Show simple item record

Authordc.contributor.authorRuiz Porras, Antonio 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T18:39:01Z
Available datedc.date.available2011-07-18T18:39:01Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2010-06
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationEstudios de Economía, Vol. 37, No. 1, Junio 2010, pp. 67-104es_CL
Identifierdc.identifier.issn0304-2758
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/128169
General notedc.descriptionArtículo de publicación ISI
Abstractdc.description.abstractIn this article we develop a microeconomic framework to study the relationships among privatization, competition for deposits and performance in banking. Particularly, we analyze banking privatization when competitive strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types are allowed. Our findings show that some conditions are necessary to justify it under the following criteria: (i) efficiency, (ii) market power/financial stability and (iii) consumption availability for depositors. They also show that privatizations are relatively easy to justify when leader-follower relationships are allowed in the banking system. Even government revenues, due to privatization, are higher when these relationships exist.es_CL
Lenguagedc.language.isoeses_CL
Publisherdc.publisherUniversidad de Chile. Facultad de Economía y Negocioses_CL
Keywordsdc.subjectBancaes_CL
Títulodc.titlePrivatización, competencia por depósitos y desempeño bancarioses_CL
Title in another languagedc.title.alternativePrivatization, competition for deposits and performance in bankinges_CL
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record