Highway franchising and real estate values

Author	dc.contributor.author	Engel Goetz, Eduardo	es_CL
Author	dc.contributor.author	Fischer Barkan, Ronald	es_CL
Author	dc.contributor.author	Galetovic Potsch, Alexander
Admission date	dc.date.accessioned	2007-05-18T16:57:34Z
Available date	dc.date.available	2007-05-18T16:57:34Z
Publication date	dc.date.issued	2005-05
Cita de ítem	dc.identifier.citation	JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS 57 (3): 432-448 MAY 2005	en
Identifier	dc.identifier.issn	0094-1190
Identifier	dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/124614
Abstract	dc.description.abstract	It has become increasingly common worldwide to auction the construction and operation of new highways to the bidder that charges the lowest toll. The resulting highway franchises often entail large increases in the value of adjoining land developments. We build a model to assess the welfare implications of allowing large developers to participate in these auctions. Developers bid more aggressively than independent construction companies because lower tolls increase the value of their land holdings. Therefore developer participation unambiguously increases welfare, yet this increase is not necessarily monotonic in the number of developers participating. Welfare also increases when large developers can bid jointly.	en
Lenguage	dc.language.iso	en	en
Publisher	dc.publisher	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE	en
Keywords	dc.subject	MONOPOLY	en
Título	dc.title	Highway franchising and real estate values	en
Document type	dc.type	Artículo de revista