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Authordc.contributor.authorCorrea Haeussler, Jośe 
Authordc.contributor.authorFoncea, Patricio 
Authordc.contributor.authorHoeksma, Ruben 
Authordc.contributor.authorOosterwijk, Tim 
Authordc.contributor.authorVredeveld, Tjark 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2019-05-29T13:38:54Z
Available datedc.date.available2019-05-29T13:38:54Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2017
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationEn: EC '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM New York, 2017. p. 169-186.
Identifierdc.identifier.other10.1145/3033274.3085137
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/168979
Abstractdc.description.abstractPosted price mechanisms constitute a widely used way of selling items to strategic consumers. Although subop-timal, the a ractiveness of these mechanisms comes from their simplicity and easy implementation. In this pa-per, we investigate the performance of posted price mechanisms when customers arrive in an unknown randomorder. We compare the expected revenue of these mechanisms to the expected revenue of the optimal auction intwo di erent se ings. Namely, the nonadaptive se ing in which all o ers are sent to the customers beforehand,and the adaptive se ing in which an o er is made when a consumer arrives. For the nonadaptive case, weobtain a strategy achieving an expected revenue within at least a 1−1/efraction of that of the optimal auction.We also show that this bound is tight, even if the customers have i.i.d. valuations for the item. For the adaptivecase, we exhibit a posted price mechanism that achieves a factor 0.745 of the optimal revenue, when the custo-mers have i.i.d. valuations for the item. Furthermore, we prove that our results extend to the prophet inequalityse ing and in particular our result for i.i.d. random valuations resolves a problem posed by Hill and Kertz.
Lenguagedc.language.isoen
Publisherdc.publisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
Sourcedc.sourceEC 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Keywordsdc.subjectMechanism design
Keywordsdc.subjectPosted prices
Keywordsdc.subjectProphet inequality
Títulodc.titlePosted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers
Document typedc.typeCapítulo de libro
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorlaj
Indexationuchile.indexArtículo de publicación SCOPUS
uchile.cosechauchile.cosechaSI


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile