Browsing by Author "b6c18902-c51a-43e4-8a8d-effa319c6723"

Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • A Bargaining Model of Friendly and Hostile Takeovers 
      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley, 2016)
      A bargaining model is developed that characterizes the conditions under which a takeover will either be friendly, hostile, or unsuccessful when the target management can tilt the selling procedure toward a white knight. The ...
    • Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword: Optimal incentives under misreporting 
      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Elsevier, 2020)
      A well-known prescription in corporate governance is that high-powered incentive contracts such as performance bonuses are an optimal mechanism for aligning managers with shareholders on an efficient investment policy. ...
    • Misreporting, optimal incentives, and auditing 
      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley-Blackwell, 2018)
      We propose a model that rationalizes the adoption of a misreporting system allowing managerial earning manipulation. A key element of our approach is the possibility of a tacit collusion between the board and the top ...
    • Optimal ownership structure and monitoring in entrepreneurial firms 
      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Elsevier, 2020)
      We model the agency problem existing in an entrepreneurial firm between its founder and an outside investor and characterize the optimal corporate governance design. The analysis describes the relationship between two ...