Eliciting Information from Interested parties in merger control
González Tissinetti, Aldo
Cita de ítem
Series Documentos de Trabajo, Mayo, 2007
This article investigates how antitrust agencies should structure
the disclosing of information about e¢ ciency gains from interested
parties (merging Örms, and competitors) in merger control.
We analyze the particular case of a horizontal merger with
danger of foreclosure, where welfare can decrease either due to
insu¢ cient e¢ ciency gains (e¢ ciency defense) or due to excessive
e¢ ciency gains if the competitor exits (e¢ ciency o§ense).
The Örst result is that evidence from competitors is not required
unless the ex-ante market shares of the merging Örms exceed a
threshold. Second, we support the role of advocacy of the parties.
The burden of proof for the e¢ ciency defense should rest
on the insiders (merging Örms) whereas the burden of proof for
the e¢ ciency o§ense should rest on outsiders (competitors). Finally,
it is optimal to make insiders report Örst and outsiders second
and any communication among parties has to be prohibited.
Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios