A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games with atomic players
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Consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. Only atomic players are required to have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions. In this context, we prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, a result that extends Rath (1992, Theorem 2) to generalized games and gives a direct proof of a special case of Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1). Our proof has the merit of being simple, based only on standard fixed point arguments and finite dimensional real analysis.
Cita del ítemSeries Documentos de Trabajo No. 311, Julio, 2010
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