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Author | dc.contributor.author | Doraszelski, Ulrich | |
Author | dc.contributor.author | Escobar, Juan F. | |
Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-30T15:40:20Z | |
Available date | dc.date.available | 2019-10-30T15:40:20Z | |
Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
Cita de ítem | dc.identifier.citation | Theoretical Economics, Volumen 14, Issue 2, 2019, Pages 597-646 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.issn | 15557561 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.issn | 19336837 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.other | 10.3982/TE3230 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/172593 | |
Abstract | dc.description.abstract | Copyright © 2019 The Authors.We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, research and development races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature. | |
Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | |
Publisher | dc.publisher | Society for Economic Theory | |
Type of license | dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | |
Link to License | dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
Source | dc.source | Theoretical Economics | |
Keywords | dc.subject | commitment | |
Keywords | dc.subject | Dynamic stochastic games | |
Keywords | dc.subject | protocol invariance | |
Keywords | dc.subject | timing of decisions | |
Título | dc.title | Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games | |
Document type | dc.type | Artículo de revista | |
dcterms.accessRights | dcterms.accessRights | Acceso Abierto | |
Cataloguer | uchile.catalogador | SCOPUS | |
Indexation | uchile.index | Artículo de publicación SCOPUS | |
uchile.cosecha | uchile.cosecha | SI | |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile