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Authordc.contributor.authorSalas, Sergio 
Authordc.contributor.authorNúñez Errázuriz, Javier 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2020-05-04T20:14:07Z
Available datedc.date.available2020-05-04T20:14:07Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2020
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationThe B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 2018; 20160114es_ES
Identifierdc.identifier.other10.1515/bejm-2016-0114
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/174283
Abstractdc.description.abstractWhat are the consequences of asymmetry of information about the future state of the economy between a benevolent Central Bank (CB) and private agents near the zero lower bound? How is the conduct of monetary policy modified under such a scenario? We propose a game theoretical signaling model, where the CB has better information than private agents about a future shock hitting the economy. The policy rate itself is the signal that conveys information to private agents in addition to its traditional role in the monetary transmission mechanism. We find that only multiple "pooling equilibria" arise in this environment, where a CB privately forecasting a contraction will most likely follow a less expansionary policy compared to a complete information context, in order to avoid making matters worse by revealing bad times ahead. On the other hand, a CB privately forecasting no contraction is most likely to distort its complete information policy rate, the consequences of which are welfare detrimental. However, this is necessary because deviating from the pooling policy rate would be perceived by private agents as an attempt to mislead them into believing that a contraction is not expected, which would be even more harmful for society.es_ES
Lenguagedc.language.isoenes_ES
Publisherdc.publisherDe Gruyteres_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Sourcedc.sourceThe B.E. Journal of Macroeconomicses_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectMonetary policyes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectSignalinges_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectZero lower boundes_ES
Títulodc.titleSignaling in monetary policy near the zero lower boundes_ES
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revistaes_ES
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorivves_ES
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación ISI
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación SCOPUS


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile