Vertical control in newly regulated economies: lessons from the theory and practice of RPM
Author
dc.contributor.author
Paredes Molina, Ricardo
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2017-07-25T15:02:02Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2017-07-25T15:02:02Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2002
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 182 Marzo 2002
es_ES
Identifier
dc.identifier.uri
https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/144781
Abstract
dc.description.abstract
This paper develops conceptual arguments to analyze RPM from the antitrust viewpoint.
Through a general model, we conclude that minimum RPM in general would reduce consumer's
price. Consequently, it could harm consumers only under very special circumstances, that can be
checked by antitrust authorities in a very simple way. Thus, the paper suggests that the influence
of the USA antitrust legislation and tradition in LDCs, and particularly in Chile, the country
with the most advanced antitrust practice in less developed countries, has unnecessarily
restricted franchising. Not surprisingly, though, the application of such dogmatic vision has
created ways to by-pass the regulation, like vertical integration, that may be legal, but create
cost for distribution channels.
es_ES
Lenguage
dc.language.iso
en
es_ES
Publisher
dc.publisher
Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios