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Authordc.contributor.authorGonzález Tissinetti, Aldo 
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationSeries Documentos de Trabajo, Mayo, 2007es_ES
Abstractdc.description.abstractThis article investigates how antitrust agencies should structure the disclosing of information about e¢ ciency gains from interested parties (merging Örms, and competitors) in merger control. We analyze the particular case of a horizontal merger with danger of foreclosure, where welfare can decrease either due to insu¢ cient e¢ ciency gains (e¢ ciency defense) or due to excessive e¢ ciency gains if the competitor exits (e¢ ciency o§ense). The Örst result is that evidence from competitors is not required unless the ex-ante market shares of the merging Örms exceed a threshold. Second, we support the role of advocacy of the parties. The burden of proof for the e¢ ciency defense should rest on the insiders (merging Örms) whereas the burden of proof for the e¢ ciency o§ense should rest on outsiders (competitors). Finally, it is optimal to make insiders report Örst and outsiders second and any communication among parties has to be prohibited.es_ES
Publisherdc.publisherUniversidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocioses_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.uri*
Sourcedc.sourceSeries Documentos de Trabajoes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectCompetition Policyes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectMerger Controles_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectEfficiency Gainses_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectAsymmetry of Informationes_ES
Títulodc.titleEliciting Information from Interested parties in merger controles_ES
Document typedc.typeDocumento de trabajoes_ES

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile