How to Sell to Buyers with Crossholdings
Author | dc.contributor.author | Loyola Fuentes, Gino | |
Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-13T13:33:27Z | |
Available date | dc.date.available | 2010-05-13T13:33:27Z | |
Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2008-10-30 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/127676 | |
Abstract | dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the pres- ence of horizontal crossholdings. We nd that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller s expected rev- enue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mech- anism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions. | en_US |
Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
Keywords | dc.subject | optimal auctions | en_US |
Título | dc.title | How to Sell to Buyers with Crossholdings | en_US |
Document type | dc.type | Artículo de revista |
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