Essential Equilibria of Large Games
Documento de trabajo
Open/
Essential-Equilibria.pdf (568.1Kb)Publication date
2012Abstract
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games
with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically
engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of
Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Identifier
URI: https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/143945
Quote Item
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 362, pp. 1 - 21, Diciembre, 2012
Collections
The following license files are associated with this item:
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile