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Authordc.contributor.authorEngel Goetz, Eduardo 
Authordc.contributor.authorFischer Barkan, Ronald 
Authordc.contributor.authorGaletovic Potsch, Alexander 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2018-08-07T20:31:08Z
Available datedc.date.available2018-08-07T20:31:08Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2004
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationJournal of Industrial Economics Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 427 - 455, Septiembre, 2004es_ES
Identifierdc.identifier.issn0022-1821
Identifierdc.identifier.otherhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00233.x
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/150724
Abstractdc.description.abstractA seaport is awarded in a Demsetz auction to the operator bidding the lowest cargo-handling fee. The competitive auction is irrelevant if the port operator integrates into shipping and sabotages competitors, thus providing a motive for a ban on vertical integration. The paper shows that such a ban increases welfare even when underhand agreements with shippers are possible. For this result to attain, the auction must be combined with a sufficiently high floor on the cargo-handling fee that operators can bid in the auction. With no floor, a Demsetz auction is worse than an unregulated bottleneck monopoly.es_ES
Lenguagedc.language.isoenes_ES
Publisherdc.publisherWileyes_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Sourcedc.sourceJournal of Industrial Economices_ES
Títulodc.titleHow to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly when Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possiblees_ES
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revistaes_ES
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorrcaes_ES
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación ISIes_ES


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile