La crítica de Rawls al utilitarismo a la luz de las nociones de autorrespeto y reconocimiento recíproco
Admission date
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2016-12-19T15:34:17Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2016-12-19T15:34:17Z
Publication date
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2016
Cita de ítem
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Hybris-Revista de Filosofía. Volumen: 7 Número: 1 Páginas: 129-150 (2016)
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Identifier
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10.5281/zenodo.51656
Identifier
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https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/141955
Abstract
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This article addresses Rawls's critique of utilitarianism in the framework of the discussion on the moral foundation of the principles of justice. It is shown the principle of utility lacks the necessary moral constraints that ensure both effective recognition among people and a fair distribution of the social bases of self-respect. Rawls's arguments against classical utilitarianism fall into two groups: first those who are independent of the contractual dimension of his theory, then those that are the result of the original position and the veil of ignorance. It is concluded that, given the relevance of the mutual recognition and self-respect for the establishment of a just society, the principle of utility cannot be a moral alternative for the organisation of the main social institutions.
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Lenguage
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en
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Publisher
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Centro Altos Estudios Filosoficos & Ciencias Sociales-Cenaltes