the maximum time teachers have to move from the first career step to the second (see Appendix E in online Supplemental Data for fuller list of changes). Lastly, the Senate added some changes designed to encourage greater equity, such as increasing the bonus for teachers working in schools with the poorest students. As with the changes introduced in the Chamber, none of the Senate's changes undermined the core of the reform: clearly specified career progression dependent on regular performance evaluations.

With Colegio endorsement, the bill was approved in January 2016 and enacted into law in April 2016.

VI. Conclusions and comparisons

The full, long-term impact of the PND on learning outcomes will take decades to emerge as new teachers enter the career and receive all the preparation, mentoring, and performance incentives and replace teachers who entered before the PND. However, on the first phase of teacher recruitment, recent developments show positive signs. After the 2016 national college entrance exams, more students with higher scores chose the teaching field (*pedagogía*), and applications for government fellowships for teaching doubled.³⁴ And, in mid- 2017, the new salary scales came into effect, boosting salaries by 30 percent. For those entering university in 2018, more students overall and more students with higher exam scores applied to pedagogy programs (*El Mercurio*, 28 March 2018, p. C6).

A central policy lesson from this case is that negotiation with unions is possible, even on the normally most conflictual issues of pay for performance, evaluations, and dismissals. Elsewhere in Latin America and other developing countries, successful negotiations are very rare in reforms to teacher careers, especially those that dramatically change teacher education, recruitment, and promotion. Several special features of the Chilean context favored negotiations. First, the newly elected Bachelet government took office with an imposing electoral mandate for education reform. Second, the Colegio was on record in previous discussions of teacher careers endorsing the principle of promotion tied to evaluations (and evaluations for municipal school teachers were already being implemented). Lastly, the fact that the Communist Party was part of the Nueva Mayoría made it more difficult for Gajardo, the head of the Colegio, to refuse to negotiate.

For broader theories, the politics of PND provide support for modified versions of some of the main arguments reviewed in the introduction. First, in the power resource tradition, from the voting in Bachelet's landslide victory in 2013 and subsequent opinion polls, her support came heavily from poorer voters, and the PND, the Inclusion Law, and university reform all favored poorer and middle income families. Second, policy networks were crucial, as the teams that designed the reforms and debated them subsequently, emphasized the need for a new structure for teacher careers. Through successive commissions, panels, and proposals, the policy network across foundations, think tanks, and universities forged a consensus on implementing a career with higher entry standards, improved training, stronger material and professional rewards, and regular evaluations to progress up the career ladder.

The absence of Chilean business in both media visibility in [Section IV](#) and the policy process in [Section V](#) contradicts a number of theories that expect greater business participation in education reform (Kosack 2012; Bruns and Luque 2014; Rhodes 2012). In comparative terms, business was absent both as organized interest groups as well as individually engaged firms along the lines of the Gates and Zuckerberg foundations in the United States or the Lemann Foundation in Brazil. The partial exception in Chile was CEP which is financed largely by business. CEP was an important and visible part of the policy network, with active participation in the Plan Maestro. A full explanation for the absence of Chilean business is beyond the scope of this paper, but a strong starting hypothesis would be their relative lack of demand for more skilled workers due to their concentration in natural resources and other lower-technology sectors (Schneider 2013).

Other theories emphasize the role of political or policy entrepreneurs (Bruns and Schneider 2016). In the most extensive analysis of education reform in Latin America in the 1990s, Merilee Grindle emphasizes the pivotal roles of 'reform mongers, policy entrepreneurs, heroes, or champions...' (Grindle 2004, 58). In the United States, Rhodes (2012) argues that policy entrepreneurs were pivotal in the success of *No Child Left Behind*.³⁵ Viewed from the Chilean experience, these arguments have less purchase, because of the mass reformist groundswell that forced education to the center of political competition among parties and candidates. Policy entrepreneurs can wield important influence where governments lack support and commitment to reform. However, in Chile the Bachelet government came to power with a strong mandate and professed commitment to education reform, so policy entrepreneurs had little impact.

In terms of theories emphasizing veto points, the absence of more radical opposition from the Colegio comes from several sources beyond institutional veto points in the political system. True, with the victories of Nueva Mayoría in both the presidency and both houses of the legislature, the number of potential veto points was reduced. However, several other facets kept the Colegio from using maximum disruptive power to stop the reforms. For one, the Colegio was internally split with an important faction (and the Colegio president) willing to negotiate. And, the government was not implacable in using its majorities to force legislation through and opened up multiple opportunities for negotiation and compromise on some key union demands.

