Strategic timing of corporate insiders when trading at earnings announcements
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2020Metadata
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Contreras Muñoz, Harold
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Strategic timing of corporate insiders when trading at earnings announcements
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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence that insiders exploit their stock’s mispricing after earnings
announcements rather than their foreknowledge of future cash flows to make profitable trades.
Insiders buy and sell more intensively shortly after the publication of earnings (from day 0 to
+5) in response to market reaction to earnings announcement, and the explanatory power is
higher relative to book-to-market and long-term past returns. Also, in line with insiders trading
on mispricing, insiders’ purchases and sales are profitable both after positive and negative
earnings surprises, which indicates that their trading strategies are superior to simple contrarian
or momentum strategies.
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Becas Chile (CONICYT)
University of Chile, School of Economics and Business
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Artículo de publicación ISI Artículo de publicación SCOPUS
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Finance Research Letters 34 (2020) 101242
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