Show simple item record

Authordc.contributor.authorFonseca-Mairena, María Haydée 
Authordc.contributor.authorTriossi, Matteo 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2019-10-11T17:30:04Z
Available datedc.date.available2019-10-11T17:30:04Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2019
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationEconomics Letters, Volumen 185,
Identifierdc.identifier.issn01651765
Identifierdc.identifier.other10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108688
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171241
Abstractdc.description.abstract© 2019 Elsevier B.V.We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
Lenguagedc.language.isoen
Publisherdc.publisherElsevier B.V.
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
Sourcedc.sourceEconomics Letters
Keywordsdc.subjectExternalities
Keywordsdc.subjectImplementation
Keywordsdc.subjectIncentives
Keywordsdc.subjectMarriage market
Títulodc.titleIncentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista
dcterms.accessRightsdcterms.accessRightsAcceso Abierto
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorSCOPUS
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación SCOPUS
uchile.cosechauchile.cosechaSI


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile