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Authordc.contributor.authorCorrea Haeussler, José 
Authordc.contributor.authorLederman, Roger es_CL
Authordc.contributor.authorStier Moses, Nicolás E. es_CL
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2014-12-24T01:19:37Z
Available datedc.date.available2014-12-24T01:19:37Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2014
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationOperations Research Letters 42 (2014) 173–179en_US
Identifierdc.identifier.otherdx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.01.006
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/126793
General notedc.descriptionArtículo de publicación ISIen_US
Abstractdc.description.abstractWe study the competitive structure of a market in which firms compete to provide various products within a bundle. Firms adopt price functions proportional to their per-unit costs by selecting markups. We consider two measures reflecting, respectively, the intensity of direct competition and the impact of complementarity on each producer’s markup. We characterize the sensitivity of these terms to various changes in the market structure and relate this to changes in producer profits and the social efficiency of the market.en_US
Patrocinadordc.description.sponsorshipThis research was partially funded by the Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería at Universidad de Chile, by the Center for International Business Education and Research at Columbia University, by CONICET Argentina Grant PIP 112-201201-00450CO and by FONCYT Argentina Grant PICT 2012-1324.en_US
Lenguagedc.language.isoenen_US
Publisherdc.publisherElsevieren_US
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Keywordsdc.subjectNoncooperative gamesen_US
Títulodc.titleSensitivity analysis of markup equilibria in complementary marketsen_US
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista


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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile