Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
| Author | dc.contributor.author | Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée | |
| Author | dc.contributor.author | Triossi, Matteo | |
| Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-11T17:30:04Z | |
| Available date | dc.date.available | 2019-10-11T17:30:04Z | |
| Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| Cita de ítem | dc.identifier.citation | Economics Letters, Volumen 185, | |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.issn | 01651765 | |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.other | 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108688 | |
| Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171241 | |
| Abstract | dc.description.abstract | © 2019 Elsevier B.V.We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium. | |
| Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | |
| Publisher | dc.publisher | Elsevier B.V. | |
| Type of license | dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | |
| Link to License | dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
| Source | dc.source | Economics Letters | |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Externalities | |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Implementation | |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Incentives | |
| Keywords | dc.subject | Marriage market | |
| Título | dc.title | Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities | |
| Document type | dc.type | Artículo de revista | |
| dcterms.accessRights | dcterms.accessRights | Acceso Abierto | |
| Cataloguer | uchile.catalogador | SCOPUS | |
| Indexation | uchile.index | Artículo de publicación SCOPUS | |
| uchile.cosecha | uchile.cosecha | SI |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile