Now showing items 1-15 of 15

    • A Bargaining Model of Friendly and Hostile Takeovers 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley, 2016)
      A bargaining model is developed that characterizes the conditions under which a takeover will either be friendly, hostile, or unsuccessful when the target management can tilt the selling procedure toward a white knight. The ...
    • Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Springer, 2017)
      A two-period ultimatum bargaining game is developed in which parties experience an envy-type externality coming from the surplus captured by their counterparts. Our assumptions on envy levels and outside opportunities allow ...
    • Asimetría de información en el mercado hipotecario chileno: una evaluación empírica 

      Kim, Hye Kyung (Universidad de Chile, 2009-12)
      Este artículo estudia la presencia de asimetrías de información en el mercado hipote- cario chileno. Nuestros resultados rechazan la hipótesis de la simetría de información y evidencian la presencia de riesgo moral.
    • Bargaining and negative externalities 

      Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Springer, 2012)
      Two important issues in distributive bargaining theory are, first, the conditions under which a negotiation breakdown occurs, and second, what and how source of parties’ bargaining powers influences the properties of a ...
    • Characterizing the efficient points without closedness or free-disposability 

      Flores Bazán, Fabián; Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2013)
      Many multicriteria problems in economics and finance require that efficient solutions be found. A recent contribution to production theory established a characterization of efficient points under closedness and ...
    • Esquemas de incentivos y carteras de inversión innovadoras 

      Portilla, Yolanda; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2010-06)
      En el contexto de la administración delegada de carteras de inversión, este artículo caracteriza las propiedades que el esquema de compensación debe poseer para incentivar la selección de portafolios con alto riesgo y alto ...
    • How to Sell to Buyers with Crossholdings 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008-10-30)
      This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the pres- ence of horizontal crossholdings. We nd that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller s ...
    • Mean-variance portfolio selection with the ordered weighted average 

      Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Merigó Lindahl, José (IEEE, 2017)
      Portfolio selection is the theory that studies the pro-cess of selecting the optimal proportion of different assets. The firstapproach was introduced by Harry Markowitz and was based ona mean-variance framework. This paper ...
    • Misreporting, optimal incentives, and auditing 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda (Wiley-Blackwell, 2018)
      We propose a model that rationalizes the adoption of a misreporting system allowing managerial earning manipulation. A key element of our approach is the possibility of a tacit collusion between the board and the top ...
    • On Bidding Markets: The Role of Competition (Job-Market Paper) 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008-01-03)
      This paper analyzes the e¤ects of industrial concentration on bidding behavior and hence, on the seller s expected proceeds. These e¤ects are studied under the CIPI model, an a¢ liated value set-up that nests a variety ...
    • Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Elsevier, 2012)
      Target firms often face a takeover threat from raiders with prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). Previous literature has shown that, when takeovers are modeled as standard auctions, toeholds induce more aggressive ...
    • Optimal Takeover Contests with Toeholds 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino (2008)
      This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We nd that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a ...
    • OWA Operators in Portfolio Selection 

      Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Merigó Lindahl, José (Springer, 2015)
      Portfolio choice is the process of selecting the optimal proportion of various assets. One of the most well-known methods is the mean-variance approach developed by Harry Markowitz. This paper introduces the ordered ...
    • Reward for failure and executive compensation in institutional investors 

      Loyola Fuentes, Gino; Portilla Sotomayor, Yolanda (Elsevier Science publishes, 2014)
      We propose a model of delegated portfolio management specialized in alternative investments, i.e., those with a high-return and high-risk profile. It is shown that in this context, as a reward for risk-taking scheme is ...
    • The ultimatum game with externalities 

      Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo; Loyola Fuentes, Gino (Academic Economic Studies, 2015)
      This paper examines the equilibrium properties of an ultimatum game model with externalities. Unlike the equilibrium of the traditional version of this game and even recent extensions of it in a similar direction as ours, ...