Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated.
We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a
project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed
as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to
the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design
problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private
learning gives rise to the trade-off between how much information to acquire and
how promptly it is reflected in the decision. We discuss implications on learning
delegation for distinct organizations.
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Patrocinador
dc.description.sponsorship
Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy (MIPP) ICM IS130002
CONICYT-FONDECYT postdoctoral award 3170783
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Lenguage
dc.language.iso
en
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Publisher
dc.publisher
Econometric Society
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Type of license
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States