Looking more closely at structures and political behavior of teacher unions also helps explain differences among reform experiences in Chile versus those in Peru, Ecuador,

and Mexico, and help specify the broader potential lessons. In the latter three countries, reformers pushed changes to teaching careers through legislatures without consulting unions and often in spite of massive strikes and disruptions. Part of the key to understanding these conflictive processes derives from differences in how unions were incorporated into politics through corporatist and clientelist means (Schneider 2018). Without going into detail, unions in Ecuador (before 2009) and in Mexico had representatives on policy councils and informally had supporters appointed to top positions in education bureaucracies (Chambers-Ju and Finger 2017; Schneider, Cevallos, and Bruns 2019). Teacher reforms therefore also led to zero-sum losses in political influence for leaders of teacher unions, making it much less likely that negotiations could be possible or fruitful. The key point is that researchers (and would be reformers) need to analyze closely the internal structure of unions and their connections to clientelist politicians and corporatist mediation to understand how amenable union leaders will be to negotiation and compromise.

Notes

1. The final law was called *Sistema de Desarrollo Profesional Docente* (System for Professional Teacher Development). We use the initial, simpler name PND throughout the paper.
2. The 2006 protests were led by high school students (whose uniforms gave them the penguin moniker). One of their core demands was improving quality, especially in public municipal schools (Donoso 2013).
3. Chile ranks highest on PISA tests among participating countries in Latin America, but ranks near the bottom among OECD countries.
4. The reforms to higher education were also designed to make university free for the poorest 60 percent of students.
5. In another education example, Finger (2017) finds that state-level reform efforts in the United States were more likely to succeed if they had strong connections to, and support from, out-of-state reform advocates. The general literature on policy networks is diffuse. For classic treatments and reviews, see Borzel (1998) and Rhodes (1997). For a recent application to education reform in India, see Ball (2016).
6. The estimate of 40–50 people in the core policy network comes from one of the co-authors who is a member of the network.
7. The Colegio is the only teacher union in Chile. For more background and history, see Murillo (2002) and Assaél and Inzunza (2007).
8. The absence of veto points in Britain and Scandinavia allowed reformers to enact sweeping performance-based reforms, whereas teacher unions in other countries such as Germany, France, and the United States availed themselves of various veto points to block reform. See also, Finger (2018) on the United States.
9. As such the Chilean case fits better Schneider's (2013) theory on hierarchical capitalism and low-skill equilibria in middle-income countries. In their reviews of earlier education reforms in other countries of Latin America, Grindle (2004, 198) and Kaufman and Nelson (2004, 267) also found little evidence of business support.
10. [coauthor] is an additional key informant through consulting work with Mineduc (2014–15).
11. To simplify terminology on Chile's education system we refer to the three different kinds of schools as private (no government support), private-voucher (private with government financing), and municipal (public with government financing). Both private-voucher and municipal schools receive per capita payments for students enrolled from the central government. Private-voucher schools are also known as 'private subsidized' (*privado subvencionado*). In 2015, 56 percent of children were enrolled in private-voucher schools,

