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Authordc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis 
Authordc.contributor.authorTriossi Verondini, Matteo es_CL
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2011-10-24T14:54:52Z
Available datedc.date.available2011-10-24T14:54:52Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2011-02
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationSOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Volume: 36 Issue: 2 Pages: 179-198 Published: FEB 2011es_CL
Identifierdc.identifier.issn0176-1714
Identifierdc.identifier.otherDOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/125494
General notedc.descriptionArtículo de publicación ISIes_CL
Abstractdc.description.abstractIn this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.es_CL
Patrocinadordc.description.sponsorshipBoth authors acknowledge financial support from CAICYT under project SEJ2005-06167/ECON and from Fundación BBVA. The second author acknowledge financial support from FONDECYT under project 11080132.es_CL
Lenguagedc.language.isoenes_CL
Publisherdc.publisherSPRINGERes_CL
Keywordsdc.subjectState Dependent Feasible Setses_CL
Títulodc.titleImplementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependentes_CL
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista


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