Yardsticks on the road: regulatory contracts and cost efficiency in the Norweian Bus Industry
Author
dc.contributor.author
Morten, Dag
Author
dc.contributor.author
Gómez-Lobo Echeñique, Andrés
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2018-01-08T20:27:18Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2018-01-08T20:27:18Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2001
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
Series Documentos de Trabajo Agosto, 2001
es_ES
Identifier
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https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/146409
Abstract
dc.description.abstract
In this paper a cost frontier model is estimated for an eleven-year panel of Norwegian bus
companies (1136 company-year observations) using the methodology proposed by Battese
and Coelli (1995). The main objective of the paper is to investigate to what extent different
type of regulatory contracts affect company performance. The panel model proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1995) allow for year/company specific efficiency measures to be
estimated. Thus, unobservable network or other time invariant characteristic of the
operating environment can be controlled for by analyzing the dynamics of measured
productivity across time for firms regulated under different types of contracts, rather than
relying solely on variations across companies during one time period. Therefore, the paper
offers some methodological advantages over previous work on this subject. The main and
robust result of the paper is that the adoption of a more high-powered scheme based on a
yardstick type of regulation significantly reduces operating costs. The results contained in
this paper thus confirms theoretical predictions regarding the incentive properties of high
powered incentive schemes and in particular the dynamic benefits of yardstick competition.
es_ES
Lenguage
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en
es_ES
Publisher
dc.publisher
Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios