Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: an equivalence
Author
dc.contributor.author
Romero Medina, Antonio
Author
dc.contributor.author
Triossi, Matteo
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2020
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
International Journal of Economic Theory (2020) 349-354
Identifier
dc.identifier.issn
17427363
Identifier
dc.identifier.issn
17427355
Identifier
dc.identifier.other
10.1111/ijet.12214
Identifier
dc.identifier.uri
https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171208
Abstract
dc.description.abstract
We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on
stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems withmulti-unit demand. The
result extends to the model with contracts.