- 36 percent in municipal schools, and 8 percent in private schools. However, there were proportionally more teachers in municipal schools (44 percent) and private schools (9 percent) compared to private-voucher schools (47 percent of teachers) (Mineduc 2016).
12. Portfolio evaluations have been used in Chile for many years for teachers in municipal schools. The PND extended evaluations to teachers in private-voucher schools. Using student scores in evaluations has been contentious in other countries. The PND did not propose using student scores in part because the existing system for testing students cannot be used to measure value added by teachers.
 13. This figure presents salaries for teachers in municipal schools who work 37 hours a week. Pay scales vary somewhat according to contract type (hours per week), school (private-voucher or municipal), and proportion of poor students.
 14. On the politics of the Inclusion Law, see Bellei (2016), Mizala (2014), and Kubal and Fisher (2016).
 15. Rarely do organizations of university students get so engaged with debates on pre-university education. Elsewhere, parents are usually only weakly and not very visibly organized (Grindle 2004). In part, the overall politicization of education in Chile may have provoked a stronger parent engagement. Parent associations cared much more about the Inclusion Law than the PND.
 16. Some parents associations appeared 10 times more often in relation to the Inclusion Law than to PND. In fact, one of them emerged mainly to fight the Inclusion Law.
 17. Some mentions of protestant churches are included in Figure 3, but the great majority of mentions are to the Catholic Church.
 18. Elige Educar and Educación 2020 were less than a decade old in 2015 (founded in 2009 and 2008, respectively). In the beginning Educación 2020 had close ties to professors at the University of Chile and students at the University of Chile and the Catholic University.
 19. Nor did business participate in other less visible ways. None of the interviewees mentioned significant engagement by business.
 20. In some countries, international organizations like the OECD or multilateral development agencies like the IDB (InterAmerican Development Bank) and the World Bank have played important roles in reform processes. Certainly, policy networks in Chile are well connected to all three, but the international agencies themselves were not visible participants. Press appearances by all international organizations are a small fraction of those by domestic associations, and a tiny fraction of appearances by politicians.
 21. The Nueva Mayoría's electoral platform was a long, 198 page document that headlined three core areas of fundamental reform, starting with education, followed by tax and constitutional reform ('Programa de gobierno,' October 2013, www.onar.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ProgramaMB.pdf, accessed 15 January 2017). The eight page section on education included proposals on: (i) new regulations for pre-school education, (ii) prohibition of student selection by schools, elimination of parental co-payments, and prohibition of profit-making in education, (iii) a national teaching career to improve teaching quality; and (iv) de-municipalisation of public education as well as reforms to higher education.
 22. Proposals on teacher careers spanned the decade since 2006: Presidential Advisory Commission (2006); a joint committee (*mesa de trabajo*) between Mineduc and the Colegio (2008); panel of experts (2010); special proposal from Elige Educar and Centro de Políticas Públicas PUC (2012); Beyer's bill on teacher careers (2012); and some proposals on teaching careers from the OECD (2014) (Bonifaz and Mizala 2014, anexo).
 23. In contrast to the United States and Europe, policy networks in Chile did not include permanent, expert staff in Congress and in political parties. This overview of the policy network draws on the experience of [coauthor] in this network since the 2000s.
 24. Membership numbers are disputed. The Colegio website puts total membership in 2017 over 100,000 (<http://www.colegiodeprofesores.cl/institucion/>, accessed 12 August 2017), but outside estimates put the total much lower. *El Mercurio* reported 52,000 (26 November 2016, p. 3). Wikipedia put paid up members at 65,000 <https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/>

Colegio_de_Profesores_de_Chile, which comports with figures given informally by staff at Colegio and Mineduc. Some portion (perhaps in the 10–20,000 range) of most of these estimates includes retired teachers.

25. The speed of reform also generated opposition as many thought the reforms were too hasty and not well thought out. By 2017, reforming Bachelet's tax reform was already a key issue for candidates campaigning to succeed her.
26. Cohesion was evident in the final voting. However, over the course of 2014, even parties in the Nueva Mayoría, especially the DC opposed many items in the government's proposal on the Inclusion Law.
27. Interview Rodolfo Bonifaz, 17 January 2017.
28. Several associations did not participate including parent associations and further right think tanks like LyD. Business associations were again conspicuously absent.
29. The Plan Maestro successfully pushed two other changes in the initial Mineduc bill: to eliminate an entrance exam to begin teaching (also strongly opposed by the Colegio) and to make voluntary the last two of the five career levels.
30. The url for this column no longer exists, but the text is copied into online Appendix F in online Supplemental Data.
31. The Colegio's behavior largely fits with Murillo's (2001) more general arguments about unions, parties, and market reform in the 1990s. The Colegio cooperated with allied parties in government. However, leadership competition within the Colegio surfaced at the end of the process in greater union militancy with the 2015 strike. And, in the first post-reform election in the Colegio, the dissident challengers won.
32. Throughout process of enacting PND, the main negotiator from the ministry side was minister Eyzaguirre.
33. 200 is less than one percent of the roughly 100,000 teachers in municipal schools. However, many other reforms in other countries with provisions for firing teachers often end up blocked or not implemented, so any dismissals is already a big step, and sets an important precedent.
34. Since 2011 the government has offered tuition fellowships to pedagogy applicants with high scores on university entrance exams. For the highest scoring applicants, the fellowship also includes a stipend and the opportunity to spend a semester overseas.
35. In Rhodes' argument, the impact of policy entrepreneurs comes from their ability to bring together coalition partners that would not naturally ally (as in African-American civil rights groups and big business). Kosack (2012) argues that where business does not push education, the poor can but only with the help of political entrepreneurs (in order to overcome the collective action problems confronting the poor).

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