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Authordc.contributor.authorParedes Molina, Ricardo 
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationSerie Documentos de Trabajo No. 182 Marzo 2002es_ES
Abstractdc.description.abstractThis paper develops conceptual arguments to analyze RPM from the antitrust viewpoint. Through a general model, we conclude that minimum RPM in general would reduce consumer's price. Consequently, it could harm consumers only under very special circumstances, that can be checked by antitrust authorities in a very simple way. Thus, the paper suggests that the influence of the USA antitrust legislation and tradition in LDCs, and particularly in Chile, the country with the most advanced antitrust practice in less developed countries, has unnecessarily restricted franchising. Not surprisingly, though, the application of such dogmatic vision has created ways to by-pass the regulation, like vertical integration, that may be legal, but create cost for distribution channels.es_ES
Publisherdc.publisherUniversidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocioses_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.uri*
Sourcedc.sourceSerie Documentos de Trabajoes_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectResale price maintenancees_ES
Keywordsdc.subjectvertical controles_ES
Títulodc.titleVertical control in newly regulated economies: lessons from the theory and practice of RPMes_ES
Document typedc.typeDocumento de trabajo

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile