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Authordc.contributor.authorRojas, Marco 
Authordc.contributor.authorVergara, Damián 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2017-04-04T19:50:42Z
Available datedc.date.available2017-04-04T19:50:42Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2016
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationSeries Documentos de Trabajo No. 415, pp. 1 - 20, Septiembre, 2016es_ES
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/143466
Abstractdc.description.abstractWhy agents cooperate is an old question that has been widely studied in economics, as well as in other disciplines. In economics, the focus has been mainly put in analyzing whether cooperative behaviors may arise from repeated interactions between strategic individuals. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by studying the effects of ambiguity, shortly defined as uncertainty about the realization of future states and the probabilities assigned to their realization, on long-run cooperation. Concretely speaking, the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the consequent determination of conditions for sustaining long-run cooperative behaviors, is revisited in an ambiguity setting. Results suggest that ambiguity is detrimental to cooperation as it decreases (increases) the expected payoff of the cooperative (non-cooperative) equilibrium and, therefore, (1) it may change the game’s structure from the Prisoner’s Dilemma setting to scenarios in which the expected payoff associated with the cooperative equilibrium is no longer Pareto-superior, and (2) it demands more patient players for sustaining cooperative agreements when the game’s structure remains unchanged. An application is made to the Cournot duopoly and the likelihood of sustaining a tacit collusion. In addition to previous results, it is found that the Cournot duopoly may not longer behave as a particular case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma for high levels of ambiguity. A positive relation between ambiguity and competition is stated. Therefore, our results may serve as an additional theoretical input for antitrust policy design.es_ES
Lenguagedc.language.isoenes_ES
Publisherdc.publisherUniversidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocioses_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Sourcedc.sourceSeries Documentos de Trabajoes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectAmbiguityes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectNeo-Additive Capacitieses_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectLong-Run Cooperationes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectInfinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmaes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectCournot Duopolyes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectTacit Collusiones_ES
Títulodc.titleAmbiguity is Detrimental for Long-Run Cooperationes_ES
Document typedc.typeDocumento de trabajoes_ES
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorrcaes_ES


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile