Intrahousehold Allocation and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Chile
Author
dc.contributor.author
Martínez Alvear, Claudia
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2018-04-24T12:40:23Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2018-04-24T12:40:23Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2013
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 557 - 605, Abril, 2013
es_ES
Identifier
dc.identifier.issn
0013-0079
Identifier
dc.identifier.uri
https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/147353
Abstract
dc.description.abstract
Until 1999 children born out of wedlock in Chile had di§erent child
support rights to those born to married couples. I interpret this law change
as an increase in bargaining power of woman in cohabiting relationships.
Using a panel of cross sectional data I Önd a decrease of 1 percentage
point in the probability of working for men, and an increase of 2 percentage
points in school attendance of children between 14 and 18 and boys
between 0 and 5 years old. These results provide evidence against the
unitary model as well as against the Nash bargaining model. The labor
market outcomes support a model where the reduction in menís relative
bargaining power is understood as a tax on wages: there is a proportion of
income that is not allocated according to the money earnerís preferences