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Authordc.contributor.authorRiascos Villegas, Alvaro 
Authordc.contributor.authorTorres Martínez, Juan Pablo 
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationSeries Documentos de Trabajo No. 311, Julio, 2010es_ES
Abstractdc.description.abstractConsider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. Only atomic players are required to have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions. In this context, we prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, a result that extends Rath (1992, Theorem 2) to generalized games and gives a direct proof of a special case of Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1). Our proof has the merit of being simple, based only on standard fixed point arguments and finite dimensional real analysis.es_ES
Publisherdc.publisherUniversidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocioses_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.uri*
Sourcedc.sourceSeries Documentos de Trabajoes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectGeneralized gameses_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectPure-strategy Nash equilibriumes_ES
Títulodc.titleA direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games with atomic playerses_ES
Document typedc.typeDocumento de trabajo

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile