Now showing items 1-17 of 17

    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley, 2016)
      A bargaining model is developed that characterizes the conditions under which a takeover will either be friendly, hostile, or unsuccessful when the target management can tilt the selling procedure toward a white knight. The ...
    • Kim, Hye Kyung (Universidad de Chile, 2009-12)
      Este artículo estudia la presencia de asimetrías de información en el mercado hipote- cario chileno. Nuestros resultados rechazan la hipótesis de la simetría de información y evidencian la presencia de riesgo moral.
    • Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Springer, 2012)
      Two important issues in distributive bargaining theory are, first, the conditions under which a negotiation breakdown occurs, and second, what and how source of parties’ bargaining powers influences the properties of a ...
    • Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Tobón Orozco, David (SAGE, 2020)
      A bargaining framework and a measure of conflict polarization are developed from two elements: (i) hatred-based negative externalities experienced by the parties to the conflict, and (ii) penalties the parties impose on ...
    • Flores Bazán, Fabián; Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2013)
      Many multicriteria problems in economics and finance require that efficient solutions be found. A recent contribution to production theory established a characterization of efficient points under closedness and ...
    • Portilla, Yolanda; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2010-06)
      En el contexto de la administración delegada de carteras de inversión, este artículo caracteriza las propiedades que el esquema de compensación debe poseer para incentivar la selección de portafolios con alto riesgo y alto ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008-10-30)
      This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the pres- ence of horizontal crossholdings. We nd that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller s ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Elsevier, 2020)
      A well-known prescription in corporate governance is that high-powered incentive contracts such as performance bonuses are an optimal mechanism for aligning managers with shareholders on an efficient investment policy. ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley-Blackwell, 2018)
      We propose a model that rationalizes the adoption of a misreporting system allowing managerial earning manipulation. A key element of our approach is the possibility of a tacit collusion between the board and the top ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008-01-03)
      This paper analyzes the e¤ects of industrial concentration on bidding behavior and hence, on the seller s expected proceeds. These e¤ects are studied under the CIPI model, an a¢ liated value set-up that nests a variety ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Elsevier, 2012)
      Target firms often face a takeover threat from raiders with prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). Previous literature has shown that, when takeovers are modeled as standard auctions, toeholds induce more aggressive ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Elsevier, 2020)
      We model the agency problem existing in an entrepreneurial firm between its founder and an outside investor and characterize the optimal corporate governance design. The analysis describes the relationship between two ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Springer, 2020)
      We characterize the optimal selling mechanism when bidders have ownership links among them (crossholdings). This mechanism discriminates against bidders who enjoy a value comparative advantage resulting from the extent to ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008)
      This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We nd that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a ...
    • Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Merigó Lindahl, José (Springer, 2015)
      Portfolio choice is the process of selecting the optimal proportion of various assets. One of the most well-known methods is the mean-variance approach developed by Harry Markowitz. This paper introduces the ordered ...
    • Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla Sotomayor, Yolanda (Elsevier Science publishes, 2014)
      We propose a model of delegated portfolio management specialized in alternative investments, i.e., those with a high-return and high-risk profile. It is shown that in this context, as a reward for risk-taking scheme is ...
    • Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Academic Economic Studies, 2015)
      This paper examines the equilibrium properties of an ultimatum game model with externalities. Unlike the equilibrium of the traditional version of this game and even recent extensions of it in a similar direction as ours, ...