Intergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: a game-theoretic approach

Author	dc.contributor.author	Sanguinetti, Pablo
Admission date	dc.date.accessioned	2011-05-19T17:21:32Z
Available date	dc.date.available	2011-05-19T17:21:32Z
Publication date	dc.date.issued	1994-12
Cita de ítem	dc.identifier.citation	Estudios de Economía, Vol. 21, No. 2, Diciembre 1994 Págs. 179-212	es_CL
Identifier	dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/128107
Abstract	dc.description.abstract	It is well known that the fiscal performance of a country is actually determined by the interaction of may fiscal authorities within the public sector. The purpose of this paper is to present a simple model that adopts a game-theoretic point of view to investigate the consequences of different modes of interaction between federal and provincial jurisdictions for the determination of the overall public sector expenditures and taxes. We motivate the theoretical exercises presenting evidence regarding the fiscal performance of Argentina in 1970-1987 where an ill-designed system of intergovernmental grants has been associated with increasing provincial government deficits and of public sector expenditures.	es_CL
Lenguage	dc.language.iso	en	es_CL
Publisher	dc.publisher	Universidad de Chile. Facultad de Economía y Negocios	es_CL
Keywords	dc.subject	Public sector expenditures	es_CL
Título	dc.title	Intergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: a game-theoretic approach	es_CL
Document type	dc.type	Artículo de revista