Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game
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Abstract
This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game
theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players
simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only
if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash
equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial
perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy
trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks,
for games with link-responsive payoff functions.
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Review of Economic Design (2019) 23:13–25
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