Optimal Takeover Contests with Toeholds
Author | dc.contributor.author | Loyola Fuentes, Gino | |
Admission date | dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-13T13:37:05Z | |
Available date | dc.date.available | 2010-05-13T13:37:05Z | |
Publication date | dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
Identifier | dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/127677 | |
Abstract | dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We nd that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias against buyers with high toeholds. This discriminatory procedure is so that the target s average sale price is increasing in both the size of the common toehold and the asymmetry in these stakes. Furthermore, a simple negotiation-based mechanism replicates the main properties of the optimal procedure and outperforms, in terms of average selling price, the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles. | en_US |
Lenguage | dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
Keywords | dc.subject | optimal auctions | en_US |
Título | dc.title | Optimal Takeover Contests with Toeholds | en_US |
Document type | dc.type | Artículo de revista |
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