| Author | dc.contributor.author | Corchón, Luis | |
| Author | dc.contributor.author | Triossi Verondini, Matteo | es_CL |
| Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2011-10-24T14:54:52Z | |
| Available date | dc.date.available | 2011-10-24T14:54:52Z | |
| Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2011-02 | |
| Cita de ítem | dc.identifier.citation | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Volume: 36 Issue: 2 Pages: 179-198 Published: FEB 2011 | es_CL |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.other | DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9 | |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/125494 | |
| General note | dc.description | Artículo de publicación ISI | es_CL |
| Abstract | dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations
are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented
by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences
that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions
that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the
Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining
and taxation. | es_CL |
| Patrocinador | dc.description.sponsorship | Both authors acknowledge financial support from CAICYT under project
SEJ2005-06167/ECON and from Fundación BBVA. The second author acknowledge financial support from
FONDECYT under project 11080132. | es_CL |
| Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | es_CL |
| Publisher | dc.publisher | SPRINGER | es_CL |
| Keywords | dc.subject | State Dependent Feasible Sets | es_CL |
| Título | dc.title | Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent | es_CL |
| Document type | dc.type | Artículo de revista | |
