Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment

Author	dc.contributor.author	Bagh, Adib
Author	dc.contributor.author	Jofré Cáceres, René	es_CL
Admission date	dc.date.accessioned	2008-12-09T17:03:57Z
Available date	dc.date.available	2008-12-09T17:03:57Z
Publication date	dc.date.issued	2006-11
Cita de ítem	dc.identifier.citation	ECONOMETRICA Volume: 74 Issue: 6 Pages: 1715-1721 Published: NOV 2006	en
Identifier	dc.identifier.issn	0012-9682
Identifier	dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/124752
Abstract	dc.description.abstract	A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.	en
Lenguage	dc.language.iso	en	en
Publisher	dc.publisher	BLACKWELL	en
Keywords	dc.subject	Better reply secure	en
Título	dc.title	Reciprocal upper semicontinuity and better reply secure games: A comment	en
Document type	dc.type	Artículo de revista