Chilean pension fund managers and corporate governance: The impact on corporate debt
Author
dc.contributor.author
Jara, Mauricio
Author
dc.contributor.author
López-Iturriaga, Félix
Author
dc.contributor.author
San Martín, Pablo
Author
dc.contributor.author
Saona, Paolo
Author
dc.contributor.author
Tenderini, Giannina
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2019-10-22T03:08:30Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2019-10-22T03:08:30Z
Publication date
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2019
Cita de ítem
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North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume48 Page321-337 apr 2019
Identifier
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10629408
Identifier
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10.1016/j.najef.2019.02.012
Identifier
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https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171843
Abstract
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In this paper we analyse the relationship between the investment of Pension Fund Managers (AFPs) and the cost of corporate debt (public and private). Using a sample of 93 non-financial Chilean listed firms between 2009 and 2014, we find that AFPs increase the probability of issuing bonds. Moreover, in line with our crowding out hypothesis, we show that AFPs increase the cost of bank borrowing. In line with the monitoring view, we find that AFPs decrease bond yields. On average, our results suggest that AFPs improve corporate governance by influencing information disclosure and by reducing the intensity of lending relationships with banks.