Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée (Universidad de Chile, 2019)
      In Essays on Assignment Problems without transfers we study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We show some impossibility results ...
    • Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée; Triossi, Matteo (Elsevier B.V., 2019)
      © 2019 Elsevier B.V.We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism ...
    • Lagos Araneda, Edgardo Esteban (Universidad de Chile, 2015)
      Esta Tesis estudia la participación cívica de las personas en Latinoamérica. Estas elecciones racionales de participación son estimadas a través de modelos Ordered Probit separados en resultados continentales y de cinco ...
    • Romero Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo (Wiley-Blackwell, 2020)
      We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems withmulti-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.