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Authordc.contributor.authorRomero Medina, Antonio 
Authordc.contributor.authorTriossi, Matteo 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
Available datedc.date.available2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2020
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Economic Theory (2020) 349-354
Identifierdc.identifier.issn17427363
Identifierdc.identifier.issn17427355
Identifierdc.identifier.other10.1111/ijet.12214
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171208
Abstractdc.description.abstractWe prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems withmulti-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
Lenguagedc.language.isoen
Publisherdc.publisherWiley-Blackwell
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
Sourcedc.sourceInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Sourcedc.sourceInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Keywordsdc.subjectGroup strategy-proofness
Keywordsdc.subjectMulti-unit demand
Keywordsdc.subjectStability
Keywordsdc.subjectStrategy-proofness
Títulodc.titleStrategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: an equivalence
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista
dcterms.accessRightsdcterms.accessRightsAcceso Abierto
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorlaj
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación ISI
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación SCOPUS
uchile.cosechauchile.cosechaSI


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile