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Authordc.contributor.authorRuiz Vergara, José 
Authordc.contributor.authorBravo, Francisco 
Admission datedc.date.accessioned2016-08-22T18:47:47Z
Available datedc.date.available2016-08-22T18:47:47Z
Publication datedc.date.issued2015
Cita de ítemdc.identifier.citationEmerging Markets Finance & Trade, 51, No. 6 Pp: 1230–1243, 2015en_US
Identifierdc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/140169
General notedc.descriptionArtículo de publicación ISI & Scopus
Abstractdc.description.abstractIn 1981, Chile replaced the former pay-as-you-go system with a new system based on individual capitalization, private administration of assets, free choice of fund managers, and state oversight of the normal functioning of the companies. The state imposes a minimum guaranteed return for investments and requires that companies hold assets as reserves to cover that guarantee. This requirement generates a herding behavior among companies. We simulate scenarios for pension fund administrators that deviate from the norm in their investment strategies. We find that the reserve requirement is overfunded under the actual conditions.en_US
Lenguagedc.language.isoenen_US
Type of licensedc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile*
Link to Licensedc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
Keywordsdc.subjectChileen_US
Keywordsdc.subjectDefaulten_US
Keywordsdc.subjectHerding behavioren_US
Keywordsdc.subjectPension systemen_US
Títulodc.titleHerding Behavior and Default in Funded Pension Schemes: The Chilean Caseen_US
Document typedc.typeArtículo de revistaen_US


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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile