Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game
Author
dc.contributor.author
Ilkilic, Rahmi
Author
dc.contributor.author
Ikizler, Huseyin
Admission date
dc.date.accessioned
2019-12-06T13:04:37Z
Available date
dc.date.available
2019-12-06T13:04:37Z
Publication date
dc.date.issued
2019
Cita de ítem
dc.identifier.citation
Review of Economic Design (2019) 23:13–25
es_ES
Identifier
dc.identifier.other
10.1007/s10058-019-00218-y
Identifier
dc.identifier.uri
https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/172792
Abstract
dc.description.abstract
This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game
theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players
simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only
if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash
equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial
perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy
trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks,
for games with link-responsive payoff functions.