Are non-contingent incentives more effective in motivating new behavior? Evidence from the field
Author
dc.contributor.author
Córdova, Angélica
Author
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Imas, Alex
Author
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Schwartz Perlroth, Daniel
Admission date
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2022-05-19T19:37:52Z
Available date
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2022-05-19T19:37:52Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2021
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
Games and Economic Behavior Volume 130 Page 602-615 Nov 2021
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Identifier
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10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.001
Identifier
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https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/185637
Abstract
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Organizations and policymakers increasingly rely on economic incentives to prompt
participation in activities amongst those who were previously not engaged. We ran a field
experiment with a recycling program to examine incentives' effectiveness to motivate new
behavior—i.e., attract non-recyclers. We compared standard contingent incentives (payment
contingent on recycling) to non-contingent incentives (upfront unconditional payment) of
different sizes. A high contingent incentive was as effective as a non-contingent incentive (of
any size) in attracting people to the program, but this masked differences in who participated.
Across incentive sizes, people who had never recycled were 5.8 times more likely to begin
recycling with the program when given a non-contingent incentive (20.2%) than when
offered a contingent one (3.5%). A second experiment conceptually replicated this effect in
an online job market, showing that non-contingent incentives were substantially more
effective in attracting previous non-compliers.
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Patrocinador
dc.description.sponsorship
ANID FONDECYT 1191745
Complex Engineering Systems Institute ANID APOYO/BASAL AFB180003
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Lenguage
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en
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Publisher
dc.publisher
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
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Type of license
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States