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Authordc.contributor.authorEngel Goetz, Eduardo 
Authordc.contributor.authorFischer Barkan, Ronald 
Authordc.contributor.authorGaletovic Potsch, Alexander 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2018-08-20T18:41:56Z
Available datedc.date.available2018-08-20T18:41:56Z
Publication datedc.date.issued1997
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Review, Papers and Proceeding. Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 68 - 72, Mayo, 1997es_ES
Identifierdc.identifier.issn0002-8282
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/151098
Abstractdc.description.abstractWe build a conceptual framework to analyze the virtues and limitations of alternative mechanisms that can be used to auction a highway. We argue that current mechanisms, which fix the term of the franchise, create unnecesary risk and facilitate post-contract opportunism by the regulator and the franchise-holder. We propose a new mechanism that allocates the franchise to the firm asking the least present value of toll revenue. We argue that this mechanisms is clearly superior to those currently in use.es_ES
Lenguagedc.language.isoenes_ES
Publisherdc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationes_ES
Type of licensedc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Sourcedc.sourceAmerican Economic Reviewes_ES
Títulodc.titleHighway franchising: pitfalls and opportunitieses_ES
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revista
Catalogueruchile.catalogadorrcaes_ES


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile